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Abstract
In nearly all authoritarian regimes, democratization finds significant societal support and a number of
organized opposition groups struggle for regime change. In some cases—such as in Iran in 1979— opposition
groups are able to cooperate with one another and bring down authoritarianism. In others—such as the Assad
regime in Syria—groups are not able to cooperate, and the ruler remains in place. Studies that apply
cooperation theory on regimes predict that shared grievances about the current government and common
interests in changing the existing regime foster cooperation among challengers. Yet, evidence suggests the
contrary. This study examines the conditions under which diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in
their ideological preferences, are able to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status
quo. It uses the case studies of the Ottoman transition to constitutional monarchy (1876–1908) and the
French transition to constitutional monarchy (1814–1830), paired according to the least similar systems
design, in combination with network theory. Using this methodology, this study analyzes the effect of
preferences on ideological issues (how the new regime should look like) and on strategic issues (how regime
change should be carried out) to explain temporal dynamics of cooperation for regime change among
challengers. This study conducts historiographical and archival work to identify the relevant actors and
relevant issue dimensions and track preferences on these issues over time. It applies these findings on
longitudinal network models (known as temporal exponential random graph models) to measure the extent
to which preference alignment on an issue dimension, strategic or ideological, bring challengers to cooperate.
Also, this study introduces two concepts. The first concept is “de-prioritization,” the process whereby
challengers postpone the resolution of certain ideological disagreements to form sustainable cooperation
against the regime. The second concept is “preference revision,” the process whereby challengers pragmatically
replace their strategic preferences with more effective ones in response to past failures and environmental
changes. Together these concepts emphasize that challengers become more likely to cooperate for regime
change if they converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any).
Convergence of preferences on strategic issues and the de-prioritization of ideological disagreements (if any)
prepares the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition that is capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence
potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions form an oppositional
coalition that is capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary
or extract considerable concessions. Findings suggest that without preference-revision and de-prioritization,
challengers remain divided and heterogeneous in their approach, at best achieving temporary gains that are
later reversed in the course of authoritarian retrenchment. This study further shows that the oppositional
coalition tends to form around a core actor who has been committed to effective strategies and attracts others
(peripheral actors) who agree with the core on the strategies but not necessarily on the ideologies. The
implication of these findings are twofold: By taking dynamics of cooperation among challengers into account,
we can distinguish between the cases where the regime is strong enough and takes on challengers and those
where the government is weak but surviving because opposition groups are unable to assume power. Also,
there is a link between the rise of an oppositional coalition and the likelihood of regime change happening.
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ABSTRACT 
 
MAKING AUTOCRATS ACCOUNTABLE: 
INTERESTS, PRIORITIES, AND COOPERATION FOR REGIME CHANGE 
Basak Taraktas 
Julia Lynch  
 Rudra Sil 
In nearly all authoritarian regimes, democratization finds significant societal support and a number 
of organized opposition groups struggle for regime change. In some cases—such as in Iran in 1979— 
opposition groups are able to cooperate with one another and bring down authoritarianism. In 
others—such as the Assad regime in Syria—groups are not able to cooperate, and the ruler remains 
in place. Studies that apply cooperation theory on regimes predict that shared grievances about the 
current government and common interests in changing the existing regime foster cooperation 
among challengers. Yet, evidence suggests the contrary. This study examines the conditions under 
which diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, are able 
to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo. It uses the case studies 
of the Ottoman transition to constitutional monarchy (1876–1908) and the French transition to 
constitutional monarchy (1814–1830), paired according to the least similar systems design, in 
combination with network theory. Using this methodology, this study analyzes the effect of 
preferences on ideological issues (how the new regime should look like) and on strategic issues 
(how regime change should be carried out) to explain temporal dynamics of cooperation for regime 
change among challengers. This study conducts historiographical and archival work to identify the 
relevant actors and relevant issue dimensions and track preferences on these issues over time. It 
applies these findings on longitudinal network models (known as temporal exponential random 
graph models) to measure the extent to which preference alignment on an issue dimension, 
strategic or ideological, bring challengers to cooperate. Also, this study introduces two concepts. 
The first concept is “de-prioritization,” the process whereby challengers postpone the resolution of 
certain ideological disagreements to form sustainable cooperation against the regime. The second 
concept is “preference revision,” the process whereby challengers pragmatically replace their 
strategic preferences with more effective ones in response to past failures and environmental 
changes. Together these concepts emphasize that challengers become more likely to cooperate for 
regime change if they converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological 
differences (if any). Convergence of preferences on strategic issues and the de-prioritization of 
ideological disagreements (if any) prepares the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition that is 
capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or 
extract considerable concessions form an oppositional coalition that is capable of signaling unity 
and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable 
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concessions. Findings suggest that without preference-revision and de-prioritization, challengers 
remain divided and heterogeneous in their approach, at best achieving temporary gains that are 
later reversed in the course of authoritarian retrenchment. This study further shows that the 
oppositional coalition tends to form around a core actor who has been committed to effective 
strategies and attracts others (peripheral actors) who agree with the core on the strategies but not 
necessarily on the ideologies. The implication of these findings are twofold: By taking dynamics of 
cooperation among challengers into account, we can distinguish between the cases where the 
regime is strong enough and takes on challengers and those where the government is weak but 
surviving because opposition groups are unable to assume power. Also, there is a link between the 
rise of an oppositional coalition and the likelihood of regime change happening. 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
Studies that apply cooperation theory on regimes predict that shared grievances about the 
current government and common interests in changing the existing regime foster 
cooperation among challengers. However, in various cases, organized contenders are 
disunited and struggle against the regime separately despite sharing interests against the 
government and his regime ––such as the Syrian opposition against the Assad regime. 
Yet, only in some cases––such as cooperation between Iranian leftists and Khomeini’s 
followers in the 1979 Revolution–– do we observe successful cooperation among 
contenders. What conditions enable diverse challengers, despite persistent 
divergence in their ideological preferences, to achieve a level of long-term 
cooperation that can transform the status quo? This study attempts to answer this 
question by using the case studies of the Ottoman transition to constitutional monarchy 
(1876–1908) and the French transition to constitutional monarchy (1814–1830) in 
combination with network analysis.  
Cooperation theory suggests that shared interests foster cooperation (Axelrod, 
1970, 2006). In applying this argument to the study of regimes, bargaining theories tend 
to argue that shared interests or grievances bring challengers to cooperate against the 
regime (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001; Crescenzi, 1999; Przeworski, 2005; Swaminathan, 
1999). However, empirical evidence suggests the contrary. Consider the case of Syrian civil 
war, where 100,000 civilians died due to the armed conflict between the Assad 
government and opposition groups (B.B.C. News, 2014). In Geneva, in January 2014, US 
Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov brought 
warring parties together to find a peaceful solution to the problem, to which all opposition 
groups were invited. Some boycotted the talks, such as the National Co-ordination 
Committee, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, and 
the Syrian National Council (B.B.C. News, 2014). If all opposition groups had participated, 
together they might have put greater pressure on the Assad government. Despite this 
incentive, some refused and the talks became inconclusive. Interestingly, these groups 
were united neither before nor after the Geneva Talks. Again, one could argue that they 
would have been better off fighting the regime together than separately. Yet, they have 
been challenging the Assad regime separately. Behind disunity, there are ideological or 
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strategic disagreements––for instance, the Syrian National Council and the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces disagree on whether violence 
constitutes a legitimate means of regime change. Strikingly, despite ongoing civil war, 
ideological and strategic disagreements between these groups seem to take precedence 
over the opposition groups’ common interests in overthrowing the regime. Contrast this 
case to the Solidarity Movement in Poland or the Cuban Revolution, in which various 
opposition groups collaborated against the authoritarian regime in pursuit of a shared 
ideological cause. In the case of the 1979 Iranian revolution, groups of intellectuals, 
merchants, and the clergy, who embraced different ideological preferences, cooperated to 
overthrow the regime. What distinguishes cases of successful unification among 
challengers in pursuit of regime transition from cases of non-cooperation? Why do shared 
interests in overthrowing the government only sometimes lead to cooperation? Also, why 
is it that in some cases challengers that belong to same ideological front (e.g., left or center-
right) and have interests against the regime seldom cooperate. When and why do 
challengers perceive ideological or strategic disagreements to be more important than 
their common interests in regime change? What is the role of ideological and strategic 
affinity in the formation of an opposition group?  
These questions are crucial to the study of struggles over regime type, because the 
incumbent government is better off when he can divide and rule challengers than 
challengers stay disunited (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Machiavelli, 1992; Tzu, 2010). In 
order to have a strong bargaining power against or deterrent capacity against the regime, 
challengers should signal unity and form a coalition capable of forcefully overthrowing the 
incumbent government. Otherwise, regime change through the intervention of some 
opposition group becomes less likely especially in regimes where governments cling to 
power ––such as the Assad government in Syria or Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The 
formation of a coherent united opposition coalition also facilitates transition dynamics by 
setting the direction of change once protests break out, such as in the Eastern European 
transitions to democracy (Kuran, 1991; McFaul, 2002). Alternatively, the collapse of the 
government may lead to disorder (as in the case of Iraq after the fall of the Saddam regime. 
Thus, all else equal, in contended regimes facing a united opposition coalition should be 
more likely to experience an effective process of the overthrow of the government 
inauguration of the institutions associated with the new regime.  
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Against this backdrop, I reiterate the research question: Under what conditions do 
diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, achieve 
a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo? In an attempt to 
examine this question, this study will elucidate the role of ideological and strategic 
preferences in hindering or promoting cooperation among challengers. I focus on the case 
of transitions from authoritarianism to constitutional government in the 19th century given 
that 20th century transitions have extensively served to theory building on regime change 
(Centeno, 2002; Tilly, 2007; Weingast, 1997).  
According to the scholarly literature on democratization, regimes may democratize 
through top-down reforms, pacts between ruling elites and opposition members, or after 
an oppositional movement overthrows authoritarianism and adopts democratic reforms. 
In cases where authoritarian governments cling to power, top-down liberalization is 
unlikely, while pacted transitions are improbable. Yet, in conceptualizing bargains 
between the government and its challengers, most actor-oriented studies tend to define 
challengers as a unitary actor. In such works, unity ensues from shared interests in 
overthrowing the government. Yet, in reality, organized opposition groups are multiple 
(such as in the case of the Syrian opposition to the Assad government), each defending a 
particular set of ideologies ––e.g., nationalism vs. socialism, secularism vs. theocracy–– 
and transition strategies ––e.g., coup vs. reform. The unitary actor assumption dismisses 
this plurality and heterogeneity across preference sets, whereby most actor-oriented 
studies happen to take the emergence of cooperation among challengers for granted.  
This study shows that the plurality of challengers and of issue dimensions (on 
which preferences are defined) poses a coordination game rather than a simple iterated 
unidimensional cooperation game. Using the cases of the Ottoman transition to 
constitutional monarchy (1876–1908) and the French transition to constitutional 
monarchy (1814–1830) in combination with network analysis, I argue that challengers are 
more likely to form a coherent oppositional coalition if they postpone ideological 
disagreements and converge on their strategies of transition (i.e., preferences about how 
regime change should be carried out). Preference convergence on strategies is easier to 
obtain than preference convergence on ideological matters since ideological preferences 
are relatively more rigid in the short-run. On the other hand, preference convergence on 
strategies differs from issue-based type of cooperation, which is susceptible to breaking 
down once the object of cooperation is attained. In contrast, preference convergence on 
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strategies implies that challengers harmonize their plans of action to overthrow the 
government. Thus, preference convergence on strategies is likely to foster long-term 
cooperation, the type of sustainable cooperation that is necessary to form an oppositional 
coalition capable of signaling unity and coherence. I further argue that oppositional 
coalitions tend to display a center-periphery structure, as to which one challenger group 
assumes the leadership. In terms of preferences, what characterizes such coalitions is 
strategic alignment (i.e., on ways to overthrow the government). Ideological alignment is 
helpful but neither necessary nor sufficient. Ultimately, this study points out that unity 
among challengers is not a given; it is crafted. 
 
 
THEORY  
I theorize that strategic interactions among challengers in as an iterated non-cooperative 
game where conflicting interests require coordination.1 In non-cooperative games, 
cooperation is self-enforcing unlike in cooperative games wherein third parties enforce 
contracts. Strategic interactions among challengers can be conceptualized as a non-
cooperative game, because there is no third party to enforce cooperation. Furthermore, as 
I discuss in detail in the section on independent variables, preferences are 
multidimensional in real life. That is, actors take into account various issue dimensions 
(not just economic or political ones) when deciding how to behave towards the regime. 
The multidimensionality of issues makes that struggles between contenders and the 
government qualify as a coordination game rather than an iterated single-issue 
cooperation games.  
Coordination games feature three characteristics: First, challengers are better off 
if they cooperate than if they do not.  Nevertheless, cooperation fails due to disagreements 
on how they will cooperate. Second, coordination games have multiple Pareto-ranked 
solutions. That is, games have many outcomes (Nash equilibria), but some are better than 
others (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, pp. 168–69). Third, trust and expectations allow for 
coordination on a mutually desirable solution (Cooper, 1999, pp. ix–x).   
																																								 																				
1 For	 more	 information	 on	 cooperative	 vs.	 non-cooperative	 games	 see	 (McCain,	 2014;	 Osborne	 &	
Rubinstein,	1994;	Vorob’ev,	2012).	
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In cases of cooperation for regime change, three characteristics manifest 
themselves as follows: Challengers are better off cooperating on forming an oppositional 
movement than taking on the regime by themselves. On the other hand, regime contention 
involves serious risks (for instance, challengers may be facing exile or capital punishment). 
Under uncertainty, challengers might suspect each other’s intentions, wondering whether 
some ally secretly compromised with the government or would try to annihilate one’s 
group after the transition. Thus, although trust facilitates coordination, it is hard to build.  
Also, coordination problems get amplified if challengers prioritize different 
preferences on an issue dimension at a given time. The mismatch between actors’ 
preferences, when all ranked at the top of preference ranking, narrows down the room for 
compromise, hence the set of possible solutions (Tadelis, 2013). On the other hand, actors 
might perceive some issues to have less priority relative to others. For instance, the 
structure of the administration might be conceived to be less urgent to be handled than, 
say, determining the boundaries of citizenship in a multi-ethnic society. In that case, 
actors might agree to some less than ideal solution on the administrative structure to 
obtain a better deal on the boundaries of citizenship. Game theory handles bargains on 
indivisible issues (issues that do not lend themselves to adequate dividing as a solution), 
among other things, via side-payments. In this study, I specify the concept side-payment 
with respect to time to incorporate the temporal variation in the ranking of preferences 
(aka preference relation) (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994; Tadelis, 2013).  
 
Prioritization & de-prioritization  
We have seen that the ranking of preferences might change over time according to the 
level of perceived priority of issues. Preference ranking at a given time affects a person’s 
move and payoff. Importantly, not all actors rank issues in the same way. For example, a 
person might consider the boundaries of citizenship and the structure of the 
administration to be as equally important issues, if centralized administration would 
mean to subdue in a region where a minority is populated to the wills of the majority. 
Others might think that this battle might be fought later, say, after minorities are 
recognized as equal citizens. Thus, while the first person might not accept side payment 
on the administrative structure, the second one might. This would mean that the 
administrative structure is ranked higher for the former than is for the latter. I introduce 
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the concept of “priority” to talk about which the position of preferences in preference 
relation at a given time. 
If actors “prioritize” some issue they are likely to see a less than satisfactory 
solution to it as unacceptable. However, actors might de-prioritize some issue at a given 
time. For example, the secular democrats in Turkey who endorsed Erdogan for democracy 
in the early 2000s de-prioritized his non-secular attitude for they prioritized 
democratization at the time.  
Prioritization or de-prioritization complement the theory of preferences in the 
following way: As mentioned earlier, ideological preferences are less likely to change in 
the short run unless some external shock brings about irrefutable contrary evidence 
undermining the perceived utility of that preference. Without a shock, however, actors are 
less likely to reconsider their worldviews in the short-run. Nevertheless, in real-life we 
observe cooperation among ideological rivals. To continue with the abovementioned 
example, the groups that believe that the fight over the administrative structure may be 
fought later prioritize the boundaries of citizenship and de-prioritize the question of the 
administration. That said, this person’s collaboration with the majority over the 
boundaries of citizenship does not mean that he abandoned his preferences about the 
administrative structure. Rather, this person postpones this disagreement to obtain a 
better deal on an issue dimension that is deemed to have priority.  
I classify the behavior of such actors as being “pragmatic” on that dimension. 
Conversely, I call the behavior of those who do not consider making concessions or 
postponing the resolution of ideological differences as being “idealistic” on that 
dimension. Let me illustrate the difference between idealistic and pragmatic behavior with 
examples from European integration. The behavior of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, 
the architects of the European Coal and Steel Community, qualifies as being pragmatic on 
the political disagreements. The latter prioritize economic dimensions and postpone the 
resolution of political disagreements on dimensions such as security. In contrast, the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (aka the EU Constitution) did not enter into 
effect, because some member states rejected the Treaty via referendum for fear of 
undermining national sovereignty. The rejection of the EU Constitution exemplifies an 
idealistic behavior on the dimension of national sovereignty vs. supranationality. 
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Preference revision in response to environmental transformations 
Besides changes in the ranking, preferences themselves may shift. For instance, a person 
who prefers rock music to pop and pop to jazz may become a fan of electronic music after 
being exposed to his roommate’s electronic music for a while. This change is different than 
changes in priority. For example, an example of change in priority would be the rocker 
teen agreeing to listen to pop (his second best choice after rock) in his friend’s mother car. 
In this example, the teen still prefers rock but he de-prioritizes enjoying his favorite genre 
for some other preference, such as, behaving good in front of the friend’s mother. In the 
case of preference revision, the teen replaces his top choice for some other choice without 
changing its rank.  
 Preference revision is captured in game theory using the concept preference 
update, in that players reconsider their preferences as new information becomes available 
(Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994; Tadelis, 2013). Yet, game theory is agnostic to sources of 
information other than nature or players themselves.2 For example, an imperfect 
information game, a player might reveal his type, which would induce the other player(s) 
to change his moves. On the other hand, exogenous shocks factor into strategies and 
payoffs. For instance, in  Acemoglu & Robinson (2001), in accordance with changes in the 
level of growth lower classes choose between revolt or not (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001). 
When conceptualized as such, environmental changes happen to be incorporated in the 
game.  
However, in real life, implications of environmental changes cannot be 
incorporated in the game, because they cannot be foreseen. One main reason for this 
unpredictability is that environmental changes are a joint function of the structure of the 
context and the way actors other than the players respond to the changes (Aoki, 2007; 
Greif & Kingston, 2011; Greif & Laitin, 2004). Players cannot possibly consider such a 
complex outcome. To give an example, suppose a political crisis caused liquidity shortage 
and dropped the level of GDP/capita, hence deteriorating living standards of lower classes 
without yet bringing them to the point of misery. However, some segments of lower classes 
might find such welfare loss intolerable and start contentious activity (e.g., strikes). Seeing 
them, others, who have a higher tolerance to pauperization, might join in. In response, 
																																								 																				
2	The	exception	would	be	stochastic	games,	where	the	game	randomly	moves	from	one	state	to	another,	
thus	changing	payoffs.	For	more	information	see	(Maitra	&	Sudderth,	2012;	Neyman	&	Sorin,	2012;	Shapley,	
1953;	Solan	&	Vieille,	2015).	
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organized contenders might decide to play revolt before welfare standards descend to the 
level preset in the game. Players cannot predict such collective action, which can be 
consequential on the fate of the regime if others decide to join in. An empirical example 
would be Eastern European transitions (Kuran, 1991). The point here is the following: 
Environmental changes are more than the rationally calculable outcomes of shocks 
themselves, since responses of actors outside the game also shape these outcomes. Thus, 
the structure of the game may vary independently of how players interact.  
 In this study, I relax the assumptions that the structure of the game is limited to 
interactions among players and that environmental changes can be fully factored in 
strategies and payoffs in advance. This assumption is particularly in order, since 
contended regimes are often situated in fluid international environments (such as 
interwar Europe or the Assad regime in the Middle East) and their domestic environments 
themselves display fluidity and uncertainty. As such, we should expect players to respond 
to environmental changes as they come rather than choose the most convenient response 
from a preset array of responses.  
I conceptualize environmental transformations (stochastic or improbable) as an 
intervening variable that is capable of making actors revise their preferences 
independently of interactions among players. Preference revision can affect cooperation 
dynamics among challengers if revisions work to make more actors adopt similar 
preferences. On the other hand, environmental changes might also be such that actors’ 
preferences end up becoming more dissimilar than before. In the first case, cooperation 
becomes easier. In the latter, it becomes more difficult.  
  
 
Hypotheses 
In the light of the multidimensionality and relative priority of preferences, I pose the 
research question in another way: if shared interests against and grievances 
about the current government bring challengers to cooperate only in some 
cases, to what extent can we explain the failure of cooperation in other cases 
by the mismatch between preferences on the issue dimensions that actors 
prioritize? This question requires identifying issue dimensions other than overthrowing 
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the government and examine their level of priority. A subsequent question is what type of 
preferences are more likely to foster sustainable cooperation among challengers? 
One might ask whether there is a difference between the effect of ideological 
preferences on cooperative behavior and that of strategic preferences. Corollary to that, 
one might wonder whether a particular type of preference is associated with a particular 
type of cooperation (long-term vs. short term cooperation). Relatively speaking, strategic 
preferences are more flexible over time than ideological preferences. The reason is 
changing ideological preferences require changing one’s worldview, which is more difficult 
and costlier than shifting strategic views (all else equal). 
In this vein, I expect shared strategic preferences to be more likely to foster long-
term cooperation, hence the rise of an oppositional coalition. Given the relative rigidity of 
ideological preferences over time, ideological preferences should be more likely to foster 
short-term cooperation (since achieving preference convergence on some ideological 
dimension is hard to obtain). The relative rigidity of ideological preferences suggests that 
preference convergence on some ideological issue dimension may or may not suffice to 
sustain cooperation on multiple successive rounds, especially if actors prioritize different 
issues and have disagreements among themselves with respect to the prioritized issues. In 
contrast, actors might find it easier to shift their strategic preferences unless they highly 
prioritize that issue dimension.  
It is also worth reminding that the type oppositional coalition that is capable of 
overthrowing the regime requires long-term cooperation. Considering the relative 
flexibility of strategies, we should expect that long-term cooperation among challengers to 
follow from convergence of strategic preferences than those of ideological preferences –
since preference convergence on ideological issues is harder to achieve. Also, if all actors 
highly value some ideological dimension on which their preferences diverge, that 
misalignment may trump agreement on another ideological issue. I expect long-term 
cooperation must be possible without preference convergence on all ideological issues. In 
this vein, I propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among 
ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and 
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the more likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the 
opposition.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when challengers 
react to past failures and new opportunities by deciding to pragmatically revise the 
priority of preferences on strategic issue dimensions. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Such adjustment is more likely to occur as peripheral actors align their 
preferences to those of an emergent ‘core’ actor.  
 
I test these hypotheses on the cases of transitions to constitutional monarchy in 
Bourbon France and the Ottoman Empire under Abdülhamid II using contextual analysis, 
content analysis, and longitudinal network analysis. I conduct contextual analysis to 
identify issue dimensions. Content analysis helps pinpoint challengers’ publicly expressed 
preferences on the identified dimensions. Longitudinal network models serve to examine 
the patterns of interactions among challengers over time. Specifically, they calculate the 
probability of tie formation (cooperation) based on preference similarity on different issue 
dimensions. By measuring the effect of each preference dimension on cooperative 
behavior, network analysis allows for comparing between the behavioral impacts of 
different preference categories. 
Network models rely on the following axioms:  
 (1) Contenders are not unitary actors. I define “an actor” as an organized group of 
challengers that occupy a position that is distinguishable from others’ positions in the 
space of issue dimensions. ó Groups vary by their singular set of preferences across 
issues. In that, two groups of actors may have close but not identical preference sets in 
some issue space. New groups emerge if they offer a novel product (preference set) in the 
market (existing positions in the issue space). Similarly, group fracture into sub-groups 
because of differences on (a) certain issue dimension(s). Therefore, if preference sets were 
identical, we would be talking about the same group. That is to say that if two non-identical 
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preference sets correspond to two different groups, we can deduce that there are as many 
non-identical preference sets as the number of actors. 
 
(2) Issue dimensions are derived from the contextual analysis (not assumed a priori).  
 
(3) The number of actors involved in struggles over the regime may increase/decrease over 
time. Thus, we cannot assume a fixed number of actors (as usually done in game 
theoretical research). The number of actors is a variable that we cannot identify without 
conducting empirical observation. The temporal variation in the number of actors has a 
causal importance for it affects dynamics of interactions among contenders ––e.g., 
increases in the number of actor may shift some game, say, from prisoners’ dilemma to 
coordination game. 
 
(4) To reemphasize an earlier point, regime change does not imply consolidation. It means 
to overthrow the current government’s regime and declaring the foundation of another 
one (we cannot know if the new regime will survive unless we observe the regime over time 
taking into account citizens’ responses to the regime).  
 
 
If the study reveals supporting evidence for that preference convergence on 
strategic issues is more likely to foster long-term cooperation among challengers, the 
theory implies the following for the structure of oppositional coalitions: we should expect 
cooperation for regime change to happen among pragmatic actors (those who de-prioritize 
certain ideological debates) rather than among idealistic actors (those who do not consider 
making concessions or postponing the resolution of ideological differences). If most actors 
behave idealistically on more than one issue dimension an oppositional coalition becomes 
less and less likely to emerge. In other words, cooperation requires at least some actors to 
be pragmatic. This theory falls in line with other cooperation theories of political science. 
To go back to the European integration example, neo-functionalism predicts that 
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integration is more likely to begin on technical issues than on political issues (Haas, 1964; 
Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, 1998; Schmitter, 1970). This hypothesis illustrates the case of 
going pragmatic on political issues and prioritizing economic dimensions. It is worth 
noting that the theory presented here does not go as far as to extend the argument to 
spillover. We see a similar behavior of prioritization and de-prioritization in Rawls’ theory 
of “Justice as Fairness” (Rawls, 2001). According to Rawls, citizens will decide the 
principles of justice under the veil of ignorance. These principles of justice will serve as 
guidelines to which citizens may refer when dealing with differences on issues of daily 
politics once they are out of the veil of ignorance (aka “reflective equilibrium”). In other 
words, citizens prioritize the issues that constitute the principles of justice, such as equal 
opportunities and political equality, and align their preferences on those dimensions. 
Other issue dimensions are de-prioritized when establishing the principles of justice. Once 
preferences are aligned on the high-priority issues constituting the principles of justice, 
social contract becomes more robust in the face of disagreements on other issue 
dimension. The theory proposed here overlaps with existing theories in applying 
cooperation theory to the study of regimes.  
One difficulty is to establish the difference between the case, in which actors 
cooperate because they postpone disagreements, and the one, in which actors cooperate 
because the process of revision harmonized their preferences on some problematic issue 
area and preference alignment now propels cooperation. The theory suggests that real 
preferences are unobservable and behavior does not perfectly mirror true motivations. I 
suggest the following:  
Convergence of preferences is more likely to drive cooperation than re-
prioritization if network analysis identifies a statistically significant positive effect on that 
issue dimension. In contrast, de-prioritization of some disagreement is more likely to 
generate cooperation if network analysis identifies no statistically significant effect on that 
issue dimension. In other words, actors do not take their preferences on that matter into 
account when deciding with whom to cooperate. On the other hand, if the analysis of the 
evolution of preferences detects change towards the harmonization of preferences, it could 
be that members of the opposition coalition groups have already adopted the same 
strategy, but because non-members have not, the estimate on this issue dimension turns 
insignificant. To establish whether this is the case, we need to examine the preference sets 
of members of the oppositional coalition. If network analysis yields a statistically 
		 13	
significant negative estimate, it is likely that those who think differently on this matter are 
likely to agree on some other issue that they prioritize more. I will elaborate in detail on 
the interpretation of results later in this chapter. 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
Dependent variable & unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis in this study is organized groups of actors that make contentious 
actions to change the current regime (i.e., challengers or contender groups). The 
dependent variable is cooperation for regime change among regime contenders. Before 
defining what I understand from cooperation for regime change, it is worth explaining 
how regime change is conceptualized.  
In this study, regime change is defined as the overthrow of the incumbent’s 
regime. It does not extend to consolidation of the new institutions associated with another 
form of government. Consolidation spans the period from the foundation of new 
institutions to the moment when citizens will have internalized rules of the new regime 
(“the only game in town” as Linz and Stepan put it, (Linz & Stepan, 1996a, p. 5)). Although 
the overthrow of some regime is temporally antecedent to the consolidation of another, at 
the time new institutions are founded, it is impossible to know whether the new regime 
will survive unless one adopts a retrospective approach ––one in which one explains a 
realized outcome from the hindsight (Tilly, 1993, p. 33). For instance, until a couple of 
years after the foundation of the 3rd Republic of France, French citizens constantly feared 
of a regime collapse; therefore, it would be erroneous for today’s scholars to discount this 
public perception about regime fragility knowing that the regime survived and simply 
classify this regime as a case of consolidated regime (Breckman, 2014). This study does 
not go as far to explain consolidation of the new regimes ––so doing would require also 
accounting for citizens’ responses to institutions of the new regime to see whether the rules 
of the game are internalized. Thus, the scope of analysis is limited to the process from 
when demands for regime change arise to the emergence of a coherent oppositional 
coalition against the incumbent’s regime.  
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 Cooperation for regime change refers to contentious activities that two or 
more organized groups of challengers collaboratively undertake with the purpose of 
overthrowing the current government and his regime. The indicators of cooperation 
include co-participation in the organization of some protest activity (such as 
demonstrations, rebellions, riots, strikes), the process of mobilization of citizens against 
the regime, the generation of anti-regime propaganda, or the plotting and carrying out of 
a coup. It is worth noting that cooperation for regime change refers to “realized cases” of 
cooperation, where actors successfully undertake/finalize as one or more of the actions 
mentioned in the list of indicators. “Inconclusive attempts” of cooperation, in which actors 
fail to accomplish one or more of the abovementioned activities despite making efforts –
–such as broken negotiations or not carrying out the promise of participating in some 
protest activity–– do not qualify as realized cases of cooperation. I code successful cases 
of cooperation as “1” and inconclusive attempts as “0”. 
 
Types of cooperation 
The dependent variable being cooperation for regime change, we need to specify what type 
of cooperation is needed to overthrow the government or extract significant concessions 
from it. Obviously, not all forms of cooperation are capable of overthrowing the 
government. For instance, actors who collaborate to pass some bill may part ways after 
successfully doing so. This type of cooperation does not necessarily lead to the formation 
of an oppositional movement to overthrow the government. On the other hand, not all 
regime challenging groups need to collaborate to overthrow the government such. For 
example, the coalition led by Lenin, which ended up eradicating the tsar’s regime, was a 
narrow but coherent coalition unlike the more heterogeneous, looser, and wider socialist 
coalition (Fitzpatrick, 2008, pp. 50–51). What type of a coalition is more likely to 
overthrow the regime?  
The literature on regimes advances the following finding: Disunited governing 
elites are less likely to remain in power in the face of rivals’ attacks to weaken them and 
external shocks (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Haggard & Kaufman, 1997). I apply this logic 
to contenders: For the incumbent to step down or make significant concessions to some 
oppositional coalition, that coalition needs to be united. What is the indicator of unity? In 
order to give the impression of being united, a coalition of actors need to stand together 
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for a while, which can be conceptualized as sustainable cooperation over time 
(otherwise, it would be a one-time cooperation).  
I suggest an additional criterion, “coherence.” In that, a coalition whose members 
have divergent visions on certain matters are less likely to be seen as robust, since such 
disagreements give rivals the incentive to employ divide-and-rule tactics. In contrast, a 
coalition whose members are like-minded on most issues appears to be more determined 
and robust, which might deter rivals from trying to fracture them from within. I define a 
coalition to be coherent if its members have similar preferences on most issues. The 
indicator for coherence is preference convergence on more than one issue 
dimensions. I use these two criteria to differentiate types of cooperation:  
 
Definition 1: Long-term cooperation: Some groups A and B are engaged in long-term 
cooperation if and only if they have been cooperating on more than one issue for at least 
three successive years.  
 
Definition 2: Short-term cooperation: Some groups A and B are engaged in short-
term cooperation, if their cooperation is limited on one issue area and lasts less than three 
successive years. 
 
In Definition 1, the condition “for at least three successive years” ensures that 
cooperation is not temporary, which signals unity. The condition “on more than one issue” 
captures preference converge, weakening the alternative explanation that cooperation is 
limited to a single issue. Preference convergence on multiple issues gives the impression 
that coalition members are like-minded on various matters and therefore likely to stick 
together in the future. If cooperation was limited to one issue, disagreements on other 
issues could have been exploited to fracture the coalition. Thus, the two conditions 
together work to rule out the possibility that cooperation is not temporary and is 
continuously renewed on multiple issue dimensions given preference convergence.  
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In Definition 2, “less than three successive years” suggests that, short of three 
years, cooperation is too brief for us to infer unity. We would need more observations to 
reject the possibility that cooperation is not temporary. The condition “on some issue” 
implies that cooperation is issue-specific. We would need more observations to get the 
impression that coalition members are like-minded on various fronts and likely to stick 
together in the future. Let me elaborate on these concepts via examples:  
Suppose there are some groups A, B, and C. Imagine three scenarios:  
 
Scenario 1: A, B, and C cooperate on issue X1 in year Y1, and on issue X2 in years Y2 and 
Y3.  
 
In this scenario, A, B, and C cooperate for three successive years but not on the same 
issues. One-year cooperation on X1 and two-year cooperation on X2 are not enough 
observations for us to dismiss that cooperation is temporary and issue-based. A sceptic 
could even suspect cooperation on X2 to collapse in year Y4 having observed the 
breakdown of cooperation on issue X1 in year Y2 (even though the renewal of cooperation 
on X2 in year Y3 makes this event less likely). Now, consider the following: 
 
Scenario 2: A, B, and C cooperate on issue X1 in year Y1, and on issues X1 and X2 in years 
Y2 and Y3. 
 
In this scenario, cooperation on X1 is successively renewed every year. Moreover, it 
extends to X2 in year Y2. This pattern sends a strong signal that this coalition might 
continue to work together in the future (we do not observe any contrary evidence to 
anticipate cooperation breakdown). Of course, a sceptic might prefer to wait and see what 
will happen on issue X2 in year Y4. On the other hand, suppose A, B, and C cooperate on 
issue X1 in year Y1, on issues X1 and X2 in year Y2, and on issue X2 in year Y3. In this case, 
there is a stronger signal for unity and coherence, but we would still need more 
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observations to dismiss the possibility that groups are like-minded and stand united. 
Contrast Scenario 2 with Scenario 3:  
 
Scenario 3: A, B, and C cooperate on issue X1 in year Y1, and issue X2 in year Y2, and on 
issue X3 in year Y3.  
 
In Scenario 3, the same partners cooperate over and over again, but the object of 
cooperation changes every year. This pattern does not allow us to dismiss the possibility 
that cooperation on X1 and X2 were one-shot issue-specific cases of cooperation. Then, 
outside observers might suspect that cooperation on X3 is also a one-shot issue-specific 
case of cooperation. An alternative explanation is that issues X1 and X2 are successfully 
accomplished (i.e., handled for good) and therefore there is no need to further cooperate 
on these issues. However, we would need more contextual information to evaluate this 
claim. 
Overall, the criteria coherence and unity are not perfect, but as the number of 
observations increases they allow us to make more confident claims about the nature of 
cooperation. In this study, I examine the patterns of interactions among contenders within 
the lifespan of a regime. Therefore, these criteria, particularly the one about “at least for 
three successive years,” allows us to have a greater confidence interval when evaluating 
the types of cooperation over time. 
 Lastly, the literature on contentious politics has long stressed that effective 
leadership makes contentious movements more likely to succeed (Goldstone, 2001; Lenin, 
1975; Marx & Engels, 1968; McAdam, 1982; Wills, 1995; Wilson, 1973). Applying this to 
case of contenders, I expect the coalition to be more effective if one group takes the lead, 
motivates, and structures others (followers). This should not come as strange to those who 
are familiar with daily parliamentary politics in multiparty systems, in which one party 
often sponsors some bill and others endorse it. On the other hand, I do not make any 
assumption about the position of the leader within the coalition. That is, there can be one 
group predominating others or one group might operate as primus inter pares––both 
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would be different ways of rationalizing and structuring the coalition to ensure 
effectiveness.  
In sum, if some oppositional coalition should signal unity and coherence to the 
incumbent, such signal is more likely to come from long-term cooperation. Otherwise, 
there would not be enough observations to give the incumbent the impression that the 
coalition is united and coherent, and therefore to be feared. Also, leadership is likely to 
improve the coalition’s effectiveness. 
 
 
Operationalization of the oppositional coalition 
I proposed that the kind of oppositional coalition that is capable of overthrowing the 
government or extracting significant concessions from it should signal unity and 
coherence and is likely to have some kind of leadership. This coalition can be thought of 
as a cooperation network of challengers, where nodes represent challenger groups and ties 
represent pairwise relations of cooperation among challengers. For example, if two groups 
cooperate for regime change, there forms a tie (edge) indicating cooperation between 
them. If they do not cooperate, they are not linked by a tie (edge). The emergence of 
cooperation can be operationalized as edge formation, while the breakdown of cooperation 
can be operationalized as edge disappearance.  
To capture unity (indicated by sustainable cooperation over time), we need to 
examine the evolution of cooperation in time. To this end, I measure cooperation on a 
yearly basis. So doing also allows us to establish when an oppositional movement emerges 
or dies.  
I operationalize leadership in a coalition as a network that has a core-periphery 
structure. Networks displaying a core-periphery structure feature a cluster of high-degree 
nodes in the core that are surrounded by a less dense periphery of nodes with lower-degree 
(Newman, 2010). Here, the central node embodies the core-actor and peripheral nodes 
form the peripheral-actors.  
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Network analysis is appropriate to examine patterns of interactions among 
contenders and the structure of the oppositional coalition for three reasons: First, 
cooperation, by definition, implies interdependence. Network analysis is developed to 
examine interdependent data and relationships, whereas methods that rely on 
independence assumption (e.g., ordinary linear regression) would be impractical in 
dealing with relational data. Second, the number of contenders varies over time (some 
groups discontinue, others emerge, and some merge/fracture). Network analysis is 
appropriate to accommodate the temporal variation in the number of actors, whereas 
game theory assumes this number to stay fixed.  
Most importantly, network analysis provides tools enabling us to identify whether 
convergence of actors’ expressed preferences makes a statistically significant effect of 
bringing a pair of like-minded actors to collaborate. First, cooperation in a year can be 
operationalized as edge formation in a year and collapse of cooperation in a year can be 
operationalized as edge disappearance. Moreover, preference can be thought of as node-
level characteristics, whereby one can examine edge creation/disappearance (cooperation 
or its breakdown) based on node-level characteristics (preferences).  
Preference convergence implies similarity of preferences on more than one issue 
dimension. I operationalize preference similarity using concept of homophily. Homophily 
can be defined as the propensity to form ties based on similarity of characteristics. In social 
sciences, homophily has often been used to examine tie formation based on direct and 
indirect affinity in the social space (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007; Kitts, 2006; Moody, 
2001). As I discuss in depth in the next section, I derive issue dimensions on which to 
examine affinity from the context using contextual analysis. With that way of 
operationalization, network analysis uses empirical data to run MCMC simulations to 
establish whether preferences have a statistically significant independent effect on 
cooperation.  
If they make an independent effect on cooperation, their estimates should be 
statistically significant. If preference similarity (homophily) precipitates cooperation, we 
should observe significant positive coefficients, meaning that more ties (representing 
cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in networks 
displaying the same number of nodes and edges. A concrete example of tie formation 
based on homophily would be patterns of friendship by race in a high school. One study 
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identifies that Asians and Blacks in a high school are biased toward interacting with their 
own race and tend to have fewer White friends (Currarini, Jackson, & Pin, 2010).  
If coefficients are significant but negative, we should infer that actors have a 
preference to work with those who hold different preferences on those issues. In more 
technical terms, such a finding indicates that fewer ties (cooperation) are formed than 
would have been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same number of 
nodes and edges. For example, family members tend not to marry each other because 
intermarriage increases the risk that the offspring displays genetic diseases or birth 
defects. Also, the value of coefficients communicates the rate of change. Going back to the 
example of high school friendship networks, findings indicate that “Asians and Blacks are 
biased toward interacting with their own race at rates >7 times higher than Whites, 
whereas Hispanics exhibit an intermediate bias in meeting opportunities” (Currarini et al., 
2010, p. 4857). This means that Asians are more than 7 times more likely to befriend other 
Asians than they are to befriend Whites.  
Thus, network analysis helps us to identify whether preference alignment affects 
behavior. How does (de-)prioritization play out with preference revision? There are three 
possibilities: Preference revision may make preferences more alike or more dissimilar. 
Alternatively, preferences might remain unchanged.  
If preferences remain unchanged and network analysis yields a positive 
statistically significant coefficient, we can infer that the issue is prioritized and 
convergence of preference drives cooperation among the like-minded. We should also 
expect coherence across the preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition.  
If preferences remain unchanged and network analysis yields a negative 
statistically significant coefficient, this indicates that those who think differently on this 
matter are likely to agree on some other issue that they highly prioritize. Then, preferences 
of members of the oppositional coalition are likely to diverge on this issue dimension. 
If preferences remain unchanged and network analysis yields a statistically 
insignificant coefficient, this indicates that that issue is de-prioritized and disagreements 
on that matter are postponed. Then, preference sets of members of the oppositional 
coalition are likely to display incoherence on this issue. 
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If preferences become more similar and network analysis yields a positive 
statistically significant coefficient, this indicates that that issue has high priority and now 
harmonized preferences foster cooperation. We are likely to observe coherence across the 
preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition. 
If preferences become more similar and network analysis yields a negative 
statistically significant coefficient, those who think differently on this matter are likely to 
agree on some other issue that they highly prioritize and preference convergence on that 
other matter propels cooperation. Preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition 
are likely to be incoherent on this issue. 
If preferences become more similar and network analysis yields a statistically 
insignificant coefficient, we understand that that issue is de-prioritized. On the other 
hand, preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition are likely to show 
coherence because preferences among a subset of actors are already harmonized and cease 
to impede cooperation. 
If preference revision increases dissimilarity of preferences and network analysis 
yields a positive statistically significant coefficient, that issue is likely to be prioritized and 
convergence of preferences is likely to drive cooperation among a subset of like-minded 
actors. 
If preference revision increases dissimilarity of preferences and network analysis 
yields a positive statistically significant coefficient, that issue is likely to be prioritized and 
convergence of preferences is likely to drive cooperation among a subset of like-minded 
actors. 
If preference revision increases dissimilarity of preferences and network analysis 
yields a negative statistically significant coefficient, it is possible that actors agree on 
another issue that they highly prioritize. 
If preference revision increases dissimilarity of preferences and network analysis 
yields a statistically insignificant coefficient, that issue is de-prioritized and disagreements 
on that matter are postponed. Table 1 below summarizes these possibilities. 
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Table	1	
 Positive statistically 
significant network 
coefficient  
Negative statistically 
significant network 
coefficient 
Statistically insignificant 
network coefficient 
No revision in 
preferences 
Issue is prioritized & 
convergence of preferences 
drives cooperation among the 
like-minded 
Those who think differently on 
this matter are likely to agree on 
some other issue that they highly 
prioritize  
Issue is de-prioritized; 
disagreements on that matter 
are postponed 
Revision 
makes 
preferences 
more similar 
Issue is prioritized & now 
harmonized preferences foster 
cooperation  
Those who think differently on 
this matter are likely to agree on 
some other issue that they highly 
prioritize and preference 
convergence on that other 
matter propels cooperation 
Issue is de-prioritized, because 
preferences among a subset of 
actors are already harmonized, 
hence the oppositional 
coalition shows coherence on 
the matter 
Revision 
increases the 
difference 
among 
preferences 
Issue is prioritized & 
convergence of preferences 
drives cooperation among a 
subset of like-minded actors  
It is likely that actors agree on 
another issue that they highly 
prioritize  
Issue is de-prioritized; 
disagreements on that matter 
are postponed 
  
When studying the effect of preferences, one major challenge is to distinguish the 
effect of homophily from that of influence (Shalizi & Thomas, 2011). Influence refers to 
the process whereby attitudes or opinions of actors who belong to a group will come to 
converge (Friedkin & Johnsen, 2011). Shalizi & Thomas show that it is impossible to 
establish using observational (and even longitudinal) data whether tie formation results 
from influence or homophily. Thus, the observed effect derives either from homophily or 
influence. However, influence is less likely to be operating in the sample sets used in this 
study: 
First, if preferences shaped behavior through influence, we should observe 
preferences of groups within the oppositional coalition to differ at the beginning and grow 
alike over time after controlling for the exogenous factors such as updating of preferences. 
An indicator would be peripheral actors gradually adopting the preferences of the core 
actor. It is worth noting that influence is harder to observe than homophily among 
interacting organized groups of actors in the 19th century, which is the timeframe of this 
analysis. One reason is that within the conditions of the 19th century, communication 
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technologies did not allow actors to contact each other as easily as in the 20th century. 
Especially in the Ottoman case, challengers did not even share the same geographical 
space (some groups operated in Geneva, others in Cairo, and others were scattered across 
Paris, Berlin, and some Balkan cities between 1895 and 1902 (Hanioğlu, 1981) and 
censorship and the Sultan’s spy network made challengers go underground rather than 
publicly announcing the solutions that proposed to resolve the country’s problems. In the 
French case, similarly, censorship made challengers go underground between 1814 and 
1816. The restriction of freedoms in both cases makes it difficult for challenger groups to 
easily learn about each other’s preference sets and emulate it. Moreover, the incentives to 
emulate the solutions that the others marketed were lower than what we tend to observe 
in party systems where parties tend to adopt moderate preferences and address the 
median voter (Fowler & Smirnov, 2009; Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007). However, such 
incentives are lower under contended regimes displaying intense political polarization at 
least for those who stand on the opposite sides. In both Bourbon France and the Ottoman 
Empire under Sultan Abdülhamid II, the sociopolitical arena became increasingly 
polarized. In France, as I discuss in Chapter 4, royalists violently confronted Jacobins and 
bonapartists, and then liberals. In the Ottoman Empire, as I discuss in Chapter 3, 
polarization between minorities, who demanded independence, and those who worked for 
imperial integrity became increasingly violent. Given polarization, members of the 
opposite sides had little incentives to adopt moderate preferences on issues that caused 
societal conflict. On the other hand, one could imagine groups on the same front to have 
an incentive to emulate each other’s preferences. However, these actors competed for the 
leadership of the country, and this competition was not democratic enough to induce 
groups to adopt moderate preferences to enlarge the electorate. For example, challengers 
in the Ottoman Empire sought to recruit militants and even combatants instead of votes 
as would be the case in contemporary multiparty systems; therefore, such groups had little 
incentive to adopt moderate preferences (Hanioğlu, 2001; Kevorkian, 2011). In Bourbon 
France, electoral and parliamentary competition was often muddled with fraud, 
oppression, and gerrymandering (Alexander, 2004). As I explain later, societal cleavages 
had a tendency to annihilate their rivals once they assumed power following the 1789 
Revolution (Rosanvallon, 2007).  
Finally, influence is less likely to occur than homophily, because challenger groups 
are not unitary (even though they are operationalized as unitary actor in this study for 
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modeling purposes). In that, we cannot know to the extent to which the opinion of those 
who emulated other groups’ strategies carried weight within the group (such as during the 
decision making process). So doing requires an individual level analysis, which is beyond 
the scope of this analysis. This study is concerned about capturing expressed preferences 
of challenger groups based on the primary documents that challengers, themselves, 
penned.  
 
The structure of the oppositional coalition  
I suggested that the oppositional coalition network is composed of some leader and 
followers. I operationalize leadership as the central node in the network, while followers 
would be peripheral nodes. One question is what determines the structure of this network? 
What mechanisms make some contenders to become leaders and others to become 
followers.  
In order to understand which challenger becomes the center of the oppositional 
coalition, we want to identify the years in which actors cooperate more and using these 
time frames to examine around which actor others populate. Specifically, first, I use the 
metric network density to examine the evolution of the density of network. The density 
means how connected a network is taking into account all possible connections in that 
network. In other words, it represents the ratio of the actual number of ties to the number 
of all possible ties (Newman, 2010, p. Chapter 6). Thus, if a network has a lot of ties among 
its nodes, it is dense –the ratio of the actual number of ties over the number of all possible 
ties gets close to 1. If a network has few ties, most of possible connections are not made; 
thus, it is not dense and the ratio in question approaches to -∞.  
At the second step, we want to understand which challenger becomes the center of 
the oppositional coalition. To this end, I compare the importance of each actor of the 
oppositional coalition. Importance in a coalition means who is central to a coalition 
network. That is, who is picked by others more frequently as a partner, which can also be 
reworded as who has more collaborators than others. Having more partners than others 
in an oppositional coalition indicates that one is more in demand by others as a partner. I 
operationalize importance using the network metric degree centrality. Degree centrality 
conveys how well-connected a node is (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). I discuss the 
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details of this measurement in the theory chapter. To give an idea about how degree 
centrality is interpreted, suppose that a node in some moderately well-connected network 
G with n number of nodes has (n-1) degrees. This means this node is well-connected to all 
others and may be central to the network. Suppose that another node has degrees (n-2), 
which would mean it is connected to everyone except for one other (besides himself). Such 
an actor would also be considerably central to the network. In contrast, if some node has 
degree 1, it is connected to only one other node. This means it is not central to the network 
(Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It should be noted that centrality in a network can be 
measured using other metrics such as closeness or betweenness, among others. However, 
given that cooperation network is not directional, that is, if node A is linked to node B the 
link from A to B also implies a link from B to A, since cooperation is reciprocal by nature.3 
 
 
Independent variables 
Independent variables are preferences, which correspond to actors’ positions on the issue 
dimensions relevant to the debate on regime type in a given context. I define preferences 
as any type of motivation that factors in actors’ decision making and shapes their behavior. 
This definition includes material interests, grievances, ideological beliefs, and strategic 
calculations. In other words, I do not distinguish between material interests, grievances, 
ideological beliefs, or strategic calculations. I use preferences as an overarching concept 
to encompass all types of motivations shaping behavior.4  
 That said, I define ideological preferences the preferences about what the new 
regime should look like. For example, the role of religion in politics counts as an 
ideological preference for it determines the limits of the sphere of domination of religious 
institutions vis-à-vis political and social institutions. Similarly, whether the economy 
																																								 																				
3 For	more	information	on	centrality	see	(Borgatti,	2005;	Easley	&	Kleinberg,	2010;	Newman,	2010).	
4	The	reasons	are	twofold:	First,	we	cannot	know	the	true	motivation	of	actors	using	observational	methods,	
since	expressed	motivations	may	or	may	not	reflect	 true	 intentions	behind	the	behavior.	Also,	different	
types	 of	 rationality	 might	 be	 simultaneously	 at	 play	 in	 shaping	 behavior.	 Behavioral	 experiments,	
notwithstanding	 their	 shortcomings,	 are	 better	 suited	 to	 the	 study	 of	 motivations.	 Second,	 actors	
themselves	do	not	necessarily	know	the	true	nature	of	their	motivations.	Various	mental	processes	distort	
rationality	as	shown	by	bounded	rationality	theory	(Kahneman,	2003,	2013;	Kahneman	&	Tversky,	1979)	as	
well	 as	 theories	 critiquing	 thin	 rationality	 employed	by	 rational	 choice	 (Elster,	 1983,	 2007;	 Elster	 et	 al.,	
2000).	
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should be centrally planned or follow the laissez-faire rule pertains to the organization of 
a regime.  
In contrast, “a strategy is a complete contingent plan for a player in the game” 
(Watson, 2008, p. 24). In this study, the game refers to the struggle against the current 
regime with the purpose of building a new form of government. Then, strategic 
preferences correspond to preferences about the methods with which the current regime 
should be overthrown and the institutions associated with another form of government 
should be established. For example, views on whether to seek foreign assistance to 
overthrow some government count as strategic preferences, because this issue revolves 
around the acceptability and feasibility of employing a particular method (get foreign 
assistance or not) to overthrow the government and change the regime. It is worth noting 
that some strategic preferences may be perceived by some actors as ideological 
preferences. For example, whether the socialist revolution should be carried out before or 
after democracy is established may appear to orthodox Marxists as an ideological issue 
about how to implement Marxist principles, whereas social democrats or Leninists would 
be more pragmatic (focusing on ends rather than means) and see it as a strategic question. 
In this study, I do not take side on actors’ views and do not get into the discussion of the 
nature of motivations (whether some issue is an ideological question or a strategic one). I 
conceptualize all issues pertaining to the methods and means to achieve some end as 
strategic matters. In this vein, whether to, say, seek foreign assistance is a strategic 
preference dimension, although for some, this issue may call into question one’s beliefs 
and devotion to a cause. Similarly, whether one misrepresents one’s intentions in building 
an alliance with an ideological opponent to overthrow the government transition is also a 
strategic issue, because whether one believes that one can outweigh the partner after 
short-term collaboration for regime change and expects to take the other for a fool after 
transition is an ex post interpretation of some behavior. We cannot truly know intentions 
and calculations of those who make the decision on whether to ally with an ideological 
partner simply by observing one’s behavior at the time of alliance building. If, indeed, we 
observe one to play the partner for a fool, there still is the question of whether one had 
really planned this move or had decided to defeat the partner after the transition. We 
cannot truly answer this question unless some evidence about motivations of decision 
makers comes to light from the hindsight. Still, such evidence would not be 100% objective 
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––for it represents a particular set of views, but they might help us construct a falsifiable 
narrative).  
On the other hand, distinguishing between ideological and strategic preferences is 
necessary for theorizing the effect of preferences on behavior. In that, ideological 
preferences are less amenable to change in the short/medium run compared to strategic 
preferences. The reason is as follows: changing ideological preferences for a person means 
abandoning an existing worldview and rearranging beliefs to rebuild a coherent vision to 
understand the world. So doing is costly and time consuming. Therefore, a communist is 
unlikely to become a rightwing supporter overnight. Such shifts are conceivable in the long 
run though. As explained by constructivism, mechanisms such as repeated interactions 
allow identities to change in the long run (Chandra, 2012). In this study, I conceptualize 
ideological affiliation as an identity, since one can argue that a militant nationalist ready 
to die and kill for his fatherland takes nationalism as a defining trait of his personality as 
well as the meaning of his life. Besides repeated interactions, the literature on regime 
shows that shocks may induce actors to reconsider their preferences (Haggard & Kaufman, 
2012; Skocpol, 1979). For instance, a person may be a keen supporter of a leader prior to 
elections ––such as secular democrats in Turkey who supported Tayyip Erdogan in the 
early 2000s–– but may be disillusioned by the latter’s policies after elections ––such as 
the democrats who turns against Erdogan once the latter becomes authoritarian.  
To recap, ideological preferences are more likely to change in the long-run, but 
actors might also change them in the short run if some shock erodes the credibility of their 
ideological principles by uncovering undeniable contrary evidence. What does this tell us 
about how cooperation emerges? Preferences affect cooperation dynamics via two ways, 
their particular meanings and their number defining what dimensionality the issue space 
will be. 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, actor-oriented studies of regimes tend to define 
preferences a priori. Typically, these preferences bear the same meaning from society to 
society, which implies that there are no differences in the way, say, grievances about living 
standards shape the struggles over regime type in, say, Weimar Germany and Iran under 
Shah Pahlavi. In reality, hyperinflation and war defeat, among other things, structured the 
debate over regime type in Germany, whereas in Iran, the debate revolved around 
discontent about top-down modernization and foreign interference in domestic affairs 
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(McElligott, 2009; Parsa, 1989). Such differences have causal value therefore are too large 
to be ignored. The specific meanings of grievances are causal because they affect which 
societal groups will mobilize (or not) and the dynamics of the power play among them 
(Locke & Thelen, 1995). In this study, I conduct a contextual analysis to identify what the 
grievances and the meanings (as understood by the players at the time) are. 
Also, given the difficulty of knowing the true motivations behind some behavior, I 
use publicly expressed preferences such as pamphlet, treaty, journal article to identify a 
group of actors’ position on an issue dimension. I take preferences on issue dimensions in 
their face value rather than conducting a heuristic analysis. That also means that I do not 
question whether publicly expressed preferences that we observe align or not with the true 
motivations. It is in order to do so, because the unit of analysis is organized groups. 
Organizations have to attract members; credibility and reputation are critical in how their 
preferences are marketed. Thus, a group that totally misrepresent its preferences to gain 
public support should face a reputation cost and loss of support when the true preferences 
are revealed (thus even if such misrepresentation is not impossible it bears considerable 
costs). Also, I do not get into the debate of how actors might differently perceive and 
understand publicly expressed preferences since that would mean taking sides on an array 
of interpretation of those preferences. Thus, I use contextual analysis to identify issue 
dimensions and content analysis to find out organized groups’ publicly expressed 
preferences on those dimensions. To reemphasize an earlier point, in so doing, I depart 
from the game theoretical studies that define preferences a priori and as fixed. I will 
elaborate on this issue in the theory part. 
Second, as also discussed in detail in Chapter 2, actor-oriented game theoretical 
theories of regimes reduce interests to a single dimension, economic or political. So doing 
ignores the complexity of the reasoning process. For instance, the axiom that lower classes 
prefer democracy because this regime type provides more income hints at a type of 
practical rationality, to use Weber’s terms, and neglects the fact that partisanship also 
shapes behavior (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). On the other hand, classifying actors by 
ideological disposition (such as Przeworski’s hard-liners, soft-liners) rather implies a 
mixture of substantive and practical rationalities (Przeworski, 2005). Again, behavior is 
too complex to be reduced down to preferences about a single regime dimension. It is 
worth noting that the literature on regimes has already pointed out that attitudes towards 
the regime affect regime stability and survival (Dahl, 1971; Linz & Stepan, 1996b; Lipset, 
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1959). Given this critical role that they play in the fate of regimes, we need to examine 
attitudes towards the regime by acknowledging their multidimensionality. 
Overall, in acknowledging the multidimensionality of preferences and their 
context-specific meanings, I conduct contextual analysis to identify them. That said, this 
study will also use control variables such as financial flows from and to contenders or 
calculations about dynamics of interactions among actors ––such as whether to ally with 
the friend of a friend.  
 
CASE SELECTION  
I test the abovementioned theory on the unification among regime challengers using a 
paired comparison of cases of transition from authoritarian to constitutional government. 
Demands for constitutional forms of government began to arise in the early 19th century 
in Western societies and in the late 19th century in non-Western societies. European 
peoples stood up against their monarchs in the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848. In the non-
West, Iran, Russia, China, Mexico, and the Ottoman Empire had undergone constitutional 
revolutions by 1911 (Sohrabi, 1995). Despite fighting similar battles in the 19th century, 
however, a gap had opened between Western and non-Western societies by the 20th 
century. Western societies began living under accountable governments, whereas most 
non-Western societies were still struggling to tie the hands of their rulers. Comparing 
Western to non-Western cases thus has important theoretical implications. Comparison 
within an exclusively Western or non-Western sample gives us insights into the dynamics 
of a particular geography. This approach does not help answering the question of whether 
there might be dynamics that transcend geographical boundaries. Also, regime literature 
has been treating Western cases as benchmarks to evaluate non-Western transitions 
(Ziblatt, 2006, pp. 311–312). However, it might be Europe that constitutes the sui generis 
case. Many like Ziblatt and Hui have stressed the need to normalize Europe. Building on 
this insight, I selected from among 19th century cases of transition.  
I use the least-similar systems design in this dissertation. The transitions to 
constitutional government in Bourbon France (a Western case) and the Ottoman Empire 
under Sultan Abdülhamid II (a non-Western case) similar outcomes, but different 
dynamics and contexts: Both regimes built on an imperial background, briefly liberalized 
before turning authoritarian again, and fell with a revolution ––the 1908 Revolution in 
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the Ottoman Empire and the 1830 Revolution in Bourbon France. In neither case did 
foreign intervention play an important role in regime change. In both cases, governments 
faced considerable regime discontent and several organized challenger groups. In this 
sense, these cases are similar. On the other hand, these transitions occurred in the West 
and in the non-West, and in different periods of the 19th century. Accordingly, the structure 
of contention and the nature of interactions among the government, contenders and the 
environment differed accordingly. In this sense, the paired comparison is a dissimilar 
systems design, in which the actors, grievances, and the sociopolitical environment differ 
across cases but the outcomes (the overthrow of the government) are similar. The finding 
of commonalities in patterns of interactions among challengers in the French and 
Ottoman cases would hint that cooperation for regime change follows dynamics that are 
independent of the particularities of the Western versus non-Western context and early or 
late transition.  
Bourbon France was a façade constitutional monarchy with a Parliament but 
without substantive checks on the power of the monarch. In contrast, the post-1877 
Hamidian regime in the Ottoman Empire was purely autocratic. In France, confrontations 
between antagonistic factions caused unrest, whereas external and internal threats 
threatened the survival of the Ottoman Empire. These differences generated contentious 
activities of dissimilar structure, nature, and repertoire of contentious action. Challengers 
in the Ottoman case encompassed constitutionalists who worked to maintain imperial 
integrity, and secessionists that worked against it. Bourbon challengers were divided not 
over this issue of territorial integrity, but rather on the shape of the regime: Besides the 
republican-monarchist axis, issues such as the role of religion in politics, civil liberties, 
and the division of power between the executive and legislative divided challengers.  
To test the theory on the emergence of cooperation for regime change among 
challengers, I conducted detailed historiographical and archival work to identify who the 
challengers and their preferences are in each case. I constructed original datasets for each 
case detailing the groups involved in the contesting of the regime (27 in the Ottoman case 
and 14 in the French case), their membership, goals, aims, and cooperation patterns. 
These databases may be of use to other scholars.  
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DATA COLLECTION 
I constructed datasets of French and Ottoman challengers using primary and secondary 
sources. My strategy for sampling sources was threefold: First, I conducted semi-
structured face-to-face interviews with historians specializing in the political history of 
19th century France and the Ottoman Empire.5 Interviews began with a discussion of my 
research design and hypotheses. Then, the interviewees suggested a set of primary and 
secondary sources to match my research interests and gave me information about the 
archives that contained these sources. I spent four months collecting the indicated 
sources, classifying them into three categories: (A) Sources on political history, the state, 
and society, (B) sources on ideologies and mental maps, and (C) sources on challenger 
groups’ organizational structure, membership, and behavior (See Appendix I for the 
classification of sources by theme and country).  
Second, I used the sources on political history, the state, and society, to establish 
the environmental conditions in which transitions took place and to identify the relevant 
actors. Actors included all of the challengers that are mentioned in secondary sources, 
government actors, and all of the foreign and domestic powers involved in the process. In 
other words, my definition of actors is not limited to elites or to “the most influential 
actors” defined according to some numerical criteria, such as the one in use in the political 
party literature (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979; Lijphart, 1999). “Small actors” are not 
necessarily negligible: Their reactions factor in the shaping of the environment. For 
example, the sphere of influence of a small contentious group in the Balkans may be 
regional, but the group or the region may play an important role– and in fact, resistance 
started by such local actors triggered the revolution in the Ottoman case.  
Historical sources pose challenges in terms of reliability (Bercovic, 2005; Lustick, 
1996; Thies, 2002; Vitalis, 2006; Wilde, 2004). Primary documents such as manuscripts, 
memoirs, and propaganda material, reflect authors’ epistemological and ideological views 
and political agenda. The partiality of such work is desirable if one is, as I was, is seeking 
to understand a particular actor’s ideas, perceptions, and mental maps. For other 
purposes, personal accounts require crosschecking facts, figures, and narratives. 
Secondary sources are not spared from issues of reliability. Historians might offer 
																																								 																				
5	The	 interviewees	 are	Akşin	 Somel	 from	Sabanci	University,	 Ahmet	 Kuyaş	 from	Galatasaray	University,	
Warren	Breckman	from	the	University	of	Pennsylvania.		
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different accounts of the same facts and phenomena, in part because  they themselves 
pursue a certain epistemological, ideological, or political agenda (Howell & Prevenier, 
2001, p. 1). For instance, Soviet historians present the USSR as a sui generis entity, 
whereas subsequent research reveals similarities between Russian society and other 
modernizing societies (Sil, 2002, pp. 311–320). Therefore, which historiography one 
chooses requires theoretical justification (Lustick, 1996). Also, historical narratives are 
revised in light of new evidence or in response to paradigm shifts in the field. For example, 
early historiography portrays the Ottoman state in the 18th century as a declining entity, 
considering its overreliance on local private actors for tax collection and security 
provision, whereas later historiography interprets the same practices as cost-effective 
solutions to administrative problems, evincing the Empire’s adaptive capacity to changing 
environment (Barkey, 1994; Shaw, 1976). Before constructing the datasets, I thus 
contrasted and compared primary and secondary sources in order to improve data quality 
(Thies, 2002; Vitalis, 2006; Wilde, 2004).  
I followed two rules in dealing with reliability issues. When faced with divergent 
narratives, I relied on recent historiography. However, I indicated in footnotes alternative 
accounts offered by earlier research. When coding factual data –such as, locations and 
dates of meetings or names, I verified information by consulting multiple sources on the 
topic. Crosschecks proved particularly useful in the Ottoman case. Ottomans used the Hijri 
calendar, a lunar calendar that starts in AD 622 marking the date of Prophet Muhammad’s 
emigration from Mecca to Medina. Hijri years have 354 or 355 days, which creates an 11-
day difference from the Gregorian calendar.6 Historians sometimes translated calendars 
with a year lag –for instance, for a given event, some marked the date as, say, 1895, while 
others as 1896. In such cases, I followed the most frequent translation.  
Secondary sources were particularly useful in collecting spatial and temporal 
information about group activities. Primary documents on challenger groups are never 
impartial, but sometimes they simply do not exist. In the Ottoman case, in particular, most 
challengers organized clandestinely, destroyed all documentation and registries on their 
activities and membership, and disciplined their members against divulging information 
in order to escape regime persecution. Consequently, there are only a handful of 
manuscripts and memoirs penned by members of some leading challenger organizations, 
																																								 																				
6 (Publications,	2003,	p.	1352).	
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such as the Committee of Progress and Union. Secondary sources provide missing 
information, which historians have derived from correspondences and diplomatic 
documents.  
 
 
 
THE ARGUMENT  
I argue that contenders are more likely to cooperate for regime change after they converge 
on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). 
Such a coherent oppositional movement is more likely to signal unity and coherence. A 
movement of this kind is more likely to steer the process of transition once a contentious 
movement breaks out at the societal level, hence set the direction of institutional change.  
The coherent movement becomes more likely to emerge among a subset of 
challengers, since it is easier to harmonize preferences within a smaller group than within 
a large one. Challengers are capable of forming a coherent oppositional coalition in three 
steps: In the first stage, there is disunity. Challengers hold mismatching preferences on 
varied issues shaping the struggle over regime type, some of which they highly prioritize. 
Mismatching preferences get in the way of long-term cooperation, which would allow to 
overthrow the regime, despite shared interests in overthrowing the government. This 
study shows that for challengers to build long-term cooperation, there must be a process, 
whereby challengers reconsider the relative priority of preferences on varied issue 
dimensions (which I refer to as “prioritization” or “de-prioritization”) and pragmatically 
replace some of their preferences with more effective ones (“preference revision”). Such a 
process begins in response to environmental changes, such as foreign invasion or 
authoritarian retrenchment. This second stage is instrumental in the overcoming of 
disagreements on varied issue dimensions. This study shows that preferences about 
strategic issues are more likely to be revised, whereas preferences on ideological 
dimensions are more likely to be postponed.  
This study further shows that convergence happens around a “core-actor,” who 
attracts others, who form the “periphery” of the coalition and adopt the same strategy but 
not necessarily the same ideologies. For such a coalition to emerge, convergence of 
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preferences on ideological issues is helpful but neither necessary nor sufficient. Yet, 
preferences on strategic issues must converge. This means that some level of 
“pragmatism,” the propensity to postpone the resolution of ideological disagreements in 
view of overthrowing the government in the short run, is necessary to form an oppositional 
coalition. “Idealists,” those who are dedicated to their preference sets, are less likely to 
sideline disagreements, which makes ideological convergence much harder to achieve. 
Therefore, the probability of having a coalition of all idealists is lower than the probability 
of having a coalition of some pragmatists and some idealists. In other words, cooperation 
for regime change in the long run requires some level of pragmatism on strategic issue 
dimensions. 
The rise of a coherent oppositional front follows from long-term cooperation. 
Long-term cooperation is distinguished from short-term cooperation because it is evident 
in iterated moves, with actors agreeing -despite their divergent ideologies- to repeatedly 
bring pressure to bear on the old regime using similar methods. My research shows that 
unity among challengers is crafted. Regime change depends not only on 
destabilization of the status quo but also on potential challengers being willing to postpone 
their ideological disagreements so as to arrive at common strategies that allow for building 
a united coherent oppositional coalition.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Implications of the argument  
Cooperation for regime change is not a natural outcome of shared interests against the 
incumbent government as bargaining theories assume to be. Such cooperation is likely to 
follow from a process, whereby certain environmental transformations induce actors to 
postpone the resolution of ideological differences and revise their strategic preferences 
pertaining to how to overthrow the government. This means, unity among contenders is 
not given, which is why in real life, we observe challengers to unite work against the regime 
only in some cases. 
This argument makes a significant contribution to cooperation theory of regimes. 
Findings from the case studies of the Ottoman and French cases indicate that cooperation 
among challengers against the current government is not a unidimensional sequential 
game of cooperation, as is generally conceptualized by bargaining theories. In such games, 
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distrust and low benefits from cooperation hinder cooperation, whereas shared interests 
and the shadow of future induce cooperation (Fearon, 1995; Watson, 2008). In cases of 
coordination, these factors are in effect. Yet, there are additional obstacles, which result 
from the multiplicity of issue dimensions constituting the debate over regime type. The 
higher the number of issue dimensions gets the harder the cooperation among challenger 
groups becomes. As a result, cooperation for regime change takes time to build. Hence, 
the plurality of possible solutions hinders cooperation for regime change independently of 
distrust, low benefits from cooperation, and incentives to cheat. 
One central finding of this research is that cooperation for regime change becomes 
more likely after challengers converge on a particular strategy for changing the regime. In 
contrast, harmonizing preferences on ideological issues is less likely to obtain in the short 
and medium run. As the following chapters show, evidence from the Ottoman and French 
cases reveal that alignment of ideological preferences does not suffice to form sustainable 
cooperation. Specifically, in the Ottoman case, ideological agreement on society type and 
the role of religion in politics did not suffice to foster cooperation among those who shared 
preferences on these matters between 1895 and 1901. Between 1902 and 1908, challengers 
were able to form an oppositional coalition, after sidelining their differences on society 
type and state type (See Chapter 3). Similarly, in the French case, agreement on 
preferences about the executive-legislative balance did not suffice to foster long-term 
cooperation. Challengers cooperated for regime after aligning their preferences on 
whether to use violence to change the regime and the role of religion in politics (See 
Chapter 4). 
What these findings imply is that in order to cooperate for regime change, 
contenders need not resolve all ideological disagreements. Postponing the resolution of 
certain ideological differences also helps with cooperation. In other words, long-term 
cooperation for regime change becomes more likely to emerge among actors who are 
pragmatic on ideological issues than those who are not. 
 Another important implication of the argument is that the rise of a coherent 
oppositional coalition makes it easier for challengers to steer the transition process once 
contentious activities break out at the societal level. Thus, such a coalition plays a 
fundamental role in dynamics of regime transition by setting the direction of regime 
change.  
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Methodologically, this study provides evidence for the theoretical and empirical 
shortcomings of defining motivations underlying cooperation ––such as economic 
interests or political grievances–– a priori and with respect to a single issue dimension. 
Grievances and interests bear different meanings across space and time, whereby the 
nature of the game that contenders play varies across cases. Besides, preferences are not 
fixed over time. Scholars of regimes who focus on interactions between contenders and 
the government need to take shifts in actors’ preferences into account. Deriving 
preferences using a contextual case study and incorporating changes in preferences over 
time into study designs help to more accurately analyze dynamics of regime change. 
 
PLAN OF THE STUDY 
The study begins with a discussion of the role and dynamics of cooperation among 
challengers in regime transitions. Specifically, I explain why we should not take 
cooperation for granted and why regime contenders are not unitary actors. I emphasize 
that grievances about regimes are multidimensional and actors take different positions on 
these dimensions. Building on these premises, I propose that cooperation for regime 
change among challengers is a case of coordination with conflicting interests on varied 
issue dimensions. I introduce the concept of prioritization and de-prioritization to capture 
changes in the ranking of preferences and that of preference revision to control for shifts 
in the content of preferences with respect to environmental transformations. Building on 
these insights, Chapter II advances the theory that cooperation for regime change among 
challengers becomes more likely when actors postpone their ideological disagreements 
and harmonize their transition strategies. Chapter II also presents the methodology for 
testing this theory.  
Chapters III and IV consist of in-depth case studies of the Ottoman and French 
transitions. Each case study chapter begins with a historical analysis that lays out the 
nature of the authoritarian regime, the issue dimensions that shaped the struggle over 
regime type, the relevant actors, and the latter’s positions on these issues. In so doing, I 
contextualize challengers in order to grasp the specific meanings of that they ascribed to 
issues and their preferences. This historical works draws on a content analysis of memoirs, 
pamphlets, and articles by prominent figures of each group, as well as secondary sources 
written on groups and their members following the procedure that I lay out in Chapter II. 
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In Chapter III, I show that Ottoman constitutionalists understood constitutionalism as a 
solution to secessionism, imperialism, and secularism rather than as a means to tie the 
hands of the leader, as was the case in Western Europe (Tilly, 1993; Weingast, 1997). 
Chapter IV uses the same methodology to analyze the French case of transition. It shows 
that French challengers embraced the idea of a regime of checks and balances upon 
realizing that they could not ensure political survival without putting constitutional limits 
on the executive.  
In the case study chapters, the historical analysis is followed by a network analysis 
of patterns of interactions among challengers over time. Network analysis allows for 
identifying the dimensions on which preference alignment propelled cooperation and on 
which others preferences are not taken into account. As I explained earlier, longitudinal 
network models help reveal whether certain issues are (de)prioritized and if who in which 
direction this affected cooperation dynamics. I use descriptive network analysis to discern 
types of cooperation (long-term vs. short-term cooperation) and compare preference sets 
of members of the oppositional coalition to one another. I show that, in both cases, and 
despite various attempts at reunification, challengers failed to work together due to 
strategic and ideological disagreements.  
Chapter 5 compares findings from the Ottoman and French case studies and 
discusses how they relate to the theory on cooperation for regime change among 
challengers. In both cases, despite differences in grievances, environmental conditions, 
and the profile of actors, cooperation unfolded in three stages. In the first stage, which I 
call the disunity stage, interactions among challengers are limited to short-term 
cooperation. At the broader scale, challengers remain disconnected, forming at best issue-
based, temporary links with one another. In the second stage, environmental changes 
prompt challengers (as in the cases of France and the Ottoman Empire0 to revise and re-
rank their preferences such that strategic preferences are harmonized. In this process, a 
subset of challengers gravitates towards a core actor, who advocated for the most salient 
preferences. The rise of a coherent oppositional coalition is instrumental in setting the 
direction of institutional change once contentious activities break out at the societal level. 
Contentious activities are stochastic events. Therefore, the timing of regime change cannot 
be predicted. On the other hand, the rise of a coherent united coalition of challengers 
makes regime transition more likely.  
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 KEY CONCEPTS & DEFINITIONS 
 
Issue dimension: subject matters that are relevant to the ongoing debate on regime type 
in society, which is conceptualized as matters that contextual analysis identifies to be 
salient. Indicators of salience are matters on which the majority of actors (including 
challengers and the public) express a certain position and consider to be critical aspects of 
the regime debate. It is operationalized as a dimension on which actors have a particular 
position. For example, if socioeconomic equality is an important part of the debate on the 
regime, that topic qualifies as an issue dimension; we define an actor’s position on that 
dimension (such as more redistribution). Issue dimensions can be (and usually are) 
multiple in a given context. Although a given issue dimension appears to be the same the 
term in which actors debate it varies by context (Locke & Thelen, 1995). Thus, issue space 
defining the ongoing debate on the regime is multidimensional. 
 
Preference: Actors’ position by an issue dimension. The indicator is the observed 
expressed position, such as a statement, declaration. Preferences are derived using a 
contextual analysis of actors’ memoirs, propaganda material, books and articles written 
on the subject of issue dimensions affecting the debate on the regime. Thus, actors occupy 
positions on a multidimensional plane, which changes in accordance with changes in 
observed expressed preferences. 
 
Strategic preferences: preferences about the methods with which the current regime 
should be overthrown and the institutions associated with another form of government 
should be established. 
 
Ideological preferences: Preferences about what the new regime should look like. 
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Unity: A group of actors is united if the same actors repeatedly cooperate over time 
(otherwise, it would look like a one-time collaboration).  
 
Coherence: A group is coherent if its members have similar preferences on most issues. 
Concomitantly, a group lacks coherence if its members have disagreements on multiple 
issues. 
 
Long-term cooperation: Some groups A and B are engaged in long-term cooperation 
if and only if they have been cooperating on more than one issue for at least three 
successive years.  
 
Short-term cooperation: Some groups A and B are engaged in short-term cooperation, 
if cooperation is limited on one issue and lasts less than three successive years. 
 
One-time cooperation: the case in which players cooperate at only one round and not 
after given some sequential game. 
 
Preference alignment: Preference alignment refers to similarity of preference on some 
issue dimension. In this study, it is not used to imply complementarity of preferences. 
 
Priority: The position of preferences in the preference ladder (preference relations in 
game theory) that some player has at a given time. 
 
Prioritization: Moving some preference to an upper rank in the ranking of preferences. 
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De-prioritization: Moving some preference to a lower rank in the ranking of 
preferences. 
 
Environmental transformations: Changes in the sociopolitical and economic 
contexts that make actors revise their preferences independently of interactions among 
players. 
 
Preference revision: Qualitative changes in preferences as new information becomes 
available (preference update in the game theoretical language). 
 
Core-actor: The challenger group that assumes the leadership position in a coalition by 
virtue of adopting the most salient strategic and ideological preferences. Core-actors are 
connected to everyone else in the coalition but everyone else need not be interconnected.  
 
Peripheral actors: The challenger groups that gather around a core actor (assuming the 
leadership position in a coalition). All peripheral actors are tied to the core actor on the 
basis of preference convergence on strategies, but preference convergence on ideological 
matters is not necessary. Peripheral actors need not be connected to each other. 
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CHAPTER 2 A Dynamic Theory of Cooperation for Regime Change 
 
Regime transitions are turbulent processes. The proclamation of a republic, the adoption of a 
constitution, the collapse of a government, or a revolution constitute the endpoint of a long process 
of struggles between the incumbent rulers and its contenders. On the day of transition, we observe 
one of the possible realizations of the scenario in which contenders overthrow the incumbent’s 
regime. In an another world, the incumbent could have crashed his contenders and consolidated 
its authority. It could also have fallen into a state of disorder (such as civil war). Alternatively, the 
regime might have been dragged into a revolutionary situation that is neither completely disorderly 
(as in a state of civil war) nor completely orderly (as in the case of a consolidated regime). What is 
interesting is that in such what I will call “semi-orderly states,”7 the regime may stay for a brief or 
long period depending on the circumstances. Then, the semi-orderly state might lead to 
consolidation, disorder, or regime change. In this dissertation, I study and theorize the regimes that 
shift from a semi-orderly state to the establishment of a new regime.  
What is a semi-orderly state and why is it important to understand dynamics of regime 
change? One can imagine semi-orderly state as a state in which organized contender groups 
challenge the incumbent’s regime but neither contenders nor the incumbent is (yet) strong enough 
to suppress the other. In other words, the forces that work to (re)produce regime stability and those 
that work for regime change coexist. Empirically, some regimes stay in semi-orderly states longer 
than others. For example, the Colombian regime has been struggling with the guerilla group FARC 
for decades, whereas the 1979 Iranian Revolution unfolded within a couple of years once Khomeini 
emerged as a leader. Why do some regimes stay in semi-orderly states longer than others? Also, 
what role does cooperation among contenders play in whether regimes will move to a new regime 
or not, if any? This chapter elaborates on the role of cooperation among challengers in contended 
regimes, where opposition groups challenge the incumbent government demanding regime change.  
The chapter is structured as follows: The first section elaborates on why we need to examine 
the role of challengers when studying processes of regime change. Specifically, I set the theoretical 
background and discuss existing explanations of transition and cooperation for transition among 
challengers. In the second section, I propose a theory of cooperation for regime change with 
multiple actors holding conflicting interests on issue dimensions constituting the debate over 
regime type. I argue that challengers are more likely to form a coherent oppositional coalition if 
they postpone ideological disagreements and converge on their strategies of transition (i.e., 
preferences about how regime change should be carried out). The type of the oppositional coalition 
that is capable of overthrowing the government or extract significant concessions from him is more 
likely to dwell upon preference convergence on strategies, since strategies are less rigid than 
																																								 																				
7	 This	 is	 an	 adaptation	 of	 the	 term	 proposed	 by	Wolfram	 in	 his	 classification	 of	 behavior	 in	 dynamical	
systems.	For	more	information	see	(Mitchell,	2009;	Wolfram,	2002,	pp.	151–159).		
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ideologies in the short run. I further argue that oppositional coalitions tend to display a center-
periphery structure, in which challenger groups gather around a particular group that assumes the 
leadership. This coalition comes about as a result of preference convergence on strategies. 
Preference convergence on ideologies is helpful but neither necessary nor sufficient. Ultimately, the 
theory suggests that it requires more than shared interests in overthrowing the regime to unify 
challengers. Cooperation for regime change among challengers is not a given; it is a result of process 
of re-prioritizing and revising preferences. 
 
Role of cooperation among challengers in regime change  
 
Why should we consider interactions among challengers in thinking about dynamics of regime 
change? Do opposition groups need to cooperate to change the regime? Theoretically, if a group of 
challengers possesses sufficient resources, it may overthrow the government on its own (for 
example via a coup). If so, interactions among challengers do not arise as a problem; what needs to 
be explained to understand regime change is how the challenger group mobilizes resources.8 Yet, 
often times, resources are scarce and challengers compete with one another to acquire them. In 
vying for resources, challengers spend the energy that they would otherwise allocate to contending 
the government. Competition also allows rulers to employ divide-and-rule tactics in order to 
fracture or preempt the rise of a united challenger front (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006).  
 Cooperation might be desirable to overcome such obstacles. For example, contenders 
might diminish the cost of resource mobilization by pooling resources or free riding on a more 
resourceful partner. Also, they might stand stronger against the incumbent if they form a united 
front. Collaboration might also be desirable, since acquiring the consent of groups making 
dissimilar demands might help to reduce regime contestation after transition. The alternative to 
not compromising with groups making different demands –which may become anti-regime groups 
after the transition– is to suppress or militarily defeat them –a costlier strategy for future 
incumbents (Goldstone, Rueschemeyer, & Mahoney, 2003; Gurr, 1988; Huntington, 1968; 
Skocpol, 1979). Thus, contenders benefit from cooperating with one another for regime change. 
Yet, in many cases of contended regimes cooperation does not come automatically–such as the 
disunited Syrian opposition groups to the Assad government. If beneficial, why do contenders not 
cooperate? Let us now see how opposition groups to the incumbent come to cooperate for regime 
change. 
																																								 																				
8	 In	 this	 regard,	 scholars	 of	 contentious	 politics	 emphasize	 the	 role	 of	 ideological	 entrepreneurship,	
recruitment,	 financing,	and	political	opportunity	structures	(Koopmans,	1993;	McAdam,	1982;	McAdam,	
Tarrow,	&	Tilly,	2001;	McCarthy	&	Zald,	1977;	Minkoff,	1993;	Olzak	&	West,	1991;	Tarrow,	1994;	Weinstein,	
2007).	
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Unpacking cooperation: The formation of oppositional movements 
 
Under what conditions do challengers cooperate for regime change? The literature on regimes 
proposes two different explanations on cooperation among challengers. Process-oriented scholars 
theorize cooperation as an outcome of historical processes –such as military, bureaucratic, or 
industrial revolutions– and contingencies –such as foreign invasion or a crisis. History plays a 
causal role by gradually transforming the socioeconomic and political environment, which, in turn, 
empowers certain societal groups against others. As structural conditions change, novel sets of 
interests emerge, new societal groups form and begin making demands from the incumbent, 
forcing the political structure upholding the incumbent’s regime to adapt. Thus, struggles leading 
to regime change follow from historical transformations (Anderson, 1974; Downing, 1992; Ertman, 
1997; Marx, 1978; Moore, 1993; Tilly, 1993). Typically, in these arguments, regime change happens 
when the opportunity presents itself after the power balance between the incumbent and 
challengers has shifted in favor of the latter (Luebbert, 1991; Tilly, 1993).  
Regarding cooperation among challengers, process-oriented scholars argue that societal 
groups cooperate against the regime on the basis of distinct common socioeconomic and/or 
political interests (such as “taxation for representation” or “proletarian interests”), which, 
themselves, are products of environmental transformations (Marx, 1978; Tilly, 1993). On the basis 
of these interests, contextual constraints and opportunities bring actors to collaborate for regime 
change as we see in rise of “the lib-lab coalition” or the bourgeoisie that drove democratic 
transitions in Western Europe (Luebbert, 1991; Moore, 1993). Thus, cooperation among contenders 
and the transitions that the latter carry out are a product of historical and structural developments 
(Marx, 1978; Poggi, 1978; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 2000).  
The strength of these explanations lies in underlining the role of processes and 
contingencies. That is, the type of interests that fosters cooperation among challengers varies by 
contextual and historical factors. This perspective beautifully accounts for cross-sectional 
variations and differences in patterns of change. On the other hand, the emphasis on contextual 
and temporal specificities forecloses the possibility of posing the question of whether there might 
be common patterns in the way cooperation emerges across different cases. This is the question 
that this dissertation addresses.  
As to what propels cooperation for regime change, some process-oriented scholars draw 
attention to the mobilizing role of organizations, such as trade unions and professional 
organizations (R. Collier, 1999; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992; Wright, 2000) or 
churches (Katznelson & Jones, 2010; McAdam, 1982). Marxist scholars emphasize the role of class 
consciousness, hegemony, and leadership (Althusser, 1972; Gramsci, 1971; Hechter, 2004; Lukács, 
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1972; Thompson, 1966; Wright, 1996). More relational arguments underline reconfigurations of 
power balance between the state and society, suggesting that regime change becomes more likely 
to when civil society gets stronger (Howard, 2003; Putnam, 1993). Even though the emphasis 
seems to be placed on different mechanisms, the gist of these arguments is that transition happens 
when proponents of regime change outweigh supporters of the regime. 
In attributing changes in power balance to processes and contingencies, some process-
oriented scholars also focus on the domestic and foreign factors that affect power balance. Ruling 
elites do not yield to pressures for regime change if they can overwhelm dissenters through 
institutional mechanisms (Brownlee, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Magaloni, 2008; Teorell, 2010), 
if they attract economic and communal elites to the regime, or if they enjoy foreign support (Bellin, 
2004; Brake, 1989; Bunce, McFaul, & Stoner-Weiss, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Skocpol, 1979). 
Concomitantly, the withdrawal of foreign support, foreign invasion, or the threat of war or 
revolution might trigger regime change (Bellin, 2004; Levitsky & Way, 2010). The literature also 
finds that unity within the ruling coalition helps incumbents to remain in power during times of 
crises (Brownlee, 2007; Dogan & Higley, 1998; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995; Levitsky & Way, 2010; 
Magaloni, 2008). These explanations display two distinct features. 
First, institutional change and stability are a function of the balance of power between the 
incumbent and contenders. That said, it is the structural and institutional factors like regime 
capacity or configuration of class relations that are the most influential in affecting the power 
balance among actors. In this sense, this literature does not address the question of whether 
cooperation among challengers matters to transitions.  
Second, in treating the balance of power among actors, most scholars tend to offer what 
Tilly calls “zero-sum accounts” (Tilly, 2000). That is, anti-regime forces’ ability to overpower the 
incumbent explains institutional change and the incumbent’s superiority over challengers accounts 
for regime survival. Although this type of explanations may seem reasonable at first glance 
(reasonable since we observe these parties interact and one of them outweighs the other), one party 
is treated as a function of the other, whereas it can be conceptualized as an independent force 
interacting with the other (Tilly, 2000). As a result, such a conceptualization dismisses the 
possibility that other reasons might be weakening them. It could be that problems about, say, 
hierarchy within some party diminishes this party’s capacity independently of the rival’s superiority 
(e.g., the Republican People’s Party in Turkey since the 1990s). In effect, a regime might be 
surviving not because its government is stronger than contenders, but because contenders are too 
weak to assume power. Of course, there are exceptions to this sort of explanations, but they 
generally focus on the inner dynamics of incumbents, such as (Brownlee, 2007; Dogan & Higley, 
1998; Haggard & Kaufman, 1995; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Magaloni, 2008). In contrast, there is not 
much written on the inner dynamics of challengers. This dissertation attempts to fill in this gap.  
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Contra process-oriented studies’ emphasis on historical legacies and contingencies, the 
alternative strand of the literature on regimes, namely bargaining models, takes bargains between 
among governments and challengers to be the decisive factor on institutional change or stability. 
Within this framework, the number of actors that are party to bargains and configurations of 
alliances among them become decisive on the institutional outcome. In this sense, our question of 
whether cooperation among challengers has an effect on transition falls within the scope of the 
theory. As to what propels cooperation, the bargaining school argues that shared interests and 
grievances bring actors to cooperate (Coppedge, 2012). This school branches into one economic 
and one political variant when it comes to the nature of interests and grievances. In the remainder 
of this section, I will discuss these variants in order. 
The defining characteristic of the economic branch of the bargaining school is to operate 
under the assumption that challengers are already unified. We will see that some political 
bargaining models relax this assumption. Economically, what unifies actors are shared interests in 
macrolevel stability or grievances about its lack. For example, in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), 
bargains over regime type define a “political conflict between the elites who are the relatively rich 
and the majority (or citizens) who is the relatively poor” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, p. 22). 
Citizens want democracy for it generates more income for them and elites want nondemocracy 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, pp. 19, 22–23). Wealth also emerges as the most important factor in 
Limongi and Przeworski (1997), who “deliberately ignore factors such as religion, colonial legacy, 
income distribution, or diffusion” (Limongi & Przeworski, 1997, p. 155). (Przeworski, Alvarez, 
Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000) follows the same pattern. In (Boix, 2003; Boix & Stokes, 2003), capital 
mobility is taken into account in addition to wealth. Overall, high taxes, pauperization, or inequality 
generate grievances among lower classes in this literature (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001; Boix, 
2003; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Rosendorff, 2001; Zak & Feng, 2003). Once these grievances surpass a 
certain threshold lower classes threaten with rebellion. Ruling elites respond by liberalization if the 
cost of repressing lower classes’ demands surpasses the cost of liberalization.  
The strength of this reasoning lies in attributing the power balance among actors to 
observable economic indicators. Environmental changes and shocks are incorporated into the 
model, which allows modelers make precise predictions.  
 However, economic bargaining models are agnostic about the identity of actors and the 
causal implications of history. This means to assume that class conflict plays out in similar ways. 
For example, according to this perspective, class conflict produced similar dynamics in Sweden 
during the Interwar period and in Iran under Shah Pahlavi. Yet, the terms of these conflicts and the 
type of the parties involved were so different that these processes yielded to different outcomes, 
social democracy in Sweden and a mullah regime in Iran (Berman, 2006; Parsa, 1989). Yet, similar 
grievances do not necessarily unfold similar conflicts, because grievances may bear different 
meanings in different contexts (Locke & Thelen, 1995). Also, this literature makes the strong 
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assumption that lower classes can/will take action once structural transformations will present an 
opportunity.9 Under this assumption, problems related to mobilization and coordination or 
distributional conflicts do not arise. If these assumptions were true, most transitions would not 
have failed or must have happened earlier. However, evidence suggests the contrary: Organized 
leftwing supporters in Interwar Europe, all of whom wanted to carry out a regime transition, 
divided into socialists, communists, and anarcho-syndicalists due to disagreements as to how 
transition should happen, which weakened their capacity of action (Berman, 2006). That is to say, 
cooperation does not automatically flow from shared interests as the literature presumes.  
 In reality, actors also have political grievances and those that have the same economic 
grievances do not necessarily make the same policy choices. For example, both the social democrat 
and communist party capture votes of leftwing supporters in post-World War II France. Political 
bargaining models add the ideological dimension to grievances, defining them along the 
authoritarian-libertarian axis or loyalty to the regime (Colomer, 2000; Linz, 1978; O’Donnell, 
Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986; Przeworski, 1991, 2005). Some models assume challengers to be 
unitary actors (Crescenzi, 1999; Sutter, 1995; Swaminathan, 1999; Zielinski, 1995). Others relax 
this assumption and classify challengers with respect to the strength of preferences, the 
composition of preference sets, or their level of organization. Using the strength of preferences, 
some models differentiate between actors holding strong preferences and those holding weak 
preferences (Przeworski, 1991, 2005). Actors holding weaker preferences –such as Przeworski’s 
soft-liner autocrats– may consider compromise with opposition actors, whereas  actors holding 
strong preferences –such as Przeworski’s hard-liner autocrats– do not (Przeworski, 2005). This 
classification allows for recognizing that different strategies may stem from similar preference sets. 
The strength of preferences also shapes outcomes –it is the soft-liners choice between autocrats or 
and democrats determines the regime outcome. Using the level of organization, other models 
define an opposition and mass public (Casper & Taylor, 1996). The role of mass public is to send a 
signal, whereupon the opposition challenges the regime. Democratization happens when 
coordination between these two actors deter regime elites. While these models give a more accurate 
picture of regime contention –by incorporating interactions between the public and organized 
groups, the assumption that only one organized challenger group challenges the regime is 
unrealistic.  
 A third type of models classifies challengers with respect to the qualitative differences 
between preference sets (Colomer, 1995, 2000; Weingast, 1997). For example, Weingast divides 
challengers into groups A and B for demanding slightly different arrangements for the same type 
of regime (limited government). Using the Spanish case of transition, Colomer (1995) defines six 
																																								 																				
9	Process-oriented	studies	also	make	the	assumption	that	actors	take	action	when	the	opportunity	presents	
itself.	 Yet,	 this	 assumption	 coheres	 with	 their	 theoretical	 approach	 that	 primes	 structural	 factors	 over	
macro-level	dynamics.	
		 47	
actors based on how much continuity from the old regime they desire and makes different 
predictions using different game types –such as the battle of sexes or prisoners’ dilemma. Colomer 
models seem more realistic since he derives his assumptions from empirical observations of the 
Spanish transition. In both studies, challengers’ capacity to act depends on their ability to 
coordinate. These models do a good job addressing coordination problems that actors pursuing the 
same political objective face.  
One limitation is that these models are designed with respect to a single regime dimension. 
In reality, more issue-dimensions shape bargains over regime type. Therefore, organized 
challengers may be as many as the number of differences on these various issues. Thus, one major 
contribution of such political bargaining models is to relax the assumption that challengers are 
identical in their preferences and reasoning. Regardless of how this literature conceptualizes 
challengers, the argument suggests that transition happens when supporters of democratization 
outweigh supporters of authoritarianism and the power balance shifts according to contingencies.  
 The strength of political bargaining models lies in recognizing that actors with common 
grievances need not employ the same strategies. On the other hand, both economic and political 
models assume fixed and unidimensional preferences. In real life, preferences transcend the 
democracy vs. authoritarianism axis or economic dimension. According to Tilly, societal actors 
confront the regime along multiple dimensions, including inclusion, equal opportunities, and 
security provision (Tilly, 2007, pp. 14–15).10 Therefore, as Ziblatt notes, it is unrealistic to theorize 
regimes according to a single ordering principle (Ziblatt, 2006, pp. 333–34). Moreover, actors may 
revise their preferences in response to environmental transformations. I follow Tilly and Ziblatt in 
contending that we should incorporate the multidimensionality of preferences to improve our 
theories. 
 What preference dimensions affect transition dynamics? To this question, bargaining 
theory provides an a priori answer–economic or political grievances (Coppedge, 2012, pp. 180–
90). For process-oriented studies, the specific way in which historical processes structure the 
context determines what grievances are. In other words, the type of grievances underlying bargains 
over regime type varies by contextual and historical factors. In this approach, historical processes 
such as military, bureaucratic, or industrial revolutions empower a distinct set of actors with anti-
authoritarian interests (Anderson, 1974; D. Collier & Collier, 1991; Downing, 1992; Ertman, 1997; 
Marx, 1978; Moore, 1993). Anti-authoritarian actors may be several and making different demands 
on the regime. In some cases, anti-authoritarian interests boil down to a particular material 
interest, whereby challengers act as a unitary actor against the authoritarian government. The 
Glorious Revolution provides a good example. English nobles stood up against the monarch on the 
basis of taxation-related grievances, and their contention gradually escalated to armed conflict 
																																								 																				
10	See	pp.	14-15	for	extended	definitions.	
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which, in turn, resulted in the regicide and the regime’s transition to constitutional government 
(Tilly, 1993).  
Yet, actors need not be homogenous groups as is the case with English parliamentarians. 
In some contexts, anti-authoritarian coalitions involve groups with heterogeneous grievances –
such as Luebbert’s lib-lab coalition (1991) or and the 1906 Iranian Revolution carried by merchants, 
the clergy, and intellectuals (Luebbert, 1991; McDaniel, 1991). These disparate groups sometimes 
cooperate for an ideological cause and sometimes for strategic purposes (while keeping their 
divergent ideological beliefs). In the case of the Cuban Revolution for example, anti-imperialism –
understood as the economic exploitation of the country’s resources and its toleration by the 
national government– mobilized workers, peasants, and students under the leadership of the 
Movement and Fidel Castro (Farber, 2007). In the case of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the clergy, 
urban middle classes, and leftwing intellectuals collaborated under Khomeini’s leadership to 
overthrow the Shah’s regime (Parsa, 1989).  
 Both process-oriented studies and bargaining theories explain the process of unification 
among challengers by aligned interests. However, as these examples show, the nature of aligned 
interests pertains to economic grievances, ideological causes, or pure strategic thinking. Process-
oriented studies attribute this variation to context and contingencies. Similar to the identity of anti-
authoritarian actors, the nature of interests also plays a causal role in shaping outcomes of bargains 
over regime type. In the Cuban and English cases, transition leads to the type of regime that 
challengers previously agreed upon. Absent such an agreement, the Iranian transition resulted in 
the regime that the dominant challenger group desired, that is, a theocratic regime. Finally, this 
literature explains the timing of transitions by historical contingencies that provide an opening and 
allow anti-authoritarian actors to overthrow authoritarianism and democratize the regime –such 
as fiscal crises or interstate wars (Downing, 1992; Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1993). Structural thresholds 
for transition vary by context.  
 Following the process-oriented approach, I believe that the identity of challengers and the 
nature of grievances shape outcomes of bargains between the government and challengers. 
Process-oriented studies do a good job showing how a particular interest or cause unify challengers 
in a given context. On the flipside, this explanation raises the question of how challengers come to 
discount the other grievances that they used to care about. For example, how did Iranian 
intellectuals and leftists come to collaborate with Khomeini’s movement? This is a noteworthy 
question in that regime contention involves great risks for challengers and although some might be 
engaging contentious movements because of the economic grievances that transition might bring, 
others pursue ideological causes.  
 What makes some challengers sideline ideological preferences and engage in strategic 
alliance when others do not? One possible explanation is that these issues are de-prioritized and 
their resolution are postponed. When de-prioritized, mismatch between preferences about this 
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issue ceases to impede cooperation. Actors begin considering cooperation with more partners than 
before. However, game theoretical models assume preferences to be fixed and the number of actors 
to stay constant. In reality, preferences evolve and challengers split or merge with respect to 
(dis)agreements on issue dimensions. Therefore, preference sets and the number of relevant actors 
vary over time. Can such dynamism be incorporated in cooperation models? Could there be a 
process whereby some challengers come to sideline some differences of opinion and focus on a 
particular set of grievances, which allow them to act as a unitary actor?  
 
*** 
 
To recap, existing explanations either attribute no significant role to cooperation among 
challengers (as in process-oriented studies) or simplify cooperation among challengers to shared 
interests in one issue dimension. However, evidence suggests that challengers are several and each 
has a different stance on the issues that underlie bargains over regime type. Therefore, they may or 
may not unite against the regime. With the exception of some political models, bargaining 
theoreticians conceptualize challengers as a body of actors already unified around some shared 
interests, which makes them capable of rising against the government whenever the opportunity 
presents itself. The unitary actor assumption allows for neglecting coordination problems that 
challengers face. Some political bargaining models relax this assumption and treat coordination 
problems. However, because preferences are defined a priori, such models capture coordination 
problems only on one political dimension. Accordingly, models define a limited number of 
opposition actors, which differ from one another on the basis of this one particular dimension and 
whose number stays constant. Such assumptions make models less realistic, reducing their ability 
to capture complex real-life situations. Process-oriented studies include the exact number of actors 
and issue dimensions as are observed in a given context, thus providing a thick explanation. 
Historical analysis elucidates how challengers come to unite around a particular interest. Yet, this 
explanation raises the question of why and how challengers discount alternative bases of 
cooperation. How is it that challengers sideline some of their disagreements? 
 Overall, the process of unification among challengers plays a fundamental role in transition 
dynamics by determining whether challengers may or may not act as a unitary actor against the 
regime. However, only some branches of the literature on regimes address problems related to 
unification, while the rest assumes challengers to be already unified and neglects coordination 
problems. For both the process-oriented and bargaining approaches, cooperation grounds on 
interest alignment. As regards the nature of the interests that unite challengers, the literature is 
divided. Economic bargaining models underline material interests; political bargaining models and 
process-oriented studies emphasize ideological causes and strategic alliances. In reality, material 
benefits, ideological causes, and strategic calculations are simultaneously involved in decision 
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making and often are entangled. In this dissertation, as I later explain in detail, I conceptualize all 
these three categories under the concept of preferences. The question of why a particular preference 
type (rather than others) shapes cooperative behavior does not find a clear answer in the literature. 
It is this question that this dissertation tackles with. In effect, cooperation among challengers 
involves dynamics more complicated than is characterized by the literature on regimes. The next 
section discusses why such complexities cannot be neglected and how they can be handled. 
 
 
A theory of coordination for regime change 
Why is cooperation among challengers a case of coordination with conflicting 
interests? 
 
The last sections discussed why cooperation among challengers is desirable and some ways in which 
it may come about. We have seen that existing theories tend to neglect the difficulties involved in 
the process of unification among challengers and attribute cooperation to different types of 
reasoning, including strategic reasoning, pursuit of an ideological cause, and material gains. In this 
section, I argue that cooperation for regime change is a case of coordination with conflicting 
interests, because it entails multiple issue dimensions on which numerous challenger groups 
occupy different positions. In this section, I begin by elaborating on how differences of opinions 
among challengers affect cooperation to show that the unitary actor assumption is too strong. I 
argue that unity among challengers is crafted (as opposed to given). Next, I show that interactions 
among challengers display the characteristics of a coordination game with conflicting interests. 
Finally, I discuss the conceptualization of interests, ideological causes, and strategic thinking. I 
explain how the concepts of preference-type and issue-dimension help capture these different types 
of motivations behind actions. I emphasize that the type of the coordination game that challengers 
play depends on the specific meaning of some issue-dimension in a given context. This specific 
meaning determines not just the identity of actors but also payoffs. This section concludes that 
historical analysis is necessary to identify the contextual meaning of issues and preferences in order 
to accurately model contenders’ behavior during transition. 
 
Why cooperation among challengers cannot be taken for granted 
Interactions among contenders involve competition and cooperation. Although shared interests in 
regime change give actors incentive to cooperate against the incumbent government, uncertainty 
and mistrust work against it. One most frequent conceptualization of this type of interactions is the 
prisoners’ dilemma (PD) game. Briefly, PD is a type of game in which two prisoners are to choose 
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between confessing a crime that they committed together and keeping silent. If one confesses and 
the other keeps silent, the confessor goes free. If both keep silent both receive a certain penalty. 
However, this penalty is no worse than the one they would receive f they both confess. Prisoners 
are held in separate cells and therefore lack communication. The dilemma of the game lies in that 
the dominant strategy is not necessarily the best (Axelrod & Dawkins, 2006; Dixit & Nalebuff, 
1993).  
If played once, PDs do not foster cooperation, because self-interest and the fear of 
punishment trump trust between the accomplices. However, if repeatedly played, cooperation can 
emerge in a world of egoists without central authority (Axelrod, 1984, p. 20). In repeated PDs, 
players encounter each other frequently enough to develop trust and trust changes payoffs. 
Knowing that the rival will be met in the future increases the stakes of cheating and improves the 
benefits from cooperation, whereby players are better off if they cooperate.11  
The PD is a non-cooperative game, as to which players cannot make credible commitments 
to a strategy (not confess). Under contentious regimes, contenders cannot commit to a strategy 
either. In this sense, their interactions can be conceptualized as a non-cooperative game. One 
caveat (not specific to PDs) is that game theory incorporates all possible environmental changes 
into the game (the modeler sets the array of responses, strategies, and payoffs by taking all 
eventualities into account in advance). Thus, once the game starts and the situation generated by 
the environmental change (say, a crisis) happens, players just adapt themselves by choosing the 
best strategy designed for it. This implies that players know in advance what the best strategy is 
and the probability of the environmental change happening. However, in real life, actors cannot 
foresee the implications of environmental changes on their payoffs.  
In reality, environmental changes produce impacts on players that are more than their 
direct effect on strategies and payoffs. For one, environmental changes do not generate standard 
outcomes in every setting. Each setting has a structure of its own, which is shaped by history. For 
example, the impact of foreign invasion is different in post-1945 France and post-1918 France. 
Thus, the best strategies are also different.  
Second, actors other than the players respond to these changes and these responses factor 
into the shaping of the structure of the game. In other words, the impact of environmental changes 
on players depends both on the structure of the context and non-players’ responses to these changes 
(Aoki, 2007; Greif & Kingston, 2011; Greif & Laitin, 2004). Players cannot possibly consider such 
a complex outcome. This unpredictability results mainly from that environmental changes are a 
																																								 																				
11	Computer	simulations	of	PD	identify	that	punishing	the	adversary	when	he	cheats	and	forgiving	him	when	
he	resumes	cooperation	(tit-for-tat)	is	best	suited	to	generate	cooperation	in	the	long	run.	Tit-for-tat	fosters	
cooperation	if	actors	avoid	unnecessary	conflict	by	cooperating,	punish	the	other’s	defection	in	the	previous	
round,	and	are	not	revengeful	(i.e.,	cooperation	after	punishing	the	cheater),	and	show	a	clearly	identifiable	
behavioral	pattern	so	that	the	other	can	adapt	his	accordingly	(Axelrod,	1984,	p.	20).	
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joint function of the structure of the context and the way actors other than the players respond to 
the changes (Aoki, 2007; Greif & Kingston, 2011; Greif & Laitin, 2004). Players cannot possibly 
consider such a complex outcome. To reiterate the example from the previous chapter, suppose a 
setting, where a crisis causes liquidity shortage, diminishes the level of GDP/capita, and 
deteriorates living standards of lower classes without yet bringing them to the point of misery. To 
some segments of lower classes, such welfare loss is already intolerable and they do not have to wait 
until they descend to the level of misery. Suppose these groups go on strike. Suppose that other 
sections of lower classes have a higher tolerance to pauperization, but, upon observing strikes, they 
decide to join in. The now enlarged crowd feels more decided to pursue the strike. Seeing the latter’s 
resolve, organized contenders might play revolt before welfare standards descend to the level preset 
in the game. Such collective action would certainly be consequential on the fate of the regime, but 
players (the regime or contenders) may not anticipate it. That is to say, environmental changes are 
more than the rationally calculable outcomes of environmental themselves, since responses of 
actors outside the game also shape these outcomes. Being agnostic to the structure of the context 
in which the game is played, game theoretical models ignore impacts that are nevertheless of causal 
value. 
A related but less important caveat is that some environmental changes are stochastic or 
too improbable that rational actors do not even consider them. For example, most people did not 
anticipate Hitler’s invasion of Poland considering such a move to be too daring for a rational 
statesman. Yet, once happened, the invasion of Poland significantly transformed the international 
environment and triggered revisions some people’s worldviews. If environmental changes are 
improbable, as in the case of the invasion of Poland, players cannot possibly take into account all 
eventualities and set the array of their preferences in advance. In the case of exogenous shocks –
such as crises or natural disasters, the events themselves are random, which makes it impossible 
for players to consider their impacts in advance. A real life example could be the 2008 financial 
crisis, which came as a shock to many and generated significant changes in people’s perceptions. 
Social sciences tend to underestimate the probability of random and improbable events, but they 
happen more frequently than assumed (Taleb, 2007). Therefore, they should not be ignored, since 
they have the potential to induce considerable changes in actors’ perceptions. 
Another caveat is that the number of players varies over time as contender groups merge, 
split, disappear, or get formed. With changes in the number of players so do payoffs.  
Finally, one major difficulty is that payoffs are structured with respect to one issue 
dimension. However, regimes have multiple dimensions, including subnational governance, 
welfare, or minority rights (Tilly, 2007, pp. 14–15). If one takes into account the plurality of regime 
dimensions, one should acknowledge the plurality of issue dimensions underlying struggles over 
regimes. Let me explain this via an example: 
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 Suppose there is a contended authoritarian regime, in which organized opposition groups 
contemplate transition to a more democratic regime. However, beyond the broad objective of 
democratization, on which interests converge, there might be disagreements concerning which 
aspect(s) of the regime should be democratized and how democratization should be carried out. 
Suppose that one such issue is the administrative structure. Imagine that, on this issue, some 
groups want centralization and others desire local autonomy in a society featuring regional 
minorities. Supporters of centralization oppose decentralization fearing it plays into the hands of 
secessionists. For others, decentralization improves the quality of the administration, which, in 
turn, boosts the local population’s satisfaction with the regime. Thus, despite agreement on regime 
change, actors might have different expectations from aspects of democratization on which 
interests contradict. Conflicting interests on aspects of the future regime, in turn, might induce 
distrust –with challengers suspecting each other’s intentions and moves, hence hindering 
cooperation against the authoritarian regime. How?  
Suppose that within a setting where there are two issue dimensions shaping bargains over 
regime type, authoritarianism vs. democracy and the structure of the administration, the 
government tries coopting challengers in an attempt to pre-empt the rise of an anti-authoritarian 
coalition. Suppose that, for some challengers, acquiring political equality and freedom is more 
urgent in the short run than resolving the administrative structure problem, and others consider 
both issues to be equally urgent because decentralization ensures autonomy of regional minorities. 
The latter might agree to working with the government, since they might prefer the status quo to a 
regime with centralized administration. Because both goals have high priority for these actors, 
coming to an agreement with other challengers may be more difficult than coming to an agreement 
with the government. In contrast, cooptation might fail on the former group, for whom coming to 
an agreement with other challengers is not as difficult as the latter since the issue of the 
administrative structure does not get in the way of a compromise with other challengers. Thus, the 
nature and outcome of interactions between the government and challengers and among 
challengers depend on the perceived meaning and priority of preferences on regime dimensions.  
 Let us make the scenario more realistic by adding another dimension, say, the role of 
religion in politics. Suppose that some prefer a theocratic regime, whereas others demand 
secularism. If to challengers, this issue is of high priority, they would be uninclined to compromise 
with those who hold a different view on the issue. Then, conflict of interests is likely to impede 
cooperation. Now consider the case of challengers who attach lower priority to the role of religion 
in politics in the short run but high priority to the issue of the administrative structure. Relative 
openness to compromise on the issue of theocracy vs. secularism will help with cooperation if they 
interact the following types of challengers:  
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(a) Challengers who have different preferences on the role of religion in politics but attach 
low priority to this matter in the short run AND hold similar preferences about the 
structure of the administration. 
 
(b) Challengers who have similar preferences on both issues regardless of their priority in 
the short run. 
 
(c) Challengers who have different preferences about the structure of the administration 
but are open to compromise because they give low priority to this issue AND have but 
similar preferences about the role of religion in politics and attach high priority to the 
issue in the short run. 
 
(d) Challengers who attach low priority to both issues and therefore are open to 
compromise regardless of whether preferences align. 
 
Thus, it is not sufficient that preferences overlap on a dimension; the priority of the issues on which 
preferences conflict should be low. In other words, both the ranking and similarity of preferences 
affect cooperation. It is worth noting that building cooperation will get more difficult as additional 
issue dimensions add to bargains over regime type. Each additional issue will require actors more 
efforts to avoid mismatches in the level of priority and similarity, while facilitating the government 
to exploit matters of disagreements among challengers. Finally, cooperation will become even more 
difficult to obtain when more than two challengers bargain with the government, which is often the 
case in reality. For instance, more than ten organized groups challenge the Assad regime in Syria 
(“Guide to the Syrian rebels,” 2013).  
The number of challengers and that of issue dimensions together point at the following: 
Challenger groups are numerous, in part because personality issues cause fractures, but also 
divisions happen because of the differences of opinion on the dimensions shaping the struggle over 
regime type. When more actors are involved, the set of possible solutions widens and conflicts of 
interests amplify. Hence, cooperation among challengers becomes more difficult and outcomes 
become more uncertain, as the number of actors and dimensions increases.  
What is this a case of? As mentioned earlier, the studies that relax the unitary actor 
assumption conceptualize interactions among challengers as a coordination problem, whereas 
coordination problems do not arise if this assumption holds. In this study, I recognize the plurality 
of challengers and of issue dimensions. Following the process-oriented approach, I involve as many 
challenger groups as are observed in real life in a given context. Such a study requires a theory of 
coordination.  
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Cooperation for regime change as a case of coordination  
 
I argue that strategic situations among challengers is closer to non-cooperative coordination games 
with conflicting interests. Coordination games are characterized as follows: First, challengers are 
better off if they cooperate than if they do not. Nevertheless, cooperation fails due to disagreements 
on how they will cooperate. Second, coordination games have multiple Pareto-ranked solutions 
(i.e., outcomes), but some are better than others (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, pp. 168–69). Third, 
trust and expectations allow for coordination on a mutually desirable solution (Cooper, 1999, pp. 
ix–x).   
Cases of cooperation for regime change also display these three characteristics: Challengers 
are better off cooperating on forming an oppositional movement than taking on the regime by 
themselves. However, as we have seen in the examples of administrative structure and the role of 
religion in politics, conflicts of preferences on institutional arrangements of the future regime may 
hinder coordination on a solution.  
Coordination problems get amplified if challengers highly prioritize some regime 
dimensions on which their preferences are misaligned. Such a setting narrows down the room for 
compromise, hence the set of possible solutions. Of the possible cooperative solutions, some satisfy 
challengers more than others. In some cases, no solution satisfies all challengers at the same time 
–e.g., a regime cannot be secular and theocratic at the same time. Also, challengers may draw 
different benefits on different issue dimensions. Thus, cooperation among challengers presents 
complex situations, which are more probable than assumed in game theoretical research on 
regimes and require coordination. What type of a coordination game this is? 
 
Coordination & the meaning of preferences 
Game theory conceptualizes coordination through various game types. In the battle of sexes, a 
couple wants to go on vacation but to different destinations –e.g., seaside vs. mountains. Payoffs 
are symmetric. The problem is when played once, no solution of this game satisfies both partners 
at the same time. Players benefit from cooperating only if they play the game successively. In this 
game, trust and conventions facilitate coordination by serving as focal points (Schelling, 1980). In 
contrast, in matching pennies, coordination on a solution always makes one player better off and 
the other worse off (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 174). In such zero-sum games, parties equalize 
gains only if they mix and randomize strategies over multiple sequences. Finally, stag hunt is a 
game of common interests, in which players draw greater benefits from cooperation than from 
going alone. Although cooperation is more beneficial for everybody, incentives to free ride hinder 
cooperation. How do we know which type of a game is being played in a given context?  
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 Game theory determines the structure of the game and payoffs with respect to the nature 
of interests/grievances. To remind, economic bargaining models focus on economic grievances and 
model class conflict, while political models treat political grievances and model ideological 
conflicts. This means the type of coordination game to be used is a function of how 
interests/grievances are defined. Once the type of model is selected, the same model applies to all 
cases. That would mean to assume that, say, class conflict under the ancient regime in France can 
be modeled in the same way as the class conflict under Weimar Germany ––a hard case to make. 
Process-oriented studies, in contrast, reveal that grievances bear different meanings in 
different contexts; therefore, different actors are mobilized and different conflicts play out (Locke 
& Thelen, 1995). In other words, qualitative differences in the identity of actors and the meaning of 
grievances and interests determine the structure of the case of coordination specific to each context.  
Following process-oriented studies, I assume that the meaning of grievances and interests, 
which varies across contexts, should be taken into account. I use historical analysis to identify these 
specific meanings, including the different ways in which they are understood and interpreted by 
actors. This assumption departs from the one that interests/grievances travel to every context. How 
can we conceptualize contextual meanings of interests and grievances? In the section, I introduce 
the concepts of issue dimension and preference type as tools to capture these different motivations.  
 
Conceptualizing the meaning of interests and grievances via preferences & issue-
dimension 
 
As discussed earlier, the literature on regimes agrees on the mechanism that aligned interests foster 
cooperation but conceptualizes the nature of interests using different motivations (economic 
interests or ideological causes and strategic thinking in some models). In this dissertation, I use 
‘preferences’ as an overarching concept that encompasses all types of motivations. The literature 
on motivations and rationality is extensive. It is outside the scope of this dissertation to discuss 
each in detail. I will instead discuss the concept of ideal types of rationality to make the point that 
by defining rationality with respect to a particular ideal type bargaining models of regimes 
oversimplify human reasoning. With reference to bounded rationality theory and critiques of the 
classical instrumental rationality, which argue that motivations are conflated in mind and 
rationality is intrinsically bounded in reality, I will show that we cannot know a person’s intrinsic 
motivations simply by observing his behavior and evaluating this behavior with respect to 
expressed motivations. I propose the concept of preference to circumvent this difficulty. I specify 
preferences with respect to the previously introduced concept of issue-dimension. Together, these 
two concepts allow capturing various types of motivations that actors have with respect to the 
regime dimensions that shape struggles between the incumbent and contenders. 
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 In Economy and Society, Weber proposes four ideal-types to think about rationality 
(Weber, 1968). Practical rationality involves doing a cost-benefit analysis of available options given 
means in a person’s disposition so as to figure out the best strategy to achieve some end. In more 
recent scholarship, this type of reasoning is called instrumental rationality (Knight, 1992; Levi, 
1997; Lichbach & Zuckerman, 1997; Shepsle, 2006). Under theoretical rationality, observation and 
reasoning are used to explain and understand the world. Substantive rationality is the type of 
rationality, where individuals follow values and principles. Finally, formal rationality involves 
following rules, laws, and regulations (Weber, 1968).12 Again, Weber reminds that these categories 
are ideal-types helping to simplify reality, whereas the boundaries between rationality types are 
muddier in real life.  
Although human behavior and rationale are too complex to fall under one rationality type, 
we have seen in the previous section that bargaining theories of regime change reduce interests to 
a single dimension (economic or political) and thus ignores the complexity of the reasoning process. 
For instance, the axiom that lower classes prefer democracy because it generates more income for 
them reminds practical rationality (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). This axiom discards the impact 
of, say, partisanship on behavior. Conversely, classifying actors with respect to their ideological 
dispositions (such as Przeworski’s hard-liners, soft-liners) implies a mixture of substantive and 
practical rationality (Przeworski, 2005). Yet, in reality, people experience a bit of all these types of 
motivation. Hence, rationality and behavior are too complex to be explained with preferences about 
a single regime dimension. It is worth reminding that there is an extensive literature on regimes 
that elaborates on how attitudes towards the regime affect regime stability and survival (Dahl, 1971; 
Linz & Stepan, 1996; Lipset, 1959). Given the critical role that they play in the fate of regimes, I 
contend that the complexity and multidimensionality of actors’ stances on the regime need to be 
acknowledged. 
 More recent scholarship on rationality explores the processes whereby rationality is 
distorted. Individuals consciously or unconsciously turn to mental processes, such as biases, 
rationalization, or reframing, in order to preserve internal dissonance (Elster, 1983, 2007). For 
example, in Sour Grapes (1983), Elster uses the fable about a fox and raisins to illustrate how 
desires are readjusted to accord with the consequence of an action: The fox sees grapes on the vine 
and tries to reach them. Despite several attempts, he fails to grab them. The fox walks away telling 
himself that the grapes are not ripe anyway! This fable exemplifies how preferences are reversed to 
																																								 																				
12	An	alternative	way	of	conceptualizing	rationality	is	to	distinguish	between	the	logic	of	appropriateness	
and	the	 logic	of	consequentialism	(Elias,	2000;	MacIntyre,	1988;	March	&	Olsen,	2006;	March	&	Simon,	
1993).	 Like	 Weber’s	 practical	 rationality,	 the	 logic	 of	 consequentialism	 involves	 considering	 costs	 and	
benefits	of	actions	given	certain	means	and	ends.	The	logic	of	appropriateness	means	to	follow	rules	of	a	
role	 or	 identity.	 In	 this	 type	 of	 logic,	 “the	 processes	 of	 reasoning	 are	 not	 primarily	 connected	 to	 the	
anticipation	of	future	consequences	as	they	are	in	most	contemporary	conceptions	of	rationality”(March	&	
Olsen,	2011,	p.	479).		
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deal with the undesired consequence of an action (i.e., the fact that the fox could not reach the 
raisins); the rationalization ‘they are not ripe’ helps preserving self-esteem (Elster, 1983, pp. 34–
40).  
In addition, “bounded rationality” theory suggests that rationality is inherently limited 
(Kahneman, 2003, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Under biases, heuristics, and fast vs. slow 
modes of thinking, individuals perceive reality differently and end up making suboptimal choices 
without even realizing it. In particular, individuals misjudge risks as the time frame elongates 
(Kahneman, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Uncertainty embedded in real-life situations provides an additional challenge to the 
classical instrumental rationality (‘means to an end’ reasoning). In real-life, people lack full 
information or information is asymmetrically distributed among them. Under such circumstances, 
people refer to prior beliefs in making decisions. Prior beliefs alleviate uncertainty by serving as 
cues and focal points to individuals (Greif, 2006; Greif & Laitin, 2004). Thus, both cognitive and 
structural reasons bound rationality. By assuming that one type of reasoning is at work, bargaining 
models of regimes cast too perfect a picture of actors’ reasoning process. 
 Another difficulty in identifying the nature of motivations involves interpersonal 
interactions. To a group, people participate for different reasons. For example, a revolutionary 
movement includes “true believers” of a cause, forcefully admitted members, or opportunists 
(Heckathorn, 1993; Hoffer, 2010; March & Olsen, 2006). These different types of people interact. 
Interpersonal interactions alter the way people reason and perceive the movement, interests, and 
the cause (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). For instance, a forcefully admitted member may end 
up believing the cause or a true believer transform into an opportunist based on how his 
experiences in the movement went. Thus, a person’s motivation varies over time as much as via 
interactions. Therefore, the best we can do is to suggest that a particular type of motivation 
predominates others at a given time or circumstance.  
 These theories highlight three important points. First, we cannot know true motivations 
behind some observed action. In other words, we cannot say whether a person is pursuing, say, 
material interests or ideological causes, or simply making strategic calculations by comparing his 
observed behavior to the motivation he expresses. Not only expressed motivation might not be 
reflecting the real motivation, but also mental maps, heuristics, and biases might be distorting the 
process of reasoning (Elster, 1983, 2007; Kahneman, 2013; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
In this dissertation, I will not be relying on ideal-types given the abovementioned 
shortcomings. Second, different motivations coexist in human mind and simultaneously affect 
decision making, which makes it inappropriate to reduce preferences to a single dimension. Third, 
motivations evolve over time and via interactions. In this study, I acknowledge the fluidity and 
complexity of motivations and will not attempt to draw boundaries between material interests and 
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cost-benefit analyses, value/belief oriented reasoning and ideological causes. Preferences serve as 
an overarching concept to talk about different types of motivations behind actions at the same time.  
 Which preferences though? As mentioned earlier, various regime dimensions underlie the 
struggle between contenders and the incumbent and preferences on each dimension 
simultaneously factor in the shaping of behavior. I proposed issue dimension as a concept to 
capture the dimensions of the regime that affect dynamics of struggles on regimes. I also explained 
how historical analysis pinpoints the relevant issue dimensions–as opposed to defining preferences 
a priori. I suggest specifying preferences with respect to issue dimensions. That is, what is the issue 
dimension that is the most salient in a given debate over regimes? For example, in modern Turkey, 
one such dimension is secularism vs. religious liberties; another is minority rights and vs. nation-
state.  
Using contextual analysis, one can identify relevant issue dimensions and conduct a 
content analysis to find out each actor’s position on these dimensions. I call the preference 
identified using this methodology as “preference of a group with respect to some issue dimension.” 
By doing this for every relevant actor, one obtains a multidimensional issue-space, in which some 
issues are perceived to be more important than others at a given time (and the level of importance 
varies by actor). Now, we need to find a tool to think about the relative importance of preferences 
by issue-dimension, which brings us to the notions of prioritization and de-prioritization. The next 
section introduces prioritization and de-prioritization as mechanisms to capture and classify 
preferences on issue dimensions.  
 
Prioritization & de-prioritization 
How do changes in preference relations affect coordination dynamics? As mentioned earlier, in 
reality, contenders process ideological pursuits and material interests. Actors also make strategic 
calculations during interactions (such as tit-for-tat). All these types of motivations factor in the 
shaping of behavior. Acknowledging that the ranking of an issue on preference relation varies over 
time and via social interactions, I expect actors who cooperate on a particular solution with others 
to either share similar preferences or be inclined to de-prioritize certain issues in the short-run so 
that conflict of interests does not get into the way. I further expect the actors who cooperate to de-
prioritize ideological issues rather than the strategic ones because ideological preferences are 
relatively more inflexible over time. Why? It is difficult to imagine a leftist to turn liberal in the 
short run. Yet, this leftist may postpone his ideological preference at a given time to work with a 
liberal on an issue at a given time. We can say that the leftist de-prioritizes his preferences on 
ideological dimensions in the short run, because some other concern trumps that issue dimension.  
 On average, I expect preferences about strategic issues to be more amenable to be updated 
in the short run than preferences about ideological issues. As mentioned earlier, the reason is that 
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one’s changing one’s preferences on ideological issues means one’s changing one’s worldview, 
which is an extensive and costly endeavor. Then, in a context where actors hold different 
preferences on ideological issues, it is reasonable to expect conflict of interests hinders cooperation. 
In this vein, I advance the following hypothesis: 
  
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse 
challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more likely there will be 
either regime change or significant concessions to the opposition.   
  
 Yet, in daily politics, we often observe cooperation among ideological rivals. How does such 
cooperation happen? Ideological differences may not impede cooperation if actors postpone the 
resolution of these differences to a later time. This would mean to de-prioritize the issues on which 
actors disagree in order to achieve some other end that actors highly prioritize in the short-run. So 
doing allows people to preserve “internal consistency” between actions and beliefs (Elster, 1983, 
2007). Hence, we can observe Christian democrats in the European Parliament cooperate with 
liberals and social democrats on some issue (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007). To put it in different 
terms, these actors choose to work together on some issue in the short-run regardless of their 
broader ideological differences. I hypothesize that the mechanisms of prioritization and de-
prioritization allow actors to postpone ideological differences to cooperate on some issue with 
ideological rivals without having to sort out all their differences.  
 What makes actors prioritize and de-prioritize some issue? In the context of contended 
regimes, one main reason is perceived urgency. The sense of urgency may arise from environmental 
changes, such as the threat of interstate war. Environmental changes generate the sense of urgency 
by altering the timeframe with respect to which actors evaluate risks associated with some issue 
(Kahneman, 2013). Under temporal constraint, (on average) individuals tend to focus on avoiding 
some undesirable outcome that might come about if some immediate situation is left unattended 
rather than the ideal of way of resolving a broader conflict. For example, ruling elites might put 
aside internal disagreements and personality issues when facing a crisis (Haggard & Kaufman, 
1995).  
What types of disagreements are more amenable to be postponed or sidelined in the short-
run? By definition, strategies are roadmaps or particular courses of action to be followed in order 
to achieve some end. Ideologies provide a worldview, a purpose, and an ideal solution to resolve 
some issue. However, they do not necessarily specify a course of action to pursue in the short-run. 
Under time constraint, when people’s senses of urgency heighten, it is likely that most actors prefer 
avoiding an undesirable outcome in the short-run than resolving broader conflicts (because costs 
of not attending an immediate situation outstrip the dissatisfaction of not solving the issue in the 
optimal way).  
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 It is worth noting that this proposition does not assume that all actors will act in the 
abovementioned way under time constraint. Nor does it assume anything about motivations and 
rationality of the actors who act this way. It simply suggests that a person might focus on solving 
an immediate problem via cooperation with those whose worldview differs from his own by de-
prioritizing these differences in the short-run. Again, so doing allows preserving internal 
consistency and resolve an immediate problem. I advance the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when challengers react to past 
failures and new opportunities by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority of preferences on 
strategic issue dimensions. 
 
 One difficulty in deciding whether the mechanisms of prioritization and de-prioritization 
are at work is to distinguish them from preference convergence after some actors revise their 
preferences with respect to some environmental transformation. Observing some cooperative 
behavior and evaluating it with respect to some previously expressed motivation does not provide 
enough information to establish the that the person prioritized or de-prioritized some 
disagreement. If that person later revised his preference in a way that the new one aligns with 
others’ preferences on that dimension, it could simply be that preference convergence drives 
cooperation. Observed behavior would not allow us to distinguish one from the other. We would 
need to update information on the person’s motivation to be able to separate one from the other. 
This leads us to the second mechanism: preference revision with respect to some environmental 
transformation. 
 
Preference revision with respect to environmental transformations 
While (de)prioritization refers to changes in the ranking of some preference, preference revision 
means to replace that choice with some other choice. Game theory captures this effect using the 
concept preference update. Preference update suggests that players reconsider their preferences as 
new information becomes available (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994; Tadelis, 2013). The act of 
substituting a preference is another way in which people respond to environmental changes. For 
example, in a PD game, a player might get the impression that his adversary is a not a cheater based 
on the history of successive cooperation. However, once the adversary plays not cooperate in some 
next round, this impression would weaken and in the mind of the player the expected probability 
of cheating would increase.  
 In the context of regime contention, preference revision is hard but not unlikely. For 
instance, some militant may quit the guerilla group for which he has been fighting upon learning 
that that group’s acts of violence against local population. This mechanism needs to be taken into 
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account, because it serves as a control variable helping us to separate between the change in the 
ranking of a preference and the change in the substance of the preference. We can do so by looking 
at the evolution of preferences over time (instead of assuming them to remain fixed over time). In 
this study, I use historical analysis and content analysis to see whether and how preferences on 
issue dimensions vary over time. 
 I conceptualize environmental transformations (stochastic or improbable) as an 
intervening variable that is capable of making actors revise their preferences. Preference revision 
may work to facilitate or hinder cooperation. Cooperation would become easier if challengers’ 
preferences become more similar after revisions. In contrast, cooperation would become more 
difficult to obtain if challengers’ preferences grow more dissimilar than before after revisions. 
 To recap our discussion, cooperation follows from aligned interests as established by 
cooperation theory (Axelrod, 1984). However, in a case where multiple issue dimensions shape the 
debate over regime type, preference alignment gets more difficult to obtain, because there are more 
issues on which preferences needs aligning and actors rank issues differently in terms of priority. 
To surmount the conflict of interests on some issue, actors should either postpone the resolution of 
that conflict (de-prioritization) in view of resolving some other issue that seems to have precedence 
(prioritization) in the short-run or adopt preferences more similar to others. Otherwise, the 
intersection of actors’ preference sets gets narrower or reduces down to an empty set, thus making 
cooperation unlikely. This, cooperation requires parties to either sideline their disagreements or be 
like-minded on the dimensions to which they attach high priority. Before proceeding to the 
operationalization of these mechanisms, let me present the last piece of the theory, the rise of an 
oppositional coalition.  
 
The rise of the oppositional movement 
The earlier discussion suggested that preferences on strategic issues are more prone to change 
and/or be re-prioritized than those on ideological issues. This difference affects the ease with which 
actors cooperate. How does this difference influence the formation of an oppositional coalition? 
 Earlier, I suggested that some oppositional coalition should signal unity and coherence to 
the incumbent by engaging in long-term cooperation if they want to give the incumbent enough 
observations that the coalition is united and coherent, and therefore to be feared. Otherwise, the 
coalition might not be able to put enough pressure on the regime, which would hurt their capability 
of carry out a transition or to extract significant concessions from the government. I further stressed 
the importance of leadership in the rise of such a coalition. 
 To signal unity, the oppositional coalition should cooperate on multiple instances, which 
may come about from preference similarity on issue dimensions. Again, preference similarity works 
if preferences are already aligned or if they are de-prioritized in the short run. If actors are to 
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prioritize long-term cooperation by postponing the resolution of some disagreements, the rise of 
such a coalition becomes more likely.  
What do actors’ preference sets in the coalition look like? Possibilities are as follows:  
(a) Actors hold similar preferences on all ideological and strategic dimensions. 
(b) Actors hold similar preferences on all strategic dimensions and some ideological 
dimensions AND sideline differences on the ideological matters on which their 
preferences are misaligned. 
(c) Actors hold similar preferences on all strategic dimensions but none on the ideological 
dimensions AND sideline differences on all ideological issues.  
With the exception of the first one, all possibilities suggest that at least some actors are 
pragmatic on ideological dimensions. If all actors are pragmatic on all ideological dimensions, the 
coalition would be constructed as a result of preference convergence on strategic dimensions. 
Alternatively, if only some actors of the coalition are pragmatic on ideological issues but others are 
not (idealistic actors), we should expect cooperation to be easier to construct among idealists than 
between idealists and pragmatists (since preference similarity on ideological dimensions are likely 
to already have precipitated cooperation among the like-minded). It is worth reiterating that 
ideological agreement is more difficult to obtain since this type of preference is relatively more rigid 
in the short-run, hence prone to be de-prioritized or revised. Concomitantly, because strategic 
preferences are more amenable to be de-prioritized or revised in the short-run, preference 
convergence on strategic issues should be easier to obtain. This discussion also implies that without 
preference convergence on strategic issues, actors are unlikely cooperate in the long run, because 
this coalition should signal capability and resolve to overthrow the government if necessary. 
Then, to be able to say that an oppositional coalition is formed, we need to look at the level 
of similarity between actors’ preferences on issue dimensions. It follows that preference 
convergence on strategic dimensions is a necessary condition, but preference convergence on 
ideological issue is not.  
Combining the two points, we can imagine the oppositional coalition to be composed of (a) 
all idealists, (b) some idealists and some pragmatics, (c) all pragmatics.  
• If it contains all idealists or pragmatists, we should expect to all members to 
connect to all others.  
• If there are some idealists and some pragmatics, we should expect to see a highly 
connected core group of idealists surrounded by pragmatists. 
 
In either case, the coalition displays a core. In the first case, the entire coalition is a core. 
In the second, there is a distinct core surrounded by periphery. The first two hypotheses already 
capture the first case. I hypothesize the following for the second case:  
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Hypothesis 3: Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when peripheral actors align 
their preferences to those of an emergent ‘core.’  
 
I will call the actors constituting the core “the central actor(s).” I call those in the periphery 
“peripheral actors.” How does such a structure emerge? 
This coalition is formed as a result of a process, since preference revision and 
(de)prioritization become effective in time. We should bear in mind that not all actors cooperate at 
the same time. Some might cooperate earlier, while others join them later. Also, cooperation might 
break down among some actors. This would mean that some bonds might untie, because 
disagreements hinder cooperation or some actors discontinue while others emerge, or because 
actors shift positions. If the coalition displays heterogeneity in preference sets, the coalition has a 
core and periphery structure, in which case we should expect some actors to begin cooperation 
earlier and attract late-comers (who join the core as a result of preference revision or 
(de)prioritization). Thus, the formation of an oppositional movement is a dynamic process, where 
composition and size of the coalition change over time. This dynamic nature requires taking into 
account changes in the inventory of actors and the repertoire of preferences. The next section recaps 
the argument.  
 
 
The Argument in a nutshell 
 
I argue that contenders are more likely to cooperate for regime change once they converge on a 
particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). Such a coherent 
oppositional movement might set the direction of institutional change. The coherent movement 
becomes more likely when preferences of a subset of challengers become similar over time to create 
room for cooperation. At the onset, challengers have mismatching preferences many issues that 
they highly prioritize. This study shows that a phase of re-ranking of issue priorities 
((de)prioritization) or preference transformation is necessary for the formation of an oppositional 
coalition. Specifically, I show that strategic issues are more likely to produce preference converge. 
I further show that convergence happens around the actor(s) who are idealistic in and attracts 
others that also adopt the same strategy (but not necessarily the same ideologies) in a network that 
contains both pragmatists and idealists. The probability of having a coalition of all idealists is low, 
because ideological convergence is hard to achieve. Once strategic convergence happens, 
challengers become more likely to form an internally consistent oppositional movement that is 
capable of overthrowing the authoritarian regime.  
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In most cases, challenger groups may lack ideological convergence and yet engage in long-
term cooperation against the authoritarian government on the basis of strategic convergence. Long-
term cooperation is distinguished from short-term cooperation because it is evident in iterated 
moves, with actors agreeing -despite their divergent ideologies- to repeatedly bring pressure to bear 
on the old regime using similar methods. Thus, unity among challengers is crafted. Regime change 
depends not only on destabilization of the status quo but also on potential challengers being willing 
to postpone their ideological disagreements so as to arrive at common strategies that allow for 
building a united coherent oppositional coalition.  
 How does strategic convergence promote cooperation for regime change? Cooperation 
unfolds in three stages. In the stage of disunity, each challenger advocates for a different set of 
transition strategies (how regime change should be carried out) and ideologies (what the future 
regime should look like). Differences of opinion on strategic and ideological issues get in the way of 
cooperation for regime change as long as challenger groups challengers attach high priority to their 
preferences on the dimensions that they disagree with one another. In the second stage, 
environmental changes give actors a perception of urgency, whereby actors begin eliminating or 
postponing certain ideological differences or revise their preferences in light of the new information 
that becomes available. Once some disagreements are put aside and preference revision on some 
issues harmonize preferences, actors begin cooperating. Some actors engage in cooperation earlier 
than others; these form the core. As cooperation is sustained in the long run, the core begins 
attracting other actors based on preference convergence on strategic matters. In this process, 
preference convergence on ideological issues is helpful but neither necessary nor sufficient. Thus, 
the oppositional coalition tends to display a core composed of rather idealistic actors and a 
periphery of rather pragmatic actors. Thus, some level of pragmatism is a necessary condition for 
the emergence of cooperation among multiple actors who tackle with multiple issue dimensions. In 
the third stage, strategic convergence is finalized and challengers become more likely to form an 
internally consistent oppositional movement that is capable of overthrowing the authoritarian 
regime. They do so when the opportunity presents itself, the timing of which cannot be predicted.  
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Figure 1 
 
Let X be the finite set of challenger groups between some year t and tt.  
$ X ={a, b, c,… z} " 𝑧 ∈ ℕ  
 
In this set, a, b, c, … z denote group of challengers that contended the government from some year 
t to tt. 𝑧 ∈ ℕ means that this number is finite. Then, let Ct be the set of challengers present in a given 
year t. C is a subset of challengers present over the entire time period (t–tt).  
$ Ct ={a, b, c,… f}: Ct ⊆ X, t " ∈ ℕ 
 
Let P(a) denote the preference of a group a. I specify this preference on some dimension d. 
Preference dimensions are finite sets; that is, on a given dimension there is a limited number of 
choices that groups can select from. Also, the number of overall preference dimensions define a 
finite set. In other words, there is a finite (non-zero) number of dimensions that shape the debate 
on regime type.  
 
P(a) d1 denotes preference of group a on dimension 1. Similarly, P(b) d1 denotes preference of group 
b on dimension 1. Figure 2 shows the preference array for some groups a and b.  
 
 
The disunity stage: Preference dissimilarity 
Preference	 convergence:	preference	
revision	&	re-prioritization
Rise	of	a	coalition	capable	of	taking	
action	to	change	the	regime	
group	x
group	ygroup	z
group	a
group	b
group	c group	d
a	coherent	
oppositional	
movement
Disunity
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Figure 2 
 
Groups a and b might hold similar preference on some dimension n. However, the entire set of 
preferences of groups a and b are not identical.  
 P(a) d1 = P(b) d1 
 P(a) d2 ≠ P(b) d2 
 P(a) d3 ≠ P(b) d3 
 P(a) d4 = P(b) d4 …  
 
è P(a) d ≠ P(b) d  
 
The process of convergence: Preference revision in response to environmental changes & re-
prioritization of issues 
Group a
P(a) d1
P(a) d2
...
P(a) dn
Group	b
P(b) d1
P(b) d2
...
P(b) dn
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Figure 3 
 
 
Environmental changes induce groups a and b to reconsider their preferences. At the end of this 
stage, groups a and b might shift to another preference on some dimension dn or stick to their 
preferences on dimension dm. 
 
I note preference change on some dimension d1 for group a è  P(a) d1’  
If preferences do not change on some dimension, say, d3 for group a I use the same denotationè  
P(a) d3  
 
At the end of the preference transformation process, groups a and b might harmonize their 
preferences on some dimension dn but not on dm.  
 P(a) d1’ = P(b) d1’ 
 P(a) d2’ ≠ P(b) d2’ 
 P(a) d3’ ≠ P(b) d3’ 
 P(a) d4’ = P(b) d4’ …  
 
è P(a) d ≠ P(b) d 
De-prioritization and prioritization work to eliminate the effect of remaining differences of opinion. 
 
Group a
P(a) d1'
P(a) d2'
P(a)	d3
...
P(a) dn'
Group	b
P(b) d1'
P(b) d2
P(b)	d3'
...
P(b) dn'
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RESEARCH DESIGN  
Dependent variable & unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis in this study is organized groups of actors that make contentious actions to 
change the current regime (i.e., challengers or contender groups). The dependent variable is 
cooperation for regime change among regime contenders. Before reminding what I understand 
from cooperation for regime change, it is worth explaining how regime change is conceptualized.  
In this study, regime change is defined as the overthrow of the incumbent’s regime. It 
does not extend to consolidation of the new institutions associated with another form of 
government. Consolidation spans the period from the foundation of new institutions to the moment 
when citizens will have internalized rules of the new regime (“the only game in town” as Linz and 
Stepan put it, (Linz & Stepan, 1996a, p. 5)). This study does not go as far to explain consolidation 
of the new regimes ––so doing would require also accounting for citizens’ responses to institutions 
of the new regime to see whether the rules of the game are internalized. Thus, the scope of analysis 
is limited to the process from when demands for regime change arise to the emergence of a coherent 
oppositional coalition against the incumbent’s regime.  
 Cooperation for regime change refers to contentious activities that two or more 
organized groups of challengers collaboratively undertake with the purpose of overthrowing the 
current government and his regime. The indicators of cooperation include co-participation in the 
organization of some protest activity (such as demonstrations, rebellions, riots, strikes), the process 
of mobilization of citizens against the regime, the generation of anti-regime propaganda, or the 
plotting and carrying out of a coup. It is worth noting that cooperation for regime change refers to 
“realized cases” of cooperation, where actors successfully undertake/finalize as one or more of the 
actions mentioned in the list of indicators. “Inconclusive attempts” of cooperation, in which actors 
fail to accomplish one or more of the abovementioned activities despite making efforts ––such as 
broken negotiations or not carrying out the promise of participating in some protest activity–– do 
not qualify as realized cases of cooperation. I code successful cases of cooperation as “1” and 
inconclusive attempts as “0”. 
 I operationalize cooperation using network analysis: The oppositional coalition that ensues 
from the cooperation process can be thought of as a cooperation network of challengers that are 
united on the basis of some shared preference. In this network, nodes represent challenger groups 
and ties represent pairwise relations of cooperation among challengers. For example, if two groups 
cooperate for regime change, there forms a tie (edge) indicating cooperation between them. If they 
do not cooperate, they are not linked by a tie (edge). I measure cooperation on a yearly basis. Also, 
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I count more than one instance of cooperation as one edge representing cooperation per year. I 
exclude the possibility of actors forming more than one tie (because they cooperated on various 
issue areas), because TERGM, which is the network model that is used in this study and will be 
explained later, does not allow for studying a network with multiple ties between nodes. On the 
other hand, break down of cooperation on some issue area is coded as 0 on that dimension and the 
lack of cooperation in one issue area does not cancel out cooperation on another issue (coded 1). 
Thus, tie formation does not follow a zero-sum rationale. 
 Long-term cooperation (cooperation iterated for at least three successive years and spans 
more than one issue) is operationalized as the observation of ties for at least three successive years 
between the same pair(s) of actors. Short-term cooperation (referring to cooperation that is limited 
on one issue area and lasts less than three successive years) is operationalized as ties that last less 
than three successive years between the same pair(s) of actors. 
Operationalizing the oppositional movement as a network makes sense for the following 
reasons: The specific type of network I describe here has a core-periphery structure. Networks 
displaying a core-periphery structure feature a cluster of high-degree nodes in the core that are 
surrounded by a less dense periphery of nodes with lower-degree (Newman, 2010). Here, the 
central actor embodies the core and peripheral actors form the periphery. Network analysis 
provides tools like centrality and density to separate between the core and periphery. 
Network analysis is convenient for studying the emergence and sustenance of network-
based social systems, such as an oppositional network  (Lusher, Koskinen, & Robins, 2012, p. 9). 
Specifically, longitudinal network models known as temporal exponential random graph models 
(TERGMs) are appropriate for measuring the effect of ideological and strategic preferences on 
convergence. As mentioned earlier, existing work relies on game theory in modeling the effect of 
preferences on cooperation, because game theory offers precise explanations as to how preferences 
and interactions co-determine the outcome, once the set of alternatives, relevant actors and 
preferences are identified (Colomer, 1995, pp. 5–8). Within this framework, bargaining models are 
designed as sequential games with a fixed number of actors and set of preferences. However, in the 
convergence process that is of interest to this study, the number of actor and the nature of 
preferences may not stay fixed –contrary to the assumptions made in game theoretical research. 
While it is possible to assume constancy of actors and preferences for modeling purposes, the family 
of exponential random graph models (ERGMs) allows for modeling without making this 
assumption. Specifically, as I explain in detail below, TERGMs are designed to incorporate dynamic 
processes that involve changes in the number of actors and nature of preferences (Newman, 2010).  
In addition, TERGMs are longitudinal models, which makes them convenient for studying 
processes such as convergence among challengers. The family of time series models also capture 
temporality. However, time-series, like all other regression techniques, are based on the 
independence assumption. Yet, cooperation is an interdependent phenomenon and decision 
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making leading to cooperation defines an interdependent process. Network analysis, like game 
theory, grounds on the interdependence assumption; therefore, it is more adequate for modeling 
interdependent phenomena like cooperation. Network models have proved handy in studying 
cooperative and antagonistic relationships from policy networks to asymmetric and interstate 
conflicts (Berardo & Scholz, 2010; Corbetta, 2013; Desmarais, Cranmer, & Menninga, 2012; 
Gerber, Henry, & Lubell, 2013; Metternich, Dorff, Gallop, Weschle, & Ward, 2013; Staniland, 2014).  
 As mentioned earlier, convergence is a process whereby a particular cooperation network 
comes about as actors adopt similar strategies. Looking at the evolution of the composition of 
cooperation over years allows for establishing when an oppositional movement emerges, i.e., the 
timing of convergence. 
Temporal exponential random graph models (TERGMs) are particularly well-suited for the 
purposes of this study, in part because they study network evolution over time. More importantly, 
TERGMs belong to the family of models called exponential random graph models (ERGMs), which 
allow for generating networks of a particular type –which is our purpose here. In that, the modeler 
generates networks that display a particular set of properties, such as the number of edges or 
degrees, but all other properties of these networks are random (Newman, 2010). The particular 
property that the modeler wants to simulate depends on the independent variable of interest. For 
example, Cranmer, Desmarais, and Menninga rely on ERGMs to study the formation of 
international military pacts based on a number of characteristics that states (nodes) display, such 
as regime type or geographic proximity (Desmarais et al., 2012). In this example, the formation of 
international military pacts between a pair of states indicates tie formation between a pair of nodes. 
Similarly, I am interested in studying the formation of cooperation for regime change among 
challengers (tie formation in the ERGM language) based on a set of ideological and strategic 
preferences that challengers adopt (node characteristics).  
How do TERGMs generate random network of a particular property? TERGMs, like 
ERGMs, are stochastic models designed to make predictions about network structure based on tie 
formation and tie patterns (Lusher et al., 2012, p. 9). To make inferences, ERGMs treat a given 
network as a single observation drawn from a complex multivariate distribution and calculate the 
probability of observing networks similar to the one we study within the realm of possible network 
configurations. In other words, the observed network is compared to all possible networks 
controlling for the property of interests (Desmarais et al., 2012, pp. 292–296). Using the same 
approach, TERGMs model the evolution of a network over sequential observations. In that, there 
is a temporal dependency assumption, suggesting that a particular network observed at time t 
depends on networks observed at preceding time intervals. Based on this assumption, TERGMs 
estimate the probability of a network based on the variation in the effects of different topological 
features over time (Hanneke & Xing, 2007, p. 2). The probability of observing some network (N) is 
defined as 
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 𝑃(𝑁, 𝜃) 	= 𝑤	(N)𝑤(𝑁.)/.01  
 𝑤	(N) is a shorthand for exp(θ′h(N)), where θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated, and h(N) 
is the vector of network statistic; exp{θ′h(N)} means that the model weighs the network statistic by 
θ (Wasserman & Pattison, 1996). The denominator is the normalizer that ensures a legitimate 
probability distribution (Hanneke & Xing, 2007).13  
 TERGMs use an MCMC algorithm, which simulates a Markov chain that constructs a new 
randomly selected network at each step. The algorithm selects the new network over the existing 
one if its configuration is more probable. If a pattern emerges among networks in the chain, the 
algorithm concludes that the Markov transitions have reached an equilibrium distribution. We 
infer that the model has converged;14 that is, most of the simulated networks look like the one we 
observe (Morris, Handcock, & Hunter, 2008, p. 16). The interpretation of parameters resembles 
regression: “A positive (negative) parameter value means we are likely to observe networks with 
larger (smaller) values of that statistic (e.g., number of triangles) than would be expected if the 
network were drawn at random from a uniform distribution of networks” (Desmarais et al., 2012, 
p. 293).  
 
 
Measuring the effect of preferences 
I hypothesize that challengers begin forming an oppositional movement once their preferences 
start converging on a particular strategy of transition and but ideological disagreements are either 
handled or postponed. Thus, independent variables are preferences, which break down into 
ideological and strategic preferences. I conceptualize preferences as nodal characteristics (i.e., 
properties of nodes representing actors). The number of nodal characteristics can be as many as 
the number of issue dimension. I derive preferences from the type of grievances that challengers 
have in a given context using in-depth case studies so as to establish the meaning of grievances as 
perceived by actors. As mentioned in the theory section, do not assume challengers to have preset 
preferences as in bargaining models.  
ERGMs capture the effect of nodal characteristics in relational processes, which is 
convenient to test my hypotheses. As explained in the theory section, the concept of homophily 
conveys whether ideological or strategic compatibility precipitates cooperation. I had defined 
																																								 																				
13	 For	 detailed	 information	 on	 the	mathematical	 derivation	 of	 TERGMs	 see	 (Desmarais	 &	 Skyler,	 2012;	
Hanneke,	Wenjie,	&	Xing,	2010;	Krivitsky	&	Handcock,	2010;	Robins	&	Pattison,	2001).	
14	The	term	convergence	used	in	the	ERGM	theory	has	no	relation	to	the	convergence	theorized	here.		
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homophily as the propensity to establish contacts based on similar characteristics. In the language 
of the network theory, homophily refers to that two nodes displaying similar parameters will 
converge toward one another within the Blau space (McPherson, 2004).15 In other words, 
homophily looks at tie formation based on direct and indirect affinity in the social space. I use 
homophily to operationalize preference alignment along the ideological and strategic dimensions 
that I will derive from the case studies. 
 In the language of TERGM, if preferences have an independent effect on cooperation, their 
estimates should be statistically significant. Significant positive coefficients suggest that more ties 
(representing cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in 
networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. Significant negative coefficients indicate 
that fewer ties (cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in 
networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. The value of coefficients communicates 
the rate of change. If actors are weakly committed to some issue, we should obtain null effect, 
meaning that actors enter cooperation regardless of whether their preference aligns with their 
partner’s on the issue in question. A significant positive estimate suggests that preference 
alignment on some issue drives cooperation. In other words, because the issue in question matters 
to them, actors refrain from coopering with those that think differently. A significant negative 
estimate indicates that actors prefer not to cooperate with those who think like them on a given 
issue.  
  
Studying the oppositional coalition 
As mentioned earlier, an oppositional coalition is more likely to arise from a process whereby actors 
adopt similar strategic preferences and sideline ideological issues on which they disagree. I also 
mentioned that I measure cooperation on a yearly basis. Looking at the evolution of the 
composition of cooperation over years allows for establishing when an oppositional movement 
emerges, i.e., the timing of convergence. Network analysis helps us to identify which types of 
preferences are more likely to propel cooperation over time and to what extent. 
  
Finding the central actor in an oppositional coalition  
 
In order to understand which challenger becomes the center of the oppositional coalition, we want 
to identify when actors cooperate more and around this time which actor becomes more central –
since being central to a well-connected network signals greater importance for a node than being 
central to a less connected network. This analysis has three-steps: First, I use the network metric 
																																								 																				
15	Due	to	space	limitations,	I	do	not	go	into	the	theory	of	homophily.	Interested	readers	may	see	(Lusher,	
Koskinen,	&	Robins,	2012;	McPherson,	2004).	
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density to examine the evolution of cooperation density and identify the years in which challengers 
were most disunited and when they reunified. The network metric density means how connected a 
network is taking into account all possible connections in that network. In other words, it 
represents the ratio of the actual number of ties to the number of all possible ties (Newman, 2010, 
p. Chapter 6). Thus, if a network has a lot of ties among its nodes, it is dense –the ratio of the actual 
number of ties over the number of all possible ties gets close to 1. If a network has few ties, most of 
possible connections are not made; thus, it is not dense and the ratio in question approaches to -∞. 
 Second, I conduct a qualitative analysis of the evolution of actors’ preference sets. So doing 
allows for preference similarity obtained by preference revision. Once we identify on which issues 
preferences were revised, we better distinguish the dimensions on which cooperation followed from 
(de)prioritization and those from preference similarity.  
 At the last step, we want to understand which challenger becomes the center of the 
oppositional coalition. To this end, I compare the importance of each actor in the oppositional 
coalition. Importance in a coalition means who is central to a coalition network. That is, who is 
picked by others more frequently as a partner, which can also be reworded as who has more 
collaborators than others. Having more partners than others in an oppositional coalition indicates 
that one is more in demand by others as a partner. I operationalize importance using the network 
metric degree centrality. Degree centrality conveys how well-connected a node is (Easley & 
Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It is calculated as below: 
 𝑑𝑖	(𝑔)(𝑛 − 1) 
 
This formula measures the degree of a given node i in a network (g) divided by the total 
number of nodes in that network minus the one whose degree centrality is measured. For example, 
if a node has (n-1) degrees it is connected to all others, thus is central to the network. A node with 
degrees (n-2) would mean it is connected to everyone except for one node, hence still quite central. 
In contrast, if a node has but degree 1, we understand that it is only connected to one other node, 
thus is much less central to the network (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It should be noted that 
centrality in a network can be measured using other metrics such as closeness or betweenness, 
among others. However, given that cooperation network is not directional, that is, if node A is 
linked to node B the link from A to B also implies a link from B to A, since cooperation is reciprocal 
by nature. 16 I finish the analysis by a qualitative study of the preference sets of actors who are part 
of the coalition network and those who are out. The qualitative differences between these two 
																																								 																				
16	For	more	information	on	centrality	see	(Borgatti,	2005;	Easley	&	Kleinberg,	2010;	Newman,	2010).	
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categories of actors will provide further evidence for the dimensions on which preference similarity 
was at work. 
 
 
Case Selection  
In order to identify the effect of strategies and ideologies on cooperation for regime transition, we 
need to compare cases where opposition groups have a higher level of strategic disagreements to 
cases where they have a lower level of strategic disagreements. Giving variation on the strategic 
diversity allows for establishing whether strategic convergence indeed precipitates actors to 
cooperate for the same cause.  
 To test my argument, I use the case of transitions from authoritarianism to constitutional 
government in the 19th century. Historical analysis presents challenges, but analyzing cases from 
the 19th century offers significant advantages for the purposes of this study. It was in the 19th century 
that monarchs around the world began facing demands for constitutional checks and parliamentary 
representation. From the 1830s onward, peoples in Western Europe periodically stood up against 
their monarchs attempting to maintain absolutism. By the 1900s, most  European societies had 
succeeded in making their governments accountable (Dincecco, 2011). Constitutional demands 
began to escalate in non-Western societies in the second half of the century. As in the West, societal 
actors revolted against their rulers. By 1911, Iran, Russia, China, Mexico, and the Ottoman Empire 
had undergone constitutional revolutions (Sohrabi, 1995). Thus, in the 19th century, Western and 
non-Western societies were fighting similar battles against their governments. A gap has opened 
between Western and non-Western societies from the 20th century and onward. The former has 
been living under accountable governments for decades, whereas some non-Western societies are 
still struggling to tie the hands of their rulers. Comparing Western to non-Western cases has 
important theoretical implications. As Ziblatt notes, regime literature has been treating Western 
cases as benchmarks to evaluate non-Western transitions, often forgetting that European 
democratizations also presented uncertainties, fears, and concessions that are thought to be 
symptomatic of non-Western transitions (Ziblatt, 2006, pp. 311–312). Thus, Ziblatt stresses the 
need for normalizing Europe. To this end, I aim to contrast and compare Western to non-Western 
cases. The 19th century presents a uniquely convenient environment, where Western and non-
Western societies were both undergoing similar challenges. Had I compared between successful 
19th century Western transitions and successful 20th century non-Western transitions, my results 
would have suffered from anachronism. 
 In order to give variation to strategic diversity, I selected the cases of transitions from 
absolute to constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman Empire under Abdülhamid II (1876–1908) –
a non-Western case– and Bourbon France (1815–1830) –a Western case. As I explain below in 
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detail, Ottoman opposition actors had significant strategic disagreements, whereas French 
challengers had fewer strategic disagreements but more ideological disagreements. Before 
discussing specifics of the cases, let me explain the spatial and temporal rationale guiding the case 
selection. The Ottoman and French transitions belong to the same era but to different geographies. 
As Bunce and Huntington note, geographical proximity may play a causal role in regime outcomes 
via spillover effects, such as in Latin America or Eastern Europe (Bunce, 2000; Huntington, 1991). 
By selecting cases from different geographies, I minimize effects of environmental conditions, 
which might otherwise account for similar outcomes.  
The Ottoman and French cases are similar on the structure of transitions. Both the 
Hamidian and Bourbon authoritarianisms built on an imperial legacy. The Bourbon regime dwelled 
upon the remnants of the Napoleonic empire. Sultan Abdülhamid II took over a five-century old 
empire as he stepped to the throne in 1876. Both regimes briefly liberalized before reverting to 
authoritarianism. The Bourbon regime commenced with an ultra-royalist government and 
parliament, which employed oppressive policies and measures to silence non-royalists. These 
policies generating intense discontent, King Louis XVIII dismissed this ultra-royalist parliament 
and government the following year. Himself being a proponent of moderate government, the King 
feared that the royalist oppression might trigger another episode of violent uprisings led by the 
alienated segments of the society, such as the bonapartists and the republicans. Under succeeding 
governments, the regime experienced relatively liberal intervals but turned absolutist once Charles 
X took the throne. In the Ottoman Empire, Abdülhamid II stepped to throne in 1876 upon the 
promise of establishing a constitution and a national parliament –a promise, which he kept. One 
year later, the Sultan prorogued the Constitution and the Parliament on the grounds of the 
difficulties posed by the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 120). Right from its 
inception, this war brought heavy casualties on the Empire. Despite the burden of the war, 
parliamentary sessions throughout 1877 were long and ineffective due to the tension between 
Muslim and Christian parliamentarians (Shaw, 1977, pp. 181–185). However, it was not slow 
legislative activities that led the Sultan to suspend the Constitution and Parliament. Non-Muslim 
parliamentarians called on their co-ethnics to not enlist to the army contra the Ottoman 
government’s invitation of all Ottoman citizens to enlist in the army; whereupon the Sultan 
dismissed the Parliament. From 1877 to 1908, Abdülhamid II ruled the Empire with an iron fist.  
Both the Bourbon and Hamidian regimes broke down as a result of rapidly unfolding 
revolutions –three weeks in the Ottoman case and three days in the French case. In both cases, a 
political crisis set these revolutions in motion. In France, the crisis broke out in March 1830 when 
the Chamber passed a vote of no confidence against the King’s ultra-royalist cabinet. Charles 
interpreted the motion as an attack against the monarchy and dissolved the Chamber without 
specifying an election date. He also restored censorship and restrained the franchise to the quarter 
richest (Girard, 1985, p. 117; Pilbeam, 1982, p. 365). In response, journalists started a resistance, 
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and leftwing societies, disfranchised middle classes, students, and workers joined in (Girard, 1985, 
p. 118; Harsin, 2002, p. 41). As the King stood his ground, resistance turned violent (Girard, 1985, 
p. 117). On the third day, protesters declared a provisionary government. Leftwing and doctrinaire 
parliamentarians took over; they dismissed republican and bonapartist demands by declaring the 
Duke of Orleans the King of the French (Harsin, 2002, p. 42). Charles X was overthrown, and 
France transitioned to constitutional monarchy. In the Ottoman case, the revolution began due to 
an international crisis. In June 1908, Russia’s and Britain’s plans to partition Macedonia were 
divulged. A small local Young Turk group initiated a revolt in Resne (Macedonia) on July 3. Despite 
the Sultan’s efforts to suppress it, this revolt expanded to the entire region. Next, the Sultan’s 
commanders, who were sent to the region to restore order, joined the rebellious Young Turks. The 
leaders of the Young Turks took over the control of the revolt and sent telegrams to foreign 
representatives to announce themselves as the effective government of the Empire. On July 24, the 
Sultan relinquished power, and constitutional monarchy was restored (Akşin, 1980; Temo, 1987).  
As regards differences, the Ottoman and French cases varied on the structure of the 
authoritarian rule and the way these regimes interacted with their domestic and international 
environments. Concerning the structure of the rule, the Hamidian and Bourbon regimes were both 
façade parliamentary monarchies with theocratic elements. In both regimes, the constitutional 
documents were non-binding, that is, the monarchs retained the right to abolish them if they so 
wished. One major difference was that the Bourbon regime remained a façade parliamentary 
monarchy throughout its lifetime, whereas the Ottoman regime became purely absolutist after 
1877. Also, the French Parliament was not representative; only rich landowners were enfranchised 
(Alexander, 2004). In contrast, the Ottoman Parliament was representative (Shaw, 1977, p. 171).17  
In terms of the balance between the executive and the legislative, both regimes had weak 
parliaments. The French Charter of 1814 centralized all powers in the King; the King designated the 
cabinet and the bicameral parliament lacked the competence to dismiss ministers (“Charte 
constitutionnelle du 1814,” 1814, pp. 364–68). The division of powers between the cabinet and the 
parliament remained ambiguous throughout the Bourbon monarchy. This ambiguity lay in the root 
of the repetitive crises that impaired the functioning of the regime and raised discontent (Hudson, 
1973, pp. 22–30). The tension between the cabinet and the parliament heightened under Louis 
XVIII, because the King was a moderate unlike the royalists in Parliament and his moderation 
spared him from being the target of discontent. During his reign, when ministers and parliamentary 
majorities belonged to different factions, policy making would frequently be blocked, because 
																																								 																				
17	According	to	Shaw,	each	district	was	represented	by	one	Muslim	and	one	non-Muslim.	The	European	
provinces	 were	 overrepresented,	 receiving	 one	 deputy	 for	 every	 82,882	 males,	 while	 the	 Anatolian	
provinces	had	one	for	every	162,148	males	and	those	in	Africa	one	for	every	505,000.	The	Jews	were	given	
one	for	every	18,750	males	(4	deputies	in	all);	the	Christians,	one	for	every	107,557	males	(44	deputies	in	
all),	and	the	Muslims,	one	for	every	133,367	males	(71	deputies	in	all)	(Shaw,	1977,	pp.	181–82).	
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parliamentarians would not support ministerial policies. Yet, lacking the competence to dismiss 
them, the latter would reject the bills that the latter would propose. Ministers would circumvent 
the parliamentary objection by issuing decrees. Such interactions rendered the suffrage the most 
controversial issue of the Bourbon regime. Each faction desired to maximize its own representation 
and minimize dissent. Therefore, all factions worked to restrain or extend the suffrage (restrain if 
they were already represented and extend if they wanted to be represented). Gerrymandering and 
electoral fraud became widespread in this environment. Accordingly, the Bourbon regime under 
Louis XVIII was characterized by violent confrontations between antagonist political factions and 
polarization. Once Charles X took the throne and imposed absolutism, the monarchy became the 
target of dissent. Despite its shortcomings, the French Parliament provided some room for dissent. 
As we shall see, this created a fundamental difference in terms of the strategies that challengers 
employed from the Ottoman case. In the Ottoman Empire, as in France, the Sultan designated the 
cabinet and the Parliament lacked the power to dismiss ministers (Tanör, 1997). Also, the Ottoman 
Parliament had considerable budgetary powers but on all other areas it played a consultative role 
(Gözler, 1999, pp. 30–50). As in France, parliamentary sessions caused tensions between 
antagonist political factions. However, because the parliament convened only for a year, the 
monarchy remained the target of contention from 1877 to 1908. As of 1877, the Sultan centralized 
decision making, imposed censorship, and exiled and persecuted all dissidents.  
One common trait between the Hamidian and Bourbon regimes was the theocratic 
foundation of the rule. However, theocracy generated different reactions in Ottoman and French 
societies due to the different ethno-religious composition of these societies. The former was a multi-
ethnic and multi-religious society and the Islamist appeal targeted a portion of the population, 
excluding the rest. The latter that was a relatively homogeneous society; therefore, appeal to 
Catholicism only generated ideological debate but did not antagonize a certain segment of the 
society. Under Louis XVIII, the clergy appeared as the ally of the royalist faction.18 Under Charles 
X, they became the monarch’s chief ally. In his rule, the clergy’s competences in sociopolitical life 
widened and the Catholic Church generated royalist propaganda through its institutional network. 
However, the theocratic appeal undercut Charles’ support among middle and lower classes and 
rallied the rise of an anticlerical front that encompassed both left and rightwing actors (Kroen, 
2000, p. 283; Pilbeam, 1982, p. 355). Like Charles X, Abdülhamid II imposed a theocratic rule, but 
theocracy improved his societal support. The Sultan promoted Panislamism as the official ideology, 
which replaced the previous ideology, Ottomanism, preaching secular imperial citizenship and a 
multicultural society. He promoted himself as “the defender of faith and Muslims” and the caliph-
¾a title that sultans had been holding since 1516 but that none before him had politicized (Karpat, 
																																								 																				
18	From	1813	to	1815,	Catholic	sympathizers	and	refractory	priests	(persecuted	by	the	Bonaparte	regime)	
collaborated	with	the	royalists	in	building	a	nation-wide	network	(Alexander,	2004,	p.	41).	
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2001, pp. 224–25). The Sultan made the theocratic turn for he had given up hope about gaining 
back Christians’ loyalties, which led him to prioritize his long neglected Muslim subjects and recast 
the image of the society as a community of faith. This strategy successfully boosted the Sultan’s 
popularity, because towards the end of the 1890s Muslims constituted the majority of the 
population,  given that territorial losses had dwindled the number of non-Muslims living in the 
Empire while inflows of Muslim emigrants had enlarged the number of Muslims (Shaw, 1977, pp. 
116–117). Thus, although both regimes leant on religion to improve support, this policy was fruitful 
only in the Ottoman Empire. 
The French and Ottoman regimes also differed in terms of their interactions with foreign 
actors. In both societies, foreign powers had negative connotations in society. However, as we shall 
see, distinctly in the Ottoman Empire, foreign dislike took the form of anti-imperialism. In France, 
the monarchical regime was imposed by the European powers. Fearing the revival of imperial 
aspirations in the country, the European powers restored the Bourbon dynasty and remained 
supportive of the monarchy until 1830. However, this support did not translate into actual military 
or economic support. Nor did the latter interfere in France’s domestic affairs. In contrast, the 
European Powers pursued colonial projects on Ottoman territories. They made invasions in North 
Africa and provided economic and political support to secessionist movements. The European 
Powers also interfered in the Empire’s domestic affairs in order to provide diplomatic support to 
Christian minorities against the Sultan’s government. They further used military defeats to extract 
further commercial or political concessions (Hanioğlu, 2008). The Empire had been suffering 
heavy indebtedness well before Abdülhamid II took the throne. However, under his reign, 
successive wars and territorial losses together with soaring tax revenues had impoverished the 
Empire so much that the state was unable to service interests on its debts. In 1881, the Great Powers 
founded the Ottoman Debt Administration to collect payments. Through this administration, 
foreign governments obtained the right to direct control over imperial revenues (Birdal, 2006). 
Thus, differently than the French regime, the Ottoman Empire found its territorial integrity 
challenged by foreign powers.  
 Another difference was that the Ottoman Empire faced secessionism unlike in France. 
Secessionist movements had emerged in the 1820s, but these early movements were among 
Christian minorities of the Empire. As of the 1880s, secessionist movements spread to Muslim 
minorities, which came as a shock to the government and the citizens who maintained imperial 
allegiances. The latter felt “disappointed” and “betrayed” every time yet another Christian minority 
made independence demands (Boyar, 2007, pp. 45–55). Independence demands of Muslims came 
as additionally shocking, because they shattered the Sultan’s societal project, the community of 
faith. Consequently, intercommunal relations grew particularly tense under Abdülhamid II. Thus, 
unlike the Bourbon monarchy, where the regime lacked foreign and domestic support, the Empire 
found its integrity was at stake. 
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 Overall, the Ottoman and French transitions make an ideal paired comparison for a least 
similar systems research design. These regimes belong to the same era and follow similar episodes 
of rise and fall, but they differ on their geographical location, longevity, legal structures, and their 
interactions with their domestic and international environment. While France was a façade 
parliamentarianism, the post-1877 Ottoman regime was purely autocratic. In France, 
confrontations between antagonistic factions caused unrest, whereas external and internal threats 
jeopardized the Empire’s integrity. These differences, as I will show, differently affected the 
structure and nature of regime contention. Let us now see who the challengers were and what type 
of demands they made. This discussion will also explain the variation on the level of strategic 
disagreements. 
 
Who are the challengers? 
 
We have seen that the Ottoman Empire’s integrity was threatened and its regime was an autocracy, 
whereas the French parliament provided some room for dissent. These differences structured 
challengers’ ideologies and strategies differently. In France, no challenger group worked against 
territorial integrity. In the Ottoman Empire, some challengers were secessionist, while others 
worked for democratization and imperial integrity. Furthermore, democratization via reform had 
some viability in France. In the Ottoman Empire, repression practically invalidated the strategy of 
reforms. I will begin by explaining how the environment of the regimes generated different types 
of regime contention. I will show that engineering regime change was particularly difficult for 
Ottoman challengers. I will then introduce each actor and their particular demands from the 
regime.  
 
*** 
 
Although the authoritarian regime faced challengers demanding liberalization in both 
cases, the Ottoman government found its integrity at stake due to activities of secessionist groups 
and the colonial powers. This contextual difference structured debates over constitutionalism 
differently. 
In France, debates over constitutionalism revolved around absolute royal power, on which 
actors took for or against positions. The conflict between these two antagonist camps, neither of 
which was homogenous, dated back to the aftermath of the French Revolution. From 1790 onwards, 
these two camps had been alternating in power through successive revolutions, coups, and 
uprisings. Each time one of the camps got in power, it tried to annihilate opponents via oppression, 
which, in turn, caused radicalization among supporters of the antagonist camps (Bergeron, 1981; 
Brown, 2007; Crook, 2002).  
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The Ottoman context was characterized not so much by ideological radicalization but by 
antagonism between supporters of imperial integrity and groups demanding independence. 
Advocates of imperial integrity were constitutionalist groups, which identified the Sultan’s 
authoritarianism as the root cause of imperial decay and secessionism. For these groups, executive 
arbitrariness caused maladministration and alienated ethno-religious minorities of the Empire 
(Mardin, 1983). Constitutionalists, like most statesmen, interpreted independence demands as 
another form of the rebellions that had been breaking out against the central administration for 
centuries. Rebellions, for them, channeled grievances about the impoverished quality of the 
government (due to corruption, disorder, ineffective taxation). Thus, most of these 
constitutionalists failed to comprehend that nationalism was not a fad, that it posited a novel 
conception of society and statehood, generating demands that could not be countered by simple 
administrative reforms (Boyar, 2007, pp. 45–55). Therefore, they thought that participation and 
parliamentary representation would help reinforce minorities’ loyalty towards the Empire, while 
helping to mitigate hostility between Muslim and Christian groups. Overall, Ottoman 
constitutionalists saw regime change as a means to preserve integrity, whereas for secessionists, 
regime change was a dispensable stage towards founding their nation states. That is, these future 
nation states were to be founded on Ottoman territories. Parliamentary representation could 
facilitate secession by helping secessionists to mobilize support and maybe pass bills for local 
autonomy. Yet, it could also be cut short if secession could have been realized under the Hamidian 
absolutism. Therefore, secessionists had a fundamental conflict of interests with constitutionalists. 
On the other hand, secessionists’ interests also conflicted with one other, since these independence 
movements often vied for the same territories–a consequence of living together for centuries– 
and/or coveted neighboring lands. Thus, secessionists had irreconcilable differences not only with 
constitutionalists and the Sultan’s government but also with other secessionists.  
The theoretical implication of this contextual difference was the variation in the strength 
of preferences. Actors of the Ottoman case faced higher sucker’s payoffs, therefore had stronger 
objections to institutional arrangements alternative to theirs. For instance, secessionists stood to 
lose more from imperial integrity, as did the constitutionalists from secessions, which narrowed 
the room for compromise between these challengers. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the historical 
analysis, some challengers prioritized overthrowing the Sultan’s authoritarianism more than their 
position on the issue of imperial integrity. Let us now see who the challengers are.  
 
France  
 
Challengers of the Bourbon monarchy included grassroots organizations and parliamentary 
factions. Grassroots organizations encompassed conspiratorial societies, civic associations like the 
Society of Friends of the Freedom of Press, newspapers, and freemason lodges (Alexander, 2004). 
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Parliamentary factions consisted of parliamentarians voicing a particular viewpoint. Lacking 
mobilizing structures, parliamentary factions collaborated with grassroots organizations in order 
to mobilize voters. Unlike other factions, the ultras enjoyed privileged access to the Church network 
given their ideological affinity with the clergy.  
Following historians, I classify challengers using the left-right axis. The leftwing referred 
to supporters of popular sovereignty, while the right comprised advocates of royal sovereignty 
(Alexander, 2004; Girard, 1985; Hudson, 1973; Sauvigny, 1967; Thureau-Dangin, 1876). The 
rightwing involved royalist factions and the constitutionnels; the doctrinaires were in the center. 
Leftists included the bonapartists, republicans, federalists, and a heterogeneous group called the 
leftwing or the independents (Rémond, 1992).19 Given spatial limitations, I will focus on the 
differences between these factions.20 
Except for the royalists, who wanted royal sovereignty, all challengers advocated for 
national sovereignty. Absolutism found support among the ultra-royalists (the ultras henceforth), 
whereas the moderate royalists desired a moderate monarchy like the constitutionnels and the 
doctrinaires. However, while moderate royalists and the doctrinaires evolved towards British-style 
parliamentarianism, the constitutionnels preferred a strong executive. On the left, the bonapartists 
wanted a strong executive; the republicans desired a strong parliament, whereas the federalists and 
the independents supported a constitutional parliamentary monarchy. Except for the ultras, all 
challengers endorsed secularism.  
Regarding suffrage, the ultras opposed the inclusion of middle classes, an idea supported 
by moderate royalists, the constitutionnels, and the doctrinaires (Girard, 1985, pp. 44–45). 
Leftwing challengers demanded universal suffrage. Decentralization found support with royalist 
factions and the left (with the exception of the republicans and bonapartists), whereas the 
constitutionnels and the doctrinaires endorsed centralization (Yvert, 2013, pp. 63–66). 
Decentralization was a hot topic, because extending local autonomy would prevent electoral frauds. 
The royalists desired it to reassert aristocratic privileges on the countryside. On freedoms, the 
constitutionnels believed that freedoms could be sacrificed for order, occupying a more extreme 
position than the ultras’. The doctrinaires and royalists believed in freedoms but their fear of 
disorder pushed them to support the latter’s illiberalism until Charles’ reign (Girard, 1985, pp. 76–
78). After 1824, these factions joined the left in advocating for freedoms, while the constitutionnels 
softened their positions. Strategically, challengers debated the legitimacy of violence as a means of 
change. Grassroots organizations were generally more inclined to using violence as a means to an 
end. While some parliamentary factions condoned violence, others insisted on conventional means 
																																								 																				
19	 Following	 the	 White	 Terror,	 the	 bonapartists	 and	 republicans	 turned	 passive	 until	 economic	 crisis	
resurfaced	these	demands;	in-between,	no	group	identified	itself	as	republican	or	bonapartist	(Alexander,	
2004,	p.	272).		
20	Interested	readers	should	consult	(Alexander,	2004;	Girard,	1985;	Hudson,	1973;	Rémond,	1992).	
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against the grassroots organizations with which they collaborated. For instance, the leftwing or 
independents split into the moderates and radicals after the former renounced violent protests as 
an electoral strategy (Alexander, 2004). Note that challengers updated preferences on freedoms, 
parliamentary powers, and violence in response to authoritarian retrenchment under Charles X. 
 
The Ottoman Empire 
 
Ottoman challengers comprised secessionists envisioning a representative regime in their 
prospective nation states, and the constitutionalists pursuing constitutional monarchy and 
imperial integrity. Most secessionists operated in the territories that they lay claims to. The 
constitutionalists known as the Young Turks organized clandestinely in the Empire or worked from 
abroad to escape regime forces. As authoritarianism entrenched after 1897, the constitutionalists 
scattered across Geneva, Paris, Cairo, London, and Berlin (Mardin, 1983). Distance and regime 
persecution impeded communication and coordination between the constitutionalists. Therefore, 
they faced more complex mobilization problems than did the secessionists and French challengers.  
The Young Turks emerged in 1889. Until 1897, they worked through an umbrella 
organization called the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which rapidly attracted 
disgruntled journalists, military officers, bureaucrats, and the ulema (members of the religious 
class) (Ágoston, 2008; Mardin, 1983, pp. 69–74). This means the CUP comprised numerous 
factions such as the ulema or military branches. Yet, these groups generally collaborated between 
1889 and 1897 (Hanioğlu, 1981, pp. 25–42). After the CUP closed down in 1897, the few 
uncompromising factions continued constitutionalist propaganda in Geneva, Cairo, and Paris 
(Hanioğlu, 1981). Yet, cooperation was irregular due to differences of opinions. After joining 
opposition circles in 1900, Abdülhamid II’s nephew Prens Sabahaddin organized the 1902 Congress 
of Ottoman Opposition to unify constitutionalists (Mardin, 1983, pp. 291–300). However, the 
Congress spawned novel factions: the Sabahattin faction, the minority, and numerous small 
organizations. The first two factions were the two leading factions. They never cooperated due to 
irreconcilable differences. Small factions initially worked with the Sabahattin faction–because 
unlike the minority, the Sabahattin faction was revolutionary–and joined the minority after this 
faction also became revolutionary. Once the Committee of Progress and Union (CPU) was founded 
in 1905, both the minority and minor factions gravitated towards the CPU. This coalition restored 
constitutionalism in 1908. Due to space limitations, here I focus on differences between 
challengers.21  
An obvious difference between constitutionalists and secessionists concerned their 
position on imperial integrity. Secessionists sought to found their nation state and identified 
																																								 																				
21	Interested	readers	should	consult	(Aksin,	2009;	Hanioğlu,	1981,	2001,	Mardin,	1983,	2000;	Temo,	1987)..	
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themselves as nationals of their ethnicity. While all desiring imperial integrity, most older 
generation constitutionalists identified themselves as Ottoman despite coming from various 
backgrounds, such as Kurds, Arabs, Armenians, Circassians, and Jews, and advocated for imperial 
citizenship (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 145). Younger generation constitutionalists supported Turkish 
nationalism or ethnic Turkish nationalism known as Turkism. In the 1900s, Ottomanism lost 
support to Turkish nationalism and Turkism among constitutionalists as a result of territorial 
losses. Regarding secularism, most secessionists made religious propaganda because it mobilized 
their co-ethnics against the Muslim Empire. Of constitutionalists, the older generations and the 
ulema factions opposed secularism, whereas the younger generations endorsed secularism–which 
became increasingly popular after 1902. Of the secularist constitutionalists, many generated 
religious propaganda to mobilize the public who were yet to learn about national identity. 
Strategically, Ottoman constitutionalists debated whether to use violence as a means of 
transition. With the exception of a few older-generation non-revolutionaries–such as Ahmed Riza 
who led the minority after 1902, most constitutionalists were revolutionary. The revolutionary 
constitutionalists, in turn, debated whether to seek foreign assistance to regime change, cooperate 
with secessionists, and instigate rebellions in provinces to weaken the Sultan’s government. Those 
opposing rebellious tactics were concerned that unrest might have played into the hands of 
secessionists in the provinces that contained large Christian minorities, such as the minority or the 
CPU (Hanioğlu, 2001). On foreign sponsorship, some constitutionalists thought it would ease the 
overthrowing of the Sultan’s government, such as the Sabahattin faction; others feared that, once 
involved, the Great Powers would never leave and eventually partition the Empire, such as the 
minority or the CPU. Concerning cooperation with secessionists, the Sabahattin faction thought it 
would alleviate resource constraints, whereas collaboration with groups that worked against 
imperial integrity seemed unacceptable to the minority or the CPU (Mardin, 1983).  
It is noteworthy that after 1902 support for non-revolutionary transition and foreign 
assistance declined, while support for secularism and Turkish nationalism increased in response to 
environmental transformations. Successive colonial invasions and the Great Powers’ increasing 
involvement in domestic affairs and the administration generated a strong support for anti-
imperialism and discredited foreign assistance. Non-revolutionary means also lost credit, as most 
constitutionalists acknowledged that they could not afford to wait for transition to come via reform 
when integrity was at stake (Mardin, 1983). The perceived urgency of transition led some 
constitutionalists to enter tactical cooperation with secessionists, while others found it 
unacceptable and unviable. Ottomanism lost popularity, since territorial losses and secessions had 
left fewer Christians in the territories. Most constitutionalists, like the Sultan, admitted the 
improbability of rewiring the remaining Christians’ loyalty towards the Empire. Unlike the Sultan, 
most constitutionalists envisioned a secular state and society, keeping up with the global trend 
towards the nation-state model. However, most citizens were unaware of the concept of nation and 
		 85	
defined themselves by religion. Moreover, though they felt that autocratic monarchies were on their 
way to oblivion, most Ottomans maintained allegiances to the monarchy (Brummett, 2000, p. 117). 
As such, some constitutionalists continued to generate religious propaganda, others–like the 
Sabahattin faction–did not. Finally, the coalition that restored constitutionalism was revolutionary, 
supported Turkish nationalism and secularism, and opposed foreign assistance and cooperation 
with minorities.  
 
*** 
 
Overall, internal debates of the French challengers principally revolved around ideological 
issues, whereas Ottoman challengers were more preoccupied with strategic issues. On the other 
hand, in both cases, grievances were multidimensional. Unlike the conceptualization of bargaining 
theory, they went beyond the authoritarian-libertarian axis and economic problems were not 
salient. Also, Ottoman and French challengers differed in the type of their ideological and strategic 
issues that they were concerned about. Yet, in both contexts, challengers updated their views over 
time. Given temporal changes in the content of preferences and their multidimensionality, it is 
more appropriate to conceptualize interactions among challengers as a case of coordination with 
conflicting interests rather than a prisoners’ dilemma game with a single issue dimension 
determining payoffs. To reemphasize an earlier point, these interactions cannot be theorized as a 
unidimensional cooperation game, because variety of preferences shape actors’ behavior. The case 
of coordination that I analyze here is more about on whose terms regime change will be carried out. 
I provide the details of the coding procedure in Appendix I.  
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CHAPTER 3 Transition to Constitutional Monarchy in the Ottoman Empire 
What conditions enable diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their 
ideological preferences, to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the 
status quo? In this chapter, I will examine this question using the case of the Ottoman 
Empire under Sultan Abdülhamid II, who reigned from 1876 to 1909 until deposed by the 
military. I test the twofold argument that contender groups become more likely to 
cooperate for regime change if they converge on a particular strategy of transition and 
sideline their ideological differences (if any). Preference convergence on strategies and the 
de-prioritization of ideological disagreements (if any) prepares the rise of a coherent 
oppositional coalition that capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to 
overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions. This case study 
covers the period from Abdülhamid II’s enthronement in 1876 to 1908 when the Empire 
transitioned back to constitutional monarchy with a revolution and focuses on the role of 
cooperation among challengers to the Hamidian regime on regime change.  
We should say the Empire “transitioned back” to constitutional monarchy, because 
Sultan Abdülhamid II took the throne conditional upon adopting a constitution and a 
parliament, a prmise which he followed through. The 1876 Constitution, Kanun-i Esasi 
(the Basic Law), was drafted by a commission composed of 28 commissioners, including 
two military officers, 16 bureaucrats (three Christians and 13 Muslims), and ten clergymen 
(ulema), and came forth on December 23, 1876 (Tanör, 1997, p. 133). In the same year, 
elections were held for the lower chamber of the Parliament, Chamber of Deputies (Meclis-
i Mebusan), which convened on March 18, 1877. The Parliament remained in session until 
June 28, 1877 until prorogued by Abdülhamid II on the grounds of the difficulties posed 
by the Russo-Turkish War that broke out that year (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 120). After 
suspending the constitutional regime, the Sultan established a very personalized 
autocratic regime–the first of its kind since since Mahmud II (1808-1839) passed away.22 
The prorogation of the Parliament and the Constitution generated uproar among 
proponents of constitutionalism, notably, the Young Ottomans who had been advocating 
for liberalization in the Empire since the 1860s (Mardin, 2000). Abdülhamid II silenced 
this opposition via censorship, arrests, incarcerations, and exiles. He also formed a 
personal spy network, which directly reported to the Sultan, to hunt constitutionalists. 
																																								 																				
22	 It	 is	worth	noting	 that	 the	Ottoman	Empire	 rarely	had	autocratic	 rules.	 The	 traditional	way	of	 ruling	
consisted	 of	 consultation	 with	 the	 clergy,	 the	 military,	 notables,	 and	 the	 high	 bureaucracy.	 For	 more	
information	see	(Berkes,	1964;	Findley,	1980;	Shaw,	1976).	
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Repression restored “order” in the Empire and the Young Ottoman constitutionalist 
movement discontinued.  
However, constitutionalist demands resurfaced in 1889, when a group of students 
at the Royal Military Medical Academy formed the Ottoman Union Society (Ittihad-i 
Osmani Cemiyeti). The revival of constitutional demands did not escape the regime’s 
spies. However, despite censorship and spies in the Academy that reported any meetings 
of more three, the Society was able to circulate handwritten papers to students of the 
School of Civil Administration, the War Academy, and later medreses23. By 1895, this 
second generation constitutionalist movement had formed branches in Istanbul, Izmir, 
Cairo, Damascus, Tripoli, some Balkan cities, London, and Geneva (Hanioğlu, 1981, pp. 
25–42). These constitutionalists came from diverse backgrounds, including military 
officers, the ulema24, intellectuals, students, bureaucrats, some Young Ottomans, and 
younger generations of constitutionalists, that is, all segments of the society that the 
Hamidian regime had been persecuting (Mardin, 1983, pp. 69–74). This group later came 
to be known as the Young Turks. 
Besides their grudge against the Hamidian authoritarianism, the Young Turks had 
little in common. The constitutionalist movement, which adopted the name of the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP from here on) in 1894, operated as an umbrella 
organization that coordinated actions of several branches across the Empire and 
ideological factions that envisioned different regimes after overthrowing the Sultan’s 
government. The ulema desired a constitutional regime compatible with the Sharia; the 
military wing focused on imperial integrity and opposed secularism but desired a less 
religious regime than the ulema, some intellectuals and bureaucrats, following positivist 
principles, demanded a secular constitutional regime (Mardin, 1983). On the top of this 
ideological diversity, the Young Turks also disagreed on how the Sultan’s government 
should have been overthrown. Older generations and some positivists opposed 
revolutionary means on the grounds that they might have caused societal disorder if 
transition were to come without people gaining awareness of their participatory and 
representative rights. Others disagreed; the Empire could not afford to wait until the 
society became aware of constitutionalism. A quick action was necessary to save the 
fatherland (Mardin, 1983).  
																																								 																				
23	Educational	institution	where	Islamic	sciences	were	taught	(Somel,	2011,	p.	178).	
24	Members	of	the	Ottoman	religious	class	(Ágoston,	2008).	
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Such disagreements stand in contrast with the word “union” in both the Society of 
Union and the Committee of Union and Progress. In both organizations, unity expressed 
the desired objective of restoring unity among ethno-religious groups of the Empire that 
had been crumbling since Greek independence (1821). The word “progress,” on the other 
hand, communicated the belief in science and modernity (Sohrabi, 2011, p. 54). The Young 
Turks sought to protect imperial integrity by modernizing the government according to 
principles of reason and science. As we shall see, there were disagreements as to how 
scientific and rational principles should apply to the government.  
The Young Turks were convinced that imperial decay resulted from executive 
arbitrariness and constitutional government was the remedy. In this sense, there is a 
difference in the contextual meaning of constitutional demands in the Ottoman Empire 
than in Western Europe. In Western Europe, grievances about taxation induced societal 
began to challenge their monarchs (Tilly, 1993). In the Ottoman context, discontent about 
taxation generated local rebellions but not result constitutional movements (Mardin, 
2000). Again, Ottoman constitutionalists desired to save their fatherland. We will see that 
this contextual difference shaped the dynamics of state-society bargains in a unique way. 
The noble cause of saving the fatherland did not yet suffice to keep the 
constitutionalists united. As I will explain, different ideological and strategic agendas 
caused splits within the movement, while the Sultan turned several constitutionalists away 
from the cause via cooptation and repression (Hanioğlu, 1981). In 1895, the Sultan coopted 
Mizancı Murat, the then leader of the CUP, to officially close down all CUP branches across 
the Empire. Nonconformist constitutionalists stayed in Europe to defend the cause. These 
perseverant constitutionalists formed numerous novel organizations. Yet, none was able 
to play the unifying role that the CUP had played. As I will explain, despite numerous 
attempts to reunite, the constitutionalists could not go beyond short-term issue-based 
cooperation against the Sultan’s regime for a decade. The Young Turks finally reunified 
when the Committee of Progress and Union (CPU from here on) was formed in 1905 and 
assumed the leadership role attracting small Young Turk organizations and a military 
constitutional organization, the Ottoman Freedom Society. This coalition carried out a 
revolution in 1908 and restored constitutionalism after a 31-year intermission. 
It is worth noting that while the Young Turks were working on saving their 
fatherland, other organized regime contending groups were also challenging the Sultan’s 
government. These contenders were nationalist groups organized along ethno-religious 
lines operating within (and sometimes also without) the Empire to build their own nation 
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state, such as the Armenian Dashnak Party or the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization. I will call these independence seeking groups “secessionists” as a shorthand. 
Obviously, secessionists had a fundamental disagreement with the Young Turks as regards 
imperial integrity. Nevertheless, most secessionists were and remained in contact with the 
Young Turks and these contacts occasionally translated into short-term issue-based 
cooperation against the Sultan’s government. Thus, challengers to the Hamidian regime 
subsumed both secessionists and constitutionalists, each of which, in turn, pursued 
different ends. The diversity in the means and ends makes the Ottoman context a perfect 
environment to test the hypotheses concerning the role of ideologies and strategies in 
cooperation.  
The chapter is planned as follows: I begin by conducting a historical analysis to 
establish the nature of the Hamidian regime, its sociopolitical environment, and the issue 
dimensions shaping the debate on regime type. This section helps identify the specific 
meaning ascribed to these issue dimensions in order to comprehend the nature of the 
struggle over regime type. The second section uses historical analysis in combination with 
content analysis to identify who the relevant actors are and how their preference sets look 
like. I contrast and compare groups’ ideologies and strategies to pinpoint the roots of 
disagreements and comprehend why actors believed that a certain strategy or ideology to 
be the solution to the Empire’s problems. This analysis builds on a content analysis of 
memoirs, pamphlets, and articles by prominent figures of each group, as well as secondary 
sources written on groups and their members following the procedure that I detailed in 
the previous chapter. Specifically, I show that Ottoman constitutionalists understood 
constitutionalism as a solution to secessionism, imperialism, and secularism rather than 
a means to tie the hands of the Sultan as was the case in Western Europe (Tilly, 1993; 
Weingast, 1997).  
The next section focuses on the patterns of interactions among challengers with 
the purpose of identifying which pairs of contenders engaged in which type of cooperation 
(short term vs. long term) and what the object of their cooperation was. This analysis helps 
establish when, if ever, challengers move from short-term to long-term cooperation and 
which type(s) of preferences were more likely to precipitate long-term cooperation. This 
section shows that despite various attempts at reunification, challengers failed to build 
long-term cooperation until 1905 due to the conflict of preferences on issue dimensions 
that they highly prioritize. Challengers could form a coherent united front only after a 
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subset of challengers aligned on their strategy of transition and postponed the resolution 
of certain ideological disagreements.  
In the third section, I begin by examining the evolution of actors’ preferences over 
time so as to control for preference revision. I look at the evolution of cooperation density 
over time in order to pinpoint temporal variation in the intensity of cooperative behavior 
with respect to temporal changes in the number of actors. So doing allows for normalizing 
cooperation density (whether we observe enough cooperation among challengers given 
the possible amount of cooperation in a given year), which, in turn, helps avoid spurious 
inferences, such as concluding that there are not enough observed instances of 
cooperation when there are not enough groups. I apply the findings from the historical 
analysis to longitudinal network models with which I measure the relative effect of 
preference convergence on each preference type (ideological or strategic) on cooperation. 
To identify which mechanisms were at work, I evaluate these results with respect to the 
findings of the analysis of the evolution of preferences over time. Finally, I examine the 
composition of the coalition network and preference sets of the core and peripheral actors 
in order to identify whether such a coalition involved all pragmatic actors or some 
pragmatists and some idealists. This analysis allows revealing the extent to which 
preference convergence on strategic issues and preference convergence on ideological 
issues were influential in the rise of an oppositional movement.  
 
The nature of the authoritarian regime and its sociopolitical 
environment  
 
In this section, I analyze the structure of the Hamidian regime and the type of policy 
problems that it faced. To examine the regime’s problems, I trace their evolution from 
their outbreak and follow their development with an eye to detect how they tied into other 
issues. Findings from this historical analysis helps us understand the stakes related to each 
issue, which, then, I use to contextualize challengers’ ideologies and strategies in the next 
section. This section shows that Sultan Abdülhamid II imposed an authoritarian rule and 
adopted a theocratic panislamist discourse as a means to preserve imperial integrity.  
 
		 91	
Democratic reversal & the Hamidian regime 
The Hamidian regime embodied the classic definition of authoritarianism. After 
suspending the Constitution and Parliament in 1877, Abdülhamid II recentralized policy 
making and began personally appointing bureaucrats, generals, and police chiefs.25 His 
diplomacy-based foreign policy allowed for circumventing the military and high 
bureaucracy that had been resisting sultanic authoritarianism since the formation of the 
Empire (Mardin, 1983, pp. 70–72). Abdülhamid II formed a personal spy network that 
directly reported to him in order to hunt down regime contenders (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, 
pp. 172–173, 212–216). To silence the criticisms that authoritarian revival generated, the 
Sultan banished and exiled the constitutionalists and their relatives living in the Empire 
(Shaw, 1977, pp. 215–16). He imposed tight censorship rules, which prohibited not only 
mentions of critical topics but even words like ‘nose’ –because it alluded to the Sultan’s 
large nose or capes in the Empire– or ‘bedbug’, tahtakurusu in Turkish –because in a rapid 
read it could have been understood as tahtın kurusun –may your throne be withered! 
(Boyar, 2006, pp. 419–20). These measures annihilated the constitutionalist opposition 
on Ottoman territories. Those who remained committed to the cause, on the other hand, 
had to withstand the Sultan’s spies and diplomatic actions with the European authorities. 
Despite the latter’s perseverance, the movement had lost momentum for about a decade 
and revived in 1889 with the rise of the Young Turks. At the societal level, authoritarianism 
(istibdat) and censorship generated discontent. The general sentiment in the society was 
that such autocratic rules were defunct (out of place in the modern era) even though 
citizens, who identified themselves with the Empire, continued to hold strong allegiances 
towards the Ottoman dynasty (Brummett, 2000a, pp. 113–189).  
Persecution and oppression had helped the Sultan to defeat most domestic 
contenders, but he still had to deal with indebtedness and secessionism. By the time 
Abdülhamid II took the throne, public debt had risen to 1740.4% of the revenues (Shaw, 
1977, p. 226). In 1881, the European Powers founded the Ottoman Public Debt 
Administration (Düyun-u Umumiye) to levy a certain portion of the Empire’s revenues as 
payments on interests on loans. This Administration provided them with direct control on 
Ottoman revenues and undermined economic sovereignty (Birdal, 2006). Given the 
state’s military and economic weakness and political instability, Abdülhamid II could not 
object to the formation of this Administration. However, the Sultan implemented a series 
																																								 																				
25	For	detailed	information	on	administrative	rearrangements	see	(Shaw	&	Shaw,	1977,	pp.	216–17).	
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of financial and tax reforms and made certain investments, which rectified Ottoman 
finances. In 1905, the budget was finally balanced (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, p. 226). Gradual 
financial recovery and authoritarianism allowed the Sultan to implement public 
construction works (such as roads, railways, postal services), agricultural and industrial 
reforms (such as the creation of industries like silk and institutions, such as the 
Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası) to provide credit to agriculturists) without societal 
resistance. Furthermore, the Sultan’s permitted European firms to build factories to 
exploit minerals and his commercial policy improved craft industries’ competitiveness and 
trade (Shaw & Shaw, 1977, pp. 227–38).  
A theocratic discourse shrouded the Sultan’s authoritarianism. Abandoning 
Ottomanism, the official ideology of the Empire from the 1860s t0 1870s –which 
advocated the revival of the multicultural society under the imperial identity, Abdülhamid 
II concocted a novel ideology combining the traditional Sunni Islamic discourse of 
Ottoman sultans with Panislamism and the caliphate. As regards the caliphate, 
Abdülhamid II unprecedentedly appealed to sultans’ title as the caliph of Muslims –which 
the dynasty had been holding since the 16th century but none before him had politicized 
(Abū Mannah, 2001, p. 128).26 This novel discourse recast the image of Ottoman society 
as a community of believers, where believers designated Muslims. On the other hand, 
despite its theocratic nature, the Ottoman Empire had never promoted Panislamism, nor 
had it tried to integrate Muslims in the Middle East. Although these Muslims were 
superior to non-Muslims under the Sharia, they were not considered to be ‘Ottoman,’ but 
only subjects of the sultan. Until the Rescript of 1839 named all subjects living in the  
Empire officially as ‘Ottomans,’ ‘Ottoman’ designated the dynasty and the ruling class (the 
ulema, the military, and the bureaucracy) (Findley, 1982, p. 14). Muslim provinces, such 
as Egypt or Syria, enjoyed administrative autonomy. The Empire would only appoint 
governors and collect tributes (Cleveland & Bunton, 2013). Thus, Abdülhamid II’s 
Panislamist discourse was unprecedented.  
																																								 																				
26	This	responsibility	of	Ottoman	sultans	found	its	expression	in	their	title	gazi	(warrior	for	the	Islamic	faith)	
(Quataert,	2000,	p.	177).	Gazi	derives	from	gaza	or	cihad	and	demands	rulers	to	expand	the	realm	of	Islam	
through	the	Holy	War	(Barkey,	1994,	p.	27;	Itzkowitz,	1980,	p.	38;	Karateke	&	Reinkowski,	2005,	pp.	53-55-
163).	Although	Ottoman	sultans	had	been	using	 this	 title	 since	 the	13th	 	 century,	 they	only	became	the	
leader	of	 the	Muslim	world	 following	Selim	 III’s	 (1512-1520)	conquest	of	Mecca	and	Medina	 in	 the	16th	
century.	Suleiman	the	Magnificent	(1520-1566)	was	the	first	to	name	himself	the	“caliph	of	all	the	Muslims	
in	 the	world,”	but	he	used	 the	 title	 as	 foreign	policy	 tool	 (İnalcık	&	Quataert,	 1994,	p.	 20).	 It	was	with	
Abdülhamid	II	that	the	caliph	title	applied	to	domestic	policy.	
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One reason behind this theocratic turn was shifts in the demographic composition 
of the Empire. As a result of territorial losses of regions populated by Christians and the 
influx of Muslim refugees, the Christian portion of the population diminished from ≈40% 
in the early 1800s to ≈20% to the late 1800s (Zürcher, 2010, p. 69). According to the 
general censuses of 1881/2–1893, the Muslims constituted 73.3% of the Ottoman 
population (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 130). In this context, Ottomanism would be ineffective 
according to Abdülhamid II. The state should reach out to Muslims in order to preserve 
imperial integrity. The Panislamist Sunni Islamist discourse referencing the caliphate 
served this purpose. In the same vein, Abdülhamid II extended freedoms of Sunni Islamist 
sects, undertook infrastructural projects to facilitate pilgrimage, and increasingly brought 
Islamic symbols into the public sphere (Karpat, 2001, pp. 224–25). These policies boosted 
the Sultan’s popularity among devout Muslim citizens.  
The other reason behind the theocratic turn was foreign policy. Since the 1830s, 
France, Britain, and Russia had been militarily or diplomatically intervening in 
intercommunal conflicts in the Middle East and the Balkans by conditioning loans and 
peace settlements on the recognition of demands for independence and autonomy of 
Balkan and North African regions. Shortly after the authoritarian revival, the British 
ceased to support the Empire’s integrity and together with Russia and France channeled 
support to independence movements. Of these movements, the Armenian cause received 
most support and attention from Russia and Britain (Dündar, 2013, pp. 15–18). Such 
interventions encroaching on Ottoman sovereignty generated strong dislike and distrust 
towards the European powers among citizens feeling imperial allegiances. In the press, 
France, Britain, and Russia were characterized as evil hegemonic powers conspiring 
against the Empire (Brummett, 2000b, pp. 150–65). In this context, Abdülhamid II’s 
Islamist discourse served to draw popular by casting the European powers as a Union of 
Crusaders united against the Caliphate (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 129). It should be noted that 
due to military and economic weakness, the Sultan could not stand up against the Great 
Powers. Rather, he followed a balance-of-power policy, playing Britain, Russia, and France 
against each other, and allied with Prussia following the rise of the German Empire. 
On the other hand, this Islamic appeal had its limitations. First, independence 
movements had sprung to Muslim communities in the Balkans. Nationalist groups had 
been active since 1878 in Albania (the Albanian League) and 1893 in Macedonia (IMRO) 
(Eberhardt, 2003, p. 29; Knowlton, 2004, p. 356). In the Middle East, the Empire had 
either already lost or was about to lose the control of its territories by the time Abdülhamid 
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II took the throne. The French occupied Tunisia and Algeria, while the British controlled 
Egypt and Sudan. People living in these territories did not have strong allegiances to the 
Empire, in part because the Empire had never tried to integrate them and also because 
independence movements were flourishing. Demands for independence were 
unwelcomed by the Ottomans who preserved imperial allegiances. The latter felt 
“disappointed” by each time a community demanded independence, which they 
interpreted as treason to the fatherland (Boyar, 2007, pp. 45–55). To them, these 
communities showed ingratitude towards the Empire that had been looking after them for 
centuries. Disappointment peaked with Armenians’ demands for independence, because 
Armenians had been the favorite minority since Greek independence. Armenians had been 
overrepresented in civil service and mediating diplomatic and financial affairs (Hanioğlu, 
1991). These movements debunked the Ottomanist ideology. Disappointment peaked a 
second time when Muslim minorities in the Balkans raised demands for independence in 
the 1870s and debunked the idea of Muslim solidarity. Around this time, Turkish 
nationalism was still unknown, but religion had a strong appeal. Patriotic citizens 
continued to define themselves essentially as “Muslim.” “Muslim” conveyed both religious 
affiliation and the “Turkish” identity, understood to be a citizen of the Empire. In other 
words, “Turkish” and “Muslim” were used interchangeably in everyday parlance (Köker, 
1990, p. 150). Despite the rise of Turkish nationalism as of the 1900s, the public, if not the 
elite, continued to understand “Turkish” as “Muslim” until the early republican era 
(Berkes, 1964; Feroz, 1993).  
Overall, the Hamidian authoritarianism dwelled upon a theocratic panislamist 
discourse. We saw that this ideological change was a political maneuver in a society where 
the majority of the population was becoming increasingly Muslim and state-society 
relations were shifting to a novel ground. While the theocratic discourse improved the 
state’s relations with Muslim citizens, rising independence demands among Muslim 
minorities discredited the ideal of Muslim solidarity. Independence movements of 
minorities, which received the Great Powers’ support, triggered suspicion and distrust 
towards both Christian minorities of the Empire and European states. On the other hand, 
we have also seen that even though Ottomanism and Panislamism had lost their grounds, 
Turkish nationalism was yet to flourish. I will explain how these demographic and 
sociopolitical shifts influenced and shaped of the Young Turks’ agendas. However, before 
doing so, we need to dig deeper into the role and function of Islam in Ottoman politics. 
Without comprehending the place and meaning of Islam in the 19th century Ottoman 
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Empire, we cannot grasp the contextual meaning of debates over the role of religion in 
politics. 
 
Legacy of past conflicts: The emergence of the main axes of 
conflict 
 
Sunni Islam had been the official ideology from the foundation of the Ottoman state until 
the mid-19th century (Karpat, 2001, p. 224). Islam was the essence of the State and the 
State embodied religion; this symbiosis found its expression in religion-state (din-ü 
devlet) (Berkes, 1964, p. 7; Karpat, 2001, p. 224). Modernization, which Sultan Selim III 
(1789-1808) initiated with the purpose of reverting imperial decline, altered this 
relationship. In this section, I elaborate on the implications of modernization on state-
society relations. 
Religion-state rested on the Sunni Islamic doctrine of government, which preached 
total obedience and just rule. Rulers drew sovereignty from the law. In their capacity as 
defenders of faith, Muslims, and the Sharia, rulers legislated for the welfare of the 
community within the boundaries set by the Sharia. Subjects were to strictly obey just 
rulers but retained the right to resist unjust rulers called ‘despots’ in Islamic law 
(Hanioğlu, 1981, pp. 141–58). In other words, law granted rulers absolute sovereignty 
provided that they duly implemented laws for common good. This principle was the 
Islamic counterpart of the doctrine of just rule in pre-modern Western political thought.27 
In the Ottoman context, as in Europe, it had served to justify authoritarian reigns as well 
as depositions. 
At the beginning of the 19th century, Mahmud II (1808-1839) relied on Sunni Islam 
to legitimize top-down modernization reforms against resistance by the military and the 
ulema. A Sunni Islamic vocabulary shrouded modernization reforms. For example, the 
reforms were designed to restore “just administration,” “bring regeneration into the 
Muslim community,” or implement “fair taxation” (Abū Mannah, 2001, pp. 8, 90–91). 
Thus, at the beginning, Islam and modernization went hand in hand. In the 1840s, Sunni 
Islam began to fall short in justifying reforms in that period when more independence 
movements sprung up in the Balkans and the European Great Powers increasingly 
intervened in the Empire’s domestic affairs. Foreign intervention took the form of 
																																								 																				
27	For	more	information	see	(Goldie,	1995).	
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extracting commercial or diplomatic privileges from the Sultan, military intervention to 
coerce the Sultan to recognize independence or autonomy of some region, or imposition 
of reforms in provinces hosting predominantly Christian populations through treaties 
(Shaw, 1977, pp. 29–36, 133–64). Such ultimatums generated in society a strong distrust 
in the Great Powers, which can be likened to anti-imperialism but the Ottomans did not 
employ this wording. Reforms targeting Christian communities also weakened Muslims’ 
support for the regime and plagued intercommunal relations in the Middle East and the 
Balkans. Nevertheless, lacking the military and economic power to resist the Great Powers’ 
ultimatums, the Ottoman government adopted more reforms towards the Christians with 
the hope of appeasing them and rolling back secessionist tendencies among minorities. In 
a context where reforms had acquired a particularistic nature, Sunni Islam could no longer 
uphold modernization. 
The first noteworthy reform package to be passed under the Great Powers’ 
ultimatum was the 1839 Rescript of Rose Chamber.28 The Rescript guaranteed the lives, 
property and honor of all subjects regardless of religion or ethnicity (İnalcık, 1964, pp. 56–
57). According to Grand Vizier Mustafa Reşid Pasha, designer of the Edict, the government 
adopted modernization reforms to enhance state power and preserve imperial integrity: 
“We do not possess the necessary [military] power to maintain the territorial integrity 
of our state… If we are not able to produce a good administration [the foreign powers] 
will establish a joint administration [in Istanbul] too,” said the Grand-vizier (Karpat, 
2001, p. 190).  
Devoid of Sunni Islam, Sultans Abdülmecid (1839–1861) and Abdülaziz (1861–
1876) relied on bureaucratic expertise; they appointed highly skilled pashas as grand-
viziers to ensure due implementation of reforms and divert the locus of societal discontent 
to another institution. Grand-viziers, such as Ali and Fuad Pashas, drafted, introduced, 
and monitored reform implementation and took charge of the administration. These 
Pashas had ample expertise, but were also rather arbitrary. They personally appointed, 
promoted, demoted, banished, and exiled each bureaucrat. This arbitrariness 
discontented not only civil servants but also citizens. In the eyes of citizens, the Sharia 
preached obedience only to the sovereign, while grand-viziers were mere civil servants 
whose legal status was no different than any other citizen of the Empire, slaves of sultan 
																																								 																				
28	For	contending	arguments	on	Western	origins	of	the	Rescript	see	(Berkes,	1964,	pp.	144–145;	Findley,	
1982;	Shaw	&	Shaw,	1977,	pp.	61–62;	Tanör,	1997,	pp.	88–96).	
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(Findley, 1980, pp. 14–18). As we shall see, this legitimacy deficit precipitated the rise of 
constitutional demands in the 1860s. In other words, the first generation 
constitutionalists, the Young Ottomans, targeted not the person of the sultan but his 
grand-viziers. 
Discontent peaked with the adoption of the Imperial Reform Edict (Islâhat 
Fermânı). The Edict (1856) introduced secularization and equality reforms. The 
government had intended to modernize the statecraft and reinforce non-Muslims’ loyalty 
towards the Empire. To their surprise, these reforms generated an unprecedented society 
wide discontent both among Muslims and non-Muslims, whose reverberations shaped the 
Young Turks’ ideologies and strategies decades later. Specifically, the Edict replaced 
religious courts with mixed tribunals, introduced new penal, correctional, and commercial 
codes, and standardized rules of appointment, salaries, and finances applied to each millet 
(religious communities officially recognized by the state). In so doing, it deprived the 
ulema and heads of the millets of their judiciary power (Somel, 2011, p. 189). In particular, 
the clergy, including, patriarchs, archbishops, and rabbis, lost their discretion over the 
administration of their community. For Muslims, secularization had additional 
implications: In religion-state, the principle of the supremacy of the Sharia operated as a 
check on the executive, requiring that all laws to conform to the Sharia and charging the 
ulema of monitoring the conformity of laws (İnalcık, 1978, p. 562) (Berkes, 1964, p. 9; 
İnalcık, 1978, pp. 107–8, 562). By abolishing this principle, secularization reforms 
liberated the executive from this check and made secular law the only source of 
sovereignty, thus exposing the society unprotected against the state (Abū Mannah, 2001, 
pp. 123–125). Equality caused even more controversies.  
The Edict’s equality reform granted non-Muslims equal access to government 
positions, taxation, and military service.29 Contemporary readers might expect equality, if 
not secularization, to please non-Muslims. Yet, the latter were most displeased of losing 
the privileges that they had been enjoying under inequality. Under the Sharia, Muslims 
were superior to non-Muslims or zımmis (people of the Book). The state granted the 
zımmis the freedom to practice their faith, guaranteed protection of their lives, liberties 
and properties, and accorded the judicial and administrative autonomy to regulate 
internal affairs of their communities if they held the millet status. Muslims and non-
																																								 																				
29	 For	 more	 information	 on	 the	 1856	 Edict	 see:	 (Abū	 Mannah,	 2001;	 Davison,	 1963;	 Findley,	 1980;	
Gözübüyük	&	Kili,	1982;	Somel,	2012;	Tanör,	1997).	
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Muslims held equal rights and obligations under the laws of property, contract, and 
obligation of the Sharia. However, non-Muslims were barred from positions of command, 
such as in the civil service and the military (Karpat, 2001, p. 76). Also, the zımmis paid the 
special poll-tax, land-tax, and a tax to obtain exemption from the military service. 
Exemption from the military service was particularly important to non-Muslims. By the 
mid-19th century, the majority of tradesmen and financiers were composed of the Jews, 
Greeks, and Armenians who made careers in finance and trade and prospered from 
lending money to the indebted Ottoman state instead of serving in the army.30 Hence, the 
Muslims’ superiority remained at the symbolic level; in practice, the zımmis  held 
socioeconomic power.  
Moreover, under inequality, most zımmis benefited from foreign protection and 
circumvented Ottoman jurisdiction by working as protégés. Protégés were Catholic, 
Greek, and Armenian mediators between Ottoman officials and foreign representatives. 
Embassies of the Great Powers would grant them immunity from Ottoman jurisdiction 
(berats) (Sonyel, 1991). By the mid-century, this practice had become increasingly 
misused with embassies selling berats for profit (Artunç, 2013). Equality eradicated the 
zımmis’ privileges, such as exemption from the military service and rights to adjudicate 
their internal affairs. By implication, more non-Muslims turned to the protégé system so 
as to escape Ottoman jurisdiction and Ottomanism fell short of preventing their alienation 
from the Ottoman state. Hence, contrary to the expectations of the drafters of the Edict, 
neither equality nor multiculturalism enhanced non-Muslims’ loyalty towards the state.  
If non-Muslims were dissatisfied by equality, Muslims were traumatized. They had 
already been feeling neglected since the state had been exclusively adopting reforms in 
Christian provinces. Moreover, they were well-aware that they had lost socioeconomic 
power to non-Muslims.31 Muslims’ superiority was symbolic but still compensated for the 
discontent about socioeconomic deprivation. By levelling them with the zımmis, the Edict 
made them feel like second-class citizens (Abū Mannah, 2001, p. 124). Some ulema formed 
a secret society to restore the Sharia, which the government soon discovered and thwarted 
(aka Kuleli Vakası (the Kuleli Incident)) (Davison, 1963, pp. 100–103). Also, a group of 
																																								 																				
30	Christian	and	Jewish	moneychangers	(aka	Galata	bankers)	borrowed	cheaply	in	Europe	and	lent	at	high	
interest	on	short	term	to	the	Empire.	For	more	information	on	the	London-Constantinople	financial	network	
see	(Cottrell,	2007,	pp.	18–40).	
31	The	Muslims	were	on	average	poorer	and	employed	 in	the	agricultural	and	military	sectors	and	small	
crafts.	They	shouldered	the	burden	of	taxation	(Mardin,	2000,	p.	18).	
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idealistic bureaucrats, the Young Ottomans, formed the secret society Patriotic Alliance 
(İttifâk-ı Hamiyyet) to promote constitutionalism against executive arbitrariness.  
Overall, from the 1830s to the 1860s, the Sunni Islamic doctrine fell short of 
legitimizing modernization reforms. As Ottoman governments adopted more and more 
reforms towards Christian communities, the religious foundations of the traditional 
Ottoman state weakened. Islam decoupled from modernization and began serving as an 
instrument to mobilize discontented citizens against the regime. Concomitantly, 
intercommunal relations grew tense and the multicultural nature of Ottoman society 
degraded. In sum, when Abdülhamid II took the throne, the Ottoman state had alienated 
Muslim elites and masses as well as its non-Muslim subjects. It was in this context that 
Abdülhamid II promoted a theocratic doctrine. As I show in the next section, backlash 
against top-down modernization was the very reason why constitutionalists, such as 
Ahmed Rıza, insisted on evolutionary change.  
 
The identity and preference sets of challengers  
 
We have seen in the previous sections that secessionism and foreign interference with 
domestic affairs had been threatening the Empire’s integrity by the time constitutionalist 
demands resurfaced. We have also seen that secessionism had discredited the ideals of 
multicultural society (i.e., Ottomanism) and Muslim solidarity, while religious and 
monarchical allegiances remained persistent despite discontent with authoritarianism. 
This section examines the type of ideologies and strategies that regime contenders 
developed to deal with the Empire’s domestic and foreign policy problems, namely, 
disintegration of Ottoman society, the role of religion, and the question of the 
administrative apparatus with a focus on the Young Turks. I combine historical analysis 
with a content analysis in order to grasp the contextual meaning ascribed to each strategic 
and ideological issue dimension. I show that the popularity and feasibility of ideologies 
and strategies changed over time in response to the environmental changes outlined in the 
previous section. In response to environmental changes, some challengers revised their 
preferences, while others had to de-prioritize the issue dimensions on which they disagree 
with other contenders before taking part in the oppositional coalition. Specifically, the 
Young Turks perceived of constitutionalism as the solution to preserve imperial integrity 
–rather a democratic reform.  
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Visions of society on the brink of imperial disintegration  
We have seen that the multicultural imperial society model fractured once nationalist 
movements mushroomed among Christian and Muslim minorities of the Empire but 
Turkish nationalism was yet to flourish. Through contacts with Western Europe, Christian 
communities, such as the Greeks, the Bulgarians, and the Armenians, among others, 
learned about nationalism and developed the ideal of their own nation-state. These 
communities saw the formation of nation state as the first step towards realizing 
themselves as a nation, after having been subject to the Ottoman yoke for centuries, which 
had left them with economic and political underdevelopment. To develop their people’s 
consciousness about national identity, these nationalist movements appealed as much to 
myths and history as religion. Religious differences between their community and the 
Ottoman state, that is, Christianity vs. Islam, proved to be an effective tool in mobilizing 
people. Thus, religion complemented nationalism for non-Muslim secessionists.  
On the flipside, Ottoman government officials also used religious 
identity/differences in framing independence movements (Boyar, 2006, pp. 49–51). This 
was, as noted before, a consequence of the millet system, for which religious identities 
constituted an administrative category. In addition, having been a bureaucratic empire for 
centuries, Ottoman officials evaluated independence movements within the center-
periphery paradigm, and therefore, had hard time understanding and acknowledging that 
nationalist uprisings differed from the sort of unrests that the Empire had experienced 
before. The vocabulary used in the official historiography to describe nationalist 
movements and nationalists communicates  us that officials perceived of nationalists as a 
few “ungrateful” subjects instigating disorder (Boyar, 2007, p. 43). That is,  nationalists 
were called rebels (isyancı), conveying the idea of resistance against the state with the 
purpose of creating disorder, and nationalist movements revolts as uprisings (ihtilal)–the 
same wording used to describe the Kuleli Affair and tax revolts (Boyar, 2007, pp. 45–55). 
This mentality explains why Ottoman governments initially devised military strategies to 
suppress these movements and subsequently adopted special reforms for peoples of the 
‘rebellious’ regions after military capacity declined. In short, Ottoman governments 
shifted from sticks to carrots strategy due to poor state capacity. As independence 
demands received foreign support, Ottoman governments promoted Ottomanism as a 
strategy to rewire Christians’ loyalties towards the Empire. We have seen that Ottomanism 
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never became popular among Christian minorities. On the other hand, Ottomanism was 
and remained popular for long time among the constitutionalists.  
Ottomanism found support particularly among the Young Ottomans, the first 
generation constitutionalists, some of which played active roles also among the Young 
Turks. Although younger constitutionalists embraced Turkish nationalism, Ottomanism 
remained powerful until the early 1900s, which is interesting considering that the 
Ottoman public had begun turning away from this ideology. From their writings of 
Ottomanist constitutionalists, we understand that patriotism underlay the attachment to 
the imperial identity (Ateş, 2009; Mardin, 1983). These constitutionalists saw non-
Muslims as fellow future citizens of a constitutional empire. As I will explain in the 
following section, both the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks came from diverse 
ethnic backgrounds, which, to them, was validation enough that the imperial society could 
be revived. That said, the Ottomanist constitutionalists were not unaware of nationalism 
spreading across the Empire. They hung on to this ideology, in part because they perceived 
themselves to be the essential element of the Empire, which ascribed to them the duty to 
save the fatherland. It follows that the constitutionalists, like Ottoman statesmen, 
evaluated ethnic nationalisms within the center-periphery paradigm. Also, embracing 
Turkish nationalism meant to acknowledge territorial losses in, particularly, the Balkans 
and the Middle East. Yet, most Young Turks, as most Young Ottomans, came from the 
Balkan regions. In other words, to them, the Balkans were the fatherland that they needed 
to save.  
Ottomanism lost support at the turn of the century after independence movements 
sprung to Muslim communities in the Balkans. These developments forced the 
constitutionalists to acknowledge nationalism. It is important to note that what we call 
“Turks” today referred mainly to the Muslims in the Balkans and Anatolia. Of all peoples 
of the Empire, these communities were the last to develop nationalism. Unlike Balkan 
nationalisms, Turkish nationalism did not develop as a result of contacts with the West 
but of Tartar intellectuals in the late 1890s.32 Their contacts with the West had inspired 
the first generation constitutionalists to develop Ottomanism. On the other hand, even 
though Turkish/Turkish replaced “Ottoman,” both terms bore cultural connotations 
rather than ethnic ones (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 296). As I explain below, ethnic Turkish 
																																								 																				
32	 For	 more	 information	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	 Turkish	 nationalism	 see	 (Akçura,	 1991;	 Copeaux,	 2006;	
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nationalists were in minority among Turkish nationalists. Most nationalist Young Turks 
used Turkish to mean Ottoman, which, as we have seen in the previous section, referred 
to the ruling class and the founding element of the Empire. To them, Turkishness 
constituted an overarching identity that encompassed the non-Muslims (Boyar, 2007; 
Hanioğlu, 1981, p. 219; Mardin, 1983). In other words, Turkish nationalists were not 
assimilationist. Turkish nationalism outcompeted Ottomanism in the 1900s (Hanioğlu, 
2001). Nevertheless, Ottomanism survived until discredited by the 1912-1913 Balkan 
Wars, which lost the Empire a large portion of its lands in the Balkans, home to most 
Young Turks (Zürcher, 2010, p. 211). 
Ethnic Turkish nationalism known as Turkism developed in parallel to Turkish 
nationalism. This variant of Turkish nationalism never became as popular as the mother 
ideology. It found most support among in the Balkans, namely, Kosovo, Monastir and 
Thessaloniki, because it was in these regions that Christian nationalist movements clashed 
most with Muslim peoples that also lived in the region. Having witnessed the rise of 
independence demands and how they received foreign support at the expense of the 
Muslims, these Ottoman constitutionalists developed an ethnicity-based version of 
Turkish nationalism. Ethnic Turkish nationalism saw assimilation as a long-term solution 
to suppress secessionist tendencies of minorities. Overall, the vision of an imperial society 
promoted by Ottomanism and the vision of a national society preached by Turkish 
nationalism and Turkism competed among the constitutionalism as potential solutions to 
societal disintegration.  
 A major difference between the Ottoman constitutionalists’ nationalism and 
secessionists’ nationalism pertained to the role of religion in politics. As mentioned above, 
religion complemented secessionists’ nationalist propaganda given that the state that they 
challenged had been a Muslim one. The constitutionalists found themselves in a 
complicated situation. Most constitutionalists held the same religious identity as the 
government that they were rebelling against. Nevertheless, the first generation 
constitutionalists, the Young Ottomans, fervently believed that the Sharia was compatible 
with constitution and parliamentarianism (Mardin, 2000). Having witnessed how top-
down secularization reforms adopted under Abdülhamid II’s three predecessors had 
alienated both the Muslims and non-Muslims, these intellectuals believed that Islam could 
mitigate societal reactions to constitutional reforms. Theirs was a synthetic pro-reform 
position in the long-standing debate that Westernization had induced in the Ottoman 
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Empire, that is, whether it was possible to politically, technologically, and economically 
modernize while retaining one’s own identity and culture (Berkes, 1964).  
The belief in the compatibility of the Sharia and constitution received a first 
challenge during the drafting of the 1876 Constitutions. The constitutional committee, in 
which some Young Ottomans served, faced the following dilemma: how to accommodate 
national representation and ensure the supremacy of the Sharia. On the one hand, the 
whole purpose of constitutional parliamentarianism was to enhance the non-Muslims’ 
loyalty by including them in the decision making. On the other hand, there was distrust in 
Christian communities; would/could Christian deputies use parliamentary channels to 
further their secessionist plans? For non-Muslims to truly engage in parliamentary 
politics, the Parliament had to be a veritable legislative organ. However, a powerful 
Parliament could also bypass the executive and pass laws in favor of independence 
demands and/or against the Sharia (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 114). These reservations had led 
commissioners to design a consultative legislative parliament (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 115). In 
other words, the constitutionalists had betrayed the very principles that they had been 
advocating for. While in sessions, parliamentary proceedings were frequently paralyzed 
due to the polarization between Muslim and Christian deputies (Shaw, 1977; Tanör, 1997). 
Christian deputies had indeed mobilized their co-ethnics against the Sultan’s regime (see 
the closure of the Parliament in the previous section). This experience had discredited the 
parliamentary regime in the eyes of the Sultan and the public.  
Against this backdrop, most Young Turks lacked the conviction in the compatibility 
of the Sharia and constitution. In addition, as I will explain in the next section, the Young 
Turks emerged from within the Royal Military Academy of Medicine, where they were 
exposed to positivism as a scientific method of investigation. They believed that the same 
positivist principles could apply to government; constitutional parliamentarianism could 
remedy imperial disintegration by checking the executive and providing participation and 
representation to Christian minorities. On the other hand, a rational government also 
demanded a secular approach (Hanioğlu, 1981, pp. 10–30). Consequently, some founding 
fathers of the Young Turks were fervent positivists and secularists, such as Abdullah 
Cevdet and Ahmed Rıza (Hanioğlu, 1981).  
Regardless of their personal opinions about the role of religion, the Young Turks 
were aware that they had to mobilize people and that people continued to maintain strong 
religious allegiances to religion. They had observed Abdülhamid II to rebuild Muslim 
communities’ trust using a theocratic discourse. Given the state of public opinion, some 
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secularist Young Turks generated religious propaganda. Others such as Abdullah Cevdet, 
Prens Sabahaddin, and Ahmed Rıza did not. Non-secularist Young Turks used religious 
propaganda to preach either Ottomanism or a society of Muslim believers. These included 
the former Young Ottomans who turned Young Turks and some older generation 
constitutionalists, such as Tunalı Hilmi. Thus, although secularism was popular and its 
popularity rose after the 1900s, the Young Turks embraced a religious discourse in order 
to mobilize people against the regime. However, this tactic had certain shortcomings. 
First, they competed with the Sultan who had the advantage of holding the caliph title and 
dominating the state’s infrastructural power. The only way in which the Young Turks 
would turn the Muslims against the defender of the faith and the caliph was to persuade 
them that Abdülhamid II was a despot. As mentioned in the previous section, Sunni Islam 
demanded complete obedience to rulers and condoned resistance only in the case that 
rulers became despots and abused their powers. Unsurprisingly, most Young Turk 
journals and pamphlets depicted Abdülhamid II as a despot and called on to Muslims to 
resist despotism (Ateş, 2009; Hanioğlu, 1981, pp. 141–158, n.d.; Mardin, 1983). It should 
be noted that even though the Young Turks felt no loyalty towards Abdülhamid II they had 
monarchical allegiances like the Ottoman public. Their criticism was crystallized in the 
person of the Sultan. Among them, republicans were rare. On the other hand, the 
constitutionalists were exiled in Europe; their anti-Hamidian propaganda could be 
effective to the extent that they could circulate their papers. The spy network, 
authoritarian pressure, and financial constraints often hindered the spread of 
constitutionalist ideas. Another problem was that appeal to Sunni Islam challenged the 
internal consistency of Ottomanist Young Turks’ discourse. The Ottomanist ideal of 
multicultural multi-religious society conflicted with the Sunni Islamist propaganda that 
brought religious differences to the fore. These two complemented each other only under 
the Sharia and the millet system, which would be the old Ottoman societal structure that 
did not offer incentives to the non-Muslims in the first place. Overall, unlike the case of 
secessionists, religion did not fully complement nationalist propaganda.  
In sum, saving the fatherland meant restoring the Constitution and the Parliament 
for the constitutionalists and gaining independence or autonomy for secessionists. We 
should expect this conflict of interests to give no incentives to either party from 
cooperation. Nevertheless, as I show in the next section, some constitutionalists 
cooperated with secessionists more than they cooperated with other constitutionalists.  
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How to overthrow the Sultan’s regime? 
For regime challengers, one chief difficulty lies in mobilizing support and resources. 
Compared to the constitutionalists, secessionists held certain advantages. First, most 
independence movements operated in the territories that they wanted to liberate. Thus, 
they were able to directly contact peoples inhabiting these territories. In contrast, the 
constitutionalists were exiled, cut from direct contact with peoples. Second, most 
secessionist groups, if not all, enjoyed foreign support to their cause, such as the 
Armenians and the Bulgarians. The Armenian groups also drew support from their 
diaspora in Russia and Western Europe. The constitutionalists, however, lacked foreign 
support to their cause, since France, Britain, and Russia had ceased to support imperial 
integrity. As I explain in the following chapter, the latter sought financial and political 
support from Britain and France; Britain showed modest interest. Third, secessionists had 
a clear ideology, nationalism. Moreover, religion complemented their nationalist 
discourse. As we have seen, the constitutionalists lacked a clear ideology with which to 
mobilize people and religion did not quite play into their cause. Finally, because 
secessionists received foreign support and that the military weakness did not allow the use 
of force, the Sultan could not do much to counter ethnic independence movements. Yet, 
he could inflict damages on the constitutionalists by exiling them, taking diplomatic action 
with the embassies of the host countries, chasing them via the spy network, and 
persecuting their relatives living in the Empire. Thus, the regime could hurt the 
constitutionalists’ cause more than it could hurt secessionists’ cause. Beyond these 
structural issues, there were resource constraints that applied to all regime challengers. 
First, mobilizing people for regime change required time and resources. The issue 
of time posed a strategic choice: Challengers could wait until after people gained 
consciousness to carry out a popular revolution or make a smaller scale revolution or coup 
by rallying their supporters. As mentioned in the theory chapter, challengers in all contexts 
had to face this choice, such as the Bolsheviks vs. the Mensheviks. In the Ottoman case, 
secessionists’ comparative advantage lay in that their peoples had already gained 
consciousness of their national identity, whereas most patriotic Ottomans considered 
themselves to be Muslim subjects of the Sultan. This difference meant that the 
constitutionalists faced a longer timeframe if they envisioned a popular revolution. 
Alternatively, they had to carry out a coup. This choice animated a heated debate among 
the constitutionalists: The evolutionary strategy referred to the idea that people had to 
gain consciousness about rights, liberties, and popular sovereignty first, then the Sultan 
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should be overthrown with a popular uprising lest rapid political change unsettled order. 
According to this ‘evolutionary change’ position, a popular movement should establish 
constitutionalism, which, however, required people gaining consciousness (Mardin, 1983, 
pp. 81–123, 177–223). As we shall see, proponents of this strategy included leaders, such 
as Ahmed Rıza and Mizancı Murat. The alternative was rapid change called the 
revolutionary strategy. For revolutionaries, the Empire could not afford to wait until 
people developed consciousness about constitutionalism, when separatism, wars, and 
colonial invasions threatened imperial integrity (Ateş, 2009). Also, there was the problem 
that Muslim communities were on average less literate than the non-Muslim ones. As one 
prominent Young Turk, Sabahaddin Bey, put it, “how can a society that does not read and 
looks down on serious studies achieve progress and carry out a radical change?” 
(Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 86). Thus, the priority of saving the fatherland called for action.  
Revolutionaries faced further difficulties. Resource mobilization and drawing 
support from local popular came at the top of the list. One way to handle this problem was 
to obtain foreign assistance. As mentioned earlier, secessionists received more sympathy 
and support in Europe; some–like the Bulgarians or the Armenians– already enjoyed 
foreign support, while others–such as the Macedonians–were actively seeking. As regards 
the constitutionalists, foreign support was limited due to the conflict of interests on 
imperial integrity (Mardin, 1983). Also, even if such cooperation were to happen, there 
was the problem of justifying a foreign sponsored coup to Ottoman public that featured 
strong foreign dislike! It should be noted that secessionists competed for limited foreign 
resources. Thus, even for these challengers, who had comparative advantage to the 
constitutionalists, foreign sponsorship was uneasy to obtain.  
The alternative was to free ride on a more resourceful group or pool resources with 
an equally resourceful group. The benefits of cooperation/free riding comprised spreading 
resistance to peoples of vaster lands and access to more wherewithal. On the flipside, such 
cooperation made groups dependent on the more resourceful partner or their 
collaborator. There was also the problem of ideologically justifying this collaboration to 
supporters. In the case of secessionists, cooperation was problematic if groups competed 
on the same territories or if they envisioned different polities. For example, the Armenian 
Dashnaktsutiun or the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) and the Social 
Democrat Hunchakian Party (SDHP) did not collaborate for long time, because the ARF 
sought autonomy and not independence as did the SDHP, or Greek revolutionaries 
refused to work with the Macedonians for they coveted the lands that the latter claimed. 
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For the constitutionalists, resource mobilization was more difficult than any other 
challenger, since they were exiled and lacked foreign support (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 5–7). 
These constraints rendered cooperation with secessionists appealing. Also, cooperating 
with secessionists allowed for mobilizing peoples in the territories beyond the 
constitutionalists’ sphere of influence–which was not large to begin with. On the other 
hand, ideologically legitimizing such cooperation would be very hard for the 
constitutionalists due to deep public distrust towards the non-Muslims.  
Overall, given the objectives, available strategic options often contradicted 
ideological principles of challengers’. For the constitutionalists, constitutional transition 
via evolutionary change required time, which the Empire did not have. Revolutionary 
change, on the other hand, required resources, which was hard to mobilize from exile while 
undergoing financial constraints. Therefore, the constitutionalists had to consider 
cooperating with foreign states or secessionists. These short-term issue-based alliances, 
however, had considerable audience costs. Secessionists faced similar audience costs for 
cooperation with the constitutionalists or another secessionist laying claims on the same 
territory. However, resource shortages were less alarming for secessionists, because they 
operated on the lands that they claimed and some received foreign support. Regardless of 
comparative advantages, I explain in the following section that strategic constraints forced 
all challengers to compromise their ideological preferences to a certain extent to build 
short-term cooperation against the regime.  
 
Patterns of interactions among challengers  
 
In this section, I examine the patterns of interactions among challengers in order to 
identify which actors engaged in long-term cooperation and among which others 
cooperation was limited to short-term issue-based cooperation. I also identify the purpose 
of each instance of cooperation. The discussion focuses on the constitutionalists, since the 
latter actually envisioned regime change unlike secessionists who pursued a state building 
project. Using the identified patterns, the next section conducts a longitudinal network 
analysis to test the effects of preferences on ideological and strategic issues on 
cooperation. This section shows that cooperation sustained only in the cases where 
challengers’ preferences converged on strategies. Groups whose strategies mismatched 
also cooperated, but such cooperation did not sustain to propel long-term cooperation. I 
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further show that preference convergence on strategies responded to environmental 
transformations, which compelled challengers to revise and re-prioritize their preferences 
on issue dimensions. 
 
The rise of a heterogeneous opposition front demanding liberalization 
In 1889, a group of medical students at the Royal Military Medical Academy founded the 
Ottoman Union Society –which later became the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). 
Not many documentation on the foundations of this Society have reached to this day, 
partly because the Hamidian repression and spies intimidated intellectuals of the period 
and forced them to live underground lives (Mardin, 1983, p. 32). As Mardin puts it, 
repression generated “collective neurosis,” making intellectuals feel guilty before even 
being accused by the regime (Mardin, 1983, p. 32). Because of this neurosis, we do not 
have detailed accounts of the precursors of the Committee. Still, historians agree that the 
Young Turks had links to the Young Ottomans, the first generation constitutionalists that 
first raised constitutional demands in the 1860s (Ahmad, 1999; Aksin, 2009; Hanioğlu, 
1981; Mardin, 1983; Ramsaur & Tunaya, 1982). As mentioned earlier, the Young Ottomans 
were dismissed and exiled after 1877, following the prorogation of the Parliament. 
Nevertheless, some Young Ottomans continued to pursue contentious activities from exile 
and those persistent challengers assumed important roles in the Young Turk movement 
(Mardin, 1983, pp. 34–35). Among them were İsmail Kemal, Sami Paşazade Sezai, and 
Mizancı Murad, some prominent members of the Young Turk movement. I will return to 
the Young Ottomans when discussing the Young Turks’ demands and ideas in the next 
section. For the moment, I will introduce the various Young Turk factions and relations 
among them. 
 
The Rise of the Young Turks and the Committee of the Union and Progress as an umbrella 
organization 
The Young Turks were heterogeneous in terms of ethno-religious identities as well as 
preferences. In terms of identities, Hanioğlu notes that “none of the original founders of 
the committee was of Turkish origin” (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 145). Yet, they all came from 
regions wherein Muslim groups found themselves threatened by Christian communities, 
such as Albanians, Circassians, and Kurds ” (Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 145). For example, of the 
founding members, Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sukuti were Kurdish, Mehmet Reşit was 
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Circassian, İbrahim Ethem (Temo) was Albanian, Konyalı Hikmet Emin was an Anatolian 
Turk, while Ahmed Rıza, the future leader of the CUP was half Austrian half Turkish. Such 
ethnic diversity existed also among the Young Ottomans. Of the three constitutionalists 
that figured in both movements, Murad Bey was from Dagestan and Kemal Bey from 
Albania, while Sami Paşazade Sezai was half Ottoman half Georgian. Although Muslims 
were overrepresented among the Young Turks, non-Muslims, especially Jews, played non-
negligible roles in the movement, but their number dwindled after 1902. There is also 
evidence of links between freemasons and the Young Turks (Hanioğlu, 1989; Mardin, 
1983). As mentioned earlier, the Young Turks, like the Ottoman public, displayed a certain 
level of mistrust towards Christian communities, which was partly a product of their 
personal experiences.  
As regards socioeconomic origins, the Young Turks came predominantly from 
middle classes. However, this statement does not veritably convey the position of the 
Young Turks within the societal structure of Ottoman society and vis-à-vis the 
government. It would be more accurate to say that they belonged to middle and lower 
ranks of the ruling class. The Ottoman ruling class in the 19th century consisted of the 
ulema (or ilmiye– men of religion), the military (askeriye), and the civil bureaucracy 
(mülkiye –including kalemiye –the scribal service– and the palace service) (Findley, 1980, 
pp. 13–15). That most Young Turks belonged to ruling classes is significant in and of itself; 
it indicates the extent to which the Hamidian regime was alienated.  
The heterogeneous socioeconomic composition of the Young Turks is quite telling 
about the extent to which the regime is alienated from the society: In spite of different 
grievances about the regime, these contenders from different socioeconomic and ethno-
religious backgrounds came together and formed the Young Turks. How did they come to 
work together? The answer lies in the context in which Abdülhamid II stepped to the 
throne.  
When enthroned in 1876, Abdülhamid II faced a constitutionalist coalition, which 
comprised high military officers, the Şeyhülislam (the highest rank of the ulema), and 
bureaucrats. This coalition had overthrown his uncle Sultan Abdülaziz in May 1876 with a 
coup, which had resulted in the Sultan’s death and his brother Murad V’s accession to the 
throne. This coup left significant impacts on Abdülhamid II, who replaced Murad V –who 
had to step down some months later due to mental instability, as well as on Ottoman 
politics. The 1876 coup was one of the rare dethronement incidents in Ottoman history. It 
followed from the cooperation between the then Young Ottoman leader, Mithad Pasha and 
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high military officers, while Şeyhülislam Hasan Hayrullah Efendi legalized the coup by 
approving Abdülaziz’s forced dethronement. The coup constituted the final stage of long-
existing discontent with the top-down modernization reforms program that Abdülaziz’s 
grand viziers had been conducting ––the previous section elaborated on the sociopolitical 
implications of the modernization program. It is worth looking at the dynamics of this 
coup and identify environmental constraints, which helps better understand how 
preference sets of the constitutionalists took shape. 
The 1876 coup succeeded the Revolt of the Softas (the students of the religious 
schools). The softas, like most other groups in society, had been long dissatisfied with the 
Empire’s declining economy and territorial losses. On May 8th, they took the streets 
accusing Sultan Abdülaziz’s government of cowardice in the face of large-scale massacres 
of Muslims and European intervention that ensued from the revolts in Bulgaria. The softas 
demanded the dismissal of the Şeyhülislam and the grand vizier and succeeded in getting 
the Sultan appoint to these posts Mithad Pasha and Hasan Hayrullah Efendi, neither of 
whom the Sultan appreciated (Shaw, 1977, p. 163). These new appointees struck an 
alliance with the military and overthrew Sultan Abdülaziz. The same coalition offered the 
throne to Abdülhamid II on the condition that he proclaimed a constitution and a 
parliament. Abdülhamid II agreed and stepped to the throne.  
Immediately his enthronement, the Sultan formed a constitutional committee to 
draft the 1876 Constitution, to which Mithad Pasha participated. We do not know for sure 
the extent to which Abdülhamid II wanted constitutional regime at that time. It could be 
that his hopes were crashed after the brief experience with the parliamentary regime or 
that he was an autocrat all along. What empirical evidence suggests is that he found 
himself in the face of a military-ulema-Young Ottoman coalition so powerful that it 
counterpoised the powers of the Sultan. Having seen his uncle murdered, he knew that his 
reign would only be secure if he compromised with these groups or if he curbed their 
power. Therefore, throughout his reign, he worked to weaken these groups by centralizing 
decision making, following a diplomacy-based foreign policy, and using censorship and 
exile. Of the ulema, Abdülhamid II was most suspicious –those who ran into the 
Şeyhülislam in the street had to pretend not having seen him (Mardin, 1983, p. 73). The 
Sultan excluded the ulema from its modernization reforms and left this institution to 
follow the course of its decay. Cut from the decision making, most members of the military, 
the bureaucracy, and the ulema found themselves in the opposition rank and populated 
CUP branches despite steep costs of regime challenge.  
		 111	
Shortly after its foundation at the Royal Medical School, the CUP attracted the 
regime’s attention. Spies infiltrated schools. Personal correspondences were inspected. 
Conversations were monitored to the extent that it became impossible for a group of four 
to have a conversation without arousing suspicion. Nevertheless, CUP members 
successfully circulated handwritten papers among medical students and students of other 
academies. In the mid 1890s, the CUP started to circulate Mechveret (a French spelling of 
the Arabic word consultation) in Turkish and Mechveret Supplément Français in French, 
where prominent CUP members, such as Ahmed Rıza, Halil Ganem, Şerafeddin 
Mağmumi, Hoca Kadri, and Abdullah Cevdet penned articles. As such ‘dangerous 
material’ entered in circulation the regime intensified arrests and controls. Although the 
CUP was able to branch out, regime persecution induced the leadership to move its 
headquarters to Paris in 1896.  
As mentioned earlier, the CUP was an umbrella organization. The Paris branch 
steered and oversaw activities of affiliated branches within and without the Empire. In 
1897, Mizancı Murad took over the CUP leadership from Ali Şefkati, because the military 
and ulema wings of disapproved of Ahmed Rıza’s strong positivist ideas. In the same year, 
Murad Bey compromised with the Sultan. According to this accord, the Sultan would 
implement reforms and the Young Turks would discontinue regime contention (Hanioğlu, 
1981, p. 34). Murad Bey kept to his part of the agreement and officially closed down the 
organization and all affiliated branches in the Empire, including the Paris and Geneva 
ones (Hanioğlu, 1981, p. 34). Uncompromising Young Turks tried to pursue propaganda 
activities in Geneva and Cairo. Yet, they were uncoordinated and scattered. One group led 
by Ahmed Rıza contained proponents of positivism and non-revolutionary regime change. 
Another group included opponents of Ahmed Rıza and positivism (Hanioğlu, 1981, pp. 
33–34). A third group comprised revolutionaries like Tunalı Hilmi and constitutionalist 
military officers (Ateş, 2009). The single achievement of the period was İbrahim Temo’s 
founding constitutionalist branches in the Balkans (Hanioğlu, 1981, p. 34).  
Over the next three years, Young Turk publications appeared as regularly as these 
challengers could finance them. The Sultan’s government took diplomatic actions with the 
Swiss and French authorities requesting the deportation of the Young Turks and the 
cessation of their seditious publishing. The Swiss authorities did not comply with the 
Sultan’s demands. The Sultan’s government offered money and positions to some Young 
Turks, such as Abdullah Cevdet and Tunalı Hilmi. The latter took the money to publish 
more seditious material (Hanioğlu, 1981, p. 35). In 1898, the Sultan dissolved whatever 
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had remained from the Damascus branch. In 1899, the Cairo branch closed down after the 
khedive of Egypt withdrew his support from the Young Turks.33 The remaining Young 
Turks, still disunited, worked from Geneva. One faction contained revolutionary Young 
Turks. Another faction led by Tunalı Hilmi was also revolutionary but it made Islamist 
Ottomanist propaganda. These two briefly worked together and parted ways in 1900  
(Ateş, 2009). The revolutionary faction stayed in touch with Ahmed Rıza. However, the 
latter’s objection to revolutionary change impeded a merger and cooperation. Overall, 
following the closure of the CUP, the constitutionalist movement lost momentum.  
 
Attempts of unification  
Contentious activities revived after Prens Sabahaddin, the Sultan’s nephew, joined 
opposition circles in 1900. Prens Sabahaddin was a fervent defender of liberalism and 
secularism, and an Ottomanist (the ideology advocating for a multicultural society of 
Ottoman nationals), who envisaged modernizing the Empire by establishing a British-
style representative government with checks and balances and promoting individualism 
and free enterprise (Mardin, 1983, pp. 291–300). These ideas challenging the Islamist 
authoritarian foundations of his rule, the Sultan persecuted Prens Sabahaddin, his brother 
Prens Lûtfullah, and his father Damat Mahmud Pasha. Seeing Abdülhamid II’s resistance 
to political modernization, Prens Sabahaddin envisaged a coup to abdicate the Sultan. He 
began to sponsor Young Turk factions to garner support for the coup. Revolutionary 
factions were quick to respond affirmatively, but Ahmed Rıza was uninspired by Prens 
Sabahaddin. Prens Sabahaddin set out to organize a congress in order to unify scattered 
constitutionalists and draw a roadmap for overthrowing the Sultan’s government. These 
efforts produced the 1902 Congress of Ottoman Opposition in Paris, which brought 
together representatives of regime challenging groups, including constitutionalists and 
secessionists.  
During negotiations, disagreements on strategic and ideological issues trumped 
challengers’ shared interests in collaborating against the government and impeded the 
formation of an oppositional coalition. Most participants left the Congress with the 
																																								 																				
33	Cairo	initially	provided	a	suitable	environment.	Although	still	legally	part	of	the	Ottoman	territory,	Egypt	
had	an	autonomous	administration.	The	khedive	had	allowed	the	constitutionalist	movement	 to	 form	a	
branch	in	Cairo,	because	he	was	cross	with	Abdülhamid	II	and	had	interest	in	supporting	challengers	to	the	
Sultan’s	regime	(Ateş,	2009;	Hanioğlu,	1981).	However,	this	cooperation	broke	down	once	the	conflict	of	
interests	between	the	constitutionalists,	who	wanted	imperial	integrity,	and	the	khedive,	who	promoted	
Egyptian	nationalism	and	envisioned	independence	from	the	Empire,	surfaced.		
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conviction that certain irreconcilable differences were so insurmountable that a united 
opposition front was unlikely in the medium run. Irreconcilable differences centered on 
the acceptability of revolutionary regime change, the acceptability of foreign assistance to 
regime change, and the acceptability of cooperation with secessionist groups (Hanioğlu, 
2001). With respect to these issues, two main factions and various small factions emerged 
from within the constitutionalist movement; the majority led by Prens Sabahaddin, the 
minority (also called the coalition for it subsumed the Ahmed Rıza faction and 
revolutionaries), and minor Young Turk groups (Hanioğlu, 2001).  
On the subject of revolutionary vs. non-revolutionary change, the majority and 
most minor factions advocated for revolutionary change. The minority contained 
revolutionaries, but because Ahmed Rıza had the leadership this faction remained non-
revolutionary until 1905. As regards foreign assistance to regime change, the majority 
thought that having the support of European Great Powers was useful in terms of both 
garnering resources and gaining international recognition for the new government. For 
the minority, expecting the Great Powers to leave once Abdülhamid II stepped down was 
a naïve idea considering the momentum of colonial invasions and economic exploitation 
via capitulations. Minor groups fell on both sides. Finally, on whether to cooperate with 
secessionists, the majority was in favor for similar pragmatic reasons as their argument 
for foreign assistance: Secessionist groups had wherewithal. The minority, on the other 
hand, opposed cooperation with secessionists, because the latter sought independence 
while the Young Turks worked for imperial integrity.   
At its first meeting, the majority adopted the name Osmanlî Hürriyetperverân 
Cemiyeti (Ottoman Freedom-lovers Committee –OFLC from here on) and began to 
publish the periodical Osmanlı (Ottoman) (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 11–12). As mentioned 
earlier, the majority advocated for revolutionary change and was led by Prens Sabahaddin, 
who had been envisaging a coup against the Sultan’s regime. As a first step, the majority 
contacted European embassies to seek support and financial assistance to their coup 
plans. Although they managed to get some recognition from Britain, most European states 
showed no interests. Meanwhile, the OFLC contacted the Albanian, Macedonian and 
Armenian secessionist groups. The Armenian and Macedonian groups refused to 
cooperate, whereas the deal with the Albanian groups caused tensions with the OFLC. 
Greek OFLC members strongly opposed the idea of a European intervention to accelerate 
Albanian independence (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 15–19).  
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While cooperation initiatives failed, the OFLC sought financial assistance to carry 
out a coup against the Sultan. The khedive of Egypt and some European bankers lent 
money to the OFLC, but the British government declined (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 20–21). 
Prens Sabahaddin sent İsmail Kemal to purchase a vessel with which to carry out a coup. 
However, İsmail Kemal later communicated the committee that he was duped, but sources 
indicate that this money went to Greeks who had interests in Albania (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 
22–23).34 In 1903, the majority was further challenged by the unexpected death of Damad 
Mahmud Pasha –Prens Sabahaddin’s father and Abdülhamid II’s son in law, whose 
position in the dynasty provided prestige to the movement– and Prens Sabahaddin’s 
brother Prens Lûtfullah’s arrest. By the end of 1903, the OFLC had lost momentum. Prens 
Sabahaddin announced that he would devote himself to scientific research. However, he 
later formed another committee. 
While the OFLC plotted a coup, the minority was experiencing organizational 
problems. Ahmed Rıza aspired to become the leader of the Young Turks. However, most 
Young Turks disapproved of his positivist stance (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 29–30). Moreover, 
the minority involved revolutionary factions and followers of Ahmed Rıza, who was a 
fervent supporter of evolutionary regime change. In that, Ahmed Rıza believed that people 
needed to be enlightened about constitutionalism and rights lest top-down rapid change 
would create adverse societal consequences (Mardin, 2006, pp. 167–170). In this process, 
both Ahmed Rıza and the revolutionaries postponed the resolution of the acceptability of 
revolutionary change. Ahmed Rıza ended up dominating the minority and this faction 
began issuing non-revolutionary publication, Şûra-yî Ümmet (Council of the People) in 
May 1902 (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 30). Şûra-yî Ümmet was smuggled into the Empire through 
French post offices and Egypt. The Sultan’s government immediately pressured the 
French and Egyptian authorities to get them to cease this publication’s circulation, which 
indicates that the Sultan seriously feared that the minority might have become the basis 
of the constitutionalist movement. Neither the khedive nor the French authorities honored 
the Sultan’s demand.  
Despite their mistrust in secessionists, the minority contacted the Armenian 
secessionist groups, Greek groups, and European liberals to discuss possibilities of 
cooperation against the Sultan. This initiative did not suffice to motivate secessionists for 
																																								 																				
34	According	to	Hanioğlu,	 this	coup	attempt	had	a	noteworthy	 impact	although	 it	 failed;	 it	was	the	only	
instance	where	the	British	support	was	obtained	(Hanioğlu,	2001,	p.	26).		
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cooperation, who were disturbed by the nationalist and anti-Christian tendencies within 
the minority (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 45–47). Thus, although the minority behaved 
pragmatically secessionists continued to highly prioritize the issue of the society type, 
whereby the conflict of preferences on this ideological mattered hindered cooperation. 
The minor Young Turk factions that emerged from the 1902 Congress included the 
Tunalı Hilmi faction, the faction of old CUP members of Albanian origin, la Fédération 
Ottomane, the Edhem Ruhi group, the Abdullah Cevdet group, old CUP members’ group 
organized around the journals Anadolu (Anatolia) and Türk (Turk), and the Young Turk 
groups in the Balkans, including those organized around the journals Muvazene 
(Equilibrium), Efkâr-î Umumiye (Public Opinion), Drita (the Light) and Islahat 
(Reform), as well as the Feryad Committee (the Cry Committee), the Muslimanska 
Narodna Organizacija (The Muslim National Organization), and Cemiyet-i Îslâmiye (the 
Islamic Society) (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 78–51).35 Of these, Edhem Ruhi briefly cooperated 
with the majority then turned to the minority. Others gravitated around the minority. On 
the other hand, cooperation broke down between the minority and the Abdullah Cevdet 
group (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 53–56). Abdullah Cevdet tried to work with the majority but 
the latter turned him down (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 82). These minor groups issued ‘seditious’ 
publications that attracted the Ottoman intelligence’s attention. They also organized and 
mobilized local population in the regions where they operated. One noteworthy 
development was the adherence of Ahmed Celâleddin Pasha, the chief of the Ottoman 
intelligence service (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 80–81). 
In 1904, Prens Sabahaddin reappeared with a new committee and project that had 
a potential to persuade the secessionists ––which had turned the minority down–– for 
cooperation against the Sultan. His decentralization program, inspired by Britain’s 
devolution and decentralized administration, involved establishing local elected 
governments in the provinces, through which all Ottoman subjects, regardless of ethno-
religious background, would find representation according to proportional representation 
and participate in the decision making (Kevorkian, 2011, p. 27). Decentralization would 
create the conditions conducive to peaceful coexistence of the Muslims and Christians by 
moderating the Turkish element in the Empire and desist ethno-religious minorities from 
seeking independence (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 83–85). Prens Sabahaddin founded Teşebbüs-
																																								 																				
35	 Not	 all	 these	 factions	 were	 formed	 immediately	 after	 1902.	 Also,	 some	 discontinued.	 For	 more	
information,	see	(Hanioğlu,	2001).	
		 116	
i Şahsi ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (the League of Private Initiative and 
Decentralization) (LPID from here on) and began publishing the journal Terakki 
(Progress) in order to mobilize support for his decentralization plan. These initiatives 
deepened the minority’s trust in Prens Sabahaddin. For the minority, decentralization 
plan would but accelerate separatism and serve Great Power interests.  
 
The rise of a coherent oppositional coalition 
In 1905, the constitutionalists had been fragmented for almost a decade since the umbrella 
organization the CUP closed down in 1897 and the constitutionalists found themselves 
fragmented. We have seen that since, the constitutionalists made successive attempts at 
reunification but none had succeeded due to disagreements on certain strategic and 
ideological issues. In 1905, a constitutionalist, Bahaeddin Şakir, developed a plan to build 
a revolutionary pragmatic organization to overthrow the Hamidian regime (Hanioğlu, 
2001, p. 130). Bahaeddin Bey shared his plan with the minority’s top leadership ––
excluding Ahmed Rıza–– and stressed the immediacy of overthrowing the Abdülhamid II 
lest the Great Powers and secessionists would disintegrate the Empire. The leadership of 
the minority had long been making this point, but had not been able to pass it by non-
revolutionary Ahmed Rıza. The CPU thus emerged as a result of the collaboration between 
Bahaeddin Şakir and the revolutionaries within the minority, of which Ahmed Rıza was 
not informed.36 The expressed objective was the resuscitation of the CUP. Yet, Bahaeddin 
Şakir envisioned a real revolutionary pragmatic organization. In an attempt to facilitate 
the overthrow of the Sultan’s government, Bahaeddin Bey sought cooperation with other 
revolutionaries, including the Armenian committees and Prens Sabahaddin (Hanioğlu, 
2001, p. 130).  
																																								 																				
36	The	rise	of	the	CPU	owed	essentially	to	Bahaeddin	Şakir,	who	was	a	former	graduate	of	the	Royal	Medical	
Academy,	personal	physician	of	Yusuf	İzzeddin	Efendi–the	second	Ottoman	prince	in	the	line	of	succession	
to	the	throne,	and	a	close	friend	of	Ahmed	Celâleddin	Pasha–the	former	head	of	the	Ottoman	intelligence	
service	who	became	the	protector	of	the	Young	Turks	(Hanioğlu,	2001,	p.	130).	Bahaeddin	Şakir	had	been	
holding	close	ties	to	the	minority	and	had	financed	the	organization	in	1905.	After	the	Sultan’s	government	
discovered	this	relationship,	he	was	banished	and	the	doctor	fled	to	Paris.	In	Paris,	he	began	his	career	in	
the	Young	Turk	movement	as	the	emissary	of	Yusuf	İzzeddin	Efendi.	Bahaeddin	Şakir	introduced	his	strategic	
shift	plan	 to	 the	 top	 leadership	of	 the	minority	without	 informing	Ahmed	Rıza.	The	plan	 found	support	
among	the	leadership	and	this	faction	de	facto	founded	the	CPU.	Once	Ahmed	Rıza	found	out	about	the	
CPU,	he	was	enraged,	since	he	considered	himself	to	be	the	natural	 leader	of	the	movement	(Hanioğlu,	
2001,	p.	132).	
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Bahaeddin Şakir first contacted Prens Sabahaddin to discuss possibilities of 
cooperation. Prens Sabahaddin turned this offer down, because he was hoping to 
cooperate with the Armenian committees himself in constructing an organizational 
network in Eastern Anatolia.37 In June 1906, Bahaeddin Şakir approached the Social 
Democrat Hunchakian Party (SDHP) together with Diran Kelekiyan, responsible for the 
political section of the Journal du Caire and a close friend of Ahmed Celâleddin Pasha–
the former head of the Ottoman Intelligence Service–and of Prince Yusuf İżzedin 
(Kevorkian, 2011, p. 30). This initiative initiated a negotiation process, during which the 
CPU and the SHDP tackled the issue of the status of Armenia. According to Kevorkian, the 
CPU delegation sincerely considered the project of autonomous Armeni. Yet, negotiations 
broke down after the CPU rejected the idea of an Armenian parliament, a local executive 
council to approve the governor, and right to participate to budget-making (Kevorkian, 
2011, p. 33). Even though ideological disagreements hindered the possibility of 
cooperation, this initiative altered the SHDP’s perception of the Young Turks, whom they 
thought to be all nationalists who could not tolerate ethnic minorities’ demands for 
autonomy ––they had the minority in mind. The CPU’s openness to consider an 
autonomous Armenia made them receptive to future initiatives by the CPU.  
After being turned down by the SDHP and Prens Sabahaddin, Bahaeddin Bey 
focused on building an internally consistent revolutionary committee (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 
136). Ideologically, he was a pragmatist. Instead of drawing up a new framework to specify 
the stance of the group, he reiterated the program of the minority penned by Ahmed Rıza 
in 1902 (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 138). This program pursued a nationalistic and patriotic 
agenda advocating fora unitary Ottoman state, in which members of minority groups 
would have equal rights and freedoms as Turks on an individual basis (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 
140). This program contradicted Bahaeddin Bey’s views about cooperation with 
secessionists, and yet he accepted, because he needed to compromise in order to build a 
coherent revolutionary organization. However, the official program drove certain eminent 
members away. One such member was Ahmed Saib, who would become an influential 
leader mobilizing the constitutionalists in Egypt. This breakup turned out to be costly for 
the CPU. Due to this ideological disagreement, Ahmed Saib refused to help the CPU form 
																																								 																				
37	Armenian	committees	had	incentive	to	work	with	Prens	Sabahaddin	because	the	latter,	unlike	the	CPU,	
already	had	some	organizational	basis	on	which	they	could	expand	upon. 
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branches in Egypt. Also, Ahmed Saib worked independently for a while before joining 
Prens Sabahaddin, Abdullah Cevdet, and the Armenian committees. 
Between 1906 and 1907, the CPU formed semi-autonomous branches (in the 
model of the Dashnaktsutiun or the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)) to 
distribute propaganda material, and recruit and train new members (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 
146). The branches in Bulgaria, Romania, Crete, Cyprus, and Caucasus were responsible 
for mobilizing local population and developing ties with other revolutionaries. Within this 
framework, the CPU began cooperating with the Albanian Aromenis (Kutzo-Vlach) 
organization, Greeks in Macedonia, Tartar nationalist intellectuals (such as İsmail 
Gaspîralî (Gasprinskii)), as well as Azerbaycani and Bosnian Muslim intellectuals 
(Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 147–65). On the other hand, the branches in the Empire were 
specialized to recruit “fedayi” (self-sacrificing volunteers) (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 144).  
While the CPU significantly extended his organizational and alliance networks 
from 1905 to 1907, cooperation with other revolutionaries did not rest on solid ground. 
Some of its allies had conflicts of interests and discords among themselves, such as the 
Tatar communities and the Armenian Committees. Such conflicts forced the CPU to 
choose a side and choices came at the expense of losing a partner ––in the Armenian-Tatar 
conflict, Bahaeddin Şakir stood with the Tatars against the Armenians (Kevorkian, 2011, 
pp. 43–44).  
 
Rivalry for the leadership of the Young Turks 
The CPU was not the only organization trying to reunite the challengers. As mentioned 
earlier, Prens Sabahaddin had been working on cooperating with others as well. The Prens 
Sabahaddin-led LPID began cooperating with the ARF and the SDHP on the basis of his 
decentralization plan in 1905, which would last until 1908 (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 95–121; 
Kevorkian, 2011, pp. 26–29; Sohrabi, 2011, pp. 96–98). These parties on built a bogus 
organization la Ligue Constitutionnelle Ottomane (the Ottoman Constitutional League–
OCL from here on) in order to mobilize people in Eastern regions (Kevorkian, 2011, p. 27). 
This coalition further cooperated in mobilizing people in the Black Sea region.  
As Prens Sabahaddin was enlarging his organizational network, Ahmed Saib, 
Abdullah Cevdet, and Tunalı Hilmi –who had parted ways with the minority– joined 
forces with Prens Sabahaddin and the OCL (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 142). This coalition 
reached out to the Macedonian independence groups like the IMRO, the Azeri socialists, 
and the Arabs (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 96–99). Furthermore, it played an active role in the 
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outbreak of rebellions in Eastern Anatolia against the Sultan’s regime between 1905 and 
1907 –the most influential one being the unrest in Diyar-ı Bekir (Diyarbakır today) and 
rebellions in Erzurum (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 91-94-108).38  
Turning to the CPU, Bahaeddin Bey resumed his initiatives to cooperate with the 
Armenian committees. In 1907, the CPU delegation met with the ARF’s representatives. 
During negotiations, the ARF accepted to make concessions on the project of an 
autonomous Armenia and considered a centralized Ottoman state (Kevorkian, 2011, p. 
43). However, negotiations broke down after one ARF member published an article in 
Prens Sabahaddin’s Terakki journal accusing the CPU of pursuing an Islamist policy that 
neglected the Christian element of the Empire (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 192). Next, the CPU 
approached the SHDP. Yet, this initiative failed as well due to Ahmed Rıza’s objections to 
consider the idea of an autonomous Armenia (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 192). On the other hand, 
the rupture between the CPU and the SDHP allowed for a rapprochement between the 
ARF and the SHDP, which had not been collaborating (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 193). 
Despite the failed cooperation attempts with the Armenians and Prens 
Sabahaddin, the CPU had managed to develop a large enough his organizational network 
to attract other organizations. One such organization was Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti (the 
Ottoman Freedom Society –OFS from here on). Founded in 1906 in Salonica, the OFS had 
several high-rank military officers as members, including Talat Bey–an old disgruntled 
CUP member– and Enver Pasha–a high-rank military officer in the Third Army in 
Monastir. Enver Pasha was instrumental in recruiting military officers and bureaucrats in 
Macedonia and Thrace, including Niyazi Bey, who started the revolt that turned into the 
1908 Revolution and Kazım Karabekir–one of Mustafa Kemal’s leading companions 
during the Independence War and the republican period (Sohrabi, 2011, p. 90). The OFS 
did not pursue a specific ideological agenda other than constitutionalism and Turkish 
nationalism; its members were revolutionaries (Sohrabi, 2011, p. 90). Following the 
merger with the OFS in 1907, the CPU began infiltrating into state institutions. On the 
other hand, the CPU came to be seen as a distinctly a nationalist faction after the merger 
with the OFS.  
																																								 																				
38	Kévorkian	contends	the	Armenian-LPID	coalition’s	role	in	the	revolt	in	Diyar-i	Bekir.	For	him,	the	revolt	
represented	local	discontent	with	pillage	and	other	crimes	committed	in	the	villages	by	the	chieftain	of	the	
Kurdish	Milli	tribe,	İbrahim,	whom	Abdülhamid	had	elevated	to	the	rank	of	pasha	in	1902	(Kevorkian,	2011,	
pp.	28–29).	
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Bahaeddin Bey made a final attempt at reuniting challengers. He organized, in 
collaboration with the ARF, the Second Opposition Congress (December 27-29, 1907).39 
This collaboration rested upon the condition that the ARF should agree to maintaining 
imperial integrity and the Ottoman dynasty, abandoning collective terrorist tactics in 
Eastern Anatolia, and rejecting foreign assistance to regime change (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 
194–95). In return, the CPU should invite a non-nationalist group, the Prens Sabahaddin 
faction. Of the invitees, The SHDP and most Armenian intellectuals, Bulgarian 
committees in Macedonia, the IMRO, Greek revolutionaries (la Ligue Hellénique), and 
the Albanian group Aromenis turned down the invitation. Macedonian constitutionalists, 
the committee of Ottoman Jews and the editorial team of the journal Hilâfet -Khilafa (the 
Caliphate) representing Arab revolutionaries of Türk Anarşist Cemiyeti (the Turkish 
Anarchist Committee) attended the Congress (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 200–2). The 
participants agreed to armed and unarmed resistance, non-payment of taxes, and 
generating propaganda in the Ottoman army (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 204). 
Like the first one, the Second Opposition Congress failed to unite challengers 
under an internally consistent oppositional movement. Despite prior agreements and the 
CPU’s revolutionary turn, the ARF and the CPU could not reach an agreement on the 
content of revolutionary means, while the ARF’s socialist ideology alienated the CPU 
(Hanioğlu, 2008, p. 204).40 Regardless, the ARF and the CPU agreed to collaborate in 
distributing propaganda material after the Congress. However, the ARF-CPU cooperation 
did not play any role in the 1908 Revolution (Hanioğlu, 2001, p. 209). This alliance 
strained the ARF’s relations with other Armenian committees and intellectuals. The CPU 
got some acclaims in European states for its openness to working with ethno-religious 
groups. Later, the CPU struck a special alliance with the Albanian group Aromenis. 
After the Congress, the CPU focused on strengthening its activist branches so to 
change the regime on its own. In 1908, the number of fedayis joining the CPU increased 
significantly, while the committee began coordinating local bands in the Balkans and 
forming an attack force within the military (Hanioğlu, 2001, pp. 119–123). The CPU was 
planning on overthrowing the Sultan’s government in late 1908. However, the revolution 
happened earlier than the committee expected.  
																																								 																				
39	Some	sources	attribute	the	initiative	to	the	ARF.	Hanioğlu,	however,	presents	documents	evincing	that	in	
fact	it	was	the	CPU	that	took	the	initiative	(Hanioğlu,	2001,	p.	194;	Kevorkian,	2011,	p.	44).	
40	The	ARF	proposed	forming	revolutionary	committees	to	spur	local	resistances.	Yet,	the	CPU	preferred	
controlling	local	bands	so	as	not	to	create	disorder	(Hanioğlu,	2008,	p.	204).	
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In June 1908, Russia’s and Britain’s plans to partition Macedonia were divulged. 
A small local Young Turk group initiated a revolt in Resne (Macedonia) on July 3. Despite 
the Sultan’s efforts to suppress it, this revolt expanded to the entire region. Next, the 
Sultan’s commanders, who were sent to the region to restore order, joined the rebellious 
Young Turks. The leaders of the Young Turks took over the control of the revolt and sent 
telegrams to foreign representatives to announce themselves as the effective government 
of the Empire. On July 24, the Sultan relinquished power, and constitutional monarchy 
was restored (Akşin, 1980; Temo, 1987).  
Overall, this survey of interactions among challengers conveys that from 1897 to 
1908 numerous attempts to form an oppositional front successively failed. Although 
certain groups formed issue-based alliances, such as the ones between the CPU and the 
ARF or the LPID, ARF and SDHP, none of them was strategically consistent, that is, none 
grounded on a concrete roadmap for regime change. The exception was the alliance 
between the OFS and the CPU as well as the minor challenger factions in the Balkans. Why 
did only some of these initiatives fail? I had hypothesized that preference convergence on 
strategies rather than on ideologies precipitates cooperation. The next section tests this 
hypothesis using network analysis.  
 
Testing the role of ideologies and strategies on cooperative 
behavior 
 
In this section, I test the evolution of the role of ideologies and strategies on cooperation 
patterns among challengers. I use longitudinal network models known as temporal 
exponential random graph models (TERGM), whose properties were discussed in the 
methodology section of the theory chapter. This section proceeds as follows: I explain the 
operationalization of the dependent variable –cooperation for regime change between a 
pair of challenger groups– and the independent variables –preferences on ideological and 
strategic issues as identified by the historical analysis. In that, I explain the 
operationalization of the dependent variable ––cooperation for regime change between a 
pair of challenger groups–– and the independent variables ––preferences on ideological 
and strategic issue dimensions–– in the Ottoman case. In the second subsection, I test the 
null hypothesis that preferences on ideological and strategic matters have no effect on 
cooperation for regime change. The third subsection presents the results of the TERGM 
analyses of the Ottoman dataset and robustness checks. I show that Ottoman challengers 
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could form a coherent oppositional coalition only after they converged on carrying out a 
revolution without foreign assistance and cooperation with minorities.  
 
Dependent variable & the unit of analysis in the Ottoman case 
As discussed in the theory chapter, the dependent variable is cooperation for regime 
change in a given year. In the Ottoman case, this takes the form of cooperation for 
transition from the Hamidian regime in a given year. It is worth reminding that 
cooperation for regime change concerns all types of activities, legal and illegal, undertaken 
with the purpose of overthrowing the authoritarian government but does not specify the 
properties of the regime to come. As the historical analysis showed, actors desired 
different types of regimes, and testing the effect of such differences on cooperation for 
regime change constitutes the purpose of this research.  
Indicators of cooperation comprise collaboration between a pair of challenger 
groups for generating verbal and written propaganda against the authoritarian regime 
(including the person of the Sultan, government policies, or the regime’s ideology) or to 
disseminate anti-authoritarian ideas (such as liberty, freedom of speech, independence), 
and co-sponsoring contentious activities of a private or public nature (such as meetings, 
protests, uprisings, plotting coups, mobilizing people for revolution).  
In coding cooperation, I did not weigh contentious activities by riskiness. That is, 
plotting a coup has the same value as co-publishing propaganda material. Social 
movements and regime literatures do not provide theoretical and empirical grounds to 
justify the assumption that high-risk activities, such as attempting a coup, have greater 
impact than low-risk activities, say, press campaigns. Rather, systematic low-risk activities 
might prove to be impactful on the long term. Also, I did not weigh cooperation by how 
many times a pair of challengers collaborated in undertaking the abovementioned 
contentious activities. This means, cooperation between some groups A and B to generate 
propaganda bears the same value 1 (indicating the realization of cooperation contra 0 
indicating its non-occurrence) as cooperation between a pair of groups C and D which, 
say, generated propaganda and plotted a coup together. Concomitantly, some failed 
cooperation attempt does not cancel out a realized instance cooperation. That is, if groups 
A and B co-sponsored a small protest in year X but failed to co-sponsor a large-scale 
demonstration in the same year, I consider A and B in cooperation for that year. This is an 
implication of not counting instances of cooperation in a given year. The reason for doing 
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so is that the TERGM techniques do not yet allow for examining graphs with multiple 
edges between a pair of nodes (Hunter, Handcock, Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2008; 
Lusher, Koskinen, & Robins, 2012). 
Another coding decision that I made was to assign information about individual 
challengers to their respective groups. In that, information in the sources sometimes 
pertained to groups sometimes to individuals. Since my unit of analysis is groups, I coded 
information by groups. That is, if sources indicated that some group X and group Y plotted 
a coup together, I coded this information as cooperation between X and Y. If the 
information concerned individuals, I transformed the individual-level data into the group-
level data (to this end, I constructed a membership dataset to keep track of group 
affiliations). Also, if sources mentioned cooperation between some individual affiliated 
with some group G1 and some group G2, I coded this information as cooperation between 
G1 and G2; members served as a link between organizations. I kept all relational data in an 
edgelist that I constructed for each year.  
 
Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis in the Ottoman case is an organized group challenging the 
authoritarian government with the purpose of changing the regime. This means, 
unorganized citizens protesting the regime are not included in the analysis. In the 
Ottoman case, organized challenger groups comprised organized secessionists and 
constitutionalists. As discussed earlier, challengers founded new factions when their 
preference set deviated from preference sets of existing groups. Thus, I coded all Ottoman 
constitutionalists and secessionists voicing a distinct preference set of ideologies and 
strategies on the dimensions identified in the historical analysis section as one group. 
On the other hand, I use a loose definition for “organized groups,” which 
encompasses institutionalized and weakly institutionalized groups. Institutionalized 
groups correspond to groups with a charter specifying the purpose of the organization, the 
scope of activities, and rules guiding its operation and member recruitment (such as the 
Committee of Progress and Union or the Armenian Revolutionary Federation). However, 
most challenger organizations did not reach that level of institutionalization. Even though 
many lacked an identity independent of their leaders, their contentious activities were 
influential enough to compel the Sultan to persecute and exile them, form a spy network 
and take diplomatic action towards the European governments to hunt them down, and 
attempt to coopt them. Weakly institutionalized groups refer to groups organized around 
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newspapers and publishing houses, as well as factions. I counted newspapers and 
publishing houses as weakly organized groups, because, besides making propaganda, they 
served as venues to hold regular meetings, draw up strategies for future opposition 
activities, and recruit members.41 Factions were composed of eminent figures and their 
followers, such as Prens Sabahaddin and his followers. Some emerged from within an 
organized group due to differences of opinion and insisted on keeping to their distinct 
preference sets instead of following group decisions–such as the Ahmed Rıza faction. 
Others were formed outside organizational frameworks, but they themselves did not 
institutionalize enough to compete with more institutionalized groups such as the CPU or 
the ARF. It is worth noting that institutionalized or weakly institutionalized, most groups, 
particularly the constitutionalist ones, survived less than five years. Because groups had 
generally a low institutionalization level, it was relatively costless for their clientele to 
found another group if the previous one failed to meet expectations, and they did so.  
When there was more than one faction within some organization each retaining a 
distinct identity, I used ‘factions’ as the unit of analysis instead of the organization itself, 
because I did not want to miss data. For example, I disaggregated the Committee of Union 
and Progress into factions, such as followers of Ahmed Rıza or Mizancı Murad or the 
military and ulema wings, because the evolution of interactions between these factions 
became decisive in the Committee’s performance (Hanioğlu, 1981). If, however, one 
faction dominated an organization, such as the Committee of Progress and Union under 
Bahaeddin Şakir’s leadership, I used the organization as the unit of analysis.  
Sometimes, faction leaders closed down some organization to form new ones 
without much change in the purpose and scope of activities, such as the emergence of the 
League of Private Initiative and Decentralization following the closure of the Ottoman 
Freedomlovers Committee by Prens Sabahaddin. So long as the purpose and scope of 
activities remained unaltered, I coded multiple organizations founded by the same faction 
as one organization. Yet, if a faction changed the purpose and scope of its activities I coded 
it as two different entities, such as the case of Tunalı Hilmi who shifted from Ottomanism 
to Turkism after 1902. Also, if two factions formed a novel institution while retaining their 
distinct institutional identity, I did not code the child organization as a separate entity. 
Using these criteria, I ended up with 28 groups, of which 20 were constitutionalist and 8 
																																								 																				
41	For	more	information	on	the	role	of	press	see	(Hanioğlu,	n.d.;	Mardin,	1983,	2000;	Tunaya,	1984).	
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secessionist factions. The table in Appendix II contains the list of groups and 
abbreviations.  
  
Constructing networks 
Using the edgelists, I constructed one cooperation network for each year from 1895 to 
1908. Nodes represent groups struggling to overthrow the Sultan’s government and edges 
represent cooperation between a pair of challenger groups.42 Since cooperation is 
reciprocal, networks are undirected. I took 1895 as the starting date, because sources do 
not provide information on the cooperative behavior of the Young Turks for earlier 
periods. Also, as mentioned earlier, the first transition came with top-down reforms and 
the Young Ottomans’ activities were not the primary cause of liberalization (Hanioğlu, 
1981; Mardin, 1983). Therefore, I do not analyze the role of the Young Ottomans on 
constitutional transition. The analysis ends in 1908 when the transition took place.  
 
Independent variables 
As mentioned earlier, grievances in the Ottoman Empire concerned territorial integrity, 
societal integrity in the face of secessionism-nationalism, the role of religion in politics, 
and strategic issues. I operationalized territorial integrity as “state type,” which is a 
categorical dummy that becomes “nation state” if a group envisioned nation state and 
“constitutional monarchy” if it envisaged constitutional monarchy. This variable captures 
the divergent objectives over imperial integrity, which roughly corresponds to the 
demarcation between secessionists and constitutionalists–it is worth noting that not all 
nationalist minority groups sought secession, some wanted local autonomy such as the 
ARF.  
I operationalized the controversy over societal integrity as “society type,” a 
categorical variable that becomes “ottomanists” if a group advocated for imperial 
citizenship, “Turkish nationalist” if it endorsed Turkish nationalism, “Turkist” if it 
supported assimilationist ethnic Turkish nationalism, and “minority nationalism” if it 
championed some nationalism other than these three. Note that society type and state type 
overlap but are different. As mentioned earlier, not all nationalist minority groups were 
secessionist and constitutionalist groups included individuals from different ethno-
																																								 																				
42	I	did	not	use	individuals	as	nodes.	Most	organizations	being	clandestine,	obtaining	complete	membership	
list	was	not	possible.		
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religious minorities (Hanioğlu, 2001). Also, not all constitutionalists envisioned the same 
society type. Thus, society type captures the difference between those that demand the 
same state type but different society types. “Secularization” captures preferences on the 
role of religion in politics. I coded a group’s position (1) if it was secularist or produced 
secular propaganda, (0.5) if it was secularist but generated religious propaganda, and (0) 
if it opposed secularism and created religious propaganda.  
As regards strategic divides, I constructed the variables “means of regime change,” 
“noninterventionism,” and “cooperation with secessionists.” Means of regime change 
concerns preferences about how transition should be carried out. A group is coded as 
“non-revolutionary” if it proposed change via reforms, and “revolutionary” if it supported 
transition via revolution or coup but disapproved of terrorist tactics (such as instigating 
rebellion and disorder in provinces), and “rebel” if it considered revolution, coup, and 
terrorist tactics. Noninterventionism was about whether to seek foreign assistance for 
regime change. I coded groups as “interventionist” if they sought foreign assistance and 
“noninterventionist” otherwise. Cooperation with secessionist groups, which concerns 
only debates among the constitutionalists, captured positions on whether to collaborate 
with secessionists. It becomes “yes” if groups were acquiescent and “no” otherwise. 
Secessionists were coded as not available (NA).  
I operationalized all categorical variables using the nodematch function and the 
continuous variables using the absdiff function in the statnet package (Handcock, Hunter, 
Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2003).  
 
Control variables 
I added three control variables in each case. The continuity of actors constitutes a 
challenge to longitudinal analysis, since factions form, discontinue, or merge. Not all 
factions coexist at the same time. “Out” controls for continuity, which is a dummy that 
becomes (1) if an actor does not exist in a given year and (0) otherwise. I operationalized 
“out” as a node attribute using the nodecov function.  
Past cooperative behavior gives TERGM its temporality dimension. Theoretically, 
past cooperation affects future decisions on cooperation. Groups might engage in 
temporary issue-based cooperation with rivals, as they may renew effective partnerships 
and break unsuccessful cooperation that they form with groups that have a close position. 
The variable “past cooperation” indicates whether groups cooperated in the previous year 
and is operationalized as an edge attribute using the edgecov function. Finally, I added 
		 127	
“clustering,” which is a structural network metric capturing the propensity to collaborate 
with the partner of a partner. High clustering indicates that the network is hierarchical at 
the local level. That is, groups tend to form partnerships with the partners of their partner. 
Low clustering suggests that nodes make attachments freely at the local level (Lusher et 
al., 2012). In other words, some existing alliance with a partner does not induce alliance 
with the partners of a partner. This metric captures strategic alliances known as “the friend 
of my friend is my friend,” which might come at the expense of preferences on ideological 
issues (the friend of one’s friend may hold rather different preferences than one’s self). I 
measure clustering using the gwesp function (fixed).  
Remember that the Sultan was able to fracture constitutionalists using cooptation 
and Sabahaddin’s financing revitalized the movement. To control for the effects of 
financing, I added “financing from the Sultan” and “financing from another contender.” 
“Financing from the Sultan” captures the Sultan’s cooptation attempts; it represents the 
number of times some contender received money from Abdülhamid II. “Financing from 
another contender” tracks the number of times some contender was sponsored by another 
contender. Both financing variables are operationalized as numeric node attributes using 
the nodecov function. A statistically significant decrease (increase) in degree means that 
financing hinders (promotes) cooperation. 
 
The Specification of hypotheses on the Ottoman case 
As explained in the theory chapter, this research mainly tests the hypothesis that “the 
higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse challengers, 
the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more likely there will be either 
regime change or significant concessions to the opposition.” I test it in three steps: First, I 
entertain the null hypothesis that ideological and strategic disagreements have no effect 
on cooperation. If rejected, this would mean that preferences about ideological and 
strategic issue dimensions affect cooperative behavior. I test this null hypothesis with a 
logistic regression using the variables ‘past cooperation’ and ‘out’ to control for 
temporality and ‘financing from the Sultan’ and ‘financing from another contender’ to 
control for the effects of financial dependencies and cooptation. Hypotheses on the 
financial variables go as follows: 
 
Financing from the Sultan makes cooperation for regime change more likely.  
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Financing from another contender makes cooperation for regime change more 
likely. 
 
I specify the main hypothesis, “the higher the level of cooperation on strategic 
issues among ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the 
old regime, and the more likely there will be either regime change or significant 
concessions to the opposition,” to the issue dimensions of the Ottoman case goes as 
follows:  
Preference similarity on state type will increase the probability that challengers 
collaborate for regime change. 
Preference similarity on society type will increase the probability that 
challengers collaborate for regime change. 
Preference similarity on secularization will increase the probability that 
challengers collaborate for regime change. 
Preference similarity on means of regime change will increase the probability 
that challengers collaborate for transition. 
Preference similarity on noninterventionism (foreign assistance) will increase 
the probability that challengers collaborate for transition. 
Preference similarity on cooperation with secessionists will increase the 
probability that challengers collaborate for transition. 
 
I test the abovementioned hypotheses using TERGM. As explained in the theory 
chapter, these hypotheses ground on the preference similarity mechanism and are 
operationalized using the concept homophily. In the language of TERGM, if preferences 
have an independent effect on cooperation, their estimates should be statistically 
significant. Significant positive coefficients suggest that more ties (representing 
cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random in networks 
displaying the same number of nodes and edges. Significant negative coefficients indicate 
that less ties (cooperation) are formed than would have been if tie formation was random 
in networks displaying the same number of nodes and edges. The value of coefficients 
communicates the rate of change. If preferences on some issue makes no effect on 
cooperative behavior, we should obtain null effect (meaning that actors enter cooperation 
regardless of whether their preference aligns with their partner’s on the issue in question). 
A significant positive estimate suggests that preference alignment on some issue drives 
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cooperation. That is, on a prioritize issue dimension, actors refrain from cooperating with 
those that think differently. A significant negative estimate indicates that on that prioritize 
issue dimension, actors prefer to cooperate with those who think differently them on a 
given issue (it is worth reminding that Table 1 in the introduction summarizes the possible 
combinations of the indicator). That is to say, if preference alignment on some issue does 
not drive cooperation it does not hinder it. 
It is worth reminding that I use preference revision as a control variable helping us 
to distinguish between cooperation that follows from preference alignment on now 
harmonized preferences and cooperation that follows from (de)prioritization. If 
preference revision harmonized preferences, we should expect preference similarity to 
propel cooperation on issues that actors highly prioritize. Controlling for changes in 
preferences, we want to identify whether preference convergence on strategic issues 
propelled the rise of an oppositional coalition (long-term cooperation for regime change). 
To this end, I examine the distribution of preferences of members of the coalition. 
 Using TERGM and findings from the analyses of the preference evolution and 
patterns of interaction, I test Hypothesis 2 suggesting that “cooperation on strategic 
issues is likely to increase when challengers react to past failures and new opportunities 
by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority of preferences on strategic issue 
dimensions.” I divide the period of interactions into two (before and after 1902) and 
explain the method of periodization below.  
I test Hypothesis 3, suggesting that “cooperation on strategic issues is likely to 
increase when peripheral actors align their preferences to those of an emergent core. I 
conduct a descriptive network analysis to test this hypothesis, which compares the 
ideological and strategic positions of the members of the coalition that carried out the 
1908 Revolution to those of the groups that stayed out of this coalition. So doing explains 
why it was a particular group (as opposed to its rivals) was able to spearhead the rise of an 
oppositional coalition for regime change. 
 
Periodization: I break down the period from 1895 to 1908 into two, the periods 
between 1895 and 1901 and 1902 and 1908. 1902 is the cut point, because it corresponds 
to the date of the Ottoman Opposition Congress, after which new factions with new 
preferences emerged and certain existing factions updated their visions of society and 
strategies of transition. 1902 is also convenient because Turkish nationalism gained 
ground in the early 1900s and Ottomanism to the wayside. For example, we observe 
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Turkist factions only after 1902 –for the proponent groups were formed after the 
Opposition Congress– and not before. In other words, this periodization controls for such 
shifts in the preference sets across challengers with respect to a turning point, i.e., 1902. 
Finally, it is worth reminding that the analysis starts in 1895, because no data were 
available on constitutionalists’ behavior prior to 1895 (Hanioğlu, 1981; Mardin, 1983) 
 
 
Effects of ideological and strategic preferences on cooperation for regime change 
In this section, I test the effect of preferences with an analysis of the evolution of 
preferences over time. First, I test the null hypothesis that preferences on issue 
dimensions other than shared interests in overthrowing the government have no effect on 
cooperative behavior. Second, I run a TERGM analysis to identify whether and how much 
each preference influence cooperation among challengers, if ever. I show that preferences 
make a significant effect on cooperation even after controlling for the variation of their 
impacts over time.  
 
The Evolution of preferences over time  
I analyze the evolution of preferences across issue areas before and after 1902 (for the 
reasons explained in the previous section). This analysis identifies whether preferences 
changed over time, and if so, in which direction. Table 2 summarizes the results:  
 
Table 2 
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value counts % counts %
nation state 4 0.31 5 0.25
constitutional 
monarchy
9 0.69 15 0.75
minority 
nationalism
6 0.46 6 0.30
ottomanism 3 0.23 2 0.10
turkish 
nationalism
4 0.31 8 0.40
turkism 0 0.00 4 0.20
revolutionary 6 0.46 12 0.60
non-revolutionary 3 0.23 3 0.15
terrorist 4 0.31 5 0.25
no 14 0.64 12 0.60
yes 8 0.36 8 0.40
NA NA NA 7 NA
no 5 0.36 7 0.54
yes 7 0.50 6 0.46
Preference distribution: The Ottoman Case
1895-1901 1902-1908
secularizatio
n
min  mean median max min  mean median max
0     0.45          0.5      1 0      0.53          0.5      1
state type
society type
strategy of 
regime 
change
foreign 
assistance 
cooperation 
with 
minorities
 
 
Table 2 suggests significant shifts in actor’s preferences about society type, strategy 
of regime change, and cooperation with minorities. Changes in perceptions about the role 
of religion in politics, state type, and foreign assistance were modest.  
The shift in preferences is the greatest on the issue of society type. The percentage 
of support for Ottomanism decreases by more than %50, while Turkism gains ground. We 
further observe more actors advocating for Turkish nationalism. These findings echo the 
findings of the contextual analysis. The finding from the analysis of the evolution of 
preferences enhances the inference that challengers abandon the idea of resuscitating the 
multicultural Ottoman society and acknowledge the fact that ethno-religious minorities of 
the Empire are not going to abandon their purpose of founding their own nation state in 
response to environmental changes (the spread of demands for independence to Muslim 
minorities). It is ironic that Abdülhamid II had come to this conclusion earlier.43 That said, 
Ottomanism still finds support. On the other hand, Turkish nationalism finds twice more 
																																								 																				
43	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	Sultan	was	not	unaware	of	the	mobilizing	power	of	nationalism	in	the	fin-
de-siècle.	He	could	not	have	promoted	Turkish	nationalism,	since	so	doing	would	conflict	with	his	theocratic	
discourse	and	also	alienate	non-Turkish	Muslim	minorities	of	the	Empire.	
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support than its assimilationist version, Turkism, after 1902. In other words, most 
Ottoman constitutionalists perceive minorities as fellow citizens of the future nation state 
rather than envisaging imposing their culture upon them.  
The other significant perception shift happens on the issue of the strategy of regime 
change. From before to after 1902, support for the non-revolutionary strategy, i.e., the 
evolutionary strategy, declines from 23% to 15%. The increase from 46% from before 1902 
to 60% after 1902 indicates that the revolutionary strategy gained ground. If we compare 
the number of groups, however, the number of groups advocating for the revolutionary 
strategy doubles, whereas there are still three groups supporting the evolutionary strategy 
as before, which indicates that some factions do not revise their preferences despite 
changes in environmental conditions. We observe a slight increase in the number of 
groups advocating for the terrorist strategy (from 4 before 1902 to 5 after 1902). This 
modest increase in support for terrorism has to do with the emergence of new minor 
terrorist constitutionalist groups.  
Concerning cooperation with minorities, there is a significant shift in the 
percentage of those who oppose this strategic solution (36% before 1902 to 54% after). On 
the issue of foreign assistance, however, preference change is modest. On the other hand, 
the change in perceptions about foreign support is also modest, though the number of 
those opposing it slightly inclines.  
We do not observe much perception change on the role of religion in politics and 
state type. On average, regime contenders become slightly more pro-secularization after 
1902. Yet, the median actor continues to believe that religious propaganda is necessary to 
mobilize people even though they themselves endorse secularization. The shift in 
perceptions about state type was also modest. Support for constitutional state moved from 
69% before 1902 to %75 after 1902, which can be explained by the emergence of new minor 
constitutionalist groups. 
Overall, from before to after 1902, there are more regime contending groups. Of 
these groups, the majority embraces nationalism, meaning both minority nationalism and 
versions of Turkish nationalism. Concerning the role of religion in politics, challengers 
continue to be pragmatic ––on average, contenders consider religion to be an effective 
tool to mobilize people. Shifts in perceptions on strategic matters are significant, however. 
We see the strategy “revolutionary strategy to change the regime without cooperating with 
minority groups and foreign states” gaining support. Next, I proceed to testing the null 
hypothesis.   
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*** 
I test the null hypothesis using a logistic regression (without the preference 
variables) and a TERGM analysis (with the preference variables). I compare the fitness of 
the logistic regression to that of the TERGM. Both models span the period from 1895 to 
1908. I run the TERGMs using the ergm package (Krivitsky et al., 2016). One challenge to 
choosing between models is the problem of overfitting, that is, whether we are adding too 
many variables. The Bayesian approach suggests choosing the model with highest 
posterior probability, that is, the probability of an event after the conditional probability 
of its occurrence is taken into consideration. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) are two penalty scores to adding variables. The BIC 
relies on the Bayesian approach, while the AIC uses information theory to calculate the 
amount of information lost when a model is applied to a dataset. These scores operate in 
different ways and the penalty term is larger in BIC than in AIC.44 Generally, BIC is a more 
conservative score than AIC. For both scores, the smaller the value the better the model. 
Table II summarizes the results for the logistic regression without preferences and the 
TERGM with preferences. 
 
Table 3 
																																								 																				
44	For	more	information	see	(Akaike,	1973;	Haughton,	1988;	Neath	&	Cavanaugh,	2012).		
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Variables Estimate Estimate p-value
edges -3.55 *** -4.43 <1e-04 ***
0.15 0.24
clustering 1.21 *** 1.01 <1e-04 ***
0.13 0.14
past cooperation 3.31 *** 3.16 <1e-04 ***
0.18 0.19
financing from the Sultan 0.15 *** 0.16 0.00 **
0.04 0.05
financing by another contender 0.17 ** 0.08 0.65
0.06 0.07
state type 0.91 <1e-04 ***
0.19
society type 0.15 0.92
0.17
secularization -0.65 0.01 *
0.26
means of regime change 1.01 < 1e-04 ***
0.16
foreign assistance 0.75 <1e-04 ***
0.16
cooperation with secessionists 0.16 0.51
0.24
AIC: –121653 –122806
BIC: –121611  –122724
standard errors are below the estimates
significance levels 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
The period 1895-1908
Logistic regression TERGM
 
Looking at the AIC and BIC scores, TERGM has smaller AIC and BIC than the 
logistic regression, which indicates that the former decreases information loss and 
therefore is a better model than the other. Specifically, there is considerable decrease in 
BIC–a conservative term, which indicates that the TERGM with which I include the effect 
of preferences is a better model than the model without the preferences. Based on this 
finding, we can reject the null hypothesis that preferences do not matter. 
Having established that ideological and strategic preferences matter, I proceed to 
testing the extent to which preference alignment on ideological and strategic matters affect 
cooperative behavior. As mentioned earlier, I run two longitudinal temporal network 
models, one on the period before 1902 and the other spanning the period after 1902. To 
reiterate an earlier point, 1902 is the cut point, because it was only after 1902 that factions 
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began revising their preferences in response to environmental changes. Robustness checks 
of these TERGM are available in Appendix III. 
 
Table 4 
Variables
edges -4.48 *** -4.66 ***
0.45 0.26
clustering 1.11 *** 1.86 ***
0.23 0.19
past cooperation 3.72 *** 3.06 ***
0.39 0.23
0.07 -0.29 **
0.06 0.25
-0.28 0.07
0.27 0.07
state type 1.43 *** 0.24
0.36 0.21
society type 0.32 -0.26
0.31 0.20
secularization -0.84 -0.86 **
0.44 0.31
means of regime change 1.15 *** 0.21
0.28 0.18
foreign assistance 0.29 0.29
0.32 0.18
–inf *** 0.11
0.00 0.21
Null Deviance: 
Residual Deviance:  
AIC: –121560 –15385
BIC: –121526  –15316
Note: Cell entries report TERGM coefficients, standard errors (in parentheses), and p-
values
p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.10 (two-tailed tests) 
financing by other 
contender
cooperation with 
secessionists
financing from the 
Sultan
–121570 on 7171  DoF    –15409 on 2268 DoF
The Ottoman Empire
(1895-1901) (1902-1908)
9948 on 7176 DoF    3161  on 2280 DoF
 
 
According to Table 4, there is a significant shift in the effect of preferences on 
cooperative behavior from before to after 1902. After 1902, the main predictors of 
cooperation for regime change are clustering, financing from the Sultan, and the role of 
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religion in politics. On the other hand, preferences on society state type and the strategic 
issues turn statistically insignificant from before to after 1902, which indicates that these 
issues are de-prioritized within the overall set of challengers.  
To begin with the role of religion in politics, the estimate turns significant from 
before to after 1902 but is negative. This communicates that actors are 58% more likely to 
work with those that hold different views on this matter than themselves. In other words, 
the actors who hold similar views on the role of religion in politics disagree among 
themselves on another highly prioritized matter. We need to examine the distribution of 
preferences among members of the oppositional coalition in order to establish whether 
preferences converge on this issue or not.  
The estimate for society type indicates that actors de-prioritized disagreements on 
this matter and cooperated with one another regardless between 1895 and 1902. In other 
words, actors are pragmatic on this dimension. This finding falls in line with the analysis 
of the evolution of preferences and the historical analysis. It is worth reminding that the 
analysis of the evolution of preferences found out that support for nationalism of all types 
increases, whereas support for Ottomanism weakens from before to after 1902. Moreover, 
the analysis of patterns of interactions revealed that challengers who held different views 
on the matter (such as Turkish nationalists and secessionists, secessionists and 
Ottomanists) engaged in cooperation. This falls in line with the hypothesis that de-
prioritization of ideological disagreements makes cooperation for regime change more 
likely. On the other hand, these findings do not tell us anything about the effect of 
ideological preferences on long-term cooperation, for which we need to examine 
preference distribution of members of the oppositional coalition.  
The estimate of state type turned statistically insignificant from before to after 
1902. This means, while preferences alignment on this issue shaped cooperative behavior 
before 1902 (note that the estimate is positive indicating a preference to work with the 
like-minded), this issue ceases to affect behavior after 1902. This finding also suggests de-
prioritization. The findings from the analysis of the evolution of preferences and that of 
patterns of interactions fall in line with this result: We know from the analysis of the 
evolution of preferences that preferences on this matter remain more or less fixed. 
Furthermore, the analysis patterns of interactions identified instances of cooperation 
between the constitutionalists and secessionists ––e.g., the CPU-ARF–– despite the lack 
of revisions in preferences on this issue. Together, these findings suggest that this issue is 
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de-prioritized. In other words, actors postpone the resolution of this disagreement, which 
accounts for why the issue no longer affects behavior. 
As regards strategic issues, preferences about cooperation with minorities and the 
means of change turn statistically insignificant from before to 1902, whereas preferences 
about foreign assistance are uninfluential on cooperation patterns all along.  
The most significant shift takes place in the area of cooperation with minorities. 
The negative infinity (–inf) estimate prior to 1902 indicates that disagreements on this 
issue perfectly predicts the absence of cooperation. Yet, preferences on this matter no 
longer affected cooperation after 1902. Similarly, actors disregard their disagreements on 
the means of change, which include revolutionary, non- revolutionary, and terrorist 
methods of regime change. This falls in line with the results of the analysis of patterns of 
interactions, which revealed instances of cooperation among those who hold different 
views on this matter (such as cooperation between minor groups and the minority). 
Finally, preferences on foreign assistance have null effect on behavior all along. Together, 
these results seem to imply de-prioritization on strategic matters. Again, as pinpointed by 
the historical analysis, actors engage in short-term cooperation regardless of their 
disagreements on strategies (as in the case of the CPU and the ARF). To re-emphasize an 
earlier point, these findings do not suggest anything about the distribution of preferences 
among members of the oppositional coalition. To the test the effect of preference 
convergence on the coalition formation, we need to analyze of the distribution of 
preferences across coalition members, which comes in the next section. 
Concerning financial ties, the results indicate that financing from another 
contender never affect cooperative behavior between 1895 and 1902 (as indicated by the 
statistically insignificant estimate). In other words, contenders do not feel obliged to work 
with a challenger simply because the latter finances them. On the other hand, financing 
from the Sultan is statistically significant and negative after 1902. The estimate indicates 
that receiving financing from the Sultan increases the likelihood of cooperation between a 
pair of challengers by 25%. In other words, the Sultan’s cooptation attempt backfires as 
contenders use the money to pursue contentious activities. These findings on the financial 
variables indicate that when preferences are taken into account, financial dependencies 
no longer matter, which provides support to the thesis of this study that preferences on 
various regime dimensions affect dynamics of cooperation for regime change.  
Results also identify past cooperation and clustering as strong predictors of 
cooperation. We understand that there is a strong tendency to cooperate with the partner 
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of a partner. Also, the estimate for clustering indicates that actors are twice more likely to 
cooperate with the partner of a partner. 
Overall, the results of the TERGM analysis, the analyses of the evolution of 
preferences, and patterns of interactions together suggest the following: From 1895 to 
1908, challengers behaved pragmatically on most ideological and strategic matters and 
cooperated with those with whom they had disagreements. In other words, actors are more 
likely to cooperate when they de-prioritize their disagreements on issue dimensions. The 
evidence is strongest on the issues of state and society types. On the other hand, these 
findings do not suggest anything about the effect of preference convergence on long-term 
cooperation, for which we need to analyze of the distribution of preferences across 
coalition members. In the next section, we will see that there were in fact two rival 
oppositional coalitions (the CPU-led one and a Prens Sabahaddin-led one) after 1902 and 
minor faction switch sides between them. This explains why most preferences seem to not 
affect cooperation.  
 
Preferences of members of the oppositional coalition & the central actor  
The TERGM analysis from the last section identified that some issues are de-prioritized. 
Yet, we are yet to see the distribution of preferences across members of the oppositional 
coalition to conclude whether preferences about strategic and ideological issues 
convergence within the coalition. To this end, this section begins with an analysis of the 
distribution of preferences across members of the coalition. Findings of this analysis 
complement the findings from the TERGM analysis. Together, they help us test the 
hypothesis about convergence of strategic and ideological preferences.  
The next step is to pinpoint which challenger becomes the center of the 
oppositional coalition. To this end, I conduct a two-step analysis: First, I identify when 
actors cooperate more and around this time which actor becomes more central –since 
being central to a well-connected network signals greater importance for a node than being 
central to a less connected network. I use the network metric density to examine the 
evolution of cooperation density, with which I pinpoint the years in which challengers 
were most disunited and when they reunified. The network metric density means how 
connected a network is taking into account all possible connections in that network. In 
other words, it represents the ratio of the actual number of ties to the number of all 
possible ties (Newman, 2010, p. Chapter 6). Thus, if a network has a lot of ties among its 
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nodes, it is dense –the ratio of the actual number of ties over the number of all possible 
ties gets close to 1. If a network has few ties, most of possible connections are not made; 
thus, it is not dense and the ratio in question approaches to -∞. 
At the second step, we want to understand which challenger becomes the center of 
the oppositional coalition. To this end, I compare the importance of each actor of the 
oppositional coalition. Importance in a coalition means who is central to a coalition 
network. That is, who is picked by others more frequently as a partner, which can also be 
reworded as who has more collaborators than others. Having more partners than others 
in an oppositional coalition indicates that one is more in demand by others as a partner. I 
operationalize importance using the network metric degree centrality. Degree centrality 
conveys how well-connected a node is (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It is calculated as 
below: 
 𝑑𝑖	(𝑔)(𝑛 − 1) 
 
This formula measures the degree of a given node i in a network (g) divided by the 
total number of nodes in that network minus the one whose degree centrality is measured. 
For example, if a node has (n-1) degrees it is connected to all others, thus is central to the 
network. A node with degrees (n-2) would mean it is connected to everyone except for one 
node, hence still quite central. In contrast, if a node has but degree 1, we understand that 
it is only connected to one other node, thus is much less central to the network (Easley & 
Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It should be noted that centrality in a network can be measured 
using other metrics such as closeness or betweenness, among others. However, given that 
cooperation network is not directional, that is, if node A is linked to node B the link from 
A to B also implies a link from B to A, since cooperation is reciprocal by nature. 45 
Areas in which preferences converge within the oppositional coalition  
In order to establish the distribution of preferences across members of the 
oppositional coalition, I take the factions that cooperated for more than three years 
																																								 																				
45	For	more	information	on	centrality	see	(Borgatti,	2005;	Easley	&	Kleinberg,	2010;	Newman,	2010).	
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(engage in long-term coalition). Those that joined the coalition in 1908 thus fall outside 
the scope of this analysis, since instances of cooperation with the coalition after 1905 
qualify as short-term cooperation (falling short of three years). Table 5 below examines 
the distribution of preferences across issue areas within the oppositional coalition led by 
the CPU, which carried out the 1908 Revolution, and compares it to that of the competing 
coalition led by Prens Sabahaddin. 
Table	5	
 Preference distribution  
 The CPU-led oppositional coalition 
The Prens Sabahaddin-led 
coalition 
secularization 
min  mean max min  mean max 
00.4     0.62      1 0     0.64      1 
  
value counts  % counts  % 
state type nation state 0 0.00 2 0.4 
constitutional monarchy 5 51.00 
3 0.6 
society type minority nationalism 0 0.00 
1 0.2 
ottomanism 1 0.20 
2 0.4 
turkish nationalism 4 0.80 
2 0.4 
turkism 0 0.00 0 0.00 
strategy of 
regime change 
revolutionary 5 1.00 3 0.60 
non-revolutionary 0 0.00 0 0.00 
terrorist 0 0.00 2 0.40 
foreign 
assistance  
no 5 1.00 1 0.20 
yes 0 0.00 4 0.80 
cooperation 
with minorities 
NA 0 0.00 
1 0.2 
no 5 1.00 1 0.2 
yes 0 0.00 
3 0.6 
 
 According to Table 6, members of the coalition unanimously oppose non-
revolutionary and terrorist strategies, foreign assistance, and cooperation with minorities.   
violence as a means to change the regime. It is worth remembering that the TERGM 
analysis identified these strategic areas to be de-prioritized (hence having no statistically 
significant effect on cooperative behavior). Yet, I noted that within the oppositional 
coalition there might be coherence. The analysis of preference distribution verifies this 
inference. Strategic convergence does not affect cooperative patterns between members of 
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the oppositional coalition and others ––which explains why the TERGM estimate was 
insignificant. These findings approve the hypothesis that strategic convergence is 
necessary for contenders to build sustainable long-term cooperation. Let us now see 
whether preferences of members of the coalition converge on ideological issues.  
 On the role of religion, all coalition members prefer a secular regime to than a non-
secular one. However, on average, coalition members believe that religious propaganda is 
necessary to mobilize people. We see that the minimum and maximum values vary 
between 0.4 and 1, which means that the extremist positions are either full secularism or 
close to a secular regime but using religious propaganda for mobilization purposes. 
Concerning state type, all members endorse constitutional regime. In other words, no 
secessionist is part of the CPU-led coalition that carries out the 1908 Revolution. It is 
worth reminding that the TERGM identified that this issue area is de-prioritized. Yet, as 
is the case with the strategic issues, it is still possible that the coalition holds coherent 
preferences on this matter. In line with this inference, the analysis of the preference 
distribution pinpoints unanimity on the issue of state type. In line with the hypothesis, 
preference alignment on this matter drives cooperation among the like-minded (i.e., 
members of the coalition). Yet, within the entire set of challengers, opinions on this issue 
do not affect cooperation patterns, since, as identified by historical analysis, coalition to 
engage in short-term cooperation with others but these instances do not turn into long-
term cooperation. This explains why the TERGM estimate is insignificant and yet the 
oppositional coalition shows coherence on this matter. 
 Finally, on society type, we see that Turkish nationalism finds more support than 
Ottomanism. Hence, there is no preference convergence on this matter. It is worth 
reminding that the TERGM analysis identified this issue area to be de-prioritized under 
both periods. Together these two findings communicate that coalition members also 
postpone this disagreement.  
Overall, the oppositional coalition shows convergence on all strategic issues, which 
falls in line with the hypothesis that strategic convergence is necessary for the rise of long-
term cooperation for regime change. On the other hand, there is no convergence on all 
ideological matters. Members are like-minded only on state type and secularization. 
Preference alignment on these matter make a positive effect on cooperation. These 
findings enhance the argument that strategic convergence is necessary for the rise of an 
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oppositional coalition, but convergence of preferences on all ideological areas is neither 
necessary not sufficient for factions to build long-term cooperation.  
 Let us compare this coalition to the one led by Prens Sabahaddin. Members of the 
Sabahaddin coalition show no convergence on strategic issues. Opinion is divided between 
revolutionary vs. terrorist means of regime change, as well as whether to take foreign 
assistance or to cooperate with minorities. On ideological issues, this coalition shows no 
coherence either. The coalition comprises both secessionists and those who desire nation 
state (see state type). As regards the role of religion, this coalition parallels the CPU-led 
coalition in that, on average, members of the Sabahaddin coalition prefer a secular regime 
but find religious propaganda useful for mobilization. On the other hand, the minimum 
and maximum values vary between 0 and 1 for this coalition, meaning that members come 
from all positions of the spectrum. As such, the Sabahaddin-led coalition shows 
convergence on neither strategic nor ideological issues. Therefore, it is unlikely to signal 
unity and coherence. As a result, the CPU-led coalition is more likely to emerge as the 
coalition that carries out regime change.  
These results indicate that within some oppositional coalition, actors should be 
pragmatic on certain issue areas so as to be incline to postpone their resolutions until after 
regime change. Evidence from the Ottoman case reveals that factions, which operate 
under the CPU leadership, share the same preferenecs on strategic issues but went are 
pragmatic on some ideological issues. This pattern falls in line with the hypothesis that 
full ideological agreement is hard to achieve; and therefore, cooperation for regime change 
(long-term cooperation) requires some level of pragmatism. Who was the center though 
and why? The next compares between the centralities of various factions so as to identify 
which one was more likely to arise as the one that signal unity and coherence. 
 
 
Finding the center of the coalition 
Table 6 
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According to the graph in Table 5, cooperation peaks in 1897, 1900, 1903 and 1907. 
Thus, from 1895 to 1908, cooperation density follows a downward trend. We know from 
the historical analysis that 1897 corresponds to the year when the CUP branches out and 
under this umbrella organizations different factions successfully cooperate. However, in 
the same year, the then leader of the CUP compromises with the Sultan and officially closes 
down the organization. Consequently, the number of active challengers drops 
significantly. It is worth noting that the calculation of the density takes into account the 
variation in the number of actors. In other words, I do not calculate density with respect 
to the number of factions that exist throughout the entire period from 1805 to 1908 ––
this would have meant to assume that some factions could have cooperated whereas they 
were even active and present within the same year. 
The steep decline from 1897 to 1898 represents the adverse effect of cooptation. 
We further now that constitutional activities revive after Prens Sabahaddin joins the 
opposition circles and rekindles contentious activities, which explains the peak in 1900. 
In 1902, there is another steep fall in cooperation density, which mirrors fractionalization 
after the 1902 Opposition Congress. Cooperation density momentarily peaks in 1903, 
when actors attempt to take action together, but the latter’s inability to work together 
results in de-intensification of network density.  
Cooperation takes off as of 1906, which corresponds to the year when the CPU 
begins to reach out to other factions. In 1908, cooperation density shows a local maximum, 
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which reflects the formation of oppositional alliances among a subset of actors. 
Importantly, there is an association with the emergence of the CPU and reunification. 
There were other local maxima prior to 1906, but the graph shows a succeeding decline. 
Therefore, these peaks represent temporary issue-based cooperation. In contrast, 
cooperation density steadily augments after 1906, which reflects the rise of oppositional 
movements among a subset of actors. 
 
The analysis of the distribution of preferences identified the CPU as the coalition 
that was more likely to signal unity and coherence than the Prens Sabahaddin-led 
coalition. Let us compare the degree centralities of rival coalitions to see whether our 
inference holds. As identified in the historical analysis, three eminent figures of the 
constitutional movement were Prens Sabahaddin, Ahmed Rıza, and the CPU in the period 
after 1897. I exclude the period before 1897, since the CPU operates as an umbrella 
organization until then. Table 7 represents the evolution of degree centralities of these 
actors.  
 
 
Table 7 
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According to Table 7, Prens Sabahaddin is most central to oppositional coalitions 
in 1900 and 1901, which are the years when he joins the constitutionalist circles and begins 
to organize the 1902 Congress. His centrality declines after 1902, dips in 1902 and 1904, 
and re-escalates as of 1906. Ahmed Rıza’s centrality to the constitutionalist movement 
declines steadily from 1898 to 1901.We know from historical analysis that the latter finds 
himself isolated due to his insistence on using an evolutionary strategy and positivism. 
From 1902 to 1905, he becomes central to the movement and his centrality surpasses 
Prens Sabahaddin’s. After 1905, Ahmed Rıza again loses his centrality and joins the CPU 
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in 1907–which explains why this centrality score goes down to 0. The CPU’s centrality is 
zero until 1905, since it does not exist before. However, it starts off with a high centrality 
score right away, which equals Ahmed Rıza’s score in 1905 and 1906. All factions that are 
connected to Ahmed Rıza are also connected to the CPU in this year. In 1907, Ahmed Rıza 
officially joins the CPU and the CPU becomes central to the movement. We understand 
that the CPU takes over the leadership from Ahmed Rıza. In 1908, the CPU has the highest 
degree centrality –the modest decline from 1907 to 1908 results from the merger with the 
Ottoman Freedom Society.46  
 
High degree centralities of Prens Sabahaddin and the CPU indicate that two 
coalition formations are taking shape between 1905 and 1908, one led by Prens 
Sabahaddin and the other spearheaded by the CPU. Although both actors’ centrality 
increases in this period, the CPU surpasses Prens Sabahaddin in terms of centrality.  
Let me reiterate the finding from the analysis of preference distribution within 
rival coalitions:  
Members of the CPU-led coalition concur on Turkish nationalism and using 
religious propaganda for mobilization purposes. Moreover, the official program of the 
group (as copied from Ahmed Rıza) also advocate for these preferences. In contrast, the 
Prens Sabahaddin-led coalition involve Turkish nationalists, ottomanists, and 
secessionists envisaging to build their own nation states. Moreover, Prens Sabahaddin, 
himself, supports Ottomanism, which loses salience among both challengers and the 
public as of 1902. Thus, the CPU-led coalition is ideologically more coherent. 
Strategically, the CPU’s official strategy has been advocating for the most salient 
preferences among challengers (as identified by the analysis of the evolution of 
preferences): revolutionary change without cooperation with secessionists and foreign 
assistance. All members of the CPU-led coalition share this strategy. Thus, the CPU-led 
coalition was homogenous in terms of preferences on strategic matters in addition to 
converging on preferences about ideological matters. In contrast, members of the Prens 
Sabahaddin-led coalition are divided between terrorist and revolutionary means of change 
(remember that the formation of the OCL is conditional upon the Armenians relinquishing 
terrorist means in Eastern Anatolia). On the cooperation with secessionists and foreign 
																																								 																				
46	The	number	of	actors	goes	down	by	one,	but	this	change	singularly	affects	the	CPU-led	coalition	because	
the	OFS	belonged	to	that	coalition.	The	PS-led	coalition	is	unaffected	from	the	change	in	the	number	of	
nodes,	since	the	OFS	was	not	part	of	that	coalition.		
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assistance, preferences of the constitutionalists, who are part of the Prens Sabahaddin-led 
coalition, align. Thus, this coalition displayed preference similarity on some strategic 
matters but not on all. In addition, the strategic preferences that they argue for loses 
salience after 1902 as identified in the analysis of preference evolution in the earlier 
section. Thus, both the analysis of preference distribution and of centrality suggest the 
following: Compared to the Prens Sabahaddin-led coalition that lacks strategic coherence 
and advocates for unpopular preferences, the CPU is more likely to resonate with other 
factions and rise as the center of an oppositional movement. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the effect of preferences on ideological and strategic issues on 
regime challengers’ ability to cooperate for regime change and form a coherent 
oppositional coalition. Combining historical analysis and network analysis, I tested the 
three hypotheses: “The higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among 
ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and 
the more likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the 
opposition.”  “Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when challengers react 
to past failures and new opportunities by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority 
of preferences on strategic issue dimensions.” “Cooperation on strategic issues is likely 
to increase when peripheral actors align their preferences to those of an emergent core.”  
 The major finding was preference convergence on strategic matters after 1902: 
After 1902, a subset of challengers aligns their preferences about the revolutionary means 
of regime change without cooperation with secessionists and foreign assistance. This 
convergence follows in part from preference revision that respond to shifts in 
environmental conditions. It is worth reminding that the acceleration of colonial invasions 
and secessionism discredit the preferences “cooperate with secessionists” and “seek 
foreign assistance.” That territorial integrity falls at stake precipitate actors to reconsider 
their priorities and update preferences. For example, after 1902, ideological 
disagreements on nationalism vs. imperial identity become obsolete, since territorial 
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integrity constitutes an urgent problem. Because of this urgency, actors shift focus on 
strategic matters.  
 
Concerning the direction of preference shifts, the preference subset suggesting 
“carry out a revolution without cooperation with secessionists and foreign assistance” 
became popular after 1902. Other preference sets do not disappear. For example, Prens 
Sabahaddin advocates for “carrying out a revolution and using terrorist means if necessary 
and cooperate with secessionists and take foreign assistance.” However, by virtue of 
advocating for the most popular set of strategies, the CPU is a better position to attract 
other challenger factions than Prens Sabahaddin. Moreover, the Prens Sabahaddin-led 
coalition lacks coherence across preferences about means of regime change and those 
about society and state types. Both pieces of evidence from the composition of rival 
factions indicates that postponing the resolution of certain issues facilitates cooperation 
among challengers.  
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CHAPTER 4 Transition to Constitutional Monarchy in Bourbon France 
What conditions enable diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their 
ideological preferences, to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the 
status quo? In this chapter, I will examine this question using the case of transition to 
constitutional monarchy in Bourbon France in 1830. I test the following hypotheses: 
Contender groups become more likely to cooperate for regime change if they converge on 
a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). 
Preference convergence on strategies and the de-prioritization of ideological 
disagreements (if any) prepares the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition that capable 
of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or 
extract considerable concessions. This case study covers the period from the restoration 
of the Bourbon dynasty to the throne in 1814 to 1830 when France transitioned back to 
constitutional monarchy with a revolution. I focus on the role of cooperation among 
challengers to the Bourbon regime on regime change.  
As was the case with the Ottoman Empire, we should talk about a transition back 
to constitutional monarchy, because the Bourbon regime was a relatively moderate 
parliamentary monarchy under its first King, Louis XVIII, but turned authoritarian once 
his successor Charles X took the throne. On the other hand, unlike in the Ottoman case, 
the parliamentary chambers continued to convene after the authoritarian revival. 
Challengers to the Bourbon regime did not seek regime change to save their fatherland as 
was the case in the Ottoman Empire. Nor did they engage in contentious activities because 
of grievances about taxation. Theirs was a struggle for survival; in a turbulent context 
context where the regime consistently underwent regime crises, each political faction vied 
for power and once in power it worked to prevent other from accessing power and even 
annihilate them.  
In a nutshell, the Bourbon monarchy was established in 1814 at the Congress of 
Vienna. In the same year, Louis XVIII promulgated the Charter of 1814. This Charter 
instituted a bicameral parliamentary system but also accorded the executive, legislative 
and judiciary powers to the king. The King organized elections for the chambers, which 
regularly held sessions from 1815 to 1830 when Charles X dissolved the Parliament 
without announcing an election date in early 1830. The dissolution of the Parliament 
triggered a regime crisis and unleashed the revolutionary process that ended with the 
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abdication of the King and transition to the July Monarchy, a constitutional parliamentary 
regime.  
As in the Ottoman case, the 1830 Revolution represented the endpoint of a series 
of conflicts over different dimensions of the Bourbon Monarchy, including the limits of 
the suffrage, the role of religion in politics, the balance of power between the executive and 
the legislative branches, and civil liberties (particularly, the freedoms of expression and 
reunion). As we shall see, part of these grievances were the ramifications of the societal 
conflict between monarchism and republicanism, which rooted back in the 1789 
Revolution. Some emanated from the imbalances inherent in the structure of the Bourbon 
regime. As I will explain, the Bourbon monarchy was a façade parliamentary monarchy. 
Ministers were responsible to the King and not to the Parliament. Therefore, any project 
of law proposed by a minister from a political faction that was not supported by the 
Parliamentary majority opposed the Chamber to the executive branch. Because the two 
branches of the government were rarely controlled by a same faction, tensions between 
the Parliament and the government systematically produced and reproduced regime 
crises, hence declining the regime’s effectiveness and raising the public’s dissatisfaction 
with the Monarchy. At the level of the political elite, the imbalance between the branches 
of the government rendered the issues of suffrage and administrative decentralization very 
controversial. Political factions vied for office and power to modify the limits of these 
regimes to their favor. Concomitantly, factions in power tried to prevent rivals from 
accessing office by any means possible, including the use of violence, gerrymandering, and 
conspiracies. In return, rivals also turned violent. Thus, the Bourbon regime regularly 
experienced illiberal episodes.  
This chapter is structured as follows: I begin by conducting a historical analysis to 
establish the nature of the Bourbon regime, its sociopolitical environment, and the issue 
dimensions shaping the debate on regime type. The second section uses historical analysis 
in combination with content analysis to identify who the relevant actors are and how their 
preference sets look like. I contrast and compare groups’ ideologies and strategies to 
pinpoint the roots of disagreements and comprehend why actors believed that a certain 
strategy or ideology to be the solution to France’s problems. This analysis builds on a 
content analysis of memoirs, pamphlets, and articles by prominent figures of each group, 
as well as secondary sources written on groups and their members following the procedure 
that I detailed in the previous chapter. I show that French challengers gradually came to 
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endorse a regime of checks and balances because they understood that without putting 
constitutional limits on the executive no faction could ensure political survival.  
In the third section, I examine I begin by examining the evolution of actors’ 
preferences over time so as to control for preference revision. I look at the evolution of 
cooperation density over time in order to pinpoint temporal variation in the intensity of 
cooperative behavior with respect to temporal changes in the number of actors. So doing 
allows for normalizing cooperation density (whether we observe enough cooperation 
among challengers given the possible amount of cooperation in a given year), which, in 
turn, helps avoid spurious inferences, such as concluding that there are not enough 
observed instances of cooperation when there are not enough groups. I apply the findings 
from the historical analysis to longitudinal network models with which I measure the 
relative effect of preference convergence on each preference type (ideological or strategic) 
on cooperation. To identify which mechanisms were at work, I evaluate these results with 
respect to the findings of the analysis of the evolution of preferences over time. Finally, I 
examine the composition of the coalition network and preference sets of the core and 
peripheral actors in order to verify strategic convergence among members of the 
oppositional coalition and identify whether such a coalition involved all pragmatic actors 
or some pragmatists and some idealists. This chapter concludes that an oppositional 
movement took shape around the independents, because this faction advocated for the 
salient ideological and strategic preferences and its members had converged on a 
particular means of transition unlike others.  
 
 
The nature of the authoritarian regime and its sociopolitical 
environment  
In this section, I analyze the structure of the Bourbon regime and the type of policy 
problems that it faced. Specifically, I examine the 1814 Charter to pinpoint the imbalances 
in the structure of the Monarchy with which to make sense of the type of problems that 
the regime experienced. Next, I trace their evolution of these issues so as to comprehend 
the stakes (enjeu) related to them. This analysis reveals specific contextual meaning of 
each problem and how these different issues came to entangle. Specifically, it shows that 
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the problems that the Bourbon Monarchy experienced were all sequels of an unresolved 
conflict between republicans and monarchists since 1789. By polarizing and radicalizing 
factions, this ongoing conflict generated a struggle for survival in which each political 
faction often turned to violence to ensure survival, annihilate and/or prevent rivals’ access 
to positions of power. 
 
The Bourbon Monarchy: Efforts to restore societal unity in a war-wearied society  
The Bourbon Monarchy was reinstated in 1814 at the Vienna Congress that convened 
following Napoléon Bonaparte’s defeat at Waterloo. Shortly after taking the throne, 
Bourbon King Louis XVIII proclaimed the Constitutional Charter of 1814 (June 4, 1814). 
The Allies restored the Bourbon dynasty to the throne in an attempt to check imperialist 
and revolutionary tendencies in France (Bertaud, 2009, pp. 286–309; Meadwell, 2001, p. 
172).47 French royalist groups known as the Chevaliers de la Foi were already organizing 
demonstrations in Bordeaux and Paris to lobby for monarchical restoration before the war 
came to an end (Alexander, 2004, p. 2; Beck, 1974, pp. 53–55). These demonstrations were 
far from reflecting general sentiments in French society. In the mid-1810s, bonapartism 
and republicanism still found considerable public support.48 In addition to not reflecting 
the general tendency of public opinion, the Bourbon Monarchy had a legitimacy problem: 
French society and the political class held mixed opinions concerning how well a foreign-
made constitution, the 1814 Charter, could remedy France’s problems.49 Still, the Allies 
and royalists in France were optimistic that the Bourbon Monarchy could bring back 
political stability and societal reconciliation to war-wearied France (Rosanvallon, 2007).  
The idea behind the Charter of 1814 was to induce political factions and citizens to 
turn to institutional means to resolve disputes rather than armed revolt as had been the 
trend since the Revolution (Alexander, 2004, p. 9). At the same time, the Charter would 
																																								 																				
47	The	Allies	ruled	out	empire	and	republic	among	options	for	the	post-1814	French	regime	because	both	
forms	of	government	had	instigated	wars	in	the	European	state	system.	For	more	information	on	the	Allies’	
position	towards	the	new	French	regime	see	(Jarrett,	2014;	Meadwell,	2001;	Schroeder,	1994;	Vick,	2014).		
48	 For	more	 information	 on	 royalists	 and	 societal	 reactions	 in	 France	 after	Waterloo	 see	 (Kroen,	 2000;	
Resnick,	1966;	Yvert,	2013).	
49	 Most	 arguments	 against	 the	 incompatibility	 of	 a	 British-style	 constitution	 revolved	 around	 Britain’s	
centuries-long	 experience	 with	 parliamentary	 checks	 on	 the	 monarch,	 which	 contrasted	 with	 French	
absolutism.	Yet,	Madame	de	Staël	also	pointed	at	religious	differences.	Herself	a	protestant,	Madame	de	
Staël	contended	that	Protestantism	was	more	compatible	to	a	regime	of	liberties	than	Catholicism	(Girard,	
1985,	p.	39;	Staël,	2008).		
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relocate power in the king so that extremist tendencies would not affect policy making. 
Therefore, unlike all constitutions issued since 1789, the Constitutional Charter of 1814 
restored authority in the king.50 The king held the powers to command land and sea forces, 
declare war, and make treaties of peace, alliance and commerce, as well as the necessary 
regulations and ordinances for the execution of the laws and the security of the state 
(“Charte constitutionnelle du 1814,” 1814, pp. 363, 365). What gave this monarchy its 
parliamentary character were the upper and lower chambers. The Chamber was bicameral 
and the king retained his veto power over legislation so as to preempt parliamentary 
tyranny (“Charte constitutionnelle du 1814,” 1814, pp. 364–68). In addition, the Charter 
limited the Parliament’s competences to checking the constitutional conformity of 
legislation while attributing the powers to nominate and institute judges to the King 
(“Charte constitutionnelle du 1814,” 1814, pp. 368–69). Moreover, the Charter instituted 
a restricted suffrage where only the wealthy had the right to vote (“Constitution française 
du 1814,” 1814, p. 367). These arrangements and particularly the disfranchisement 
excluded the Jacobins and bonapartist extremists from the decision making.  
As regards state-society relations, the Charter reiterated the fundamental rights of 
citizens and the principle of religious toleration that all constitutions since 1791 had 
featured. Yet, differently from the previous constitutions, the 1814 Charter made 
Catholicism the official religion (“Charte constitutionnelle du 1814,” 1814, p. 364). Also, 
the Charter was non-binding. Similar to the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, the Charter 
was granted to citizens as a courtesy of the king and its survival rested upon the latter’s 
goodwill. By implication, the monarch could revoke his constitutional right to destroy the 
Parliament as well as and the freedoms that the Charter instituted whenever he wanted. 
As such, the Bourbon monarchy represented as a step back from the previous republican 
regimes that grounded on popular sovereignty and an irrevocable constitution.  
Thus, the Bourbon Parliamentary Monarchy had numerous parliamentary and 
democratic limitations. We will see how these shortcomings bred and fed the problems 
that the regime experienced. Democratic limitations posed less of a problem under the 
first king, Louis XVIII (1814-1824). However, they served as leverage to authoritarian 
																																								 																				
50	For	more	information	on	the	king’s	competences	under	the	previous	constitutions	see	(“Constitution	de	
la	 République	 Française	 du	 1795),”	 1795,	 “Constitution	 de	 la	 République	 française	 du	 1799,”	 1799,	
“Constitution	Française	du	3	Septembre	1791,”	1791,	“Constitution	Girondine,”	1793,	“Sénatus-consulte	
organique	du	1804,”	1804).	
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retrenchment under his successor Charles X (1824-1830), how had absolutist tendencies. 
We will see that Charles X’s attempts to govern as a traditional authoritarian monarch met 
resistance from the Parliament and society. Over his 6-year reign, societal actors’ 
frustration with the authoritarian revival accumulated and finally exploded with in July 
1830. 
Besides the problems inherent to the structure of the regime, the Bourbon 
Monarchy stepped in an unaccommodating political environment. Shortly after the 
Hundred Days –when Bonaparte had returned from exile and taken power– royalist and 
clerical factions in southern France rose up to persecute their ‘enemies’, which referred to 
supporters the Emperor, rich protestants, and the federalists (les fédérés)51 (Resnick, 
1966, p. 116). These popular uprisings lasted about a year and caused the death of 
hundreds of civilians, because the army turned a blind eye to the massacres by 
intentionally remaining passive (Resnick, 1966). Therefore, this episode came to be  
known as the Second White Terror for reminding the Jacobin terror (terreur) 52 under the 
First Republic and the First Constitutional Monarchy.53  This appellation was more than a 
pun. It signaled that the Bourbon Monarchy would have to deal with societal polarization 
and confrontation over regime type. Having described the structure of the regime and its 
sociopolitical environment, I turn to the type of problems that the Bourbon Monarchy 
experienced.  
 
Regime problems and grievances under the Bourbon Monarchy  
In this section, I explain the type of problems that stemmed from the structural flaws of 
the 1814 Charter and how they played out in the unsettled political environment of the 
Bourbon society. I show that confrontation over regime type divided into a number of what 
might be called “technical issues” that galvanized parliamentary factions as well as 
grassroots organizations.  
																																								 																				
51	Members	of	the	local	federations	that	formed	to	prevent	counterrevolution	after	1789	and	resurfaced	
during	the	Hundred	Days.	For	further	 information	on	the	fédérés	see	(Alexander,	1991;	Edmonds,	1983;	
Hanson,	2003).	
52	In	terms	of	death	toll,	the	Jacobin	Terror	outweighs	the	White	Terror.	For	more	information	see	(Resnick,	
1966).	
53	For	detailed	information	on	the	White	Terror	see	(Alexander,	1991;	Resnick,	1966).	
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The first regime crisis broke out as early as the Parliament convened with respect 
the issue of ministerial responsibility. Ministerial responsibility referred to the question 
of whether the cabinet’s role consisted of mediation between the king and the chambers–
in which case ministers needed parliamentary support to remain in post– or due 
implementation of royal will –in which case they remain in post even in the absence of 
parliamentary backing. On this issue, the Parliament evoked its right as the representative 
of public opinion and demanded that ministers amended the projects of laws unsupported 
by the chambers. The cabinet retaliated by raising the issue of suffrage restriction. How 
could the Parliament claim to represent public opinion when only the wealthy held the 
right to vote? Deep down, the question of ministerial responsibility touched upon the 
legitimacy of the regime. In that, questioning ministers’ legitimacy equaled questioning 
the legitimacy of the monarchy since the king appointed ministers and both legislative and 
legislative powers emanated from the monarch. Thus, contending parliamentary powers 
was problematic for royalists who were the very supporters of the Bourbon Monarchy. We 
will see that over time many revised their position and endorsed a British-style 
parliamentary monarchy with checks and balances.  
Thus, the issues of ministerial responsibility and suffrage restrictions were 
entangled right from the beginning. This issue bundle had other ramifications: Besides the 
issue of who would get to vote, election results varied by how much autonomy local 
authorities had in administering districts and organizing electoral campaigns. Hence, the 
suffrage, in turn, raised the issue of administrative centralization vs. local autonomy (I will 
call this issue the decentralization issue from here on). Centralized administration allowed 
the government to gerrymander, manipulate electoral lists, pass laws to hinder rivals’ 
electoral campaigns, and take other actions to steer the electoral process according to its 
interests. In contrast, local autonomy strengthened rival factions by granting the freedom 
to duly conduct electoral campaigns and protection from the encroachments of the central 
administration. Intricate to the issues of local autonomy and the suffrage was the 
controversy over the Church’s role in administration and education. Church network 
provided an effective tool for mobilization in provinces. It was through the Church 
network that royalists had mobilized towards the end of the Napoleonic Wars and during 
the Second White Terror. Also, when royalists were in power, the Church worked for the 
royalist cause even under local autonomy. For rival factions, the strategy to ensure political 
survival was to simultaneously institute local autonomy and restrain the Church’s role in 
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sociopolitical life. Thus, ministerial responsibility, parliamentary powers, suffrage 
restriction, administrative decentralization, and the role of religion in politics played out 
in conjunction with each other.  
One might not expect the seemingly technical issues like ministerial responsibility 
to preoccupy the average citizen. Yet, they did, because all of these issues had a history 
going back to the 1789 Revolution. The Bourbon regime inherited these issues from the 
previous regimes since the latter not only failed to solve them but also reproduced them 
only to further entangle them with each other. In order for us to fully understand the stakes 
attached to these issues, we need to know their contextual meanings. To this end, the next 
section conducts a historical analysis spanning from the aftermath of 1789 to 1814 with 
which to elucidate how each issue emerged and tied into the others.  
  
Legacy of past conflicts: The Emergence of the main axes of conflict 
The debate on parliamentary powers roots back to the ancient regime (l’Ancien régime). 
The ancient regime had accorded equal weight to votes of all estates. Yet, because the 
nobility and the clergy would always stick together, the Third Estate (le tiers état) 
systematically found itself outvoted, which created frustration among lower classes. The 
process whereby this frustration resulted in the 1789 Revolution will not be discussed here. 
Yet, the evolution of the debate on parliamentary powers in the aftermath of the 
Revolution is worth examining considering our purposes. By examining the evolution of 
the debate on parliamentary powers from the first constitutional monarchy to the fall of 
the First Empire, I will explain why the division of powers between the executive and 
legislative acquired so much importance. Specifically, we will see that the radicalism of the 
first republican regime left such a bitter taste that the republican group itself fractured 
into sub-factions and monarchists became more radical in return. 
Founding a republic and abolishing the monarchy had not crossed the minds of 
the revolutionaries who carried out the Revolution in 1789 and worked in the National 
Assembly until 1791 (Fitzsimmons, 2002; Rosanvallon, 2007).54 Back in the summer of 
																																								 																				
54	 Fitzsimmons’	 analysis	 of	 primary	 documents	 reveals	 that	 representatives	 of	 the	 Third	 Estate	 who	
attended	 the	 meetings	 on	 May	 4,	 1789	 aimed	 to	 resolve	 financial	 difficulties	 and	 reform	 the	 voting	
procedure.	 Fitzsimmons	 evinces	 that	 neither	 revolutionaries	 nor	 the	 aristocrats	 and	 the	 clergy	 –who	
supported	revolutionaries–	had	been	planning	a	revolution	(Fitzsimmons,	2002,	pp.	33–68).	For	a	similar	
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1789 and the aftermath of the Revolution, the idea was to reform the state to create a more 
equal and less arbitrary polity (J. M. Anderson, 2007, p. 9; Fitzsimmons, 2002, p. xiii).55 
Therefore, France was still defined as monarchy under the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man. Yet, under the new regime, sovereignty was conferred to the “nation” and was 
exercised through an elected National Assembly exercised popular sovereignty on behalf 
of people (Kley, 1994).56 The executive power continued to lay with the king. Because 
revolutionaries had not envisioned a full-fledged transition to constitutional regime, the 
Declaration left the boundaries between the executive and legislative ambiguous. The 
Declaration also lacked provisions to induce cooperation between the King and the 
Assembly (J. K. Wright, 1994, pp. 226–29).57 Consequently, all disagreements between the 
two branches of the government rapidly escalated into a crisis and generated public 
discontent in the period from 1790 t0 1791. Regime discontent, in turn, fueled demands 
for abolishing the monarchy and sowed the seeds of republican radicalism at the 
grassroots level.  
The origins of republican radicalism go back to July 1791. At the Champs de Mars 
protests on July 17, demands for abolishing the monarchy and a republic found voice for 
																																								 																				
interpretation	of	the	French	Revolution	see	(J.	M.	Anderson,	2007;	François	Furet,	1981;	Hunt,	2004;	Rudé,	
1991;	 Tocqueville,	 2004)	 (Anderson,	 2007;	 François	 Furet,	 1981;	 Hunt,	 2004;	 Rudé,	 1991;	 Tocqueville,	
2004).	The	Marxist	historiography	offers	a	different	interpretation:	Revolutionaries	acted	as	a	united	class	
with	a	clear	class-consciousness	against	upper	class	oppression.	For	a	survey	of	this	argument	see	(Doyle,	
1999;	 Ellis,	 1978;	 Mazauric,	 2009;	 Soboul,	 1989).	 Furthermore,	 the	 legislative	 work	 and	 the	 1791	
Constitution	indicate	that	revolutionaries	understood	regime	change	as	checks	on	royal	power,	including	
the	abolition	of	privileges,	suspensive	royal	veto,	and	a	unified	assembly	to	replace	the	estates.	Further,	
parliamentary	debates	suggest	that	the	Assembly’s	power	grew	at	the	expense	of	the	king	on	an	ad	hoc	
basis.	 In	 that,	 following	 the	 abolition	 of	 privileges	 in	 August	 4,	 1789,	 the	 Assembly	 signed	 the	 Pact	 of	
Association	(le	pacte	d’association)	with	which	each	province	recognized	the	Assembly’s	authority	over	the	
monarch’s.	Next,	the	Assembly	rejected	aristocratic	members’	proposal	to	preserve	royal	veto	and	institute	
an	upper	chamber	in	order	not	to	provide	grounds	for	the	resuscitation	of	the	society	of	orders	and	the	king	
to	obstruct	legislation	(Fitzsimmons,	2002,	pp.	54–67).	
55	 According	 to	 the	 cahiers	 de	 doléance	 sent	 to	 the	 Estate-Generals,	 the	 Third	 Estate	 demanded	 fiscal	
equality	and	judicial	reforms	to	alleviate	arbitrariness.	As	the	nobility	and	the	clergy	denied	these	demands,	
the	sessions	came	to	a	deadlock,	which	persisted	for	about	two	months	(J.	M.	Anderson,	2007;	Fitzsimmons,	
2002)(Anderson,	2007;	Fitzsimmons,	2002).		
56	The	Declaration	also	declared	all	Frenchmen	to	be	free	and	equal	citizens	(Fitzsimmons,	2002,	pp.	56–
58).	
57	 For	 information	 on	 internal	 debates	 on	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 among	 revolutionaries	 see	
(Fitzsimmons,	2002,	pp.	47–68).	
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the first time when a Parisian crowd, led by the Jacobin58 and Cordelier59 clubs and the 
sans-culottes,60 gathered to protest the Assembly’s decision to reinstate Louis XVI 
following his unsuccessful flight attempt(Rose, 1983, pp. 141–145). What started as a 
peaceful protest turned violent after regime forces indiscriminately opened fire on 
protesters.61 In response, leaders of the Cordelier clubs called upon legislators to proclaim 
a republic (Alpaugh, 2014, pp. 75, 91). Empowered by public pressure, the Assembly forced 
the King into signing on to the Constitution of 1791 with which France officially 
transitioned to constitutional monarchy (“Constitution Française du 3 Septembre 1791,” 
1791, p. 201). These protests set an example in French society, teaching grassroots 
organizations how to use violence and radical discourse to influence policy making.  
Grassroots organizations increasingly turned to radicalism and violence under the 
constitutional monarchy. Let us however look at the structure of the regime in order to 
understand the nature of the environment in which radicalization gained ground: The 
Constitution of 1791 had defined the role of the king a “civil servant of the state” and 
transferred his rights to veto legislation, declare war, tax, and administer local government 
to the National Assembly (“Constitution Française du 3 Septembre 1791,” 1791, pp. 208–
12). This clause had tilted the division of power between government branches in favor of 
the legislative, thus creating what we can call a Parliament-dominant regime. 
Furthermore, the 1791 Constitution had reaffirmed sociopolitical and administrative 
equality among citizens substituted the Ancient regime’s provinces by 83 departments, 
each of which would have a local elective administration (“Constitution Française du 3 
Septembre 1791,” 1791, pp. 201-202–7; Hanson, 2004, p. 179). In this clause, we see the 
																																								 																				
58	 The	 Jacobin	 Clubs	were	 the	most	 influential	 of	 the	 popular	 societies	 that	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	
General-Estates	were	formed	in	October	1789.	These	clubs	aimed	to	“debate	and	discuss	issues	before	the	
Assembly,	to	support	the	drafting	and	acceptance	of	a	constitution,	and	to	correspond	with	like-minded	
societies	throughout	France”	(P.	R.	Hanson,	2004,	p.	160).	They	rapidly	built	a	network	that	extended	to	
provinces	in	1790	and	1791.	By	July	1791,	the	Jacobins	had	had	934	clubs	nationwide.	Following	the	King’s	
flight	attempt,	these	clubs	turned	radical;	they	expelled	the	moderate	Jacobins	called	the	Feuillants	and	
adopted	a	republican	discourse.	Under	the	leadership	of	Robespierre,	membership	doubled	and	the	clubs	
played	a	chief	role	in	the	elections	to	the	National	Convention	(Hanson,	2004,	p.	161).	
59	 The	 Cordeliers	 Clubs	 were	 one	 of	 the	 several	 district	 assemblies	 that	 Parisians	 founded	 during	 the	
Revolution.	In	1790,	they	officially	became	a	club	and	adopted	the	name	Cordelier	after	the	district	where	
it	was	located.	These	clubs’	objective	was	to	monitor	the	respect	of	the	rights	ascribed	to	citizens	with	the	
Declaration	of	Rights	of	Man	and	Citizen	and	regularly	hold	popular	deliberations	(Cock,	2001,	pp.	60–90).		
60	The	sans-culottes	referred	to	militant	radical	 lower	class	supporters	of	the	Revolution	who	demanded	
equality	and	the	abolition	of	the	monarchy	and	privileges	(Soboul,	1980,	pp.	5–19).	
61	This	day	came	to	be	remembered	as	the	Massacre	of	the	Champs	de	Mars	(Mathiez,	1975,	pp.	45–47,	
135–36).	
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origins of the decentralization debate. This arrangement had aimed to contain the gentry’s 
counterrevolutionary tendencies and consolidate the regime in the countryside.62 Despite 
their progressive aspects in an international state system where absolutism constituted 
the most popular form of government, revolutionary popular societies were still 
unsatisfied. The Jacobin and Cordelier Clubs continued to organize small-scale protests to 
call on parliamentarians to reassert the power of the Assembly against the monarch 
(Alpaugh, 2014, p. 100). The government condoned radical societies’ protests for it needed 
their support to suppress counterrevolutionary resistance.63  
Radicalized grassroots organizations found their way into the Assembly with the 
elections of September 1792. The new Assembly comprised the Feuillants,64 who 
supported a unicameral constitutional monarchy with a strong parliament (as described 
in the 1791 Constitution), the Plain –opponents of republicanism, and Republicans, which 
divided into the Girondins–that demanded a federal republic as in the United States of 
America– and the Montagnards –supporters of a centralized republic (C. J. Mitchell, 
1988, pp. 15–19). The Montagnards subsumed the Jacobins–who demanded a strong 
centralized republican state– and the Cordeliers –proponents of local autonomy, direct 
democracy, and secularism (Hammersley, 2005, pp. 23–58). We understand that the rise 
of radical republicanism induced fractionalization within the republican camp and led to 
the emergence of moderate alternatives. On the other hand, such a wide range of 
preferences systematically raised tensions in the Assembly. Still, parliamentarians 
generally cooperated.  
Cooperation in the Assembly failed with respect to the issues of the émigrés and 
refractory priests. The émigrés referred to the Frenchmen, mostly aristocrats, who had 
fled the Revolution and been generating counterrevolutionary propaganda in Prussia, 
Britain, and the Holy Roman Empire (Hanson, 2004, pp. 112–14). On these issues, 
factions in the Assembly (which I will call “parliamentary factions” from here on since they 
voted en bloc) divided into advocates of the revolutionary heritage who wanted to expel 
																																								 																				
62	For	an	excellent	survey	of	resistance	to	the	French	Revolution	on	the	countryside	see	(Hanson,	2003)(P.	
R.	Hanson,	2003).	
63	Regime	 forces	did	not	 intervene	 to	 these	small	protests	and	protesters	presented	a	united	 front	and	
expressed	solidarity	with	those	who	fell	on	July	17th	(Alpaugh,	2014,	p.	92).	
64	The	Feuillants	grew	out	of	the	Jacobin	clubs	due	to	their	disagreement	over	the	course	of	the	Revolutions.	
Unlike	 the	 Jacobins,	 the	 Feuillants	 supported	 the	 constitutional	 monarchy	 as	 established	 by	 the	 1791	
Constitution	(C.	J.	Mitchell,	1988,	p.	15)		
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émigrés from the country and refractory priests from their posts and those who feared that 
these radical policies would drag France into a war against the European powers that had 
been hosting these émigrés and catholic supporters (Shusterman, 2013, pp. 75–76). On 
both issues, radical republicans voted out the moderates and Louis XVI vetoed the decrees 
that the Assembly passed. The veto impeding the legislative process, radical republican 
societies initiated violent protests that lasted from July to August. Republican 
parliamentarians held back the police and the National Guard, since dragging protests  
empowered their leverage in the Assembly (Alpaugh, 2014, pp. 106–116). In September 
1792, republican parliamentary factions were powerful enough to abolish the monarchy 
and declare the Republic of France. In January 1793, they passed the law on regicide.   
To recap, the process from the 1789 Revolution to the proclamation of the Republic 
is best described as an unintended consequence of confrontations between the executive 
and the legislative. We have seen that the 1789 Revolution was not planned. Because it 
was not planned, the revolutionaries that proclaimed the constitutional documents 
promulgated from 1789 to 1792 did not think of devising arrangements to induce 
cooperation between government branches; they only passed the arrangements that 
restrained the power of the executive power. This caveat, as we have seen, was the reason 
why disagreements escalated into crises, while ineffective government fueled public 
discontent and radicalism. One most important development in this process was that 
violence and protests became a routine practice that both the government and non-
governmental actors began to employ. Also, radical societies emerged as a novel political 
player and a powerful ally to republican parliamentarians against the king and 
counterrevolutionaries. Hence, we understand that the debate on political violence 
emerged as a by-product of the controversy over parliamentary powers and the boundaries 
of the executive. Similarly, the issue of administrative centralization entered the agenda 
as a by-product of the confrontation between republicans and monarchists. It is important 
to realize that while these issues were debated separately they stemmed from the same 
root cause, which was the controversy over parliamentary powers and the boundaries of 
the executive. In the following section, I examine the evolution of the conflict between 
republicanism and monarchism under the republican and Napoleonic regimes and explain 
how republican radicalism contributed to the rise of bonapartism as a third way. 
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From republicanism to tyranny: evils of excess parliamentary power 
In this section, I focus on the evolution of the conflict between republicanism and 
monarchism under the republican and Napoleonic regimes. Specifically, I explain how 
parliamentarianism and republicanism came to be associated with parliamentary tyranny 
in the eyes of the public and discontent with republican radicalism contributed to rise of 
bonapartism as a third way. I will show that the confrontation between republicanism and 
monarchism reproduced the debates on parliamentary powers, the boundaries of the 
executive, political violence, and decentralization. I will further show that the issues of 
suffrage extension, the Church’s involvement in politics, and liberties vs. order entered the 
agenda following the bitter experience with Jacobinism.  
From republic to parliamentary tyranny 
We have seen that the King’s evocation of his veto power induced republican 
parliamentarians of the first Constitutional Monarchy to abolish monarchy and proclaim 
the Republic of France. The most striking characteristic of this republican regime was the 
prominence of its Parliament. In this section, we will see how this Parliament-dominant 
regime evolved into tyranny and radical republicans infiltrated into the state. We will see 
that after radical republicans tried to annihilate their rivals via state institutions, all 
factions began to compete to control the state apparatus. As I explain in the remainder of 
this section, thereafter, whichever faction assumed power, it used the state infrastructure 
to persecute rivals in the name of “preserving order.” This strategy generated the debate 
on order vs. liberties, making the French as suspicious of a strong legislative as of a strong 
executive.  
To this day, the First Republic (1792–1795) resonates with Jacobin terror (la 
terreur). Although the terror tends to be attributed to the Jacobin regime, it is important 
to realize that other parliamentary factions and radical societies played a significant part 
(Brown, 1997, p. 666). We should rather see the terror as the outcome of interactions 
between the radicals in government and factions in the opposition.  
The episode leading to Jacobin terror began in September 1792 when the sans-
culottes took the streets to defeat enemies of the Revolution inside. With the help of some 
officers of the National Guard, protesters attacked prisons and massacred convicts 
(Francois Furet & Ozouf, 1989, pp. 521–22). Three months later, radicals set an 
extraordinary revolutionary tribunal to execute counterrevolutionaries (Alpaugh, 2014, p. 
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136). By then, military defeats by Britain, Austria, and the Netherlands had eroded support 
for the Girondin government. The erosion of support for moderate republicans played into 
the hands of radical republicans. Empowered by public dissatisfaction with military 
defeats, radical republicans took a series of drastic measures, including the transformation 
of the popular counterrevolutionary tribunal into an official organ of the state, the purge 
of the Girondins from the Assembly, and the foundation of the Committee of Public Safety 
with which to hunt down counterrevolutionaries (J. M. Anderson, 2007, pp. 17–18; 
Hanson, 2003, p. 8). With each of these measures, the level of regime oppression 
intensified and the radical republicans, now controlling the state organs, became more 
and more violent.  
State violence met societal resistance. First, royalists, refractory priests, and 
peasants started a counterrevolutionary rebellion in the Vendée, which rapidly spread to 
neighboring departments (Tilly, 1976, pp. 226, 305–10). One striking pattern of this 
rebellion was the unification of regime contenders of different classes against the 
republican regime. With this cross-class opposition alliance, the issues of equality, the 
Church’s role in politics, and liberties vs. order became connected. Second, the federalist 
uprisings broke out on April 29.  Like the Vendée, federalist revolts rapidly spread to major 
cities, such as Bordeaux, Lyon, and Caen (Alpaugh, 2014; Hanson, 2003, pp. 8144–147). 
With the federalist uprisings, decentralization also added to the amalgam of issues. In 
addition, we see that other factions emulated the use of violence as a political strategy. 
Seeing the spread of uprisings, the Jacobins t0ok over the executive power in September 
1793. Under the leadership of Maximilien Robespierre, the Committee of Public Safety 
suppressed the federalist revolts and peasant unrest and executed several Girondins and 
Cordeliers, as well as hundreds of civilians suspected regime traitors, including scientists, 
peasants, priests, and workers (J. M. Anderson, 2007, p. 20; Hanson, 2003, pp. 163–73).65 
Although societal resistance to state violence was considerably strong and 
influential, the fall of the Jacobin regime came with the Girondin coup of July 1794, known 
as the Thermidorian reaction–Thermidor, 9 Year II indicating the date of the coup 
																																								 																				
65	Robespierre	enjoyed	radical	popular	societies’	support	thanks	to	the	press	propaganda	that	he	conducted	
(Gough,	1999,	pp.	115–120).	However,	 the	execution	of	 the	Cordelier	 leaders,	Danton	and	Desmoulins–
whom	were	very	close	 to	Robespierre,	 turned	 the	Committee	against	 their	 leader	 (Hampson,	2006,	pp.	
170–73).	Members	of	the	Committee	ousted	Robespierre	and	his	colleagues	with	a	coup	and	condemned	
him	to	death	sentence	on	July	27,	1794	(J.	M.	Anderson,	2007,	p.	21).	
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according to the revolutionary calendar.66 From September to July 1793, besides taking 
numerous drastic measures, the Jacobin government also issued the Constitution of 1793 
(Hanson, 2004, p. 87). This Constitution fused the judiciary and executive powers in the 
hands of the legislative and made the government responsible before the Assembly 
(“Constitution Girondine,” 1793, pp. 239–54). This arrangement allowed the Jacobins to 
govern as arbitrarily as the king under the ancient regime. Once more we see one faction 
instrumentalizing the Constitution to annihilate its rivals. As regards state-society 
relations, the Constitution restored universal suffrage, granted citizens social rights (e.g., 
the right to education and the freedom of association), and instituted referendum to enact 
popular sovereignty (“Constitution Girondine,” 1793, pp. 231, 234–36, 296–97). 
Ironically, this Constitution was the most democratic of the revolutionary constitutions in 
the domain of civil liberties, but was never enforced due to provincial revolts and the 
Girondin resistance in cities. Once the Thermidorians took power, they issued a new 
constitution. The Constitution of 1795 abolished the fusion of powers so as to preclude 
another episode of parliamentary tyranny. Thus, we see that the controversy over 
parliamentary powers and the boundaries of the executive continued to shape the 
dynamics of the succeeding regimes. 
The Jacobin regime had taught the French that excess parliamentary power was as 
threatening to civil rights and liberties as excess executive power. This experience also 
reinforced the society’s desire for civil liberties and justice (Jainchill, 2003).67 In an 
attempt to prevent parliamentary tyranny and protect liberties, the Thermidorians 
introduced several veto points into the Constitution of 1795 (Baczko, 1994, p. 254). To pre-
empt parliamentary tyranny, the Constitution established a strict separation of powers 
and bicameralism (“Constitution de la République Française du 1795),” 1795, pp. 304–7). 
Universal suffrage was abolished to exclude radicals from policy making; only taxpayers 
held the right to vote. Moreover, voters elected only one-third of new legislators in the 
																																								 																				
66	For	more	 information	on	the	Thermidorian	reaction	and	the	purge	of	the	Jacobins	see	(Baczko,	1994;	
Brown,	2007;	Jainchill,	2003;	Luzzatto,	1991;	Woloch,	1970).		
67	There	is	an	extensive	debate	on	whether	the	Thermidorian	regime	represents	a	break	with	the	Revolution	
or	 continues	 it.	 For	 the	 break	 argument	 see	 (Aulard,	 1901;	 Brunel,	 1999;	 Woloch,	 1970).	 For	 the	
continuation	 thesis	 see	 (Baczko,	 1994;	 Livesey,	 2001;	 Palmer	&	 Armitage,	 2014)(Baczko,	 1994;	 Livesey,	
2001;	 Robert	 Roswell	 Palmer	 &	 Armitage,	 2014)(Baczko,	 1994;	 Livesey,	 2001;	 Palmer	 &	 Armitage,	
2014)(Baczko,	1994;	Livesey,	2001;	Robert	Roswell	Palmer	&	Armitage,	2014)(Baczko,	1994;	Livesey,	2001;	
Palmer	&	Armitage,	2014)	(Baczko,	1994;	Livesey,	2001;	Palmer	&	Armitage,	2014).	
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elections. This arrangement served to filter out royalist extremists.68 As regards the 
executive, the Constitution of 1895 accorded the chambers the right to elect five directors 
–which gave this regime the name le Directoire (the Directory) (“Constitution de la 
République Française du 1795),” 1795, pp. 307–309). These five directors would use the 
executive power. Besides its complexity,  this arrangement also lacked provisions to induce 
cooperation among the directors and between branches of the government as was the case 
with the previous revolutionary constitutions (Woloch, 2002, p. 3). Therefore, as in the 
previous republican regimes, disagreements rapidly escalated into crises and ineffective 
government rekindled demands for a strong executive. We will see that these demands 
prepared the Napoléon Bonaparte’s regime. In this regime, as in the previous 
revolutionary regimes, we see the government devising complicated arrangements to 
prevent others from accessing positions of power. 
The experience with the Thermidorian regime reiterated the lesson from the First 
Constitutional Monarchy, that the separation of powers fell short to both restore order and 
protect liberties. The most difficult problem that the Thermidorian regime encountered 
was the lower class frustration with disenfranchisement. When the regime extended the 
election quota from one-third to two-thirds of the Assembly in 1797, both the 1797 and 
1798 elections increased the royalist and Jacobin representation in the chambers 
(Bourdon, 1946, p. 218). In both instances, the Directory refused to honor the election 
results and accord representation to royalists and Jacobins fearing the revival of 
extremism. More drastic measures followed this one, including the arrest of prominent 
royalist and Jacobin leaders, the purge of some directors from the Directory, the closure 
of  the royalist and Jacobin press and clubs, the reinstitution of the military commissions 
to execute returned immigrés and exiled clerics, deportations, and the trial of civilians 
accused of brigandage at military courts instead of civil courts (Brown, 1997, pp. 677–79; 
Palmer, 1959, pp. 255–64; Woloch, 1970, p. 5).69 In so doing, the Directory repeated the 
Jacobin government’s mistake of curtailing freedoms and turning to oppression to restore 
order. As in the Jacobin regime, oppression generated societal resistance, which 
manifested itself as chronic violence against regime officials, banditry, and sporadic anti-
																																								 																				
68	Additional	measures	against	extremism	included,	the	closure	of	the	Jacobin	clubs,	the	abolishment	of	
revolutionary	tribunals,	the	prohibition	of	political	gatherings,	and	the	insertion	of	‘the	hatred	for	royalism	
and	anarchy	(implying	Jacobinism)	into	the	oath	of	loyalty	to	the	Directory	regime	(Woloch,	2002,	p.	4).	
69	For	more	information	on	the	1797	and	1798	elections	and	the	purge	of	royalists	and	the	sans-culottes	
see	(Bourdon,	1946;	Cobb,	1954;	Dautry,	1950;	Meynier,	1928;	Suratteau,	1958).	
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republican uprisings especially in Western France (la chouannerie) (Brown, 2007; Devlin, 
1990, pp. 199–223). As was the case under the Jacobin regime, societal opposition groups 
formed a cross-class alliance, encompassing royalists, Jacobins, Catholic supporters, and 
peasants (Brown, 2007, p. 268). Thus, ironically, regime oppression created more 
disorder. By 1799, many came to believe that France needed a new constitution (Brown, 
2007; Lefebvre, 1984; Lyons, 1975; Woronoff, 2004). In this context, Bonaparte and the 
allied directors easily carried a coup known as le 18 Brumaire –marking the day of the 
coup according to the revolutionary calendar.70 
Thus, we see that the Thermodorian regime draws various parallels to the previous 
revolutionary regimes. In all these instances, the factions in power made complicated 
constitutional arrangements to prevent their rivals’ excess to power or exclude them from 
decision making. Besides decreasing the government’s effectiveness, these measures 
generated significant societal resistance that escalated to disorder when the governments 
used force to reinstate order. Dissatisfaction with the regime under both republican and 
Thermidorian regimes propelled demands for more effective government. We saw that the 
republican government issued the Constitution of 1793 to fuse powers. Similarly, the 
Thermidorian regime gave way to another dictatorial regime, the Napoleonic regime that 
I elaborate on in the next section. 
 
The rise of the third way: Bonapartism & rebirth of excess executive power 
Napoléon Bonaparte had come to power through an unconventional way; his ideas were 
equally unconventional for his period. Unprecedentedly since 1789, Bonaparte I 
abandoned the previous republican regimes’ discourse of the need for protecting the 
Revolution. He was convinced that the ancient regime was not to come back; now, it was 
time to rationalize institutions and create a new society (Lyons, 1994, pp. 295–98).71 
Unsurprisingly, such ambitious plans met societal resistance. Bonaparte I, like the 
preceding the Jacobin and Thermidorian regimes, turned to repression to restore order. 
																																								 																				
70	Besides	discontent,	the	lack	of	societal	resistance	is	explained	by	state	of	siege,	which	placed	40%	of	the	
country	under	the	jurisdiction	of	generals	the	(Brown,	1997,	p.	677).		
71	 Historians	 depicted	 Napoléon	 Bonaparte’s	 regime	 differently.	 For	 accounts	 that	 portrayed	 him	 as	 a	
despot	or	an	enlightened	despot	see	(Bluche,	2008;	Doyle,	2009;	Lyons,	1994;	Tulard,	1983).	For	accounts	
that	saw	his	regime	as	more	liberal	or	democratic	see	(Brown,	1997;	Dwyer,	2015;	Francois	Furet	&	Ozouf,	
1989;	Godechot,	1969;	Lentz,	2012).	
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However, as we will see, his authoritarianism differed from under previous governments’ 
authoritarianisms. Also, unlike in previous revolutionary regimes, his regime became 
more and more aristocratic finally resulting in the proclamation of the First Empire 
(Dwyer, 2015, p. 582). In order to comprehend the regime’s evolution to the Empire, I 
compare the Constitutions of 1799, 1802, and 1804 and discuss the measures that the 
Emperor adopted. We will see that authoritarianism entrenched gradually and that the 
areas in which the Napoleonic regime turned authoritarian correspond to the issues that 
preoccupied the Bourbon Monarchy.  
We can say that the Napoleonic regime’s most effective move to gain legitimacy 
after the coup was to restore universal suffrage and alleviate previously excluded societal 
groups’ frustration. Inclusion became official in the Constitution of 1799. This 
Constitution also incorporated the rights enumerated in the Declaration of Rights of Men 
into the main body of the constitution–whereby these rights became claim rights 
(“Constitution de la République française du 1799,” 1799, pp. 304–7). The 1802 and 1804 
Constitutions preserved these clauses, reaffirming the seemingly inclusive feature of the 
regime. Inclusion was seeming, because the gradual increase of the first consul’s powers 
systematically decreased the impact of these clauses. Extending the first consul’s powers 
meant that the executive power was attributed to a non-elected body, which betrayed the 
very principle of popular will. Yet, on the surface, the regime remained bicameral until the 
transition to the Empire. Under both the 1799 and 1802 Constitutions, the regime had one 
elected Tribunate and one Senate (“Constitution de la République française du 1799,” 
1799, pp. 306–7). These arrangements did not disguise the fact that these chambers were 
becoming increasingly accessory. Bonaparte I coopted the Senate, the Tribunate, and 
prefectorial corps in order to reduce dissent in the government (Woloch, 2002, pp. 46–
53).72  
The extension of the executive’s powers happened gradually: under the 
Constitution of 1799, Bonaparte I was only the first Consul, but primus inter pares of the 
three directors (“Constitution de la République française du 1799,” 1799, pp. 305–8).73 In 
																																								 																				
72	 Bonaparte	 also	 purged	 some	 senators,	 bureaucrats,	 and	 generals	who	 rivaled	 him	 or	 challenged	 his	
regime.	For	more	 information	on	how	Bonaparte	defeated	his	dissidents	 see	 (Bergeron,	1981;	Englund,	
2005;	Geyl,	1967;	Lefebvre	&	Roberts,	2011;	Woloch,	2002).	
73	 In	order	 to	prevent	constitutional	violations,	 those	who	drafted	 the	Constitution	of	1799	created	 the	
consul	 system	so	as	 to	design	a	 third-party	mechanism	against	extremism	within	 the	Assembly	and	 the	
government.	However,	after	becoming	the	consul	and	putting	the	1799	Constitution	to	the	referendum,	
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1802, he was the first consul for life (“Sénatus-consulte du 1802,” 1802, p. 315). In 1804, 
he finally became the emperor (“Sénatus-consulte organique du 1804,” 1804, p. 328). 
Under the Constitution of 1804, the emperor had the power to abolish the elected 
assembly, the Tribunate (“Sénatus-consulte organique du 1804,” 1804, pp. 331–35).74 In 
1807, Bonaparte I used this right. Thereafter, this executive-dominant Napoleonic regime 
was officially an authoritarian Empire. 
Authoritarian turn did not go uncontested. French society manifested its 
resistance via brigandage, rebellions in the countryside, and federalist revolts.75 Towards 
the opposition, the Napoleonic regime was equally repressive yet more effective than the 
Directory. Bonaparte I purged f regime contenders within the bureaucracy,76 widened 
censorship,77 and restrained the freedom of association78 (Sutherland, 1986, pp. 333–35; 
Woloch, 2002, pp. 3–9). On the other hand, administrative centralization, which had 
begun under the Consulate, allowed to directly appoint the administrative and judicial 
personnel in the countryside, including prefects, subprefects, mayors, and judges–
designated by local elections after the Revolution (Brown, 1997, p. 684). Through the local 
administration, the imperial regime adopted easily controlled the countryside. Moreover, 
the Napoleonic Code followed by a series of legal reforms to improve administrative 
effectiveness, including the promulgation of the Civil Code (1806) and the Code of 
Commerce, the law authorizing troops to shoot brigands and rebels on site, the 
																																								 																				
Bonaparte	imposed	himself	as	the	first	consul,	which	allowed	him	to	monopolized	power	in	the	following	
years	(Woloch,	2002,	pp.	30–31).	
74	 Even	 though	 the	 regime	had	become	personalistic,	 it	 adopted	 certain	 judiciary	 reforms	 to	make	 this	
branch	of	 the	government	more	effective,	such	as	 the	promulgation	of	 the	Civil	Code	 (1804)	 (“Sénatus-
consulte	organique	du	1804,”	1804,	pp.	341–44).	
75	The	character	of	federalist	uprisings	varied	across	departments.	In	some	departments,	royalists	took	the	
lead;	in	others	republicans	revolted.	Evidence	shows	that	the	population	was	torn	between	royalists	and	
republicans	in	some	departments.	For	more	information	see	(Alexander,	1991).		
76	 More	 than	 160	 magistrates,	 who	 were	 officially	 appointed	 for	 life,	 were	 dismissed.	 Bonaparte	 also	
dismissed	his	consultants	and	dissenters	among	regime	elites	(Bourdon,	1970,	p.	836;	Dwyer,	2015,	p.	282).	
77	By	1804,	numerous	papers	had	already	been	closed	down	or	their	sales	had	been	limited,	and	censorship	
had	curtailed	the	freedom	of	expression.	In	1806,	censorship	widened;	the	imperial	regime	required	every	
publisher	to	convey	the	ministry	a	copy	of	each	publication	(Woloch,	2002,	pp.	206–208).	
78	The	Penal	Code	of	1810	(article	291)	prohibited	gatherings	of	more	than	20	people	(Rosanvallon,	2007,	
p.	111).	
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establishment of Extraordinary Military Commissions and Special Tribunals (Brown, 
1997, pp. 683–86).79  
Authoritarianism and repression were disguised under a revolutionary rhetoric 
and certain democratic practices. For example, the Napoleonic Code guaranteed open 
trials and equality before the law. After  abolishing the law of immigrés and the law 
authorizing military courts to try cases of brigandage –the two controversial laws adopted 
under the Directory– the regime created the impression of resuming regular justice 
(Brown, 1997, pp. 687–84). Bonaparte I further created the image of involving people  in 
decision making by maintaining certain popular democratic practices, such as plebiscite, 
publicly held trials in special and military tribunals, judges’ oath to loyalty for the republic 
and the revolutionary principles (Brown, 1997, pp. 687–88). Moreover, the regime 
extended religious freedoms to all Christian sects and Jews, which alleviated 
dissatisfaction created by the confiscation of the properties of the church (Broers, 2006). 
Most importantly, the Bonaparte regime executed fewer people than the Jacobin republic 
or the Directory (Dwyer, 2015, p. 583). However, alongside democratic practices and 
revolutionary rhetoric, the regime had created its own elites, an imperial elite 
distinguished by wealth or expertise and loyalty to the regime, and another provincial elite 
from the successful revolutionary bourgeoisie of landowners, professional men and 
administrators, and of manufacturing elites (Lyons, 1994, p. 298). Thus, if the Napoleonic 
regime created less dissatisfaction than the ancient regime and the Jacobin regimes, it was 
because inclusive features, though ineffectual in practice, disguised exclusion.  
Overall, the issue of parliamentary powers, administrative centralization, the role 
of the Church in politics, and freedoms vs. order preoccupied the Napoleonic regime. As 
we will see, the same issues would preoccupy the Bourbon Monarchy. While being equally 
repressive and authoritarian as the previous republican regime, the Napoleonic regime 
had more legitimacy than its predecessors. Military victories, on the one hand, and 
democratic practices, on the other hand, alleviated discontent with the regime (Jourdan, 
2012). Discontent intensified once France began losing on the battlefield (Pilbeam, 2002, 
p. 34). As we saw earlier, royalist organizations mushroomed in Southern France, while 
uprisings in the Vendée resumed (Bertaud, 2009, pp. 286–309). The Empire fell following 
																																								 																				
79	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Empire	 pursued	 some	 of	 the	 discriminatory	 and	 racist	 practices	 of	 the	
Revolutionary	regime,	 i.e.,	 the	slavery,	 the	 interdiction	on	racial	 intermarriages,	 the	denial	of	entry	 into	
France	towards	blacks	and	mulattos	(Dwyer,	2015,	p.	584).	
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the defeat at Waterloo (1814). At the Congress of Vienna, the Allies restored the Bourbons 
to the throne (Lyons, 2006). Napoléon Bonaparte was deposed with a brief decree of the 
Senate in 1814 (“Constitution française du 1814,” 1814, “Décret du Sénat conservateur du 
3 avril 1814,” 1814).   
To recap, we observe continuities across the republican, Thermidorian and 
imperial regimes. Underneath all problems that these regimes experienced lay the 
confrontation over republicanism vs. monarchism. In all regimes, one faction controlled 
the state, and while in power, it modified constitutional arrangements to prevent and 
preempt its rivals’ access to power. This tendency created non-equilibrated (either 
executive or parliament-dominant) regimes. Moreover, all regimes adopted extraordinary 
means of justice and curtailed civil liberties in the name of protecting order. The 
Napoleonic regime exceptionally extended religious tolerance to draw public support, 
whereas all other regimes worked to roll back the Church’s and monarchists’ influence in 
politics. On the other hand, the Napoleonic regime paralleled the Jacobin regime in fusing 
powers (in the hands of the legislative in the latter and of the executive under the former) 
to effectively repress regime contention. However, the imperial regime looked more 
legitimate, given Napoleon’s military victories and because complicated constitutional 
arrangements under the preceding regimes had created demand for government 
efficiency. Demand for effective government explains why bonapartism survived long after 
the Bourbon monarchy was gone. It is thus important to realize that the confrontation over 
republicanism vs. monarchism repetitively posed a tradeoff between government 
effectiveness and representation across different regimes in post-1789 France. Under the 
republican regimes, the Parliament predominated the executive, whereas under the 
Directory and the Napoleonic regime, the reverse was the case. Even though one was 
executive-dominant while other was Parliament dominant, democratic practices created 
the impression of involving people into decision making under both the republican and 
Napoleonic regimes. In contrast, the strategy of outward exclusion fuelled discontent 
under the Directory.  
As regards issue areas, we see that the issue of the suffrage, liberties vs. order, the 
use of violence as a political strategy, administrative centralization, and the Church’s role 
in politics remained on the agenda under Bonaparte I. For they remained unresolved, the 
Bourbon regime inherited these issues. This explains why the seemingly technical issues 
created so much controversy under the Bourbon Monarchy. On the other hand, the 
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Napoleonic regime left another important legacy that the Bourbon royalists could not 
quite grasp. Even though Jacobin violence had tarnished the image of the Revolution and 
republicanism, the continuing effectiveness of the revolutionary discourse under 
Bonaparte implied that the ancient regime was not to come back. Equality, universal 
suffrage, and nationalization –which I will elaborate on in the following section, had 
already eroded the sociopolitical foundations of the ancient regime. Another indication of 
the already eroded of sociopolitical underpinnings of absolutism was the very emergence 
of bonapartism as a third way. We will see in the next section that the Bourbon royalists 
acknowledged the improbability of reviving the ancient regime only towards the end of the 
Bourbon Monarchy–a fact that Bonaparte I had correctly diagnosed more than decades 
ago. In the next section, I discuss the evolution of preferences about the issues of 
parliamentary powers, the suffrage, liberties vs. order, the use of violence as a political 
strategy, administrative centralization, and the Church’s role in politics. As detailed in the 
methods section, I will be relying on secondary and primary sources (such as newspapers, 
petitions, protests, and apathy) to identify positions of grassroots organizations and 
citizens.  
 
The Identity and preference sets of challengers 
In this section, I discuss the type of grievances that the issues of parliamentary powers, 
the suffrage, liberties vs. order, the use of violence as a political strategy, administrative 
centralization, and the Church’s role in politics engendered and the type of solutions that 
actors proposed to tackle them.  
In the previous section, we have seen that radicalism, political violence, and 
political repression derived from government instability and that government instability 
stemmed from the imbalance between the executive and legislative powers. The 
republican constitutions had made complex arrangements to constrain the royal power, 
but such complexity had hindered decision making and eroded public support for the 
regime. In order to improve effectiveness, the republican regimes, like the imperial one, 
fused the legislative and executive powers and violated the spirit of popular will and 
parliamentarianism. The 1814 Charter similarly designated as the king the source of all 
powers. This clause, which aimed to preempt parliamentary tyranny, blurred the 
boundaries of the executive and legislative powers, thus providing the ground for constant 
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government instability. We also saw that some seemingly technical issues, all of which had 
a history going back to the 1790s, mobilized both societal actors and parliamentary 
factions. In this section, I introduce the relevant political actors of the Bourbon regime, 
discuss their origins and composition so as to understand their stance on each issue. In 
order to highlight where they differed from one another, I contrast and compare these 
actors’ grievances and solutions that they proposed.80 I show that the proposed solutions 
to the enjeu on regime type varied from absolutism to popular sovereignty. However, along 
this axis, Bourbon actors made demands for different regime types. I further show that 
even among those that advocated for the same regime type, there were nuances regarding 
the issues of liberties vs. order, the use of violence as a political strategy, and 
administrative centralization.  
 
Bourbon actors & their stance 
It is customary for historians to use the left-right scale in classifying political actors of the 
Bourbon regime (Alexander, 2004; Girard, 1985; Hudson, 1973; Sauvigny, 1967; Thureau-
Dangin, 1876). This study follows this convention. Yet, it is worth reminding the meaning 
of the left and right in Bourbon France: As we have seen, in post-1789 French society, 
“leftwing” designated supporters of popular sovereignty, while “rightwing” referred to 
advocates of royal sovereignty. These connotations preserved their meanings under the 
Bourbon monarchy. However, the left-right axis does not fully capture nuances within the 
left/rightwing. For instance, despite both being classified as rightwing, the 
constitutionnels, unlike the ultra-royalists, advocated for national sovereignty. On the 
other hand, the royalists and the leftwing independents endorsed decentralization, 
whereas the bonapartists, also on the left, did not. In addition, between 1814 and 1830, 
most actors revised their stance in response to strategic interactions and environmental 
changes, which further challenged the left-right divide. Given these challenges, it is more 
appropriate to speak of “factions.” As mentioned earlier, I define faction as a group of 
individuals voicing a distinct preference set on the issues that shape the political agenda, 
which, in the case of Bourbon France, corresponds to liberties vs. order, the separation of 
powers, the role of the Church in politics, and decentralization.  
																																								 																				
80	I	identified	relevant	actors	by	conducting	interviews	with	experts	on	19th	century	French	and	a	content	
analysis	of	primary	and	secondary	sources	(including	papers,	petitions,	contentious	activities	like	protests).	
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The rightwing consisted of the royalists and the ultra-royalists (the ultras from 
here on), the constitutionnels and the doctrinaires. The former sought to restore the 
ancient regime, whereas the constitutionnels and the doctrinaires aimed to reconcile 
revolutionary heritage with national sovereignty. The leftwing comprised a heterogeneous 
group called the liberals (also known as the independents or the left). These factions, in 
turn, subsumed various sub-factions that differed from each other on strategic terms.  
In terms of organization, Bourbon actors operated on the ground or in the 
parliament. Some factions–such as the independents and the ultras– had foot both on the 
ground and in the parliament. When referring to organized actors on the ground, I will be 
using the term “grassroots organizations.” Grassroots organizations encompassed secret 
and conspiratorial societies, as well as NGO-like associations (such as the Society of 
Friends of the Freedom of Press), mutual aid societies, freemason lodges etc. I will be 
referring to actors operating in the parliament as “parliamentary factions.” Parliamentary 
factions consisted of deputies that together voiced a specific preference set across issue 
areas and voted en bloc. Unlike contemporary political parties, Bourbon parliamentary 
factions lacked mobilizing structures and therefore collaborated with local activists, 
grassroots organizations, newspapers, and secret societies.81 Only the independents 
developed a nation-wide party organization to mobilize the electorate. Also, the ultras 
uniquely benefited from access to the clerical network given their ideological affinity with 
the clergy. Let us now see what these factions were and what they demanded. This 
discussion is structured along the left-right axis. 
 
The rightwing 
The factions constituting “the rightwing” took dissimilar positions across issue areas. We 
will see that the royalists were passionate about royal sovereignty but also about liberties 
and decentralization, whereas the constitutionnels and the doctrinaires endorsed popular 
sovereignty and centralization. Also, the constitutionnels prioritized order over liberties 
more than absolutists.  
 
																																								 																				
81	Political	parties	would	not	emerge	until	after	the	20th	century	(Duverger,	1992;	S.	E.	Hanson,	2010;	Lipset	
&	Rokkan,	1967).	
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The Royalists 
In terms of ideology, even though none of the Bourbon factions voiced a clear and unified 
body of thought on government, the royalists had significant variations in royalist 
theoreticians’ views of government (Girard, 1985; Hudson, 1973, p. 16).82 Before 
examining ideological nuances, it is necessary to consider organizational differences 
across royalist actors.  
Royalist organizations preceded the Bourbon Monarchy. As mentioned earlier, 
formed in 1810, the Chevaliers de la Foi had already been lobbying the Allies for the 
restoration of the monarchy before the Napoleonic Wars ended. The Chevaliers’ lobby was 
effective thanks to the nation-wide network that they they built between 1813 and 1815. By 
1814, they held their strongholds in the Midi of France. Such rapid organizational 
expansion was a product of the collaboration between the royalists, and Catholic 
sympathizers and refractory priests that the Bonaparte regime and the revolutionary ones 
before them had persecuted (Alexander, 2004, p. 41). This organizational network came 
handy following the Hundred Days when Bonaparte had returned from exile and taken 
power. In an attempt to prevent the return to the Empire, royalist activists attacked the 
bonapartists and federalists in provinces and the royalist generals turned a blind eye on 
civil violence (Alexander, 2004, p. 45). Given the considerable death toll and terror, this 
episode came to be known as the White Terror (1814–1815) –to distinguish it from the 
Jacobin terror. During the White Terror, the royalists silenced or intimated their 
ideological rivals using violence. The pushback against the leftwing allowed royalists to 
extend their support basis. On the other hand, the White Terror induced persistent 
leftwing members that went underground to respond violence with violence, whereby the 
use of violence as a political strategy began gaining ground. To the persecuted segments 
of society, violence as a political means seemed legitimate, since they were the victims of 
state violence. Also, being victim of political violence together with republicans ironically 
cleansed the tarnished image of Bonapartism. We will see that the republicans and 
																																								 																				
82	If	we	look	at	the	memoires	and	treaties	by	Madame	de	Staël,	Benjamin	Constant,	Joseph	de	Maistre,	and	
François-René	de	Chateaubriand,	we	see	different	These	differences	stemmed	in	part	from	dissimilar	life	
experiences.	 Some	 royalist	 thinkers,	 unlike	 others,	 were	 émigrés;	 they	 observed	 alternative	 forms	 of	
governments	in	the	host	country	but	were	also	distanced	from	French	politics.	On	the	other	hand,	the	works	
by	the	non-émigrés,	especially	if	published	prior	to	the	Bourbon	Restoration,	were	too	theoretical	lacking	
insights	into	the	practical	problems	of	the	representative	regime.	
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bonapartists later joined the liberals and honored Bonaparte as a “soldier of the 
Revolution” (Girard, 1985, p. 88).  
In the aftermath of the White Terror, the royalists obtained an overwhelming 
parliamentary representation. In 1815 and 1816, grassroots organizations remained in 
close contact with royalist parliamentarians and this collaboration survived until the fall 
of the Monarchy. The foremost difference between the royalist grassroots organizations 
and the royalist parliamentarians pertained to the issue the use of violence as a political 
strategy. The former perceived political violence as an electoral strategy, whereas 
parliamentarians were less prone to using it. In referring to extreme royalist 
parliamentarians, I will employ term “ultras.” I will call the moderate royalist 
parliamentarian factions by the name of their leaders. The term “ultra” emerged as a 
shorthand for the royalist deputies who sat in the 1815 and 1816 Assemblies. As Louis 
XVIII put it, these parliamentarians were “more royalist than the King himself” 
(Lamartine, 1891, p. 213). This appellation resonating with rival factions, the royalist 
parliamentarians came to be called as the ultras.  
The difference between extreme and moderate royalists concerned parliamentary 
powers. While both strands of royalism loathed popular sovereignty due to its 
susceptibility to the tyranny of people, the extremist branch argued for the indivisibility of 
royal sovereignty and opposed representative government (an argument best developed 
in de Maistre) (Hudson, 1973, pp. 18–22).83 Constitution and checks and balances 
contrasted the principle of the indivisibility of royal sovereignty. Moreover, they were 
unnecessary in practice, since  the aristocracy and the clergy both assisted and checked 
the king (Girard, 1985, pp. 57–58).84 Therefore, the Monarchy needed to strengthen the 
Catholic Church’s and the aristocracy’s role in politics instead of working on a charter. In 
other words, they opposed administrative centralization for taking the control from the 
hands of the gentry only to place it in the hands of the state. This argument, which had 
developed in reaction to the republican vision of unitary society, constituted one 
distinguishing characteristic of royalists from the other rightwing factions  (Rosanvallon, 
																																								 																				
83	For	a	detailed	account	of	this	argument	see	(Maistre,	1814).	
84	For	examples	of	 this	view,	see	 (Bonald,	1843;	Lamennais,	1817).	Such	views	grounded	on	 idea	of	 the	
agency	of	the	providence	against	the	ideas	of	chance	and	the	supremacy	of	reason	(Hudson,	1973,	pp.	18–
20).	
		 174	
2007, pp. 107–118).85 On the other hand, absolutist royalists divided on the limits of 
clerical influence in politics. For some, papal intervention constituted a check on royal 
arbitrariness– such as Joseph de Maistre, Louis-Claude de Saint Martin, and Félicité 
Robert de Lamennais. Others insisted on keeping the Vatican out of domestic affairs–such 
as like Louis Bonald (Hudson, 1973, pp. 16–17). We understand that all absolutists aspired 
to bring the ancient regime back even though, as we saw,  the Revolution had already 
eroded its sociopolitical underpinnings.86  
Moderate royalists accepted representative government and constitution in 
principle. Yet, they opposed the 1814 Charter on the grounds that France lacked the 
sociopolitical foundations of a British-style government (Hudson, 1973, p. 47). Instead, 
these royalists thought, an aristocratic parliament, formed via limited suffrage and 
indirect elections, should check royal arbitrariness (Girard, 1985, p. 64). For fear of the 
revival of radicalism, moderate royalists opposed the enfranchisement of middle classes. 
They also endorsed censorship and institutional restrictions on press in an attempt to 
control public opinion that they considered to be whimsical and therefore prone to causing 
government instability (Hudson, 1973, pp. 33–45). As regards parliamentary powers, 
these royalists deemed parliamentary approval necessary in policy making. To them, 
ministers were mere intermediaries between the king and the parliament. As we shall see 
in the next section, moderate royalists had to revise this idea in response to governmental 
crises, because if ministers were mere intermediaries, parliamentarians happened to 
question royal sovereignty when critiquing ministers’ policy proposals. By the reign of 
Charles X, moderate royalists, such as Chateaubriand and the Agier faction (known as the 
“defection” for splitting from the absolutist ultras) had embraced the idea of a British-style 
monarchy where the king ruled but not governed (Hudson, 1973, p. 71). This perception 
shift opened the door to collaboration with the leftwing against absolutism. 
																																								 																				
85	For	detailed	explanation	on	the	republican	vision	of	societal	unity	see	chapter	one	through	four	in	
(Rosanvallon,	2007).	
86	 This	 theory	 represented	 an	 aristocratic	 reaction	 to	 the	 Revolution	 and	 the	 Individualist	 movement.	
Individualists,	spearheaded	by	la	Société	des	individualistes,	contested	the	tyrannical	culture	of	collectivity	
and	 unity,	 which	 had	 been	 reigning	 since	 1789,	 and	 demanded	 that	 the	 State	 to	 assist	 individuals	 in	
cultivating	 their	 personal	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 (Rosanvallon,	 2007,	 pp.	 96–97).	 To	 the	 royalists,	 the	
individualist	 vision	 of	 society	 sounded	 like	 a	 collection	 of	 individuals	 with	 unbundled	 egoisms;	 they	
therefore	believed	that	individualism	jeopardized	social	unity	upheld	by	traditions	and	Catholicism	(Hudson,	
1973,	pp.	18–19;	Rosanvallon,	2007,	pp.	110–18).	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	liberals,	the	légitimistes,	the	
doctrinaires,	and	the	Saint-Simonians	also	opposed	the	individualists	due	to	similar	concerns	about	social	
unity	(Rosanvallon,	2007,	pp.	96–98).		
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Concomitantly, it turned the absolutist royalists against them, thus making the latter a 
target to absolutist royalists’ oppression. Thereafter, the defection also began to make 
demands for the freedoms of press and expression.  
 
The constitutionnels (constitutionalists) 
Historians classify the constitutionnels as the center-right because they ardently defended 
the 1814 Charter against royalists. After 1817, the independents (liberals) also called 
themselves constitutionnels, but in this essay,  I reserve the term for the rightwing group 
that originally used the term (Alexander, 1991, p. 106).  
The constitutionnels advocated for popular sovereignty and a moderate 
government. Because such moderation pleased Louis XVIII, some constitutionnels served 
in the cabinet against the ultra-dominated Chambers. The constitutionnels had 
acknowledged that seeking to bring the ancient regime was an unrealistic, if not romantic, 
quest. They, like the bonapartists and Bonaparte I before them, had understood that the 
socioeconomic foundations upholding this regime type had long disappeared (Hudson, 
1973, p. 26). The constitutionnels focused on reconciling monarchy with the Revolutionary 
heritage, i.e., equality and national sovereignty. This objective found its best expression in 
Minister of the Police Decazes’ program of “royaliser la nation et nationaliser les 
royalistes”  (royalize the nation and nationalize the royalists (Girard, 1985, p. 61).  
Like moderate royalists, the constitutionnels argued for a representative 
government, but advocated for the enfranchisement of middle classes contra the former. 
For the constitutionnels, representative government implied a parliament representing 
public opinion, which, in turn, meant that the inclusion of middle classes by which they 
understood small-propertied classes, industrialists, and tradesmen who, now, constituted 
the backbone of the modern economy.87 Yet, universal suffrage was out of the agenda, for 
it was conducive to parliamentary tyranny (Hudson, 1973, p. 26). The constitutionnels, 
like the royalists, thought lower classes to be ignorant and prone to radicalism (Girard, 
1985, pp. 44–45).88  
																																								 																				
87	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	this	point	of	view	see	(Constant,	1814).	
88	As	Constant	put	it,	they	needed	education	and	experience	with	the	rules	of	representative	government	
before	 they	 could	 participate	 (Constant,	 1814).	 Rémusat	 also	 expressed	 concerns	 about	 the	 youth’s	
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As regards parliamentary powers, the constitutionnels contended that the cabinet 
represented and expressed royal will, therefore needed not parliamentary approval to 
execute policies. Constitutionnel ministers as developed this argument against the ultra-
dominated chambers under Louis XVIII. On the other hand, the constitutionnels were 
more authoritarian than the royalists, advocating for strict censorship and severe 
restrictions on the freedom of association when necessary, and administrative 
centralization (Yvert, 2013, pp. 63–66). In their minds, the raison d’état took precedence 
over liberties. As regards the Church’s influence in politics, the constitutionnels endorsed 
secularization not necessarily because they were anticlerical like the republicans, but 
because they sought to undercut royalist support. Under Charles X, the constitutionnels 
softened their authoritarian position and left room for freedom of press and checks and 
balances.  
 
The doctrinaires  
The doctrinaires initially stood on the center-right before shifting to the center-left. While 
sharing many ideas with the constitutionnels, such as concerns about popular sovereignty, 
absolutism, and lower-class radicalism, the doctrinaires distinguished themselves from 
the constitutionnels by “their habits of conversation” as Barante, a prominent doctrinaire 
spokesman, put it (Girard, 1985, p. 41–46; 69; Rosanvallon, 2007, pp. 109–112). Thus, the 
difference between and the doctrinaires was one of tone. The former were pragmatic, 
whereas the doctrinaires made intellectuals and idealist statesmen, such as Royer-Collard, 
François Guizot, Barante, Rémusat, Pierre François Hercule de Serre (Girard, 1985, pp. 
69–70). The doctrinaires saw their mission as instituting a government capable of 
finalizing the social transformation initiated by the Revolution. 
That said, the doctrinaires left a significant legacy on French politics. By 
dissociating equality and liberties from the revolutionary heritage, they reframed 
freedoms as principles in themselves. This theoretical distinction served to weaken 
arguments in favor of authoritarianism: In that, if liberties were but mere values attached 
to the Revolution, one could justify the use of political violence as a means to defend the 
revolutionary heritage. If, however, liberties were principles in themselves, the high 
																																								 																				
indifference	to	traditions	and	traditional	values	like	family	and	their	attachment	to	revolutionary	tendencies	
(Rémusat,	1958).	
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purpose of protecting the Revolution fell short to justify the use of violence (Girard, 1985, 
pp. 76–78). Another implication of liberty as a principle was that it left room for a gradual 
long-term transition to universal suffrage. In other words, unlike the royalists and 
constitutionnels, the doctrinaires accepted universal suffrage at least in principle. 
However, this transition should happen only after lower classes would become educated 
(Girard, 1985, pp. 73–76). It is worth remembering that we saw the same reasoning in the 
Young Ottomans and the Young Turks.  
Overall, the doctrinaires distinguished from the constitutionnels by arguing for a 
moderate government, which resembled more to representative government at least in 
principle (Girard, 1985, p. 73). The doctrinaires grew less and less authoritarian over time. 
Under Charles X, they often joined liberal campaigns for freedom of expression and 
association. In this period, they also became increasingly vocal in endorsing checks and 
balances.  
 
The leftwing 
The leftwing comprised a heterogeneous group called the liberals (also known as the 
independents or the left), the republicans and bonapartists. Over time, republicans and 
bonapartists joined this group. Speaking of the liberals, it is worth noting that this term 
initially designated the constitutionnels and the doctrinaires, who coined the term to 
describe their objections to absolutism. when they emerged, the independents adopted 
this term to define themselves as anti-absolutists. Although the constitutionnels, the 
doctrinaires, and the liberals simultaneously used the appellation for a while, the term 
came to singularly designate the liberals, since the latter took the leadership of the anti-
absolutist front.89  
 
																																								 																				
89	Given	its	anti-absolutist	connotations,	some	historians	categorize	all	opponents	of	absolutist	royalists	as	
liberal,	which	disguises	the	variations	between	and	within	the	left	and	right.	Following	Alexander	(2004),	I	
reserve	the	term	liberals	for	the	leftwing	or	independents,	because,	as	we	shall	see,	rightwing	factions	often	
joined	the	ultras	in	adopting	arbitrary	measures	to	suppress	regime	contention	(Alexander,	2004).	
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The liberals (the left or the independents) 
The liberals emerged in 1817 on the eve of the elections with the motto “rendre la parole à 
la nation” (give the floor back to the nation) (Girard, 1985, p. 87). This faction proposed 
candidates from middle classes, such as Gilbert du Motier Lafayette, Jacques Laffitte, and 
Casimir Perrier, all of whom appealed to the interests of financiers and industrialists while 
luring the bonapartists, republicans and the federalists (Girard, 1985, pp. 83, 85). 
Gradually, liberals subsumed all these policy losers and became increasingly 
heterogeneous. As mentioned earlier, bonapartists, republicans, and the federalists joined 
the liberals, since no group dared identify itself as republican, bonapartists, or federalist 
in the aftermath of the White Terror. On the other hand, we shall see that republican and 
bonapartist demands resurfaced as of 1827 at the popular level (Alexander, 2004, p. 272).  
The liberal rhetoric was characterized  by national sovereignty, suffrage extension 
to lower classes, anti-monarchism, and a fervent opposition to aristocratic and clerical 
preponderance (Alexander, 2004, p. 28–29,80). The liberals envisioned overthrowing the 
Bourbon regime to restore national sovereignty and equality by adopting a democratic 
constitution that made the king a civil servant of the state (Girard, 1985, p. 87). As such, 
this faction differed from and lacked any institutional affiliation to the old radical 
republicans even though they were often associated with them (Hudson, 1973, p. 56). Their 
most salient theme was patriotism constituted and they were the most successful ones to 
mobilizing voters with this discourse of all other factions that also appealed to patriotism. 
However, the liberals’ patriotism bore militaristic elements, which attracted bonapartists 
(Girard, 1985, p. 88).  
The patriotic anti-absolutist discourse allowed the liberals to rapidly augment their 
vote share in the two years following the foundation and make Eastern France their 
stronghold. They owed their rapid success as much to grievances of middle classes and 
leftwing supporters as to the quasi-clandestine organizational network of liberals on the 
ground. The liberal grassroots organizations encompassed the federalist committees, 
salons and cafés, leftwing newspapers, such as le Censeur, le Correspondant électoral, le 
Constitutionnel, la Minerve, as well as societies like the Société des Amis de la Presse that 
brought together journalists oppressed by the regime, secret societies and salons like the 
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Carbonari,90 and masonic lodges (Alexander, 2004, p. 85; Girard, 1985, p. 85; Hudson, 
1973, p. 57). The liberals branched into moderates and radicals. Contra radical liberals, 
the moderates argued for forming strategic alliances and compromise. Despite 
disagreement on this issue, the liberals mostly remained united. This solidarity had 
followed from collectively being victim of repression in the hands of the royalists who had 
boxed the bonapartists, republicans, and federalists under a same category, enemies of the 
regime (Alexander, 2004, pp. 76–77). State violence sustained this solidarity (Alexander, 
2004, p. 82). Moderate or radical, both liberal branches had foot on the ground as well as 
in the Parliament. Following Alexander, I will refer to the moderate factions as the center-
left and the more radical factions as the left (Alexander, 2004, p. 28). 
The liberals demanded a veritable parliamentary regime with a strong legislative 
assembly, elected by people to check the executive, and an independent judiciary 
(Alexander, 2004, pp. 106–7). Contra proponents of centralization, they demanded the 
reintroduction of elections to appoint local officials. The liberals also championed the 
freedom of press and expression. For them, the state had a duty to protect civil liberties 
and to ensure free fair elections (an argument used against electoral frauds under ultra 
governments) (Alexander, 2004, p. 108). The liberals appeared in the secularization 
coalition with the defection, the constitutionnels, and the doctrinaires (Alexander, 2004, 
p. 108). On the other hand, they opposed the 1814 Charter for it did not live up to the 
revolutionary heritage. 
 
The bonapartists, federalists, and republicans 
These three factions, officially discontinued in the aftermath of the White Terror, pursued 
regime contention within the liberal faction. While all classified as leftwing and 
proponents of the revolutionary heritage, the bonapartists, republicans, and federalists 
varied on their ideas about parliamentary powers, decentralization, and the Church’s role 
																																								 																				
90	The	French	Carbonari	was	a	clandestine	organization	founded	to	overthrow	the	Bourbon	regime	with	a	
coup	 or	 a	 revolution.	 Members	 of	 this	 organization	 came	 from	 the	 aristocracy,	 students,	 liberal	
professionals,	workers,	and	within	the	military.	They	believed	that	by	passing	the	Law	of	the	Double	Vote,	
which	 restrained	 the	 suffrage,	 and	 oppression,	 the	 King	 had	 violated	 the	 Charter,	 the	 social	 contract;	
therefore,	 a	 revolution	 was	 in	 order	 (Spitzer,	 1971).	 Ideologically,	 the	 Carbonari	 brought	 together	
supporters	of	republicanism,	bonapartism,	and	liberalism.	Appealing	to	the	tricolor	flag	and	Bonaparte,	who	
was	 seen	as	 a	 liberal	 crusader	 since	 the	White	Terror	 in	1815,	 the	Carbonari	 generated	militaristic	 and	
patriotic	propaganda	(Alexander,	2004,	pp.	175–77).	
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in politics. The bonapartists demanded a strong executive, universal suffrage, 
secularization, and centralization. While also endorsing universal suffrage, secularization, 
and centralization, the republicans wanted a strong parliament. The federalists advocated 
for a moderated but still strong parliamentary regime and decentralization so as to 
preserve local autonomies.  
This section examined the range of preferences across issue areas. I identified that 
the differences across factions went beyond the left-right axis, since both along the 
left/right end of the axis, factions argued for different regime types. I showed the issues of 
liberties vs. order, the use of violence as a political strategy, and administrative 
centralization had utmost importance, because they nuanced factions that advocated for 
the same regime type. In the next section, I conduct a historical analysis to examine the 
evolution of patterns of cooperation among regime contenders in order to see whether and 
how strategic and ideological preferences impacted cooperation dynamics.  
 
Patterns of interactions among challengers 
 
In this section, I examine the patterns of interactions among challengers in order to 
identify which actors engaged in long-term cooperation and among which others 
cooperation was limited to short-term issue-based cooperation. I also identify the purpose 
of each instance of cooperation. Using the identified patterns, the next section conducts a 
longitudinal network analysis to test the effects of preferences on ideological and strategic 
issues on cooperation. This section shows that cooperation sustained only in the cases 
where challengers’ preferences converged on strategies. Groups whose strategies 
mismatched also cooperated, but such cooperation did not sustain to propel long-term 
cooperation. I further show that preference convergence on strategies responded to 
environmental transformations, which compelled challengers to revise and re-prioritize 
their preferences on issue dimensions. 
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A fluid heterogeneous group of challengers 
The Bourbon Parliament convened following the August 1815 elections, which, organized 
in the aftermath of the White Terror, allowed the royalists to obtain an overwhelming 
majority in the Chamber (Resnick, 1966, p. 116). These royalists were so extremist that 
Louis XVIII called this Chamber as la Chambre introuvable (unobtainable chamber 
meaning the dream chamber for a king) (Lamartine, 1891, p. 213). To counterweight this 
Chamber, the King appointed a cabinet composed of the constitutionnels and doctrinaires, 
such as Decazes, Guizot, Barante, Talleyrand, and Fouché. Thus, we see that in the absence 
of constitutional arrangements to clarify the boundaries between the two government 
branches, the King relied on the rivalry between political factions to strike a balance 
between the executive and the legislative. 
Instead of operating as checks and balances, as Louis XVIII had hoped, rivalry 
between the ultras and the center-right caused tensions that rapidly escalated into crises. 
The ultras would not endorse the cabinet and ministers would circumvent the Parliament 
by issuing decrees. The Parliament called the legitimacy of this practice into question by 
drawing on its role as representatives of public opinion. The ministers ridiculed this 
argument by pointing at the restricted suffrage and bringing up the issue of suffrage 
extension (Girard, 1985, pp. 55–63). Thus, as early as the winter of 1816, ministerial 
responsibility, parliamentary powers, and the suffrage had impeded the regime’s 
functioning and polarized the political elite. To surmount the crisis, the King charged 
Richelieu, an ultra, of forming a new cabinet. 
Upon taking power, the ultra cabinet collaborated with the Chambre introuvable 
in adopting a series of repressive laws to restore order,91 including the law on seditious 
writings, the law on public security (allowing for the arrest of individuals suspected of 
conspiring against the regime), the law on courts prévôtales (extraordinary courts to try 
political crimes), and denial of amnesty to criminals indicted for treason (Hudson, 1973, 
pp. 61–65). This government of ultras purged numerous bonapartist civil servants and 
generals to populate these ranks with royalist supporters (Alexander, 2004, pp. 53–54; 
																																								 																				
91	Since	the	Hundred	Days	(July	1814),	the	ultras	had	begun	to	see	conspiracy	behind	every	protest	and	
unrest	 (Girard,	1985,	pp.	81–82).	This	 fear	was	not	completely	unfounded.	 In	southern	France,	 leftwing	
secret	societies,	such	as	the	Union,	conspired	against	the	regime.	Other	incidents	included	Didier	revolts	to	
reestablish	Bonaparte	and	the	assassinations	of	Prosecutor	Fualdès,	Marshal	Brune	(Alexander,	2004,	pp.	
54–84).	On	the	other	hand,	the	ultra	repression	forged	solidarity	among	the	persecuted	factions.		
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Hudson, 1973, p. 75).92 Moreover, the government restricted the already limited suffrage 
and abolished the right to divorce. Such measures, which aimed to revive the ancient 
regime, did not please the King. However, Louis XVIII was still hoping to reach a national 
reconciliation. The discovery of a number of leftwing plots to overthrow the regime 
crashed these hopes. Of these, the rebellion in Grenoble in May 1816 had the potential of 
transforming into a counterrevolution. The extreme royalist General Donnadieu 
suppressed this rebellion with severe repression. Heartened with the discovery of leftwing 
conspiracies against the monarchy, extreme royalists in the Parliament and on the ground 
together organized royalist protests and the ultra parliamentarians began generating 
royalist propaganda via state institutions. Yet, more than the royalist generals’ repression 
and ultraroyalist propaganda, it was the Allies’ military intervention that suppressed 
rebellions (Alexander, 2004, p. 38). Concerned about royalist fanaticism, Louis XVIII 
scheduled new elections for September 1816.  
The one-year experience under the government of ultras left a long-term legacy. 
On the one hand, opponents of the ultras joined forces to preempt the reelection of the 
Chambre introuvable. During election campaigns, the constitutionnels, the doctrinaires, 
and the liberals formed electoral coalitions in most departments; in a few others, the 
royalists compromised with the center-right and left in order to prevent the latter from 
forming a counter-coalition (Alexander, 2004, pp. 62–63). On the other hand, the 
solidarity among royalists began to shatter. The controversy over parliamentary powers 
and ministerial responsibility had persuaded moderates in the Parliament, such as the 
Chateaubriand faction, of the infeasibility of unbounded royal sovereignty. We will see 
that, ironically, the Chambre introuvable sowed the seeds of parliamentarianism 
(Barthélemy, 1904, p. 168). At the societal level, repression and conservative measures 
turned voters away from royalists. The 1816 elections produced a chamber dominated by 
the constitutionnels. To honor the parliamentary majority, Louis XVIII asked Decazes to 
form a new cabinet (Alexander, 2004, pp. 81–82).  
Once in power, the constitutionnels drafted a project of law to enfranchise middle 
classes. The constitutionnel and doctrinaire majority in the Parliament passed the bill 
despite the ultras’ objections (Alexander, 2004, pp. 82–83; Girard, 1985, pp. 64–658). On 
																																								 																				
92	 According	 to	 de	 Sauvigny,	 the	 Ultras	 replaced	 between	 50,000	 and	 80,000	 civil	 servants	 with	 their	
supporters	(Sauvigny,	1967,	p.	136).	
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the other hand, the constitutionnel cabinet did not abolish the repressive measures that 
they had attacked under the ultra government. The constitutionnels, like the ultras and 
republicans before them, deemed repression unpleasant but necessary strategy to restore 
order. The persistence of the repression regime broke the electoral alliance between the 
liberals and the constitutionnels (Alexander, 2004, p. 82). The liberals decided to get 
organized to gain parliamentary representation upon seeing that they could not rely on 
the center-right to not undermine civil liberties. The electorate shared the liberals’ feelings 
about repression. Discontented about repression, the electorate voted  for liberals in the 
next elections and the ultras lost seats (Girard, 1985, pp. 65–66). However, the King did 
not ask liberals to form a new cabinet. He appointed constitutionnel ministers to 
counterweight the Parliament of liberals.  
Contrary to the expectations, the major confrontation took place not between 
liberals and the center-right but between the center-right and the ultras. The conscription 
law abolishing the predominance of the aristocracy within the military and the bill on the 
freedom of press opposed the constitutionnel-doctrinaire block to the ultras.93 Liberals 
sided with the constitutionnels on these two bills, but this short-term issue-based 
cooperation did not go as far to talk the constitutionnels into abolishing the repression 
regime. Moreover, it strained their relations with leftwing societies on the ground 
(Alexander, 2004, pp. 85–86). Towards the end of the legislative year, liberal 
parliamentarians had come to the idea that the constitutionnels’ raison d’état posed a 
more imminent threat than the ultras’ project of reviving the ancient regime(Alexander, 
2004, p. 84).  
The liberal-constitutionnel cooperation collapsed in 1820 following the 
assassination of the Duke of Berry, the only Bourbon heir capable of producing an heir. 
This incident triggered a crisis reintroducing regicide into the political vocabulary and 
sparking speculations about “a third Restoration.” The ultras agitated the public against 
Decazes, a prominent constitutionnel minister. Seeing the uproar, the King asked Villèle, 
a moderate royalist, to form a moderate cabinet. Even though the Villèle cabinet did not 
generate ultraroyalist propaganda in 1816, it used the assassination of the Duke of Berry 
to weaken liberal support. Specifically, it framed the assassination as a leftwing plot 
																																								 																				
93	 In	an	attempt	to	weaken	this	coalition,	the	ultras	spread	conspiracy	theories	against	the	King	and	the	
Charter,	such	as	the	Waterside	conspiracy	in	1818	(Hudson,	1973,	p.	84).	
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against the monarchy, even though the murderer, Louvel, an ex-military, was unaffiliated 
to any leftwing organization (Malandain, 2011, p. 33). Meanwhile, royalists on the ground 
spread more conspiracy theories about prospective liberal coups and riots. Leftwing 
parliamentarians retaliated using a violent rhetoric, but leftwing radicals on the ground 
responded to violence with violence. Leftwing violence on the ground played into the 
hands of the ultra government; Villèle passed further restriction on the press law, 
persecuted journalists, and adopted the general security law authorizing the government 
to incarcerate individuals suspected of conspiracy without trial (Girard, 1985, p. 91; 
Malandain, 2011). Consequently, liberal and doctrinaire press lost ground, but royalist and 
constitutionnel press were unaffected (Hudson, 1973, pp. 97–98). We see that the 
doctrinaire-constitutionnel bloc also shattered on the issue of the use of violence as a 
political strategy. Meanwhile, the constitutionnels entered a short-term issue-based 
alliance with the ultras fearing that elections might produce another liberal Chamber and 
crimes committed during the White Terror might get inspected (Alexander, 2004, p. 92). 
With the constitutionnels’ support, the Villèle government passed the law of 
double vote, which gave a second vote to the 25% of the 100,000 voters who paid highest 
taxes and included some gerrymandering measures (Pilbeam, 2002, p. 39). This bill 
obviously aimed to deny liberals parliamentary representation. Although middle class 
enfranchisement was one of their top demands, we see that the fear of liberals pushing the 
constitutionnels to act against their ideological preferences. To contest the law of double 
vote, conspiratorial leftwing organizations, such as the Union and the Chevaliers de la 
Liberté (an umbrella organization), organized violent riots. Moderate leftwing supporters 
on the ground launched a petition campaign and collected 19,000 signatures from the 
recently disfranchised (Alexander, 2004, pp. 94, 141). In response, the ultras spread a 
rumor about a possible leftwing revolution. Rumors and the law of double vote suffrage 
allowed the ultras to secure a parliamentary majority at the 1821 elections. The liberals 
still got some seats, whereas the constitutionnels and doctrinaires lost seats (Alexander, 
2004, pp. 136–37).  
Between 1821 and 1824, the cabinet of ultras and ultra parliamentarians adopted 
a series of oppressive measures and laws, including the purge of non-royalist civil servants, 
the law of tendency (i.e., preliminary censorship to prevent crimes against public order, 
religion, the king, and the state), the law authorizing the state to try anyone for criticizing 
the government, the prohibition of the circulation of liberal Spanish newspapers, and the 
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law according bishops the competence to set the curricula at royal colleges (Alexander, 
2004, pp. 138, 145–46; Hudson, 1973, p. 21). Consequently, it became impossible for 
anyone to contest the government via conventional means, such as petition and press 
campaigns. Radical liberals organized violent riots and uprisings sometimes in 
collaboration with the Carbonari (Alexander, 2004, pp. 175–79; Hudson, 1973, pp. 104–
5). This strategy of violence distanced moderate liberals from radical liberals. At that 
point, they were unable to control radicals on the ground. The liberals paid a steep price 
for radicalization and violence at the 1824 elections. These elections produced another 
ultra majority in the Chamber (Alexander, 2004, pp. 153–55). The constitutionnels, the 
doctrinaires, and liberals together had but 17 seats (Alexander, 2004, p. 140; Hudson, 
1973, p. 107). This electoral defeat taught the moderate left that violence undercut the 
electorate’s sympathy to their cause (Alexander, 2004, p. 177). Therefore, as of 1824, the 
center-left banned the use of violence as a political strategy and distinguished itself from 
the radical-left. Following the dissociation, the center-left set out to build their own party 
network. Meanwhile, the royalist block in the Parliament fractured. Moderate royalists led 
by Agier and Chateaubriand split from the ultras, thus forming the defection (la défection). 
The defection could no longer acquiesce to sacrificing civil liberties to maintain order. This 
group joined forced the liberals to defend civil liberties (Alexander, 2004, p. 191; 
Rosenblatt, 2009, p. 161).  
To recap, from 1815 to 1824, the structure of parliamentary and electoral alliances 
changed frequently. Sometimes it was issue-based agreements that produced temporary 
alliances among factions, but mostly factions worked together against a shared political 
rival. For example, at the onset, the leftwing and the center-right cooperated against 
royalists. Once the leftwing empowered, the constitutionnels turned to royalists. In such 
strategic alliances, the fear of the rival led factions to betray their ideological principles. 
Thus, alliances were fluid and temporary under Louis XVIII. We will see that alliances 
tended to solidify under Charles X.  
 
The Rise of a coherent oppositional coalition  
Charles X took the throne in 1824 following Louis XVIII’s death. Charles X’s reign started 
with a most controversial law on indemnity for confiscated properties of the émigrés. The 
question of the émigrés was controversial enough. The law on indemnity for the latter’s 
confiscated property constituted an even more delicate issue.  In 1793, the Jacobin regime 
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had auctioned the properties in question as national wealth (les biens nationaux) and 
lower and middle classes had acquired them. Compensating for these properties meant to 
dispossess the new acquirers, i.e., lower and middle classes. Upon returning to France in 
1814, the émigrés had reclaimed their properties. Louis XVIII had rejected these demands 
because the issue risked turning lower and middle classes against the Monarchy (Jones, 
1988, p. 155). In contrast, this controversial law was the first project of law that Charles X 
proposed, which signaled that the new King was not going to be a moderate as his 
predecessor and that he conspicuously sided with the aristocracy. This law on indemnity 
agitated the left that criticized the bill for bringing feudalism back (Jones, 1988, p. 155; 
Kroen, 2000, p. 114). This bill passed in 1825 despite uproar (Hudson, 1973, p. 112).  
The second bill that Charles X proposed was as controversial as the first one. The 
Sacrilege Law introduced by his Minister Villèle in 1826 condemned perpetrators to hard 
labor for life and solitary confinement. In practice, this law would serve to persecute 
Protestants and nonbelievers, hence extend clerical support for the Monarchy (Kroen, 
2000, p. 113). In other words, this bill clearly signaled the King’s willingness to restore the 
ancient regime. This law met criticism from both the leftwing and the center-right. The 
government’s response was brief: “the Christian King only desired to conserve the faith of 
ancestors” (Recueil critique de jurisprudence et de législation, 1829, p. 43).94 Next, the 
government introduced the bill extending the clerical power to the domain of education 
and authorized nunneries to acquire property without legal confirmation (Kroen, 2000, 
pp. 115–17). This law clearly implied a theocratic turn. Charles X’s theocratic reign also 
manifested itself through a religious discourse, the frequent use of religious symbols in the 
public sphere, and state-sponsored religious celebrations and festivals (Kroen, 2000, pp. 
116–19).  
Theocratic turn did not appeal to the public. Very few members of the lower class 
attended Charles X’s coronation ceremony on October 24, 1826 and the attendees to 
lacked enthusiasm. Moreover, in major cities, such as Lyon and Reims, Molière’s play 
deriding an absolutist monarch, Tartuffe, was staged on the very day of the coronation 
and attracted hundreds of citizens. Ridiculing a monarch who, claiming to his divine right 
to rule, ruled irrationally without restraint, Tartuffe became a symbol of resistance to “the 
clericalism” (Kroen, 2000, p. 283). Within the Parliament, the defection, the doctrinaires, 
																																								 																				
94	For	more	information	see	(Ford,	2005;	Hartman,	1972;	Kroen,	2000).		
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the constitutionnels, and liberals formed an anticlerical block. This block launched a 
propaganda campaign to mobilize citizens for resistance to the encroachments of the 
Church and the affiliated networks of missionary organizations, such as Mission de la 
France, the Congrégation, and the Chevaliers de la Foi (inactive after 1826), into the 
domains of education and administration (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 354; Rader, 2013, p. 74). This 
campaign found strong support in eastern France where the majority of the population 
were Protestant (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 355).  
Realizing that societal and parliamentary pushback against clericalism and 
absolutism might escalate into a crisis, Charles X toughened censorship regulations in 
1826. However, the number of anti-governmental pamphlets in circulation augmented 
despite censorship.95 In response, liberal societies launched a campaign for the liberty of 
press, including the Société des amis de la liberté de la presse (the society of friends of the 
freedom of press). Anti-absolutist societies were formed in society, such as the “Aide-toi, 
et le Ciel t’aidera” (help yourself, and Heaven will help you) (Hudson, 1973, p. 138). Most 
importantly, the Société des amis de la liberté de la presse and Aide-toi, et le Ciel t’aidera 
initiated an institutionalized cooperation with moderate royalists. Cooperation at the 
grassroots level precipitated a parliamentary alliance between liberals and the defection 
(Alexander, 2004, p. 191). Hence, an anti-absolutist opposition front began to take shape 
under the leadership of liberals. 
1827 constituted a turning point for the absolutist regime. The 1827 elections 
declared a victory for liberals. From 1827 to 1830, the ultras would find themselves on the 
defensive side (Girard, 1985, pp. 102–3). Most alarming for extreme royalists was the shift 
of rich landowner support to liberals. In other words, royalists had lost their natural ally. 
The other disgruntled societal groups that voted the left included liberal professionals, 
industrialists, financiers, tradesmen, and middle classes (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 357).  
The period from 1827 to 1829 was a prelude to the 1830 Revolution. Economic 
grievances added to political grievances. French economy had been in recession since the 
second half of the decade. Recession was most visible in the silk and wine sectors, two of 
the largest industries in France. Recession deepened following bad harvest in 1827. The 
																																								 																				
95	To	give	an	idea,	in	an	epoch	when	papers	did	not	sell	by	issue,	the	liberal	press	had	430,000	subscribers	
and	the	moderate	royalist	press	reached	6,000	subscribers,	while	pro-government	press	had	14,000	
(Girard,	1985,	p.	101).	
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cabinet’s economic measures fell short to remedy supply shortage, inflation, and high 
unemployment. Lower classes were most affected by the economic downturn; they started 
riots in provinces to contest the government’s ineffectiveness. Liberal societies organized 
protests as well. By 1829, lower class riots had spread to cities and become violent (Gonnet, 
1955, pp. 254–56). The government turned to repression to suppress riots and started a 
propaganda campaign blaming the downturn on concerted actions by the enemies of the 
Monarchy (Gonnet, 1955, p. 263). These policies backfired: Bonapartist demands 
resurfaced among urban lower classes, the societal segment most hit by unemployment, 
and industrialists. The propertied classes and producers petitioned the government for the 
eradication of indirect taxes and protectionism (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 262). Yet, the 
government ignored it. The regime’s indifference turned upper-classes away from the 
monarchy (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 358). By 1830, almost all societal groups perceived the 
regime as being incapable of handling the situation. The conditions were ripe for regime 
change. The crisis over ministerial responsibility provided the spark for the Revolution 
(Pilbeam, 1982, p. 358).  
The crisis over ministerial responsibility broke out right after the 1829 elections. 
The elections had produced yet another liberal majority in the Chamber. Utterly 
displeased with this outcome, the King asked Martignac, a moderate royalist, to form a 
cabinet in order to counterbalance the Chamber (Pilbeam, 2002, p. 40). By appointing a 
royalist cabinet, Charles X strained the relations with the parliamentarians before even 
the Parliament convened. Martignac’s cabinet consisted of moderate royalists –such as 
Polignac– and the doctrinaires –such as Royer-Collard. By excluding the ultras, Martignac 
meant to smoothen relations with the Parliament (Girard, 1985, p. 104). Yet, we learn from 
the partisan press that this cabinet failed to amend relations with the leftwing, while also 
alienating royalists who perceived this move as a concession (Rader, 2013, pp. 43–45).  
The Martignac cabinet was more compromising; it abolished censorship and the 
prerequisite of pre-publication inspection for the press and adopted measures to prevent 
corruption in elections (e.g., the establishment of permanent electoral lists, authorizing 
citizens to monitor voting registry procedures, and ordinances decreasing the Church’s 
control over society) (Backouche, 2000, pp. 135–46). The cabinet made more concessions 
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by issuing the two ordinances that curbed the Church’s influence in education.96 This 
strategy backfired. The anticlerical opposition found these measures insufficient, while the 
Jesuits and Catholic activists thought that concessions went too far.  
The bill on the reinstitution of elections for local civil servants prepared the fall of 
both the Martignac cabinet and the Bourbon Monarchy. This decentralization bill could 
have obtained liberal support had it not contained arrangements that worked to expand 
the aristocratic dominance in provinces (Alexander, 2004, p. 243). After the Chamber 
turned the bill down, Martignac resigned. This time, Charles X asked an ultra, Polignac, 
to form a cabinet. The Polignac cabinet contained notorious ultras like LaBourdonnaye 
and General Louis- Auguste de Bourmont. The liberals became even more agitated, 
interpreting the King’s decision as a coup against representative regime (Alexander, 2004, 
p. 243). The liberal press in collaboration with the Aide-toi, et le Ciel t’aidera committees 
launched a campaign to defend the Charter and civil liberties. Also, liberal societies 
launched a petition campaign for the reinstitution of local elective councils (Pilbeam, 
1982, p. 263). Liberal parliamentarians and the leftwing press also formed a society to call 
on citizens to not pay the direct taxes that the Chamber did not approve (Pilbeam, 1982, 
p. 263). Rapidly extending its network nation-wide, this and successfully dissuaded some 
citizens from paying taxes (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 264).  
The trigger for the 1830 Revolution came at the day the Parliament reconvened. In 
their opening speech, liberal parliamentarians and the defection inveighed against the 
Villèle ministry and the King for undermining civil liberties (Rader, 2013, pp. 48–49). 
Charles X became very angry but did not react fearing an insurrection. Encouraged by the 
King’s inaction, the Parliament passed a vote of no confidence against the Polignac cabinet 
in March 1830. Charles X took this motion personally and this time dissolved the Chamber 
without specifying an election date (Pilbeam, 1982, p. 365). To contain the backlash that 
his decisions would generate, he restored censorship and restrained the franchise to the 
quarter richest (Girard, 1985, p. 117). Journalists began a resistance, which turned into an 
armed resistance once the leftwing secret societies joined in (Girard, 1985, p. 117).  
																																								 																				
96	The	first	one	excluded	all	instructors	and	professors	affiliated	with	an	unauthorized	congregation	from	
educational	 institutions,	 which	 primarily	 addressed	 the	 Jesuits.	 The	 second	 reestablished	 regulations	
concerning	seminaries,	which	made	little	seminaries	illegal	(Backouche,	2000,	p.	136).	
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Initially, liberal parliamentarians did not openly support the resistance 
anticipating the army to intervene and protests to de-intensify (Girard, 1985, p. 117). 
However, the King’s decision to restrict the suffrage had also mobilized the now 
disfranchised middle classes. The latter’s participation to the resistance created a domino 
effect: The Bourse refused to discount bills; factory owners closed their factories and 
workers joined the resistance. On July 27, some journals, such as le Temps, le National, le 
Globe, le Journal du commerce, ignored the censorship and published issues accusing the 
King of violating the social contract (Mansel, 2003, pp. 238–39). The government seized 
these presses, but this intervention only exacerbated the public backlash. A group of 
skilled artisans, students, workers, peasants, and lower classes barricaded some streets 
chanting “save the fatherland” and waving the tricolor flag –a traditional symbol of the 
Revolution (Girard, 1985, p. 118; Harsin, 2002, p. 41). In this crowd, students made 
republican propaganda, while peasants and workers made bonapartist demands (Girard, 
1985, p. 118). Regardless, protesters attacked clericalism and absolutism with one voice 
and called on liberal parliamentarians (Harsin, 2002, p. 41). The army intervened to 
restore order, which made the crowd even more violent. Several soldiers died during 
clashes with protesters (Mansel, 2003, p. 239).  
On the second day of the uprisings, liberal parliamentarians officially sided with 
the resistance. Parliamentarians, such as Lafitte, Adolphe Thiers, and François Mignet, 
signed the petition drafted by the resistance. They further demanded Polignac’s 
resignation and the annulation of censorship and suffrage restrictions. Charles X refused. 
On the third day, protesters captured the Palaces of Louvre and Tuileries and declared a 
provisionary government at the Hotel de Ville. At this point, leftwing parliamentarians 
officially took control of the resistance. They declared the Duke of Orleans the future king 
of France –provided that he acknowledged the Charter and the tricolor flag (Harsin, 2002, 
p. 42). Protestors most welcomed this declaration and the revolution came to an end.  
At the end of this three-day insurrection known as the three glorious days, France 
transitioned to the July Monarchy. 496 civilians and 150 soldiers had lost their lives 
(Harsin, 2002, p. 41). On the other hand, despite the violent and revolutionary character 
of the resistance, liberal parliamentarians managed to establish their authority over 
protesters. This authority over protesters was crucial in setting the direction of the 
transition: in an environment where protesters called for a republic or an empire, France 
transitioned to another constitutional monarchy, because liberal parliamentarians had 
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endorsed neither of these options. Thus, liberal parliamentarians’ leadership was decisive 
in setting the direction of the transition. The July Monarchy was a more democratic 
parliamentary regime than the Bourbon Monarchy.97  
Thus, under Charles X’s reign, we see the rise of an anticlerical front and an anti-
absolutist front both of which were spearheaded by the leftwing. In this period, the 
leftwing had the largest support among all opposition factions, because they had been long 
advocating for the freedom of press, civil liberties, and secularization. Moreover, the 
leftwing had the strongest support basis among lower classes, whereas the center-right 
and the defection, which figured in the anticlerical and anti-absolutist fronts rather 
appealed to upper and middle classes. However, the economic crisis also pushed these two 
classes towards the left. This explains why the oppositional front took shape under the 
liberal leadership. Liberal parliamentarians also proved their centrality in the oppositional 
movement by establishing their authority over protesters. Thus, we can conclude that 
alliances solidified under Charles X and liberals emerged as the leader of the oppositional 
front. The next section conducts statistical analyses to measure the impact of preference 
agreement on cooperation for transition to the July Monarchy. 
 
Testing the role of ideologies and strategies on cooperative behavior 
In this section, I test the evolution of the role of ideologies and strategies on cooperation 
patterns among challengers. I use longitudinal network models known as temporal 
exponential random graph models (TERGM), whose properties were discussed in the 
methodology section of the theory chapter. This section proceeds as follows: I explain the 
operationalization of the dependent variable –cooperation for regime change between a 
pair of challenger groups– and the independent variables –preferences on ideological and 
strategic issues, which were identified in the previous section– in the French case. In the 
																																								 																				
97	The	Charter	of	1830	defined	France	as	a	monarchy	and	the	King	as	the	“King	of	the	French”	(instead	of	
the	King	of	France)	(“Charte	constitutionnelle	du	1830,”	1830,	p.	389).	The	legislative	was	reinforced	at	the	
expense	of	the	executive	(“Charte	constitutionnelle	du	1830,”	1830,	pp.	391–93).	With	this	Charter,	 the	
king	lost	his	power	to	initiate	legislation	and	to	legislate	by	ordinances,	which	had	generated	governmental	
instability	under	the	Bourbon	Restoration	(“Charte	constitutionnelle	du	1830,”	1830,	p.	390).	The	suffrage	
was	 extended	 and	 censorship	was	 abolished	 (“Charte	 constitutionnelle	 du	 1830,”	 1830,	 pp.	 390,	 392).	
Catholicism	 was	 no	 longer	 the	 state	 religion	 (“Charte	 constitutionnelle	 du	 1830,”	 1830,	 p.	 390).	
Symbolically,	the	tricolor	flag,	the	legacy	of	the	French	Revolution,	was	reinstated	(“Charte	constitutionnelle	
du	1830,”	1830,	p.	394).	For	more	information	see	(“Charte	constitutionnelle	du	1830,”	1830).	
		 192	
second subsection, I test the null hypothesis that ideologies and strategies have no effect 
on cooperation for regime change. The final subsection presents the results of the TERGM 
analyses of the French dataset and robustness checks. I show that French challengers 
formed a coherent oppositional coalition only after having reached an agreement on a 
secular regime respecting civil liberties and achieving regime change without the use of 
violent means. This coalition took shape under the center-left’s leadership, the faction that 
had been advocating these preferences.  
 
Dependent variable & the unit of analysis in the French case 
The dependent variable is cooperation for regime change in a given year. Cooperation 
includes all types of activities, legal and illegal, undertaken with the purpose of liberalizing 
the regime. I collected the data on cooperation from primary and secondary sources using 
the following indicators: co-sponsoring some bill in the parliament and the cabinet, 
creating verbal and written propaganda against the authoritarian government and its 
policies (including the King, his Charter, or the monarchy), and co-sponsoring or 
collaborating on some contentious activity of a private or public nature (e.g., meetings, 
protests, uprisings, plotting coups, mobilizing people for revolution). It is worth noting 
that regime change conveys the objective of overthrowing the authoritarian government 
but does not specify the properties of the regime to come. As the historical analysis has 
showed, actors desired different types of regimes, and testing the effect of such differences 
on transition constitutes the purpose of this paper.  
Indicators of cooperation are collaboration between a pair of challenger groups for 
generating verbal and written propaganda against the authoritarian regime (including the 
person of the King, government policies, or the regime’s ideology) or to disseminate anti-
authoritarian ideas (such as liberty, freedom of speech, independence), and co-sponsoring 
contentious activities of a private or public nature (such as meetings, protests, uprisings, 
plotting coups, mobilizing people for revolution).  
In coding cooperation, I did not weigh contentious activities by riskiness. That is, 
plotting a coup has the same value as co-publishing propaganda material. Social 
movements and regime literatures do not provide theoretical and empirical grounds to 
justify the assumption that high-risk activities, such as attempting a coup, have greater 
impact than low-risk activities, say, press campaigns. Rather, systematic low-risk activities 
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might prove to be impactful on the long term. Also, I did not weigh cooperation by how 
many times a pair of challengers collaborated in undertaking the abovementioned 
contentious activities. This means, cooperation between some groups A and B to generate 
propaganda bears the same value 1 (indicating the realization of cooperation contra 0 
indicating its non-occurrence) as cooperation between a pair of groups C and D which, 
say, generated propaganda and plotted a coup together. Concomitantly, some failed 
cooperation attempt does not cancel out a realized instance cooperation. That is, if groups 
A and B co-sponsored a small protest in year X but failed to co-sponsor a large-scale 
demonstration in the same year, I consider A and B in cooperation for that year. This is an 
implication of not counting instances of cooperation in a given year. The reason for doing 
so is that the TERGM techniques do not yet allow for examining graphs with multiple 
edges between a pair of nodes (Hunter, Handcock, Butts, Goodreau, & Morris, 2008; 
Lusher, Koskinen, & Robins, 2012). 
The unit of analysis is an organized group challenging the authoritarian 
government to change the regime.98 In the French case, this definition refers to 
parliamentary factions and grassroots organizations.99 I coded all parliamentarians 
voicing a distinct preference set as one group. Similarly, all grassroots organizations that 
shared a distinct preference set and worked together were coded as one group.100  
 
Constructing networks 
I constructed one cooperation network for each year from 1814 to 1830. The analysis spans 
the period from 1815 when the Parliament convened for the first time to 1830 when the 
Monarchy fell. Nodes represent factions struggling to overthrow the Bourbon regime and 
																																								 																				
98	I	leave	unorganized	citizens	that	protested	the	regime	aside.	
99	 I	 collapsed	ministers	 into	 parliamentary	 factions,	 because	 parliamentary	 factions	 and	 their	ministers	
always	acted	in	unison;	setting	ministers	as	a	separate	faction	would	cause	correlation	and	degenerate	the	
model.	Also,	grassroots	organizations	and	parliamentary	factions	were	affiliated	but	operated	in	different	
environments.	Their	preference	sets	resembled	but	were	not	identical	to	parliamentary	groups.	
100	If	some	organization	comprised	factions	with	each	holding	a	distinct	preference	set,	I	coded	factions	as	
separate	actors	and	not	the	organization.	If,	however,	one	faction	dominated	and	others	followed,	I	coded	
the	 organization	 as	 one	 actor.	 Also,	 if	 some	 individual	 challenger	 founded	more	 than	 one	 organization	
without	changing	the	purpose	and	scope	of	its	activities,	I	coded	all	such	organizations	as	one	group.	Yet,	
the	purpose	and	scope	of	its	activities	changed,	I	coded	those	organizations	two	different	entities.	Also,	if	
two	factions	formed	a	novel	institution	while	retaining	their	distinct	institutional	identity,	I	did	not	code	the	
child	organization	as	a	separate	entity.	
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edges represent cooperation between a pair of challenger factions.101 Since cooperation is 
reciprocal, networks are undirected.  
 
Independent variables 
As we saw in the historical analysis section of this chapter, grievances in Bourbon France 
related to the issues of parliamentary and ministerial powers, the role of religion in 
politics, decentralization, suffrage extension, civil liberties vs. order, and the use of 
violence as a political strategy. I operationalize these variables as follows:  
Parliamentary and ministerial powers are operationalized as a continuous variable 
called “the executive-legislative balance,” which varies between (-1), indicating that the 
regime was executive-dominant and the parliament had at best a consultative role, and 
(1), meaning that the parliament retained all powers. Zero (the origin) refers to a regime 
of checks and balances. This continuous variable serves two purposes: Notice that at both 
ends of the axis, power is concentrated in the hands of one government branch. Hence, at 
the extremes, we observe parliamentary tyranny –if the Parliament predominates– or an 
empire or absolutist monarchy–if the executive predominates. This continuous scale 
allows for capturing overlaps in the separation-of-powers output of preferences of factions 
that stand on opposite ends of the left-right axis. For example, bonapartists and the ultras 
fall on the same end of the executive-legislative axis for both preferring a strong executive, 
even though they disagree on who should retain it. Second, this axis nuances within 
factions. For instance, the ultras want absolutism, whereas moderate royalists demand 
checks and balances.  
I operationalize the issue of civil liberties vs. order as a continuous variable using 
the “authoritarian-libertarian axis,” which is a widely used measurement (Inglehart & 
Flanagan, 1987; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Leconte, 2008; Shapiro & Hacker-Cordsn, 
1999). This variable allows for capturing differences in degrees of tolerance for 
authoritarianism¾for example, the constitutionnels surpassed the ultras in illiberalism. 
This axis spans from (-1), indicating a faction acquiesces to suppressing liberties to 
preserve order, to (1), meaning that it objects to sacrificing freedoms for order.  
																																								 																				
101	I	did	not	use	individuals	as	nodes.	Most	organizations	being	clandestine,	obtaining	complete	membership	
list	was	not	possible.		
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Suffrage extension is operationalized as a categorical variable called “suffrage.” 
Suffrage varies between “upper classes,” “middle classes,” and “universal”, corresponding 
to the limits of enfranchisement. Finally, I operationalize the role of religion in politics 
and centralization as categorical variables, respectively, “centralization” and 
“secularization.” Actors are coded “pro-decentralization” if they agree to electing local 
government officials and “pro-centralization” if they oppose. Similarly, actors are 
“theocratic” if they oppose the Church’s involvement in public policies and “secular” 
otherwise. I operationalize all categorical variables using the nodematch function and the 
continuous variables using the absdiff function in the statnet package (Handcock et al., 
2003).  
 
Control variables 
French parliamentary factions and grassroots organizations operated in different 
environments, which must have affected the intensity and ease of communication and 
cooperation among challengers. Parliamentary sessions regularized and structured 
interactions among parliamentarians, whereas distance taxed communication among 
grassroots organizations and between grassroots and parliamentary factions. I 
constructed the “venue of operation” variable in order to control for these impediments. 
Venue of operation is a categorical dummy that is “parliament” if actors operated in the 
parliament and “grassroots” if they operated on the ground.  
I use two control variables to control for network effects. The continuity of actors 
constitutes a challenge to longitudinal analysis, since factions form, discontinue, or merge. 
Not all factions coexist at the same time. “Out” controls for continuity, which is a dummy 
that becomes (1) if an actor does not exist in a given year and (0) otherwise. I 
operationalized “out” as a node attribute using the nodecov function.  
Past cooperative behavior gives TERGM its temporality dimension. Theoretically, 
past cooperation affects future decisions on cooperation. Groups might engage in short-
term issue-based cooperation with rivals, as they may renew effective partnerships and 
break unsuccessful cooperation that they form with groups that have a close position. The 
variable “past cooperation” indicates whether groups cooperated in the previous year and 
is operationalized as an edge attribute using the edgecov function. Finally, I added 
“clustering,” a structural network metric capturing the propensity to collaborate with the 
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partner of a partner. High clustering indicates that the network is hierarchical at the local 
level. That is, groups tend to form partnerships with the partners of their partner. Low 
clustering suggests that nodes make attachments freely at the local level (Lusher et al., 
2012). In other words, some existing alliance with a partner does not induce alliance with 
the partners of a partner. This metric captures strategic alliances known as “the friend of 
my friend is my friend,” which might come at the expense of preferences on ideological 
issues (the friend of one’s friend may hold rather different preferences than one’s self). I 
measure clustering using the gwesp function (fixed).  
 
The specification of hypotheses on the French case 
As explained in the theory chapter, this research mainly tests the hypothesis that “the 
higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically diverse challengers, 
the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more likely there will be either 
regime change or significant concessions to the opposition.”  
This hypothesis is tested in three steps: First, I entertain the null hypothesis that 
ideological and strategic disagreements have no effect on cooperation. If rejected, this 
would mean that preferences about ideological and strategic issue dimensions affect 
cooperative behavior. I test this null hypothesis with a logistic regression using the 
variables ‘past cooperation’ and ‘out’ to control for temporality.  
I specify the main hypothesis, “the higher the level of cooperation on strategic 
issues among ideologically diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the 
old regime, and the more likely there will be either regime change or significant 
concessions to the opposition,” to the issue dimensions of the French case goes as follows:  
 
Similarity along the authoritarian-libertarian axis will increase 
the probability that challengers collaborate for transition. 
Similarity along on the executive-legislative balance will increase 
the probability that challengers collaborate for transition. 
Similarity on suffrage will increase the probability that 
challengers collaborate for transition. 
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Similarity on secularization will increase the probability that 
challengers collaborate for transition. 
Similarity on centralization will increase the probability that 
challengers collaborate for transition. 
Cooperation becomes more likely if both challengers work on the 
ground or in the parliament. 
 
I test the abovementioned hypotheses using TERGM. As explained in the theory 
chapter, these hypotheses ground on the preference similarity mechanism and are 
operationalized using the concept homophily.  
In the language of TERGM, if preferences have an independent effect on 
cooperation, their estimates should be statistically significant. Significant positive 
coefficients suggest that more ties (representing cooperation) are formed than would have 
been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same number of nodes and 
edges. Significant negative coefficients indicate that less ties (cooperation) are formed 
than would have been if tie formation was random in networks displaying the same 
number of nodes and edges. The value of coefficients communicates the rate of change. If 
preferences on some issue makes no effect on cooperative behavior, we should obtain null 
effect (meaning that actors enter cooperation regardless of whether their preference aligns 
with their partner’s on the issue in question). A significant positive estimate suggests that 
preference alignment on some issue drives cooperation. That is, actors highly prioritize 
this issue and refrain from cooperating with those that think differently. A significant 
negative estimate indicates that actors prefer not to cooperate with those who think like 
them on a given issue. That is to say, if preference alignment on some issue does not drive 
cooperation it does not hinder it. 
Using TERGM and findings from the analyses of the preference evolution and 
patterns of interaction, I test Hypothesis 2 suggesting that “cooperation on strategic 
issues is likely to increase when challengers react to past failures and new opportunities 
by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority of preferences on strategic issue 
		 198	
dimensions.” I divide the period of interactions into two (before and after 1824) and 
explain the method of periodization below.  
I test Hypothesis 3, suggesting that “cooperation on strategic issues is likely to 
increase when peripheral actors align their preferences to those of an emergent core. I 
conduct a descriptive network analysis to test this hypothesis, which compares the 
ideological and strategic positions of the members of the coalition that carried out the 1814 
Revolution to those of the groups that stayed out of this coalition. So doing will explain 
why of all contender groups, it was a particular group that was able to spearhead the rise 
of an oppositional coalition for regime change. 
 
Periodization: I break the period from 1814 to 1830 into n two intervals, the reign 
of Louis XVIII (1814-1824) and the reign of Charles X (1825-1830). The reason for taking 
1824 as the dividing line is as follows: We know from the historical analysis that the 
Bourbon regime turned absolutist after Charles X took the throne. I expect this 
authoritarian turn to change the sociopolitical environment and induce actors to 
reconsider their preferences. If preference revision harmonized preferences, we should 
expect preference similarity to propel cooperation on issues that actors highly prioritize.  
Controlling for changes in preferences, we want to identify whether preference 
convergence on strategic issues propelled the rise of an oppositional coalition (long-term 
cooperation for regime change). To this end, I examine the distribution of preferences of 
members of the coalition. That said, I run two sets of models, one looking at the entire 
period from 1814 to 1830, the other comparing the two reigns.  
 
Effects of ideological and strategic preferences on cooperation for regime change 
In this section, I test the effect of preferences with an analysis of the evolution of 
preferences over time. First, I test the null hypothesis that preferences on issue 
dimensions other than shared interests in overthrowing the government have no effect on 
cooperative behavior. Second, I run a TERGM analysis to identify whether and how much 
each preference influence cooperation among challengers, if ever. I show that preferences 
make a significant effect on cooperation even after controlling for the variation of their 
impacts over time.  
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The Evolution of preferences over time 
I analyze the evolution of preferences across issue areas before and after 1824. This 
analysis aims to pinpoint whether and in which direction preferences changed over time. 
Table 8 below summarizes the findings.  
Table 8 
executive-
legislative	balance
authoritarian-
libertarian
value counts	 % counts	 %
grassroots 8 0.57 7 0.46
parliamentary	
faction
6 0.43 6 0.54
upper	class 3 0.21 2 0.15
middle	class 4 0.29 5 0.38
universal 7 0.50 6 0.46
theocratic 3 0.21 2 0.15
secular 11 0.79 11 0.85
centralization 6 0.43 6 0.46
decentralization 8 0.57 7 0.54
no 5 0.36 7 0.54
yes 9 0.64 6 0.46
violence
centralization
Preference	distribution:	Bourbon	France
Louis	XVIII	(1814-1824) Charles	X	(1825-1830)
min		mean	median	max min		mean	median	max
–1												-0.9											0									0.75
–1						–0.14													0											1
–0.75							0.12										0.5					0.75
–1								–0.23									–0.5											1
suffrage
venue	of	
operation
secularization
 
 
In Table 8, we observe significant shifts in preferences about authoritarianism vs. 
libertarianism, the executive-legislative axis, suffrage, and the use of violence from the 
reign of Louis XVIII to the reign of Charles X. In contrast, changes in preferences on 
centralization, and secularization were modest.  
The shift along the authoritarian-libertarian axis is striking. From one reign to 
another, the mean shifts from (-0.9) to (0.12), meaning that the average actor prioritizes 
order vs. liberties under Louis XVIII and liberties over order under Charles X. We observe 
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a significant shift also in the median. The median actor values order as much as equality 
under Louis XVIII, but clearly prefers liberties under Charles X. This shift reflects 
revisions in the views of the doctrinaires and the moderate royalists in response to 
authoritarian retrenchment under the ultra government and Charles X. It is worth 
reminding that these factions joined forces with the liberals to protect freedoms after 1824. 
This finding indicates that Charles X’s absolutism mismatched demands of the majority 
political factions. It is also significant that the mean and the median appear on the same 
sides of the axis, but the mean is closer to the authoritarian end than the median after 
1824. This means, the majority of the factions prioritized freedoms over order, but the few 
supporters of authoritarianism pull the mean towards the authoritarian end. In a nutshell, 
under Charles X, the political class does not want an illiberal regime. 
Along the executive-legislative axis, the shifts in the means and medians from 
before to after 1824 indicate that actors distance themselves from a strongly executive 
dominant regime in response to their experiences under Charles X. Under Louis XVIII, 
the average actor prefers an executive-dominant regime, whereas under Charles X the 
average actor endorses checks-and-balances. The shift in medians from before to after 
1824 further indicates that support for parliamentary checks on the executive increased 
((-0.5) vs. (0.5)). On the other hand, the means under both Louis XVIII and Charles X are 
closer to checks and balances than they are to absolutism and they are even further away 
to a strongly legislative-dominant regime than they are to absolutism. This finding 
communicates dislike with absolutism and even stronger dislike with a strongly 
legislative-dominant regime ––which indicates that republican regimes still resonates 
with parliamentary tyranny and violence in the eyes of Bourbon. This finding together with 
the shifts along the authoritarian-libertarian axis imply that Charles X’s authoritarianism 
is unlikely to find support among the political class.  
Another significant revision in preferences happens with respect to the use of 
violence. More factions prefer not using violence as a political means before 1824, while 
support for non-violent means of regime change finds more support after. We would need 
to examine the preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition to see whether 
strategic convergence propelled the rise of a coherent oppositional front.  
Finally, preferences about suffrage seem to have been revised. Support for middle-
class enfranchisement increases 29% before 1824 to 38% after 1824. Support for 
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restricting the right to vote to the upper class slightly diminishes from 21% to 15%. On the 
other hand, support for universal suffrage slightly declines. In sum, after 1824, suffrage 
extension is the most salient preference under Charles X, while support is divided between 
whether middle class enfranchisement and universal suffrage.  
Preference revisions were modest in the areas of the role of religion in politics and 
the structure of the administration. On the former, support for secularization slightly 
increases from before to after 1824 (79% vs. 85%). Moreover, under both reigns, support 
for secularization among the political class overwhelms support for a theocratic regime, 
which indicates that Charles X’s theocratic absolutist reign is unlikely to resonate with the 
political class. Concerning the structure of the administration, preferences seem to have 
remained more or less constant. Support for decentralization slightly surpasses support 
for centralization after 1824 (as in between 1814 and 1824). However, this difference is not 
large enough for us to say that the majority of factions takes either of the two sides. Rather, 
support is divided more or less equally.  
We do not observe significant changes on organization type. Under both reigns, 
the majority of actors operated on the ground, meaning that the regime features 
considerable contentious activity on the ground. In other words, French society was 
neither dormant nor indifferent towards the political problems of the Bourbon monarchy.  
Overall, we see the following preference set finding most support under Charles X: 
a secular regime of checks and balances that respects civil liberties and extends the 
suffrage from beyond the wealthiest. Importantly, most factions concur that regime 
change should come via non-violent means. I proceed to testing the null hypothesis that 
preferences on issue dimensions other than shared interests in overthrowing the 
government have no effect on cooperative behavior.   
*** 
I test the null hypothesis using a logistic regression (without the preference 
variables) and a TERGM analysis (with the preference variables). I compare the fitness of 
the logistic regression to that of the TERGM. Both models span the period from 1814 to 
1830. I run the TERGMs using the ergm package (Krivitsky et al., 2016). One challenge to 
choosing between models is the problem of overfitting, that is, whether we are adding too 
many variables. The Bayesian approach suggests choosing the model with highest 
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posterior probability, that is, the probability of an event after the conditional probability 
of its occurrence is taken into consideration. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) are two penalty scores to adding variables. The BIC 
relies on the Bayesian approach, while the AIC uses information theory to calculate the 
amount of information lost when a model is applied to a dataset. These scores operate in 
different ways and the penalty term is larger in BIC than in AIC.102 Generally, BIC is a more 
conservative score than AIC. For both scores, the smaller the value the better the model. 
Table II summarizes the results for the logistic regression without preferences and the 
TERGM with preferences. 
Looking at the AIC and BIC scores in Table 9, the TERGM has smaller AIC and BIC 
than the logistic regression, meaning that the former decreases information loss and 
therefore is a better model than the latter. We can thus reject the null hypothesis that 
preferences do not matter, since adding preferences significantly improves the 
explanatory power of the model. The next section measures the effect if each preference 
on cooperation. 
																																								 																				
102	For	more	information	see	(Akaike,	1973;	Haughton,	1988;	Neath	&	Cavanaugh,	2012).		
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Table 9 
Variables Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
edges -3.11 *** -4.44 ***
0.14 0.35
clustering 0.67 *** 0.77 ***
0.11 0.12
past cooperation 4.10 *** 3.17 ***
0.16 0.18
venue	of	operation 1.77 ***
0.21
executive-legislative	balance -0.07
0.21
authoritarian-libertarian -0.87 ***
0.17
suffrage 2.20 ***
0.27
secularization 0.23
0.22
violence 0.83 ***
0.19
centralization -0.48 *
0.22
AIC: –63071 –63316
BIC: –63047  –63316
standard errors are below the estimates
significance levels0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
The period 1814-1830
TERGMLogistic regression
 
 
Having established that ideological and strategic preferences make a statistically 
significant effect on cooperation, I proceed to testing how much each ideological and 
strategic preference affects cooperation dynamics. To this end, I run two longitudinal 
temporal network models, one on the period before 1824 and the other on the period after 
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1825. To reiterate an earlier point, 1824 is the cut point, because with the enthronement 
of Charles X, the regime took an authoritarian turn and democratic reversal led actors to 
update their visions of regime and strategies of transition. Robustness checks of these 
TERGM models are available in Appendix IV. 
 
Table 10 
Variables Estimates p-values Estimates p-values
edges -4.32 *** -6.93 ***
0.42 1.13
clustering 0.77 *** 0.14
0.14 0.26
past	cooperation 2.78 *** 4.87 ***
0.22 0.44
venue	of	operation 1.56 *** 1.69 ***
0.26 0.40
0.15 0.50
0.26 0.55
authoritarian-libertarian -0.96 *** 0.11
0.21 0.46
suffrage 2.11 *** 2.49 ***
0.37 0.47
secularization 0.28 2.28 *
0.29 0.92
violence 0.71 ** -0.01
0.24 0.40
centralization -0.20 *** -0.33
0.27 0.41
AIC:	 –23437 –4246
BIC:	 –23376 	–4195
p	<	0.01,	p	<	0.05,	p	<	0.10	(two-tailed	tests)	
Bourbon	France
Model	I	(1814-1824) Model	II	(1825-1830)
Note:	Cell	entries	report	TERGM	coefficients,	standard	errors	(in	parentheses),	and	p-values
executive-legislative	balance
 
According to Table 10, preferences about the authoritarian-libertarian axis, the use 
of violence, and centralization turned statistically insignificant from before to after 1824. 
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Noticeably, preferences about the executive-legislative axis are insignificant all along. In 
contrast, preferences about suffrage always affects actors’ decisions about with whom to 
cooperate. The other striking finding is that preferences about secularization turns 
significant after 1824, meaning that agreements and disagreements over this issue affect 
cooperation dynamics under Charles X, unlike under his predecessor.  
In terms of magnitude, preference similarity on the limits of suffrage makes 
cooperation among challengers 7 times more likely before 1824 and 11 times more likely 
after 1824. This means, actors that hold similar views on suffrage extension have a strong 
inclination to not work with those who hold different opinions on this matter. This finding 
falls in line with the finding from the analysis of the evolution of preferences, which had 
identified overwhelming support for suffrage extension beyond upper classes after 1824. 
Together these two findings indicate that preferences are revised and on this highly 
prioritized issue, preference alignment drives cooperation among contenders. 
Concerning the authoritarian-libertarian axis, actors are 62% more likely to 
cooperate with those who hold different views on authoritarianism vs. civil liberties than 
those whose preferences resemble to theirs before 1824. That means that there is some 
other issue that actors prioritize more than this and the divergence of opinions on this 
more important matter trumps agreement on authoritarianism vs. libertarianism among 
the like-minded. After 1824, this issue ceases to affect cooperative behavior. It is worth 
reminding that the analysis of the evolution of preferences had identified a shift in 
preferences in favor of libertarianism. These two findings together indicate that this issue 
is de-prioritized but it is possible that within the oppositional coalition members share 
similar preferences on this regard.  
As regards centralization, actors are 18% more likely to cooperate with those who 
hold different views on decentralization than those who hold similar preferences before 
1824. As was the case in the authoritarian-libertarian axis, this means that this issue is 
prioritized but there is divergence of opinions another highly prioritized issue among 
those who have the same stance on (de)centralization and these disagreements trump 
agreement on centralization. After 1824, this issue makes no statistically significant effect 
on cooperative behavior. It is worth noting that the analysis of the evolution of preferences 
had identified no shift in preference on this dimension. Together these two findings 
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suggest de-prioritization (while preferences remained more or less the same, the issue no 
longer shapes cooperation patterns among contenders). 
Preferences along the executive-legislative axis seem to have no statistically 
significant effect on cooperative behavior under either reigns. This issue is de-prioritized. 
On the other hand, the analysis of the evolution of preferences had identified more support 
for checks and balances. This means that while this issue is de-prioritized within the 
overall set of challengers, it is possible that members of the oppositional coalition share 
similar preferences about the matter.  
Another interesting shift in the effects of preferences takes place with respect to 
the role of religion. After 1824, this issue makes a statistically significant effect on 
cooperative behavior (unlike before 1824). Specifically, preference similarity on 
secularization makes cooperation between a pair of actors 8 times more likely after 1824. 
We know from the historical analysis that the regime turned theocratic under Charles X. 
Together these two findings indicate that preferences are revised and on this highly 
prioritized issue, preference alignment drives cooperation among contenders. This finding 
also responds to falls in line with the hypothesis that actors pragmatically revise their 
preferences in response to environmental changes.  
On the use of violence, preferences on this matter seems to cease affecting 
cooperation patterns under Louis XVIII. Interestingly, preference similarity on this matter 
makes cooperation 103% more likely between a pair of like-minded actors. It is worth 
reminding that the analysis of the evolution of preferences had identified preference shift 
in favor of the use of non-violent means of regime change. These two findings together 
indicate that this issue is de-prioritized but it is possible that within the oppositional 
coalition members share similar preferences on this regard. The next section examining 
preference sets of members of the oppositional coalition will tell us whether it is the case.  
Finally, cooperation patterns are also shaped by organization type and clustering. 
Grassroots organizations are about 4 times more likely to cooperate with grassroots 
organizations rather than with parliamentary factions under both Louis XVIII and Charles 
X. On the other hand, after 1824, actors no longer show the tendency to cooperate with 
partners of partners, whereas this tendency makes cooperation 114% more likely before 
1824. This finding falls in line with the hypothesis on preference convergence. Given the 
emergence of consensus on protecting civil liberties without turning to violence after 1824, 
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actors no longer need to form partners of partners with whom their views do not 
necessarily cohere. The emerging consensus allows for the rise of an oppositional 
movement among the factions that demand suffrage extension, a secular regime that 
protects civil liberties without turning to violence. Next, I examine the composition of 
coalitions so as to corroborate that preference alignment took place. 
 
Preferences of members of the oppositional coalition & the central actor  
The TERGM analysis from the last section identified that some issues are de-prioritized. 
Yet, we are yet to see the distribution of preferences across members of the oppositional 
coalition to conclude whether preferences about strategic and ideological issues 
convergence within the coalition. To this end, this section begins with an analysis of the 
distribution of preferences across members of the coalition. Findings of this analysis 
complement the findings from the TERGM analysis. Together, they help us test the 
hypothesis about convergence of strategic and ideological preferences.  
The next step is to pinpoint which challenger becomes the center of the 
oppositional coalition. To this end, I conduct a two-step analysis: First, I identify when 
actors cooperate more and around this time which actor becomes more central –since 
being central to a well-connected network signals greater importance for a node than being 
central to a less connected network. I use the network metric density to examine the 
evolution of cooperation density, with which I pinpoint the years in which challengers 
were most disunited and when they reunified. The network metric density means how 
connected a network is taking into account all possible connections in that network. In 
other words, it represents the ratio of the actual number of ties to the number of all 
possible ties (Newman, 2010, p. Chapter 6). Thus, if a network has a lot of ties among its 
nodes, it is dense –the ratio of the actual number of ties over the number of all possible 
ties gets close to 1. If a network has few ties, most of possible connections are not made; 
thus, it is not dense and the ratio in question approaches to -∞. 
At the second step, we want to understand which challenger becomes the center of 
the oppositional coalition. To this end, I compare the importance of each actor of the 
oppositional coalition. Importance in a coalition means which actor is central to a coalition 
network. That is, who is picked by others more frequently as a partner, which can also be 
reworded as who has more collaborators than others. Having more partners than others 
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in an oppositional coalition indicates that one is more in demand by others as a partner. I 
operationalize importance using the network metric degree centrality. Degree centrality 
conveys how well-connected a node is (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It is calculated as 
below: 
 𝑑𝑖	(𝑔)(𝑛 − 1) 
 
This formula measures the degree of a given node i in a network (g) divided by the 
total number of nodes in that network minus the one whose degree centrality is measured. 
For example, if a node has (n-1) degrees it is connected to all others, thus is central to the 
network. A node with degrees (n-2) would mean it is connected to everyone except for one 
node, hence still quite central. In contrast, if a node has but degree 1, we understand that 
it is only connected to one other node, thus is much less central to the network (Easley & 
Kleinberg, 2010, p. 62). It should be noted that centrality in a network can be measured 
using other metrics such as closeness or betweenness, among others. However, given that 
cooperation network is not directional, that is, if node A is linked to node B the link from 
A to B also implies a link from B to A, since cooperation is reciprocal by nature. 103 
 
Areas in which preferences converge within the oppositional coalition  
In order to establish the distribution of preferences across members of the 
oppositional coalition, I take the factions that cooperated for more than three years 
(engage in long-term coalition). Those that joined the coalition in 1830 or in 1829 remain 
outside of the scope of analysis, since falling short of three years, their cooperation with 
the coalition qualifies as short-term cooperation. Table 11 below examines the distribution 
of preferences across issue areas within the oppositional coalition.  
																																								 																				
103	For	more	information	on	centrality	see	(Borgatti,	2005;	Easley	&	Kleinberg,	2010;	Newman,	2010).	
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Table	11	
		 Preference	distribution	of	the	oppositional	coalition	
		 	Average						min			max	
executive-
legislative	
balance	 –0.11										-0.4									0	
authoritarian-
libertarian	 0.43											0							0.75	
		
value	 counts		 %	
suffrage	 upper	class	 0	 0.00	
middle	class	 5	 0.71	
universal	 2	 0.29	
secularization	 theocratic	 0	 0.00	
secular	 7	 1.00	
centralization	 centralization	 4	 0.57	
decentralization	 3	 0.43	
violence	 no	 7	 1.00	
yes	 0	 0.00	
 
 According to Table 11, members of the coalition unanimously oppose the use of 
violence as a means to change the regime. This finding supports the hypothesis strategic 
convergence is necessary for contenders to build sustainable long-term cooperation. Let 
us now see whether preferences of members of the coalition converge on ideological issues.  
 On the role of religion, all coalition members endorse secularization. However, 
opinion is divided when it comes to suffrage and centralization. On the former, support 
for middle-class enfranchisement predominates support for universal suffrage. Despite 
this disagreement, both sides join forces to demand suffrage extension beyond the 
wealthiest. The TERGM analysis had identified the structure of the administration to be a 
de-prioritized issue area. In effect, members of the coalition are divided between the two 
positions, centralization and decentralization. Regardless, they manage to build successful 
cooperation. Cooperation despite this ideological disagreement indicates that the 
resolution of this issue matter is postponed.  
Along the authoritarian-libertarian axis, the analysis identifies no faction that 
supports authoritarianism. All factions are libertarian –notwithstanding that they are 
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libertarian at different degrees. The average is 0.43, which indicates that the majority of 
the coalition members demand a moderately libertarian regime. Finally, on the executive-
legislative axis, the majority of coalition members want a regime of checks-and-balances 
with a slightly predominant executive (-0.11). The maximum and minimum vary between 
0.4 and 0, which means that there are very few factions within the coalition that demand 
an executive-dominant regime. The rest endorses checks and balances.  
Thus, the coalition shows convergence on strategic issues. Members are also like-
minded when it comes to secularization. This finding echoes the findings from the 
contextual analysis and the TERGM. Together these three findings indicate that 
secularization is a prioritized issue on which coalition members are like-minded. 
Therefore, preference alignment drives cooperation. On the rest of the ideological issues, 
an unanimously endorsed position does not stand out. However, members of the coalition 
mainly are in favor of libertarian regime of checks and balances and suffrage extension 
beyond upper classes. Hence, there is convergence on strategic matters but no 
convergence on all ideological issues within the coalition. Even though preference 
alignment on certain ideological issues propels cooperation the postponement of the 
resolution of certain ideological issues also help with cooperation. These findings enhance 
the arguments that strategic convergence is necessary for the rise of an oppositional 
coalition and that ideological agreements help but are not necessary for factions to engage 
in long-term cooperation. Let us now see which actor was the center of the coalition.  
These results further indicate that within some oppositional coalition, actors 
should be pragmatic on certain issue areas so as to be incline to postpone their resolutions 
until after regime change. Evidence from the French case reveals that factions came to an 
agreement on strategic issues but went pragmatic on some ideological issues. This pattern 
falls in line with the hypothesis that full ideological agreement is hard to achieve; and 
therefore, cooperation for regime change (long-term cooperation) requires some level of 
pragmatism. Who was the center though and why? The next compares between the 
centralities of various factions so as to identify which one was more likely to arise as the 
one that signal unity and coherence. 
 
Finding the center of the coalition 
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Table 12 shows the evolution of the density. According to the graph, cooperation 
density fluctuates frequently until 1824 but follows an upward trend after 1824 with the 
exception of the dip in 1829. Density peaks in 1821, 1828 and 1830 and dips in 1815, 1824, 
and 1829. It is worth noting that the density is calculated by taking the changes in the 
number of actors into account. In other words, I do not calculate density with respect to 
the number of factions that existed throughout the entire period from 1814 to 1830 ––this 
would have meant to assume that some factions could have cooperated whereas they did 
not even active and present within the same year. 
Cooperation is the least intense in 1815 due to the adverse effects of the White 
Terror and densest in 1821 and 1830. Cooperation peak in 1821 follows the assassination 
of the Duke de Berry, after which the royalists successfully rally centrist factions against 
the leftwing actors. Cooperation density declines in 1824 because the anti-ultras coalition 
fractures and the issue of violence divides the leftwing into moderates and radicals, but 
inclines again as of 1825. With the exception of the dip in 1829, we see cooperation to peak 
again in 1830. The fracture in 1829 follows from the fracture within the anti-ultra coalition 
with respect to the issue of violence as a political strategy. Radicals collaborate with 
radicals and moderates work with other moderates. The peak in 1830 represents the 
coalition formation for the 1830 Revolution. Let us look at the degree centrality to see 
which actors function as the pillar of the coalition. To this end, I compare the degree 
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centrality of all parliamentary factions after 1825. I exclude the period before the 
authoritarian revival, Table 13 represents the evolution of degree centralities of these 
actors.  
Table 13 
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According to Table 13, degree centrality is the lowest for the ultras, represented in 
light blue line, and highest for the center-left, represented in dark blue line. The other 
three factions’ degree centrality is the same; therefore, the lines overlap. These three lines 
are in the middle. We understand that the defection, the constitutionnels, and the 
doctrinaires belong to the oppositional coalition; they are not the center. Furthermore, the 
graphs indicate that ultras are the most isolated faction, whereas the center-left is the most 
popular one attracting the most number of challengers.  
On the other hand, as we saw in the analysis of the distribution of preferences 
across coalition members, there are no ideological coherence within the coalition led by 
the leftwing, which is a heterogeneous faction in and of itself. This leftwing-led coalition 
includes he defection, the doctrinaires, the constitutionnels, as well as bonapartists and 
republicans that tag along in the last two years of the Bourbon regime. Strategically, the 
coalition displays heterogeneous preferences, which implies that preference alignment on 
strategic matters is necessary for the rise of an oppositional coalition but ideological 
convergence is not.  
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Turning to the most salient solutions, see that suffrage extension to middle classes, 
a secular regime of checks and balances respectful of civil liberties, and objection to using 
violence as a political strategy emerge found most support. It is worth remembering from 
the historical analysis that the center-left had been advocating for the strategy of ‘non-
violent regime change’ as well as for secularism, checks and balances, and respect of civil 
liberties. In contrast, the defection, the constitutionnels, and the doctrinaires, who held 
different views on these matters, shifted to this point of view after pragmatically revising 
their preferences in response to environmental changes under Charles X. This finding 
approves the hypothesis that the actor that has been advocating for the salient preferences 
is more likely to rise as the center of the oppositional coalition.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter examined the effect of preferences on ideological and strategic issues on 
regime challengers’ ability to cooperate for regime change and form a coherent 
oppositional coalition. Combining historical analysis and network analysis, I tested the 
following: “The higher the level of cooperation on strategic issues among ideologically 
diverse challengers, the more sustained the pressure on the old regime, and the more 
likely there will be either regime change or significant concessions to the 
opposition.”  “Cooperation on strategic issues is likely to increase when challengers react 
to past failures and new opportunities by deciding to pragmatically revise the priority 
of preferences on strategic issue dimensions.” “Cooperation on strategic issues is likely 
to increase when peripheral actors align their preferences to those of an emergent core.”  
 The most important finding was that strategic convergence happened after 1824 
when a subset of challengers concurred on not using violence as a political strategy to 
change the regime. Convergence responded to shifts in environmental conditions, that is, 
the electoral defeat of the leftwing 1824 exposing public disapproval of violence and 
radicalism. Following this backlash, the center-left distanced itself from its radical wing 
and asserted itself as a non-violent political faction. Concerning the direction of preference 
revisions, the preference subset suggesting “transition to a secular regime of checks and 
balances respectful of civil liberties without using violence” became popular after 1824, 
the authoritarian revival. My analysis further identified that the center-left was uniquely 
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advocating for this set of preferences, and therefore more likely to emerge as the center of 
this movement.  
Another important finding was that the postponement of ideological differences 
promoted cooperation on the executive-legislative and authoritarian-libertarian axes and 
centralization. On the other hand, the issues of the role of religion in politics and suffrage 
gained priority after 1824. On these matters, preference similarity drove cooperation 
among the like-minded. Overall, findings confirm the argument that an oppositional 
movement becomes more likely to materialize after political crises urge actors to 
reconsider their priorities and pragmatically revise some ineffective ones with the effective 
ones and postpone the resolution of certain disagreements.  
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Chapter 5 What have we learned about dynamics of cooperation for regime 
change? 
 
This dissertation addressed the puzzle of the emergence of cooperation among challengers 
for regime change. Specifically, it sought to answer, “what conditions enable diverse 
challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, to achieve a 
level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo?” The start of this study 
was as follows: Studies that explain regime change by focusing on interactions among the 
government and its contenders assume, on the one hand, that challengers are unitary 
actors, and on the other hand, that the dynamics of these interactions can be modeled with 
respect to conflict and alignment of interests on one issue dimension. This issue dimension 
pertains to grievances about either economic issues (including welfare, taxation, or 
redistribution) or the ideological ones along the authoritarianism vs. democracy axis. 
Based on the aforementioned two assumptions, these studies argued that shared interests 
against the regime precipitated cooperation to overthrow the government or extract 
significant concessions from it.  
These assumptions do not quite capture struggles between the government and 
contenders that we observe in real life. First, there often are more than one challenger 
groups and these groups do not act as a united front. One contemporary example is the 
Syrian opposition groups to the Assad regime. Not only did the Syrian groups not form a 
united front, but also they did not stand together at the Geneva Talks where they could 
have extracted concessions from the government. If shared interests against the regime 
foster cooperation, as bargaining models applying cooperation theory to regimes argued, 
why did this mechanism fail to foster cooperation among the Syrian opposition groups? 
One could say that the Syrian case is exceptional. However, cases from the history also 
display the same pattern. For example, the Russian opposition groups to the Tsar’s regime 
under Imperialist Russia or the opposition groups to Sultan Mehmed VI under the 
Ottoman Empire were several. So were the contender groups to the Shah Pahlavi’s regime 
and to the Qajar regime in Iran. Thus, the plurality of challengers could not have been 
specific to the Syrian case. On the other hand, unlike in Syria, contenders in these 
historical examples, though not all, successfully cooperated against the government. How 
did the challengers in these cases come to cooperate against the regime?  
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Second, in real-life, struggles between the government and contenders concerning 
regime type have multiple dimensions ––from welfare to minority rights. These 
dimensions vary across cases. For instance, in the case of the Iranian opposition to the 
Pahlavi regime one major issue was anti-imperialism, which was understood as objections 
to foreign interference and political and economic predominance. In the case of the 1905 
Revolution in Imperial Russia, one of the driving issues, among others, was the agrarian 
problem. Although one could argue that the agrarian problem can be captured as 
economic grievances, it would be diminutive to operationalize anti-imperialism along the 
authoritarian vs. libertarian axis (ignoring its international dimension). Moreover, in Iran, 
economic problems accompanied anti-imperialism. Similarly, Imperial Russia had 
ideological problems, such as the problem of nationalities or Jews, alongside economic 
problems. Thus, unlike how issue dimensions are modeled by bargaining theories of 
regime, struggles over regime type were multifaceted. Several regime dimensions 
mobilized groups of contenders in each case and groups attached different levels of 
priority across issue dimensions. These observations motivated the following theory, 
which I tested using the cases of transitions to constitutional monarchy in Bourbon France 
and the Ottoman Empire.  
The theory that I advance to explain what brings contenders to cooperate goes as 
follows: Contender groups become more likely to cooperate for regime change if they 
converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if 
any). Preference convergence on strategies and the de-prioritization of ideological 
disagreements (if any) prepares the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition that is capable 
of signaling unity and coherence. Together preference convergence and de-prioritization 
of ideological disagreements create the potential for contender groups to overthrow the 
regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions.  
As highlighted above, de-prioritization of ideological disagreements for the 
oppositional coalition to signal unity and coherence. Unity implies that groups have been 
working together for a while and coherence refers to the capacity to stand together on 
various issue problems based on like-mindedness. These two characteristics of 
oppositional coalitions have a deterrent capacity vis-à-vis the government that tries to 
maintain power and employs cooptation and divide-and-rule tactics to weaken the 
opposition groups. Also, if there is an already existing oppositional movement, the society 
in question is more likely to undergo a successful orderly transition. The reason is the 
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following: Generally, transitions begin with contentious activity at the public level (if not 
happened via a coup), which may or may not succeed. For example, the 2013 Gezi protests 
in Turkey died down without achieving their purpose (respect of civil liberties). In 
contrast, contentious activity in Poland resulted in the collapse of the communist regime 
in 1989. One major difference between these cases, among others, relates to the capacity 
of an already existing oppositional movement in Poland (the Solidarity Movement). Once 
contentious activities erupted, the Solidarity Movement took the lead and successfully 
steered the transition process. In Turkey, no such movement existed. The Gezi movement 
lasted some months but eventually died, because the large crowd of contenders could not 
sustain the momentum in the face of the authoritarian government’s reprisals. If there had 
been an oppositional coalition capable of taking the lead of the Gezi protests, could the 
regime have been liberalized? Maybe. We cannot know for sure. Yet, we can say that the 
Movement’s capacity to extract concessions from the government would have increased 
given organizational capacity and leadership that an oppositional front provides 
(McAdam, 1982; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Tarrow, 1994).  
The rise of oppositional coalitions that is capable of overthrowing the regime 
follows from a three-stage process. In the first stage, there is disunity. Each challenger 
advocates for a different set of transition strategies (how regime change should be carried 
out) and ideologies (what the future regime should look like). Differences of opinion on 
strategic and ideological issues get in the way of cooperation for regime change as long as 
challenger groups challenger groups attach high priority to their preferences on the 
dimensions that they disagree with one another. In the second stage, environmental 
changes give actors a perception of urgency, whereby actors begin eliminating or 
postponing certain ideological differences or revise their preferences in light of the new 
information that becomes available. Once some disagreements are put aside and 
preference revision on some issues harmonize preferences, actors begin cooperating. 
Some actors engage in cooperation earlier than others; these form the core of the 
oppositional coalition. As cooperation is sustained in the long run, the core begins 
attracting other actors based on preference convergence on strategic matters. In this 
process, preference convergence on ideological issues is helpful but neither necessary nor 
sufficient. Thus, the oppositional coalition tends to display a core composed of rather 
idealistic actors and a periphery of rather pragmatic actors. Thus, some level of 
pragmatism is a necessary condition for the emergence of cooperation among multiple 
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actors who tackle with varied issue dimensions. In the third stage, when some popular 
contentious movement breaks out, the timing of which cannot be predicted, the now-
unified oppositional movement to take action, such as overthrowing the government or 
extracting significant concessions.  
Challengers transition from the stage of disunity to that of unification when they 
pragmatically revise their preferences and de-prioritize the issues on which they cannot 
reach an agreement. The mechanisms of preference-revision and de-prioritization 
increase preference similarity, whereby actors may begin collaborating. Specifically, 
preferences on strategic issues are more likely to produce convergence than those on 
ideological issues, since the latter are relatively more rigid in the short run. Convergence 
is centered around a core actor or core actors who is or are idealistic and attracts to 
themselves others pragmatic ones who agree with the core on the strategies but not 
necessarily on the ideologies to unify. Once strategic convergence is finalized, challengers 
become more likely to form an internally consistent oppositional movement that is capable 
of overthrowing the authoritarian regime. 
In this chapter, I contrast and compare the Ottoman and French cases of transition 
to constitutional monarchy. It is worth noting that these cases are paired according to the 
least similar systems design. The evidence presented in chapters 3 and 4 shows that, 
despite the significant differences in initial conditions, historical contexts, and duration of 
the regimes, cooperation among challengers emerged in a similar manner over a series of 
similar stages in Bourbon France (1814-1830) and Ottoman Turkey (1876-1908). In what 
follows, I review the evidence and discuss the findings in light of the theory and discuss 
alternative explanations. This discussion follows the stages of cooperation presented in 
the theory. Overall, this study shows that cooperation among challengers is a dynamic 
process rather than being a mere outcome of convergent interests against the 
authoritarian regime as characterized by the existing literature on regimes and 
cooperation.  
 
The stage of disunity  
We have seen that the Ottoman and French cases differed in terms of the structure of the 
regime, the identity of challengers, the issue dimensions that shape the struggles over 
regime type, the geography and the time period. Despite these differences, these cases 
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resembled in their initial conditions, i.e., the constellation of actors and the structure of 
their interactions at the time of the rise of demands for regime change. The parallel 
between the initial conditions in both cases was twofold: There were many groups of 
organized challengers actively challenging the regime and various issue dimensions that 
structured the debate over regime type. Also, each defended a particular set of strategical 
and ideological solutions to remedy facets of the regime type problem. During the disunity 
stage in both cases, challengers remained divided, only engaging in short-term issue-
based cooperation. Long-term cooperation did not arise because of the conflict of 
preferences on the issue dimensions that challengers highly prioritized. This pattern of 
short-term issue-based cooperation for regime change persisted until challengers began 
to revise the priority and content of their preferences to converge on a particular solution 
set.  
 The rise of demands for regime change & the structure of the authoritarian 
regime 
 The case studies spanned the Bourbon regime in France and the Hamidian regime 
in the Ottoman Empire. However, demands for regime change preceded the rise of these 
regimes in both cases. When both of these regimes settled in, French society and the 
international community expected it to be less authoritarian than the previous regime.  
 These expectations derived from the dismal experiences with authoritarianism and 
oppression under the previous regime. In the French case, the Bonaparte regime provided 
strict equality and universal suffrage, but disrespected basic rights and liberties were 
disrespected. Some republican and royalist groups had mobilized to constrain the 
executive arbitrariness and were violently oppressed by the Bonaparte government in the 
process. When the Bonaparte regime was finally ousted by the Allies in 1814, French 
society was significantly polarized and was experiencing violent disorder. In order to 
reconstruct societal peace and solidarity, King Louis XVIII enacted a constitutional 
charter that instituted a bicameral parliament elected with a restricted suffrage so as to 
check extremism on the left and right. The Parliament’s powers and his authority over the 
cabinet were limited to prevent parliamentary tyranny. Nevertheless, the international 
community and French society expected the Bourbon regime to be a moderate 
parliamentary monarchy. Upon taking the throne, the King organized parliamentary 
elections.  
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In the Ottoman case, the Hamidian government also ushered in a polarized society 
experiencing violent disorder. Societal expectations from the new Sultan were similar to 
those in the French case, that is, the Hamidian regime was to bring constitutional 
parliamentarianism in the Empire. Constitutionalists known as the Young Ottomans had 
mobilized to advocate for constitutional parliamentarianism to check executive 
arbitrariness under Sultan Abdülaziz (1861-1876). As was the case under Bonaparte, these 
constitutionalists were harshly oppressed and silenced. Shortly after his successor Murad 
V took the throne, a crisis emerged. In the midst of the crisis, some constitutionalists made 
an unsuccessful attempt of coup and died in the process. Abdülhamid II replaced Murad 
V upon the promise of instituting a constitution and parliament. Like Louis XVIII, 
Abdülhamid II issued a constitution, which established a bicameral parliament to be 
elected by universal male suffrage, and organized parliamentary elections.  
When they assumed power, both the Bourbon and Hamidian governments faced a 
crisis. In France, the White Terror, during which royalist grassroots organizations 
attacked bonapartists and republicans and caused the death of hundreds of civilians. 
Meanwhile royalist parliamentarians passed laws to restrict rights and liberties and crash 
opposition groups. Although he did not stop the White Terror, Louis XVIII dissolved the 
ultra-royalist chamber due to his concern about the latter’s extremism. In the Ottoman 
Empire, Russia declared war when the state was in a dire economic situation and on the 
verge of a civil war between its Christian minorities and Muslim populations. While the 
Empire experienced heavy war defeats, the Ottoman Parliament was torn apart by the 
polarization between Christian and non-Christian deputies and was unable to function 
effectively. What is more, when the Sultan invited Ottoman citizens to join the army, 
Christian deputies generated propaganda to dissuade their co-ethnics from enlisting. In 
response, Abdülhamid II prorogued the Parliament. Like Louis XVIII, the Sultan took a 
drastic measure to silence opposition. On the other hand, it is worth noting that Louis 
XVIII was a moderate unlike Abdülhamid II who was an autocrat. Thus, the Ottoman and 
French regimes took different paths after the dissolution of the first parliaments. France 
remained a parliamentary monarchy but the Ottoman Empire evolved into an autocracy.  
Despite being a parliamentary monarchy on the surface, royalist extremism in the 
Parliament and on the ground created an authoritarian environment under the Bourbon 
regime. Oppression initially silenced opposition groups like the republicans and 
bonapartists. Yet, soon, they resurfaced as part of the independents or the leftists. 
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Similarly, the Hamidian regime had suppressed opposition via exiles, arrests, censorship 
and spy networks. Yet, as in the French case, the constitutionalist opposition reappeared 
by the end of the 1880s. Opposition groups in both cases resumed contention.  
Importantly, in neither case were the Ottoman constitutionalists and the French 
independents the only challenger groups. The constitutionnels and the doctrinaires in 
France and secessionists in the Ottoman Empire were contending the regime. 
Characteristically, contender groups in neither cases did/could engage in long-term 
cooperation. Rather, their interactions were limited to short-term issue-based cooperation 
despite efforts to work together on the long term. Thus, evidence from both cases suggests 
that the number of challenger groups and issue dimensions were several and challengers 
did not unite contra the assumptions of bargaining theory. 
The theory that I advanced here attributes short-term issue-based cooperation to 
conflict of preferences with respect to issue dimensions relevant to the regime type debate 
among challenger groups. In line with the theory, the case studies identified multiple issue 
dimensions that caused disagreements among contenders. In the Ottoman case, imperial 
integrity vs. national independence, the nature of society, and the role of religion in politics 
highlighted ideological dimensions. Strategic issues focused on revolutionary vs. non-
revolutionary change, whether to seek foreign assistance, and whether to cooperation for 
regime change between secessionists and constitutionalists was acceptable given that the 
former sought to secede and the latter aimed to preserve territorial integrity. The varied 
issue dimensions emphasize not only the conflict of preferences, but also the complexity 
with the issues. Relatedly, in the French case, the balance between the executive and the 
legislative power, authoritarianism and raison d’état vs. libertarianism and respect of civil 
liberties and rights, the role of religion in politics, the structure of the administration, and 
the limits of the suffrage constituted the ideological dimensions of the debate. The 
strategic dimension of the debate concerned whether using violence to carry out regime 
change was acceptable.  
In the Ottoman case, Ottoman challengers divided, primarily, into secessionists 
and constitutionalists depending on whether they endorsed territorial integrity. Within 
these categories, challengers further divided into ‘secularists and non-secularists’, 
‘supporters of centralization and its opponents’, ‘revolutionaries vs. non-revolutionaries’, 
‘Turkish nationalists, Ottomanists, assimilationist Turkish nationalists and nationalists 
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seeking secession from the Empire’, ‘proponents and opponents of foreign assistance’, and 
finally ‘supporters and opponents of cooperation between secessionists and 
constitutionalists’. Different combinations of these categories created idiosyncratic 
preference sets. In France, challengers divided, mainly, into the leftwing and the 
rightwing. Yet, as in the Ottoman case, subdivisions occurred with respect to the 
abovementioned issue dimensions: authoritarians vs. libertarians’, ‘supporters of an 
executive dominant regime and supporters of a parliament dominant regime’, ‘supporters 
of universal suffrage, limited suffrage and advocates of suffrage extension to middle 
classes’, ‘proponents of non-violent means of regime change and their opponents’, 
‘secularists and non-secularists’, and ‘supporters of centralization and its opponents’. 
Typically, in both cases, these categories cut across each other and each challenger group 
advocated for a different combination of preferences on these categories. In other words, 
no two challenger groups displayed the same preference set. Also, given contextual 
differences. the identity of challenger groups differed between the Bourbon and Hamidian 
regimes. A striking difference was that while the left-right axis partially captured the 
positioning of challengers in the French case it was not even relevant in the Ottoman case. 
As regards the nature of issue dimensions, the legacy of past conflicts was decisive 
in the shaping of the main ideological axes over regime type. It is worth noting that the 
emergence of these issue dimensions dated further back than the rise of contender groups 
making demands for regime change. In other words, the sociopolitical environment in 
which these actors would operate had taken shape much earlier. In the Ottoman case, 
ongoing modernization efforts to improve state capacity, colonial invasions, and 
independence movements among ethno-religious minorities of the Empire made the issue 
of imperial integrity most salient. Imperial integrity was understood both as territorial 
integrity and social cohesion, whereby distinct ideological debates arose: the type of 
society, the type of the state (constitutional monarchy vs. nation state), and the structure 
of the administration. In the French case, the conflict over regime type originated from 
the confrontation between republicans (leftwing) and royalists (rightwing) over the nature 
of sovereignty. Due to this confrontation, post-1789 France underwent successive 
constitutional reversals and authoritarian episodes until the Bourbon regime set in 
depending on which faction assumed power. Regardless of political leaning, whichever 
faction assumed power it curtailed liberties of expression and reunion to preclude its 
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rivals’ accession to power positions. As a result, the issues that accompanied the nature of 
sovereignty revolved around organization of power in Bourbon France.  
 
The role of preference convergence on issue dimensions in the shaping of 
cooperation patterns among challengers  
Concerning the type of cooperation, the theory that I advanced here suggests that building 
long-term cooperation is difficult in the first stage due to the dissimilarity of preferences 
on the issue dimensions that groups valued differently in the short-run. Even if they try, 
challengers are unlikely build long-term cooperation that might turn into an oppositional 
coalition in this stage, because preference dissimilarity on highly prioritized issues trumps 
preference similarity on issues with lower priority. Specifically, the theory expects the 
highly prioritized issues on which opinions differed to rather be of ideological nature on 
the grounds that ideological preferences stay rigid compared to strategies in the short-run. 
Concomitantly, preference convergence on strategic issues falls short to foster cooperation 
because these issues have lower priority. Let us turn to evidence from the case studies. 
Evidence from both cases suggests that challenger groups engaged at best in short-
term issue based cooperation. In the Ottoman case, the longest instance of cooperation 
between a pair of challengers lasted three years and spanned one issue dimension. In the 
French case, some challengers cooperate for more than three years, but the object of 
cooperation changes too quickly for us to deduce long-term cooperation. This pattern of 
short-term issue-based cooperation came forth in both contexts regardless of the 
differences in the identity of challengers and issue dimensions. If shared interests against 
the regime sufficed to unite challengers, we would not have seen this pattern to persist for 
a long time ––about ten years in both the Ottoman Empire and Bourbon France. This 
finding makes the explanation of cooperation for regime change by bargaining theory 
untenable. An alternative explanation would be that contender groups prefer cooperating 
with the most resourceful group regardless of whether their preferences on issue 
dimensions aligned. That is, although contenders do not completely disregard 
compatibility of preferences on issue dimensions, preference compatibility comes as 
secondary to material gains. If this explanation holds true ideological differences should 
have no effect on cooperation patterns. 
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Yet, network models revealed contrary evidence to the resource-seeking 
explanation in both cases. The models identified that preference dissimilarity on 
ideological issues significantly hindered the formation of cooperation among contenders. 
For example, the most resourceful factions within the constitutionalist movement in the 
Ottoman Empire in the period between 1895 and 1901 were Murad Bey and his followers, 
Ahmed Rıza and his followers, and the activists (the activists being the less resourceful of 
the three). If the resource-seeking explanation held true, we should have seen less 
resourceful factions cooperate with one these or these three would engage in long-term 
cooperation in order to form an opposition front. Yet, the Murad Bey and Ahmed Rıza 
factions could not go beyond short-term issue-based cooperation. Neither could the 
activists and the Ahmed Rıza factions. The Murad Bey faction and the activists also 
engaged only in short term cooperation, because Murad Bey quitted the movement despite 
being one of the emergent leaders. On the other hand, the case studies reveal supporting 
evidence for the preference-compatibility theory presented here. In that, Murad Bey and 
his followers was non-revolutionary Turkish nationalist non-secularist and opposed 
cooperation with secessionists and seeking foreign assistance. In contrast, Ahmed Rıza 
and his followers were secularist Ottomanist non-revolutionary and opposed cooperation 
with secessionists and seeking foreign assistance. The activists were not ardent defenders 
of secularism even if they did not want theocracy. Also, they supported Turkish 
nationalism, revolutionary change and opposed cooperation with secessionists and 
foreign assistance. It is important to note that preferences of the Murad Bey and Ahmed 
Rıza factions aligned on strategic matters but differed on the ideological ones. Preferences 
of the Murad Bey faction and the activists had more overlaps on ideological issues, but 
were contradictory on the strategic matter, especially the revolutionary vs. non-
revolutionary change issue. Preferences of the Ahmed Rıza faction and activists differed 
on the ideological and strategic front. These patterns fall in line with the hypothesis that 
preference convergence on all strategic matters does not suffice to promote cooperation 
when actors disagree on ideological matters that they highly prioritize.  
We observe similar patterns between 1900 and 1905 despite unification attempts 
of one challenger group, Prens Sabahaddin and his followers. In this period, not only Prens 
Sabahaddin’s efforts miserably failed, but also challengers found themselves further 
divided due to irreconcilable differences on strategies of regime change, namely, 
revolutionary vs. non-revolutionary change and whether to seek assistance from European 
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states and secessionist organizations, which actors highly prioritized. The two emergent 
factions of this period were the Prens Sabahaddin group and the coalition (led by Ahmed 
Rıza), which never cooperated. Let us look at whether ideological disagreements had an 
effect on this fractionalization.  
The Prens Sabahaddin group endorsed Ottomanism and secularization and 
advocated for foreign assistance and collaboration with secessionists in order to carry out 
a coup or revolution in the short run. In contrast, the CPU-led coalition argued for Turkish 
nationalism, moderate secularism, and revolutionary change without foreign assistance 
and collaboration with secessionists. Opinions of minor groups divided more or less 
equally between Turkish nationalism or its assimilationist variant Turkism and between 
secularism and non-secularism. They prioritized revolutionary change in the short run. 
Although there seems to be convergence on revolutionary change, groups still disagreed 
on the two other strategies. Unlike Prens Sabahaddin, the coalition led by Ahmed Rıza 
found it unacceptable to cooperate with those working against imperial integrity. Both 
sides highly prioritized this issue between 1902 and 1905 and the conflict of preferences 
hindered the rise of the Young Turk coalition that Prens Sabahaddin worked hard to build. 
On the other hand, minor groups were able to temporarily cooperate with both the 
coalition and the Prens Sabahaddin group, because they were pragmatic on cooperation 
with secessionists, which allowed them to work with both camps. Thus, we see again in 
this period that short of preference convergence on all strategic issues cooperation among 
challengers tends not to last long. These findings also weaken the alternative explanation 
that contenders prefer working with the most resourceful groups. 
Turning to the French case, major confrontations involved the royalists and the 
leftwing and the royalists and the constitutionnels from 1814 to 1824. The royalists and 
the leftwing were rivals because of their diverging preferences on the limits of the suffrage, 
the nature of sovereignty, the role of religion in politics, the executive-legislative balance, 
and civil liberties. Although both were technically on the right, the gap between the 
royalists and the constitutionnels was equally wide. These two held different opinions on 
the limits of the suffrage, the nature of sovereignty, the role of religion in politics, the 
executive-legislative balance, and civil liberties. As mentioned earlier, the constitutionnels 
were more authoritarian than the royalists, but the royalists desired a more executive-
dominant regime with stricter suffrage than the constitutionnels. The royalists were the 
most resourceful group in this period. Yet, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire, 
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diverging preferences on ideological issues impeded the rise of long-term cooperation, 
even though these three actors’ preferences on strategic issues did not contradict. 
Preference convergence on strategies did not suffice to overcome preference dissimilarity 
on highly-prioritized ideological issues, whereby actors could not sustain cooperation in 
the long run. Thus, as in the Ottoman case, cooperation was short-term and issue-based 
in this period. These findings do not support the most resourceful groups attract less 
resourceful groups. 
A significant example of issue-based cooperation was the cooperation between the 
leftwing and the constitutionnels, between the constitutionnels and the royalists, and 
between the leftwing and the royalists. The leftwing and the constitutionnels cooperated 
against the royalists on suffrage extension beyond the wealthiest until the left obtained 
representation in the Parliament. Once they obtained seats in the Parliament, leftwing 
parliamentarians worked with the royalists against authoritarian projects of laws 
proposed by the constitutionnels. Also, against universal suffrage the royalists and the 
constitutionnels collaborated against the leftwing. On the other hand, leftwing grassroots 
organizations never approved of leftwing parliamentarians’ tactical alliance to the center-
right. This difference almost broke down the leftwing alliance. Similarly, radical royalists 
did not work with others. These findings fall in line with the hypothesis that, short of 
preference convergence on all ideological issues, similarity of preferences on some 
ideological matters does not suffice to form an oppositional coalition that is capable of 
sustaining cooperation among challengers in the long run.  
Another striking evidence that preference convergence on some ideological issues 
was not sufficient to precipitate the rise an oppositional coalition came from the Ottoman 
case. In the Empire, religion had decoupled from the monarchy as of the 1860s when the 
government abolished the Sharia as the principle source of law. Thereafter, the ulema 
began working against absolute monarchy ––it is worth noting that the ulema had formed 
a particular branch within the Young Turk movement between 1895 and 1900. This branch 
did not want secularization as was the case with the Murad Bey faction. These two 
cooperated for briefly, while the ulema refrained from working with the secularist Ahmed 
Rıza faction. Thus, we see that preference convergence on some ideological issues helped 
with cooperation and its lack hindered it. However, preference convergence on some 
ideological issues did not suffice to foster long-term cooperation. 
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To recap, the theory proposed by this study anticipated short-term issue-based 
cooperation among challengers as long as ideological differences are not sidelined and 
actors do not prioritize strategic matters for preference similarity to precipitate 
cooperation on this front. In line with the theory, we observed that cooperation could not 
go beyond short-term cooperation, primarily because of conflicting preferences on the 
ideological issues. Agreement on strategic issues did not suffice to overcome conflict of 
preferences on ideological matters, because ideological issues were highly prioritized. It is 
important to note that ideological issues had high priority in both French and Ottoman 
cases, because, in both cases, the legacy of conflicts on regime type made these issue 
dimensions of high priority. As a result, issue-based instances of cooperation on strategic 
issues did not translate into long-term cooperation as long as these ideological issue 
dimensions, on which actors had differences, preserved their high priority. This pattern 
lasted for about a decade in both cases regardless of contextual differences. This finding 
supports the claim that instances of cooperation based on shared interests on a singular 
dimension are not enough to unite challenger groups. The theoretical implication of these 
findings is as follows: The multidimensionality of issues makes a non-negligible impact on 
dynamics of cooperation among challengers regardless of contextual differences in the 
nature of axes of conflict, the identity of actors, and geographical and temporal boundaries 
across cases. Findings indicate that this pattern of “entrapment” in short-term 
cooperation may persist as long as actors continue to attach high priority on ideological 
issues. Hence, it is more appropriate to think of regime change as a case of coordination 
with conflicting interests. In other words, modeling interactions as a simple cooperation 
game, as most bargaining models do, causes significant information losses.  
 
The stage of unification among challengers: the role of preference 
revision & re-prioritization 
The theory of cooperation for regime change that I advanced predicts that environmental 
changes induce a sense of urgency in challengers’ minds and this change in the perceived 
urgency of matters precipitate them to revise and re-prioritize their preferences. This 
process is necessary for challengers to harmonize preferences on the highly prioritized 
issue dimensions lest the preference similarity mechanism cannot foster long-term 
cooperation, hence the rise of an oppositional front, as in the stage of disunity. The 
harmonization of preferences follows from revisions in the content of preferences in an 
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attempt to adapt to environmental changes and de-prioritization of some ideological 
disagreements that challengers cannot resolve in the short-run. Once a subset of actors 
harmonizes their strategies of transition and postpones their ideological disagreements, 
an oppositional coalition emerges. This coalition signals unity by demonstrating a capacity 
to engage in long-term cooperation and coherence between its members’ preference sets, 
thus countering the government’s incentive to employ cooptation and divide-and-rule 
tactics against them. As a result, the coalition counters the government’s incentive to 
employ cooptation and divide-and-rule tactics. The theory suggests that the formation of 
such a coalition requires at least some pragmatic actors, since obtaining ideological 
convergence among all idealists is improbable in the short-run. Finally, this coalition is 
capable of steering the direction of regime change once contentious activities erupt and 
begin the transition process. What does the evidence from the Ottoman and French cases 
look like?  
 
The role of environmental changes in the stage of unification 
What do we understand from environmental changes? Environmental changes refer to 
processes and shocks that transform the balance of power between societal actors and the 
government in a polity, such as foreign invasion, migration waves etc. These changes 
induce actors to revise their preferences by bringing irrefutable evidence. The 
consideration of new evidence debunks the validity of certain ideological and strategic 
choices and. Once some choices from the solution set are eliminated, contenders find it 
easier to harmonize their preferences. Similarly, environmental changes give actors the 
sense of urgency, whereby the latter de-prioritize certain ideological disagreements that 
they cannot resolve in the short-run to pave the way for cooperation for regime change. 
Equally vital in this re-prioritization process is the prioritization of strategic issues. 
Together preference revision and re-prioritization facilitate cooperation for regime change 
among contenders by eliminating the conflict of preferences on certain issue dimensions.  
Evidence from both the Ottoman and French cases falls in line with the theory. 
First, the process of preference revision commenced with authoritarian retrenchment in 
both contexts. The increasing level of oppression in the French and Ottoman societies 
made it more and more difficult for contenders to pursue contentious activities. In 
response, contenders in both cases began considering cooperation with others. 
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Characteristically, in both cases, strategic preferences were first to undergo revision. This 
pattern falls in line with the theory; as hypothesized, strategic preferences were relatively 
less rigid in the short run. Thus, actors began to pragmatically replace some ineffective 
ones as developments decreased the perceived feasibility of their own strategic 
preferences. 
In the Ottoman case, this process began when the Sultan made a heavy blow on the 
CUP by coopting Mizancı Murad in 1897. After 1897, the Hamidian regime increasingly 
suppressed the constitutionalist movement, including sending more spies, more arrests, 
and taking diplomatic actions with the host European states, increased attempts of 
cooptation. Also, the regime increased attempts of cooperation. While these actions 
intensified efforts to unite, cooperation remained issue-based and short-term between 
1897 and 1902. Specifically, the Ahmed Rıza faction and the activists intermittently 
cooperated between 1897 and 1899 but broke off relations afterwards due to irreconcilable 
differences. Similarly, Prens Sabahaddin and the activists collaborated between 1900 and 
1902 but cooperation failed I 1902 when disagreements over whether to get foreign 
assistance and work with secessionists resurfaced. From 1902 to 1905, actors’ gradually 
changed their preferences. Ahmed Rıza withdrew his veto to revolutionary change and 
collaborated with the activists who had been advocating for this strategy all along. This 
alliance was referred to as the minority. Some minor revolutionary Young Turk factions, 
such as the Edhem Ruhi group, initially allied with the revolutionary Prens Sabahaddin 
group, but the latter’s willingness to work with secessionists and foreign states made them 
gravitate towards the minority. Progressively, in this period, factions embraced Turkish 
nationalism and Ottomanism lost support. This shift was most striking in the case of 
Tunalı Hilmi. By 1905, Turkish nationalism, revolutionary change without foreign 
assistance and collaboration with secessionists had found the most support among the 
Young Turks.  
In the Ottoman case, the process of unification initiated by authoritarian 
retrenchment was able to sustain and move forward as a result of the rise of independence 
movements among Muslim minorities of the Empire. Specifically, the surge of uprisings 
among Muslim minorities in the Balkans as of 1899 gave contenders the sense of urgency. 
Contenders realized that they could not afford to wait longer, because the Empire was 
disintegrating, therefore they had to take action. Clearly, these uprisings completely 
debunked the feasibility of Ottomanism and Muslim solidarity, whereby Turkish 
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nationalism gained more credit. By 1905, most constitutionalists endorsed Turkish 
nationalism. Preference convergence on Turkish nationalism catalyzed cooperation 
among like-minded challengers. Moreover, ideological disagreements on the role of 
religion were sidelined to pave the way for cooperation to occur. As regards strategic 
issues, the Turkish nationalist coalition pragmatically de-prioritized its objection to 
cooperating with secessionists. On the other hand, objection to foreign assistance was 
prioritized such that like-minded groups began to form coalition networks. 
Turning to France, contenders began reconsidering the validity of their 
preferences in response to authoritarian retrenchment initiated in 1821. In 1821, the 
leftwing obtained the majority in the Chamber and their electoral victory alarmed the 
royalists. Between 1821 and 1824, the regime of ultra-royalists consistently intensified 
oppression to silence regime contention. The government adopted a series of oppressive 
measures and laws, including the purge of non-royalist civil servants, preliminary 
censorship to prevent crimes against public order, religion, the king, and the state, the law 
authorizing the state to try anyone for criticizing the government etc. As the leftwing 
contested these oppressive policies by organizing violent protests, they lost public support 
to their cause, which manifested itself as an electoral defeat for the left in 1824. This defeat 
made moderate leftwing supporters realize that violent strategies harmed their cause more 
than they served. Thus, they distanced themselves from the radical branch and banned the 
use of violence as a political strategy after 1824.  
The process of preference revision, which had started in response to oppression by 
the royalists, sustained in response to increasing authoritarian retrenchment following 
Charles X’s enthronement. Charles X passed several controversial laws concerning the 
émigrés and the Sacrilege, which precipitated regime contenders from both the left and 
right to re-prioritize their preferences on certain dimension. As in the Ottoman case, 
increasing oppression made contenders realize that they had to take action against the 
Charles X regime. The role of religion in politics gained priority as the King relied more 
and more on clerical support. Because preferences of most challengers aligned on this 
dimension, preference similarity made it possible to form a secularization front including 
the doctrinaires, the constitutionnels, the defection, and the independents formed to 
contest the theocratic turn. Also, some center-right actors, such as the defection and the 
doctrinaire, became more and more disillusioned with a strong oppressive royalist regime 
and gravitated towards a liberal regime based on checks and balances respecting civil 
		 231	
liberties. As preferences converged on a regime of checks and balances respecting civil 
liberties this ideological dimension it became easier to form an oppositional coalition 
given that convergence on strategies had already taken place.  
As for the structure of the oppositional coalition, coalitions in both cases began 
taking shape around a core actor. In the Ottoman case, it was the CPU. In the French case, 
it was the leftwing. In both cases, these factions (and none other) emerged as a core, 
because they were the only ones to advocate for the preference set on which the majority 
of contenders aligned. From its foundation to 1908, the CPU put emphasis on 
revolutionary change (without terrorist tactics), as indicated by the spreading cell-
formations across the Empire and the recruitment of the fedayis. The CPU preached 
Turkish nationalism and a constitutional monarchy and objected to foreign assistance and 
collaboration with secessionists. His rival, Prens Sabahaddin, advocated in favor of these 
strategies even though they did not find the most support among regime contenders. The 
CPU’s dedication to these salient ideological and strategic preferences attracted others 
towards it, such as the merger with the OFS, which allowed the rise of a coherent 
opposition movement.  
Similarly, in the French case, the leftwing rose as the center of the oppositional 
movement by virtue of advocating for the preference set on which the majority of 
contenders aligned. To reiterate an earlier point, the leftwing had been opposing the use 
of violence and advocating for a secular liberal regime of checks and balances. Uniquely 
advocating this stance, the leftwing emerged as the core, attracting some center-right 
actors––such as the defection and the doctrinaire–– to itself. As mentioned earlier, 
protesters that initiated the July Revolution called on to moderate leftwing 
parliamentarians (and none other) and listened to the latter’s directives. Once the 
oppositional coalitions were formed, regime change unfolded rapidly in both cases. The 
next section discusses the link between regime change and cooperation among 
contenders. 
 
What is the relationship between the rise of an opposition 
coalition and regime change? 
In the cases studied in this dissertation, the transition process began in response to small 
contentious events that grew in size and intensity. We saw that neither in France nor in 
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the Ottoman Empire were the oppositional coalitions part of the contentious processes 
that put the transition process in motion at the beginning. They joined shortly after they 
observed that these events did not die down overnight. Evidence from both cases indicates 
that the opposition coalition took the lead and set the direction of change once involved.  
In the Ottoman case, the 1908 Revolution began when a Young Turk officer, Niyazi 
Bey, started a local uprising in a small Macedonian village. Niyazi Bey took initiative to 
protest the European Great Powers’ plans to partition the Empire. In June 1908, Russia’s 
and Britain’s plans to partition Macedonia were divulged. This uprising qualifies as a small 
event for two reasons: First, the CPU headquarters did not immediately take action upon 
the divulgation of the partition plans; rather, the leaders had been planning on 
overthrowing the Sultan’s government later in that year. In other words, the event did not 
seem so important to the CPU leaders to induce them to spring into action. Yet, it seemed 
important enough to Niyazi Bey, a middle rank officer in the small Macedonian village 
Resne, to induce him to start an uprising. Second, the CPU did not immediately take 
responsibility for the uprising. It took responsibility for and control of the uprising only 
after it spread to neighboring villages and the region. Once the CPU headquarters joined 
in, it did not take long for the Sultan to relinquish power.  
We see a similar pattern in the revolutionary process of the Bourbon case. Charles 
X had dissolved the Parliament without declaring an election date after the latter had laid 
serious criticism about his reign. Just like in the Ottoman case, parliamentarians did not 
immediately take action. Next, the King restrained the freedom of speech and the suffrage. 
Importantly, none of these actions made opposition parliamentarians to take action 
against the King. Yet, they induced journalists, civilians, and grassroots organizations in 
Paris to protest these illiberal acts. As was the case in the Ottoman Empire, leftwing 
parliamentarians did not join forces with protesters on the first day. They signed 
protesters’ petition on the second day when protests enlarged and intensified. On the third 
day, leftwing parliamentarians had control over protesters. Empowered, they proclaimed 
the July Monarchy. It is worth reemphasizing that leftwing parliamentarians set the 
direction of transition. The protesting crowd was making demands for a republican or 
bonapartist restoration. It was upon the parliamentarians’ initiative that France 
transitioned to the constitutional monarchy known as the July Monarchy.  
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To recap, similarities between the two cases are striking. Both revolutions began 
with a small-scale local event and organized opposition groups did not immediately claim 
responsibility for these contentious activities. They claimed responsibility only after 
regime contention proved robust and persistent. Their involvement was decisive in setting 
the direction of transition. In the Ottoman case, the CPU sought to restore the constitution 
and parliament. In the French case, leftwing parliamentarians wanted to found a 
constitutional monarchy. Importantly, other contender groups were making other 
demands for regime type.  
These findings illustrate that the unification among challengers plays a causal role 
in the transition process because, in both cases, regimes transitioned to constitutional 
monarchy as the oppositional coalition had wanted so long. Yet, constitutional monarchy 
was not the only direction that regimes could take. For example, in France, there were 
demands for reviving the Empire or the republic. The oppositional coalition led by the 
leftwing succeeded in defeating these alternative directions without uproar and convinced 
the society in that constitutional monarchy was the best option. Similarly, in the Ottoman 
Empire, the CPU-led coalition took the local revolt in Macedonia under control and 
adopted the reforms that transitioned the Empire to constitutional monarchy, whereas 
alternative demands existed. Importantly, as in the French case, Ottoman challengers 
managed to get the outcome of the Revolution recognized by the international community 
and Ottoman society in 1908. 
These findings are not sufficient to make a general claim on the causal role of the 
unification among challengers. However, they provide irrefutable evidence that the 
opposition coalitions were the forces behind the direction of regime change. In other 
words, there is a link between the rise of an oppositional coalition and the likelihood of 
regime change. 
One pushback to this argument comes from process-oriented studies of regime 
change, which associate the beginning of the transition process also to environmental 
changes. However, this literature focuses on big shocks, such as economic downturn or 
foreign invasion, at the end of which the incumbent government collapses. The role of 
environmental shocks in these theories is to weaken the incumbent government, hence to 
create an opportunity structure for contenders to overthrow the regime. Similarly, 
bargaining theories of regime change attribute the timing of transition to shocks. In these 
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theories, shocks serve to alter the power balance between the government and contenders 
and create a structural opening for transition.  
In contrast, the theory that I suggest here starts the transition process earlier, when 
an oppositional coalition comes to life. Once such a coalition emerges, the polity enters a 
third stage where conditions become ripe for even a small contentious event to trigger 
transition. In other words, the rise of an oppositional coalition brings the polity to a fragile 
state, in which unless the power balance tilts in favor of the government, the presence of a 
united coherent oppositional coalition makes transition. It is important to stress that the 
rise of a coalition does not start the chain of events producing regime change. Like 
bargaining theories and process-oriented studies, I argue that the timing of change cannot 
be predicted. We can only identify the relevant short-term and long-term causes from the 
hindsight after examining the chain of events. My argument is that the rise of an 
oppositional coalition enters the polity into a state where regime change becomes more 
likely than before.  
This argument has two implications on theories about regimes. First, small events 
can trigger regime change as much as big shocks. For example, the military intervention 
conducted by William began the Glorious Revolution that ended with regime change and 
regicide. However, the military intervention decision was taken after the news of the birth 
of a male heir to King Charles broke. Interestingly, relatively more important issues had 
happened before, such as the suspension of the provisions of the Test Acts or the arrest of 
the seven archbishops, none of which resulted in the military intervention. To give another 
example (this time from a case of an unsuccessful contentious movement), the 2013 Gezi 
Protests started as a small-scale local protests of a handful of environmentalist against the 
demolition of Gezi Park but lasted for months and spread across various cities in Turkey 
before it died down without extracting concessions from the government. The stimulus 
came in the night of May 31st 2013: The police sprayed gas on peaceful protesters; 
thousands of citizens took up the streets and protests dragged for months. As in the 
English case, the Turkish government had passed more controversial laws that the 
demolition of a local park and numerous police interventions had happened in protest 
activities. None of these bigger events triggered large-scale protests. The examples can be 
extended to the Arab Spring and the Eastern European Revolutions, some of which 
succeeded while others not.  
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These examples illuminate that attributing the timing of regime change to big 
shocks makes us discard a considerable universe of cases where small events also triggered 
regime change. The difficulty with small events is that they are more unpredictable in 
terms of implications than big shocks. In that, it is easier to imagine some economic shock 
or foreign strike to cause serious sociopolitical disorder. Yet, it is more difficult to imagine 
a small protest to start a chain of actions resulting in regime change. 
The role of small vs. big events in my theory is as follows: Unlike bargaining theory 
and process-oriented studies that emphasize long-term structural causes, big shocks do 
not help us to understand the timing of the overthrow of the government. Rather, they 
affect the fate of regimes by initiating the process of preference revision and re-
prioritization on contenders’ side, which, in turn, makes them more likely to form a united 
front capable of overthrowing the regime or extracting concessions. Again, this is different 
than attributing the timing of the overthrow of the government to big shocks. The reason 
is that the regimes collapse less frequently than the frequency with which they are hit by 
shocks. Most of the time, regimes demonstrate a certain capacity to resist shocks, which 
scholars of democratization attribute to the nature of their institutional arrangements and 
the structure of their economy (Przeworski et al., 2000; Svolik, 2008). Notwithstanding 
the validity of these explanations, I would like to emphasize the empirical fact that most 
cases of transition begin with a relatively small contentious event that unexpectedly grows 
in size and intensity. This brings us to the second implication of the theory for regime 
literature. 
The literature tends to define consolidation as survival measured by observed 
longevity (Boix, 2003; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & 
Limongi, 2000; Svolik, 2008). I contend that the longevity is not an indicator of the 
regime’s robustness to contention. If that were the case, we would have to classify all 
regimes as robust to contention until after the collapse happens (because the specific 
timing cannot be predicted). Yet, contended regime facing a coherent oppositional 
coalition cannot be conceptualized as a consolidated regime, since such a regime is already 
in a fragile state (as in the case of Syria). It can be that the government is weak but 
surviving because opposition groups are unable to assume power. This situation 
fundamentally differs from suggesting that the regime is robust. Simply by looking at the 
longevity of some regime, we cannot tell the difference between the case where the regime 
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is robust and faces some contention and the one in which the regime is essentially weak 
but survives because the opposition cannot get in power.  
 This study provided evidence for us to establish that there is a link between the rise 
of an oppositional coalition and the likelihood of regime change happening. 
Conceptualizing some regime facing a united opposition front as in a fragile state 
amenable to collapse if the opportunity presents itself help avoid what Tilly calls a zero-
sum explanation: That is, explaining regime change by the government’s weakness and 
survival by the opposition’s weakness. While a variety of reasons may account for why a 
regime becomes weaker or loses legitimacy, this dissertation has been motivated by the 
desire to better understand how contenders adjust their initial strategies and broader 
oppositional fronts emerge in the process of altering the dynamics between the 
government and its challengers.  Two historical cases focused on the same outcome do not 
form the basis of a general theory.  But, the parallel dynamics across two very different 
historical settings provide reason for a wider research agenda examining other cases, 
including contemporary ones, where we can trace the sources and implications of 
whatever cooperation emerges, or fails to emerge, among contenders initially motivated 
by different ideologies and interests. 
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APPENDIX I: STRATEGY FOR CODING 
The unit of analysis for this study and dataset was organized groups. I constructed three 
sets of data for each case. The first set involved factual information about challenger 
groups: when and where they were founded, where they operated (location of 
headquarters and branches), whether they merged with another group, how long they 
remained active, their membership profile, whether they shared members with another 
group, and their sources of financing (who were the financers, how many times they 
financed another group, how many times they were coopted by the government). As noted 
earlier, I included all actors mentioned in secondary sources.  
In the French case, challengers comprised parliamentary factions and grassroots 
organizations. In coding the French case, I followed three rules. First, I coded 
parliamentary factions and grassroots representing the same political stance as separate 
actors. Even though parliamentary factions relied heavily on grassroots, given the lack of 
professional party networks, they did not have authority over the latter. Consequently, 
there were occasional coordination failures. Grassroots did not mimic decisions taken by 
parliamentary factions, because they had their views of their own, which sometimes 
differed from those of parliamentarians. Also, on average, grassroots were more radical 
than parliamentary factions (Alexander, 2004). Thus, there were also variation in terms 
of the strength of preferences. Second, I coded all parliamentarians voicing a distinct 
preference set as one group. In the same vein, all grassroots and their affiliated 
organizations (such as publishing houses, newspapers, civil society organizations) voicing 
the same preference set as one actor. Some political factions, such as the independents or 
moderate royalists, had relatively more affiliated organizations than others. If I had 
defined each of these daughter organizations as a separate actor, some factions would have 
been overrepresented. Results of the analysis, particularly network models, might have 
been biased given the sheer number of actors doing the same move. Third, according to 
the 1814 Charter, the King appointed the cabinet. These ministers belonged to a certain 
political faction. The same political faction also had parliamentary representation. In 
order to avoid correlation, I coded ministers and parliamentary factions of the same 
faction as one actor. The reason was twofold: Parliamentary factions and their ministers 
always acted in unison. Even when some ministers belonged to some faction and some 
belonged to another faction, ministers would impose their own policies until dismissed by 
the King even if other ministers disagreed. In other words, because the French system did 
		 238	
not define collegial responsibility for members of the cabinet, ministers and 
parliamentarians of the same faction stood together.  
In the Ottoman case, challengers comprised organized groups of secessionists and 
constitutionalists. I did not code individuals for two reasons, in part because a complete 
membership list was unavailable, which posed the risk of working with missing data. Also, 
individuals were fluid. While individuals sometimes appeared in more than one 
organization, organizations outlive individuals –with the exception of founders in some 
weakly institutionalized groups that I explain below. I employ a loose definition of 
‘organized groups’, which encompasses institutionalized and weakly-institutionalized 
groups. Institutionalized groups have a charter specifying the purpose of the organization, 
the scope of activities, rules guiding its operation, member recruitment, and the 
headquarters and branches –such as the Committee of Progress and Union, the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation. However, most constitutionalist organizations were not 
institutionalized enough to develop identities independent of their leaders. Also, most of 
them survived less than five years; their clientele would found another organization if the 
previous one failed to meet expectations (Hanioğlu, 2001a; Mardin, 1983). Nevertheless, 
these groups undertook opposition activities influential enough to make the Sultan want 
to coopt them.  
Weakly institutionalized groups refer to challengers organized around newspapers 
and publishing houses, and factions composed of eminent opposition figures like Ahmed 
Riza or Prens Sabahattin and their followers. I counted newspapers and publishing houses 
as weakly organized groups for two reasons. early and some late challengers relied solely 
on propaganda, because they believed in non-revolutionary transition–the rationale being 
that people would gain consciousness about constitutionalism and collectively claim 
accountability from the monarch, whereas if constitutional changes were imposed on 
people they might reject or fail to draw full benefit or some societal disorder might ensue 
(Mardin, 1983). Almost each challenger group published one paper and/or owned a 
publishing house to disseminate their distinct viewpoint. Therefore, authorship indicated 
membership to a faction. Although editors sometimes accepted articles by members of 
other factions, if such collaboration was not so frequent to bias coding. Besides, 
newspapers and publishing houses served as venues where regime contenders would hold 
regular meetings, draw up strategies for future opposition activities, and recruit 
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members.104 Thus, they operated as organizations. As for factions structured around 
eminent opposition figures, some emerged from within institutionalized groups due to 
differences of opinion, while others were formed outside institutional frameworks.  
As in the French case, I coded all weakly institutionalized and weakly-
institutionalized groups with a distinct preference set as a separate actor. If some formal 
organization comprised factions with each voicing a distinct preference set and that the 
differences of opinions affected organizational behavior, I coded each faction as a separate 
actor instead of the organization itself in order not to miss data. For example, I 
disaggregated the Committee of Union and Progress into factions like followers of Ahmed 
Riza or Mizanci Murad, because the factions did not always act in unison (Hanioğlu, 1981). 
If, however, one faction dominated the organization and others followed –such as in the 
Committee of Progress and Union under Bahaeddin Şakir’s leadership, I coded the 
organization as one actor. Also, if some individual challenger founded more than one 
organization without changing the purpose and scope of activities, such as the League of 
Private Initiative and Decentralization and the Ottoman Freedomlovers Committee both 
founded by Prens Sabahattin, I coded all such organizations as one group. Yet, if the 
purpose and scope of its activities changed, I coded those organizations two different 
entities. Also, if two factions formed a novel institution while retaining their distinct 
institutional identity, I did not code the child organization as a separate entity. 
It is important to note that not all groups coexisted at the same time due to mergers 
or discontinuations. I constructed a ‘structural zeros’ dataset to establish which groups 
existed in a given year and which did not. If a group existed only a few months in a given 
year, say, from January to March 1820, I coded that group as existent in 1820.  
The second set of data included information about ideological and strategic 
positions of challenger groups with respect to the issue dimensions identified by 
preliminary surveys of political history, the state, society. I coded groups’ ideological and 
strategic positions on a yearly basis in order to take into account changes in preferences. 
While coding challengers’ stances, I relied on personal accounts, propaganda material, 
and secondary sources. Issue dimensions were different in each case. Therefore, I will 
explain the specific coding rules in the related chapters.  
																																								 																				
104	For	more	information	on	the	role	of	press	see	(Hanioğlu,	n.d.;	Mardin,	1983,	2000;	Tunaya,	1984).	
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The third set contained information about cooperative behavior, that is, which 
challengers cooperated with whom in a given year. I used the following indicators for 
cooperation: joint authorship in a contentious publication, co-sponsoring some bill in the 
parliament and the cabinet, collaborating in creating verbal and written propaganda 
against the authoritarian government and its policies (including the Sultan, or the King, 
his Charter, or the monarchy), and co-sponsoring or collaborating on some contentious 
activity of a private or public nature (e.g., meetings, protests, uprisings, plotting coups, 
mobilizing people for revolution).  
If challengers undertook one of these joint activities together, I coded it as 
cooperation. If they undertook more than of these activities –such as publishing together 
and organizing an activity, I coded them as a single instance of cooperation. I did not code 
multiple activities as different instances of cooperation, because collaboration on multiple 
fronts indicates sustainable cooperation. On the other hand, I do not downplay the 
importance of collaborating in a particular task, say, publishing. Each activity involving 
some risk, accepting to run this risk together counts as cooperation in regime contention. 
Also, I did not weigh activities by riskiness, because there was no evidence suggesting that 
some high-risk activity like attempting a coup had greater impact than repetitive low-risk 
activities like press campaigns. Yet, there was evidence for the effectiveness of repetitive 
low-risk activities in the medium/long run.  
When dealing with missing information, I followed three rules. If sources indicate 
cooperation in some year, say 1890, and cooperation in some later year, say, 1892, and if 
in addition they note a pair of challengers generally working together, unless there is 
information to suggest otherwise, I consider cooperation to continue in 1891. Also, if 
sources indicate cooperation only in one year but not later, I code it as a single instance of 
cooperation. Finally, if two challenger organizations set a bogus organization, I coded the 
bogus organization as an instance of cooperation (and not as a separate actor as I explain 
above). I kept the cooperation data in the form of edge lists (one edge list per year). 
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APPENDIX II: OTTOMAN CONTENDER GROUPS’ NAMES & 
ABBREVIATIONS  
Abbreviation  Group
SDHP the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party
ARF the Armenian Revolutionary Federation
IMRO the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
TSC the Turkish Syrian Committee
TSCpost1902 the Turkish Syrian Committee after 1902
Bashkim The Albanian Union Society
AR Ahmed Riza and his followers
MM Mizanci Murad and his followers 
CUP_ulema the ulema faction of the Committee of Union and Progress
CUP_military the military faction of the Committee of Union and Progress
TH Tunali Hilmi and his followers  
activists the activist faction of the Committee of Union and Progress
CUP_Berlin the Berlin branch of the Committee of Union and Progress
PS Prens Sabahattin and his followers
FO la Federation Ottomane (Ittihad-i Osmani)
ER Edhem Ruhi and his followers
AC Abdullah Cevdet and his followers
SC Dawn of Ottoman Union Committee (Safak Komitesi)
turk Turk (newspaper)
muvazene Muvazene (newspaper)
MR Mustafa Ragip and his followers (Feryad, Sark)
MNO the Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija 
CPU the Committee of Progress and Union
OFS the Ottoman Freedom Society
zionists zionists under Theodor Herzl's leadership
AS Ahmad Saib and his followers (Sancak)
IT Ibrahim Temo and his followers
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APPENDIX III: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS IN THE OTTOMAN CASE 
The goodness of fit results for the periods 1895–1901 and 1902–1908 indicate that both 
models’ predictions hit the observed values or are very close to them. This means the 
model makes a good job predicting cooperation patterns given the ideological and 
strategic variables at hand. Also, all p-values are large indicating the variables are 
significant. Furthermore, the MCMC diagnostics for each model indicate that the values 
are uniformly distributed around the mean values with the exception of financing from 
another contender. Similarly, the MCMC diagnostics for the model examining the period 
from 1895 to 1908 also show that the ideological and strategic variables successfully 
predict and explain cooperation patterns.  
Goodness of Fit Results 
obs min mean max MC p-value obs min mean max MC p-value
edges 128 108 126.49 142 1 264 217 266.00 305 0.98
clustering 100 81 98.63 119 0.92 230 179 231.59 271 1.00
past cooperation 82 74 81.62 87 0.94 180 154 181.30 197 0.80
financing from 
the Sultan 212 154 210.94 271 0.94 24 13 24.72 36 1
state type 114 96 113.62 132 0.92 240 196 241.59 277 0.96
society type 56 43 55.79 68 1 94 75 93.86 111 1.00
secularization 47.8 35.1 47.202 58.1 0.88 86.4 71 87.09 100.6 0.92
foreign assistance 64 53 63.6 76 0.98 184.00 157 182.94 218 0.92
means of regime 
change
cooperation with 
secessionists
62 50 61.67
68 55 67.43
1
Goodness	of	fit	results
1895-1901 1902–1908
financing by 
other contender 72 282 219 285.75 347 0.96
83 0.88 184
66 78.92 94 0.98
157 184.06 209 0.98
78  
MCMC Diagnostics 
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APPENDIX IV: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS IN THE FRENCH CASE 
According to Table 14 below, individual p-values for the independent variables and the 
joint p-value for the entire model are large, indicating that sample statistics for the 
TERGM model for the period from 1814 to 1830 are significantly different from the 
observed, hence the model is not degenerate. Individual p-values for the independent 
variables and the joint p-value for the entire model are large also for the TERGMs 
examining the periods between 1814-1824 and 1824-1830. These results imply that sample 
statistics for the TERGM model for these periods are significantly different from the 
observed, therefore the models are not degenerate. 
Table 14 
edges 0.09
clustering 0.02
past	cooperation 0.04
venue	of	operation 0.10
executive-legislative	balance 0.01
authoritarian-libertarian 0.50
suffrage 0.03
secularization 0.03
violence 0.43
centralization 0.11
Joint	P-value 0.01
Individual	p-values
TERGM	(1814-1830)
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Table 15 
(1814-1824) (1825-1830)
edges 0.44 0.04
clustering 0.43 0.02
past	cooperation 0.09 0.04
venue	of	operation 0.70 0.79
executive-legislative	balance 0.98 0.03
authoritarian-libertarian 0.37 0.07
suffrage 0.41 0.04
secularization 0.44 0.07
violence 0.34 0.03
centralization 0.78 0.45
Joint	P-value 0.47 0.02
Individual	p-values
 
Turning to the goodness of fit results, Table 16 presents model statistics for the TERGMs for the 
reigns of Louis XVIII and Charles X. According to the results, both models’ predictions hit the 
observed values or are very close to them. This means the model makes a good job predicting 
cooperation patterns given the ideological and strategic variables at hand. Also, all p-values are 
large indicating the variables are significant. Furthermore, the MCMC diagnostics for each model 
indicate that the values are uniformly distributed around the mean values with the exception of 
financing from another contender. Similarly, the MCMC diagnostics for the model examining the 
period from 1895 to 1908 also show that the ideological and strategic variables successfully predict 
and explain cooperation patterns. 
 
Table 16 
obs min mean max MC	p-value obs min mean maxMC	p-value
edges 300.00 278.00 299.42 323.00 0.88 200.00 187.00 200.91 220.00 1.00
clustering 220.00 183.00 220.49 257.00 1.00 164.00 143.00 165.17 193.00 0.94
past	cooperation 230.00 217.00 230.82 242.00 0.94 166.00 156.00 166.12 174.00 1.00
venue	of	operation 166.00 147.00 165.48 180.00 1.00 134.00 124.00 134.22 145.00 1.00
executive-legislative	balance 114.00 97.25 113.69 130.00 0.96 86.00 76.80 86.36 97.40 1.00
authoritarian-libertarian 133.00 110.75 132.91 150.50 1.00 79.50 68.25 80.09 96.75 0.98
suffrage 214.00 193.00 213.22 229.00 1.00 138.00 129.00 138.77 152.00 1.00
secularization 246.00 227.00 245.91 266.00 1.00 198.00 184.00 199.01 217.00 0.98
violence 154.00 139.00 154.03 169.00 0.98 130.00 118.00 130.51 142.00 1.00
centralization 218.00 199.00 217.82 234.00 0.88 112.00 103.00 112.43 128.00 1.00
Charles	X	(1825-1830)	
Goodness-of-fit	for	model	statistics	
Louis	XVIII	(1814-1824)
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